Bautista vs. COMELEC

A COMELEC en banc resolution canceling a certificate of candidacy in the first instance is void for lack of jurisdiction and violates due process because cancellation is a quasi-judicial function that must first be heard and decided by a COMELEC division; a Punong Barangay must be a registered voter of the barangay where he seeks office; and the second placer cannot be proclaimed in lieu of an ineligible winning candidate absent the notoriety exception, the vacancy instead being filled by the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member.

Raymundo A. Bautista and Divina Alcoreza were rival candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas in the July 15, 2002 barangay elections. The case concerns the COMELEC’s power to cancel certificates of candidacy and the qualifications for elective barangay officials under the Local Government Code of 1991 and COMELEC Resolution No. 4801. It also implicates the rule on permanent vacancies in the Office of the Punong Barangay and the settled doctrine on second placers in election contests.

On June 10, 2002, Raymundo A. Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas for the July 15, 2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño refused to accept the certificate because Bautista was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On June 11, 2002, Bautista filed an action for mandamus against Jareño with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14. On July 1, 2002, the trial court ordered Jareño to accept Bautista’s certificate of candidacy and to include his name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay, ruling that Section 7(g) of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801 mandated inclusion until the COMELEC directed otherwise. Jareño complied and, on July 5, 2002, referred the matter of Bautista’s inclusion to the COMELEC Law Department.

On July 11, 2002, the COMELEC Law Department recommended cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy because he was not registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the recommendation before the July 15, 2002 barangay elections. In those elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza were candidates for Punong Barangay. Bautista obtained 719 votes while Alcoreza obtained 522 votes, a margin of 197 votes. The Lumbangan Board of Canvassers proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay on July 15, 2002. Bautista took his oath of office on August 8, 2002 before Congresswoman Eileen Ermita-Buhain and again on August 16, 2002 before Nasugbu Municipal Mayor Raymund Apacible.

Meanwhile, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5404 on July 23, 2002, canceling Bautista’s certificate of candidacy and directing the Election Officer to delete his name from the official list of candidates. On August 10, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5584, which set the policy for proclaimed candidates found ineligible for not being registered voters in the place where they were elected: the Election Officer was to implement the resolution deleting the candidate’s name; the candidate was to cease and desist from taking his oath or assuming office unless a temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court; and the Board of Canvassers was to reconvene to proclaim the duly elected candidates and correct the certificate of canvass. In a letter dated August 19, 2002, COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tancangco directed Election Officer Jareño to delete Bautista’s name, order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene, and direct Bautista to cease and desist from assuming office. On August 20, 2002, Jareño issued an order deleting Bautista’s name and prohibiting him from assuming the position. The Board of Canvassers reconvened on August 23, 2002, corrected the Certificate of Canvass of Votes, and proclaimed Alcoreza as the winning Punong Barangay. Alcoreza then assumed the post.

On August 26, 2002, Bautista wrote the COMELEC requesting reconsideration of the resolutions. On September 9, 2002, while that letter was pending, he filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. In an affidavit dated August 24, 2002, Bautista admitted that he was not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan. He stated that he had been out of the country from 1995 until 2001, that he discovered upon returning that his name was no longer in the list of registered voters, and that he tried to register in 2002 but was allegedly denied because the registration office was not open. Election Officer Jareño denied the allegation, stating that no registration was conducted between December 27, 2001 and September 15, 2002 and that she first met Bautista when he filed his certificate of candidacy on June 10, 2002.

After the elections, Alcoreza was proclaimed and assumed the position, while Bautista refused to vacate the barangay hall and continued performing the functions of Punong Barangay without receiving compensation; Alcoreza likewise performed the functions of the office. In a quo warranto case filed by Barangay Councilman Armando Bartolome, the Municipal Trial Court of Nasugbu rendered a decision dated November 25, 2002 finding Bautista guilty of usurping and unlawfully exercising the position of Punong Barangay and ordering his ouster. Municipal Mayor Apacible issued a memorandum dated February 4, 2003 directing all department heads and the chief of police to entertain only transactions initiated by Alcoreza. On February 12, 2003, 1,246 concerned citizens of Barangay Lumbangan filed a petition for early resolution of the case. Bautista later padlocked the barangay hall, and on June 19, 2003, some barangay councilmen and policemen allegedly forced it open. The Supreme Court resolved the case based on the pleadings to avoid further delay.

• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Bautista argued that without any disqualification case formally filed against him, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of his case and could not motu proprio act on the issue of his alleged lack of qualification; even assuming a disqualification case existed, jurisdiction lay with the COMELEC sitting in division, not the en banc.
• Due Process: Bautista alleged that the COMELEC denied him due process because there was no notice and hearing prior to the issuance of Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584; he became aware of them only upon receiving Election Officer Jareño’s order dated August 20, 2002.
• People’s Choice and Liberal Interpretation: Invoking salus populi est suprema lex, Bautista argued that the people’s choice expressed in the local elections deserved respect and that election laws should be liberally interpreted.
• Second Placer: Bautista subscribed to the view that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the second placer in case of ineligibility of the winning candidate.

• Prematurity: Respondents contended that a motion for reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions was a prerequisite to a petition for certiorari and prohibition; the petition was premature because Bautista had a pending motion for reconsideration and filed the petition barely two weeks after filing it without waiting for its resolution.
• COMELEC Jurisdiction: Respondents alleged that the Constitution vests the COMELEC with power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, including the power to pass upon the qualification of candidates, and that the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to cancel the certificate of candidacy of disqualified candidates is settled jurisprudence.
• Due Process: The Solicitor General submitted that the COMELEC did not deprive Bautista of due process because he had the chance to be heard and present his side when he filed a letter requesting reconsideration; respondents also argued that no presentation and evaluation of evidence was needed because the issue of whether Bautista was a registered voter could be resolved by looking at the COMELEC registration records.
• Second Placer: The Solicitor General submitted that the disqualification of the winning candidate does not result in the proclamation of the second placer because the second placer was not the choice of the electorate and the COMELEC declared Bautista ineligible only after his election and proclamation; respondent Alcoreza alleged that her proclamation was legal and valid and that her case fell under the exception in Grego vs. COMELEC because Bautista was disqualified and the electorate was fully aware of his disqualification.

• Propriety of Certiorari Despite Pending Motion for Reconsideration: Whether a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC en banc resolutions was a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition, making the petition premature.
• COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction: Whether the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584.
• Due Process: Whether the COMELEC deprived Bautista of due process when the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584.
• Qualification as Registered Voter: Whether Bautista was a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan when he filed his certificate of candidacy.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the winning candidate Bautista.

• Propriety of Certiorari Despite Pending Motion for Reconsideration: No. The petition was not premature. Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure prohibits a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order, or decision except in election offense cases; certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 was the proper remedy.
• COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction: Yes. The COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is a quasi-judicial function that must first be heard and decided by a COMELEC division; the en banc may act only on a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling.
• Due Process: Yes. Bautista was deprived of procedural due process. The COMELEC en banc issued the resolutions without prior notice and hearing, and the opportunity to seek reconsideration did not cure the defect because reconsideration of en banc resolutions is prohibited except in election offenses.
• Qualification as Registered Voter: No. Bautista was not a registered voter of Barangay Lumbangan. Section 39 of the Local Government Code requires a Punong Barangay to be a registered voter of the barangay, and Bautista admitted his non-registration.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: No. It was not proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay. The second placer cannot be proclaimed when the winning candidate is ineligible unless the notoriety exception applies; the exception did not apply, and the permanent vacancy should be filled by the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member.

• Propriety of Certiorari Despite Pending Motion for Reconsideration: The general rule requires a motion for reconsideration before certiorari, but the case cited by respondents involved a motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC division resolution. Under Rule 19 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a division is allowed. However, Rule 13, Section 1(d) prohibits a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order, or decision except in election offense cases. The assailed resolutions were issued by the COMELEC en banc and did not involve election offenses. Thus, reconsideration was not available; Bautista had no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than certiorari. Waiting for the COMELEC to act on his letter would allow the reglementary period to lapse. Rule 64, Section 2 of the Rules of Court allows a final order or resolution of the COMELEC to be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65.
• COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction: The Constitution vests the COMELEC with administrative and quasi-judicial powers. Administrative powers may be exercised en banc, but quasi-judicial powers are governed by Article IX-C, Section 3, which requires election cases to be decided first in division and motions for reconsideration by the en banc. Cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is not merely administrative; it involves quasi-judicial functions because it requires investigation, notice, hearing, evidence, and decision. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy is filed with the Law Department, heard summarily after due notice, and decided by the COMELEC. Jurisdiction lies with the COMELEC sitting in division, not en banc. In this case, the Election Officer reported Bautista’s ineligibility to the Law Department, which recommended cancellation; the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation in Resolution No. 5404 without first referring the case to a division. The en banc could act only if there was a motion for reconsideration of a division decision. Thus, it acted without jurisdiction. Garvida vs. Sales, Jr. and Baytan vs. COMELEC support this conclusion.
• Due Process: Due process in administrative proceedings requires an opportunity to be heard, not necessarily a formal trial-type hearing. But there must be prior notice and hearing. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without prior notice and hearing. The consequences were severe: cancellation of Bautista’s certificate of candidacy and annulment of his proclamation, affecting not just the right to be voted for but the right to hold public office. The fact that Bautista later filed a letter for reconsideration did not cure the defect because the 1993 COMELEC Rules prohibit reconsideration of en banc resolutions except in election offenses. The argument that registration records could easily resolve the issue ignored cases of voters excluded through inadvertence or registered with erroneous names; Section 7(g) of Resolution No. 4801 allowed inclusion until the COMELEC directs otherwise. Rule 23 requires a summary proceeding after due notice. A summary proceeding does not dispense with notice and hearing. Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections held that the COMELEC cannot annul a proclamation without notice and hearing. Thus, procedural due process was violated.
• Qualification as Registered Voter: Under the Local Government Code of 1991, Section 39, an elective local official must be a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected, and a candidate for Punong Barangay must be a registered voter of the barangay. COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Section 2 reiterated this. Before the Local Government Code, under the Revised Administrative Code and Barrio Charter, “qualified elector” or “qualified voter” did not require registration, as held in Rocha vs. Cordis and Yra vs. Abaño. But the Local Government Code changed the requirement to “registered voter.” Bautista admitted in his August 24, 2002 affidavit that he was not a registered voter of Lumbangan. He had been out of the country from 1995 to 2001 and failed to register during the 1997 general registration under Republic Act No. 8189. When he returned in 2001 and learned his name was no longer in the list, he should have registered under the continuing registration system. His claim that Jareño refused to register him in January 2002 was unsupported by any application form; Jareño denied it and stated no registration was conducted between December 27, 2001 and September 15, 2002. Thus, he lacked a mandatory qualification and made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, false representation of a material fact is a ground for cancellation; a candidate may be prevented from running, if elected from serving, or prosecuted. The electorate cannot cure ineligibility.
• Proclamation of Second Placer: The settled doctrine is that the COMELEC cannot proclaim the candidate with the second highest votes when the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception recognized in Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Grego vs. COMELEC requires concurrence of two assumptions: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of the candidate’s disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Here, the COMELEC Law Department recommended cancellation on July 11, 2002, but the COMELEC en banc did not act before the July 15, 2002 elections; Resolution No. 5404 was issued only on July 23, 2002. When the electorate voted for Bautista, it believed he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to invalidate their votes as stray. A subsequent finding of ineligibility cannot retroact to invalidate votes cast. Domino vs. COMELEC held that votes for a candidate not notoriously known as ineligible are presumed cast in sincere belief and cannot be treated as stray. Thus, Alcoreza’s proclamation was void. Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, a permanent vacancy in the office of Punong Barangay is filled by the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in case of permanent disability, the second highest ranking member. Since Bautista failed to qualify, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member should assume the office for the unexpired term.

• COMELEC Quasi-Judicial Powers Must Be Exercised First in Division — Under Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution and the 1993 COMELEC Rules, the COMELEC exercises administrative and quasi-judicial powers. Administrative powers may be exercised en banc, but quasi-judicial powers, including election cases and cancellation of certificates of candidacy, must be decided first by a division; the en banc may act only on a motion for reconsideration. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it approved the Law Department’s recommendation to cancel Bautista’s certificate of candidacy without a prior division hearing.
• Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy as a Quasi-Judicial Function — A proceeding to cancel a certificate of candidacy is not merely administrative; it involves investigation, notice, hearing, evidence, and a decision, and therefore partakes of quasi-judicial functions. Because it is quasi-judicial, the COMELEC must observe the constitutional and procedural requirement that the case be heard first in division. The Court found that the en banc short-circuited this process.
• Due Process in COMELEC Cancellation Proceedings — Due process requires prior notice and hearing, or at least a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side. A summary proceeding does not dispense with notice and hearing. The Court held that the COMELEC en banc violated procedural due process when it issued Resolution Nos. 5404 and 5584 without notice and hearing, especially because the resolutions canceled Bautista’s certificate of candidacy and annulled his proclamation.
• Registered Voter Qualification for Punong Barangay — Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, a candidate for Punong Barangay must be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run. The earlier rule under the Revised Administrative Code and Barrio Charter, which treated a “qualified elector” or “qualified voter” as one who possessed the qualifications to vote but was not necessarily registered, was superseded. Bautista’s admitted non-registration made him ineligible.
• Material Misrepresentation in Certificate of Candidacy — Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a false representation of a material fact in a certificate of candidacy, including a false statement regarding a qualification for elective office, is a ground to deny due course to or cancel the certificate. A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be prevented from running, if elected from serving, or prosecuted. The Court found that Bautista falsely represented himself as a registered voter.
• Second Placer Rule and Notoriety Exception — The COMELEC cannot proclaim the candidate with the second highest number of votes as winner when the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified. The exception requires the concurrence of two assumptions: (1) the candidate with the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of the disqualification, such awareness being within the realm of notoriety, but nonetheless votes for the ineligible candidate. The Court held that the exception did not apply because the COMELEC acted only after the election and the electorate believed Bautista was qualified.
• Votes for an Ineligible Candidate Not Retroactively Stray — A subsequent finding of ineligibility does not retroact to the date of the election so as to invalidate the votes cast for the ineligible candidate. Votes cast for a candidate not notoriously known to be ineligible are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief that he was qualified and cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The Court applied this in voiding Alcoreza’s proclamation as second placer.
• Permanent Vacancy in the Office of Punong Barangay — Under Section 44 of the Local Government Code, a permanent vacancy in the office of the Punong Barangay is filled by the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in case of his permanent disability, the second highest ranking sangguniang barangay member. A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fails to qualify. Because Bautista failed to qualify, the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member was to assume the office for the unexpired term.
• Will of the People Cannot Cure Ineligibility — The electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications prescribed by law for elective office. The will of the people expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. The Court rejected Bautista’s invocation of salus populi est suprema lex and liberal interpretation of election laws.

• "The COMELEC en banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to the candidate." — This passage states the core jurisdictional and due process violation: the en banc cannot cancel a certificate of candidacy in the first instance without a division hearing.
• "A summary proceeding does not mean that the COMELEC could do away with the requirements of notice and hearing." — This defines the minimum procedural requirement in cancellation proceedings and rejects the argument that the COMELEC could act solely on registration records.
• "It is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in case the winning candidate is ineligible or disqualified." — This is the Court’s canonical statement of the second placer rule applied to void Alcoreza’s proclamation.
• "The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility." — This articulates the principle that electoral victory does not cure the lack of a legal qualification, supporting Bautista’s ineligibility despite his having obtained the highest number of votes.

• Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., 338 Phil. 484 (1997) — Held that jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in division, not en banc; the Court relied on this to find the en banc acted without jurisdiction.
• Baytan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003 — Explained the COMELEC’s administrative and quasi-judicial powers; quasi-judicial powers must be exercised first in division and on reconsideration en banc.
• Canicosa vs. COMELEC, 347 Phil. 189 (1997) — The COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, then on motion for reconsideration en banc, when exercising quasi-judicial powers.
• Angelia vs. Commission on Elections, 388 Phil. 560, 566 (2000) — A COMELEC en banc resolution not involving an election offense is not subject to reconsideration; certiorari is the proper remedy.
• Sandoval vs. Commission on Elections, 380 Phil. 375, 392 (2000) — The COMELEC cannot annul a proclamation without prior notice and hearing; due process requires an opportunity to adduce evidence.
• Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA 400, 429 — The electorate cannot substitute for or waive constitutional and statutory qualifications; the will of the people cannot cure ineligibility.
• Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 105111 & 105384, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 297 — Recognized the second placer rule and its exception; cited for the notoriety requirement.
• Grego vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501 — Reiterated the exception to the second placer rule; the Court found its two assumptions absent.
• Domino vs. COMELEC, 369 Phil. 798 (1999) — Votes cast for a candidate not notoriously known as ineligible are presumed sincere and cannot be treated as stray.
• Rocha vs. Cordis, 103 Phil. 327 (1958) — Under earlier law, “qualified elector” did not require registration; distinguished because the Local Government Code of 1991 requires a registered voter.
• Yra vs. Abaño, 52 Phil. 380 (1928) — Defined “qualified elector” as one possessing the qualifications to vote, not necessarily registered; cited in the historical discussion.
• Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, 174 SCRA 245 — The will of the people expressed through the ballot cannot cure ineligibility.
• Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377 (1999) — Material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy may prevent running, prevent serving if elected, or lead to prosecution.
• Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002 — Cited for the rule that the second placer cannot be proclaimed when the winning candidate is disqualified.
• Recabo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 368 Phil. 277 (1999) — Cited in relation to the rule that the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member assumes the office of Punong Barangay in case of permanent vacancy.
• Stayfast Philippines Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 81480, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 596, 601 — Explained that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
• Villarosa vs. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 497 (1999) — Discussed the difference between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, supporting the conclusion that cancellation proceedings are quasi-judicial.

• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 2 — Vests the COMELEC with administrative and quasi-judicial powers, including exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests and appellate jurisdiction over barangay election contests.
• 1987 Constitution, Article IX-C, Section 3 — Requires all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, to be decided by the COMELEC in division, with motions for reconsideration decided by the en banc.
• 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 13, Section 1(d) — Prohibits a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order, or decision except in election offense cases; basis for holding the petition not premature.
• 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 23 — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy; requires summary hearing after due notice and allows delegation of reception of evidence.
• Omnibus Election Code, Section 78 — Allows denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy for false material representation; applied because Bautista falsely stated he was a registered voter.
• Omnibus Election Code, Section 74 — Requires material representations in the certificate of candidacy; cited in relation to misrepresentation.
• Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), Section 39 — Requires an elective local official, including a Punong Barangay, to be a registered voter in the barangay where he intends to be elected; basis for Bautista’s ineligibility.
• Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), Section 44 — Provides that a permanent vacancy in the office of the Punong Barangay is filled by the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or the second highest ranking member in case of permanent disability; basis for succession after Alcoreza’s void proclamation.
• R.A. No. 8189 (Voter’s Registration Act of 1996), Sections 7, 8, and 10 — Establish general registration, continuing registration, and registration of voters; Bautista failed to register anew after his name was deleted.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 4801, Sections 2 and 7(f)-(g) — Prescribes qualifications for Punong Barangay, including registered voter status, and requires the Election Officer to verify and report non-registered candidates while including their names until the COMELEC directs otherwise.
• Rules of Court, Rule 64, Section 2 — Allows a final order or resolution of the COMELEC to be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65.
• Revised Administrative Code, Section 2174 — Historical qualification for elective municipal officer as a “qualified voter”; cited to contrast with the registered-voter requirement under the Local Government Code.
• Barrio Charter (R.A. No. 2370), Section 8 — Historical qualification for barrio council as a “qualified elector”; cited in the same historical discussion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur. Ynares-Santiago, J., on official leave.