Bautista vs. COMELEC

Votes bearing the name or nickname of a bona fide candidate that were separately tallied due to the pendency of disqualification proceedings against a similarly named nuisance candidate must be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate where the voters' intent is clearly ascertainable, notwithstanding that the nuisance candidate's disqualification was not yet final on election day, because technicalities must not be permitted to defeat the will of the electorate.

Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent Miguelita del Rosario were duly registered candidates for Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A third individual, Edwin "Efren" Bautista, also filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position, filed at midnight on the last day for such filing. Petitioner had previously served as Barangay Captain of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor in 1970, and Vice-Mayor in 1980, and was known by the appellation "Efren." Edwin Bautista, by contrast, was known in Navotas as "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo," was a tricycle driver with no demonstrated accomplishments, no political line-up, and no personal funds to support a campaign. The Omnibus Election Code's nuisance-candidate provision, Section 69, authorizes the COMELEC to cancel a certificate of candidacy filed to cause confusion among voters by similarity of names or to mock the election process.

Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent Miguelita del Rosario were duly registered candidates for Mayor of Navotas, Metro Manila in the May 11, 1998 elections. A third individual, Edwin "Efren" Bautista, filed his certificate of candidacy at midnight on March 27, 1997, the last day for filing, at the very last minute. On April 1, 1998, petitioner filed a petition before the COMELEC praying that Edwin Bautista be declared a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC found merit in the petition and, in a resolution dated April 30, 1998, declared Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, finding that his real nickname was "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo," that he had no bona fide intention to run, and that two "Efrens" and two "Bautistas" would confuse the voters. Accordingly, Edwin Bautista's name was excluded from the certified list of candidates distributed to the boards of election inspectors.

On May 8, 1998, Edwin Bautista filed a motion for reconsideration. Because the motion was not yet resolved by election day, the Election Officer of Navotas issued conflicting directives on May 10, 1998 — first directing the BEI to include Edwin Bautista's name in the certified list, then later that same day recalling the directive pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. To address the resulting confusion, the Regional Election Director of the National Capital Region, responding to a request from petitioner's counsel, instructed the BEI to tally separately, either in some other portion of the election return not intended for mayoralty votes or in a separate sheet of paper, the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA," "EFREN," "E. BAUTISTA," and "BAUTISTA." This directive was affirmed by the then COMELEC Chairman in a Memorandum directing the BEI to proceed with the counting of votes for local officials excluding the votes cast for those names as stray, but to segregate such stray votes into a separate improvised tally sheet in order to count the total stray votes.

On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration with finality. Edwin Bautista then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 133607, which was dismissed on May 21, 1998 for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion; his motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 7, 1998. Meanwhile, when the canvass of election returns commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas refused to canvass as part of petitioner's valid votes the separate tallies of ballots bearing "EFREN BAUTISTA," "EFREN," "E. BAUTISTA," and "BAUTISTA." Petitioner raised objections during the canvass and, on May 20, 1998, filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, docketed as SPC No. 98-10. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on May 28, 1998, ruling that the duty of the Board of Canvassers is only to canvass what appears on the face of the election returns and that stray votes in a separate tally sheet cannot be considered entries in the election returns, further invoking Section 211(4) of the Omnibus Election Code.

The factual record established that Edwin Bautista obtained only 29 votes, while petitioner, under the restrictive name "Cipriano 'Efren' Bautista," received 17,981 votes. There were 12,034 Bautista votes tallied but not credited to petitioner, and 8,982 Bautista votes not tallied and credited to petitioner, totaling 21,016 separately tallied Bautista votes. It was also established that through newspaper releases and other forms of notification, the voters had been informed of the COMELEC's decision to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that there was utter lack and disregard of due process in the issuance of the questioned COMELEC order.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the inclusion, as part of his valid votes, of the votes that were separately tallied by the boards of election inspectors and the respondent Board of Canvassers.

• Scope of Canvassing Duty: Respondent COMELEC countered that the duty of the Board of Canvassers is only to canvass what is on the face of the election returns and not to go beyond it, and that stray votes in a separate tally sheet cannot be considered entries in the election returns.
• Stray Votes Under the Omnibus Election Code: The Office of the Solicitor General opined that the improvised sheets of paper containing the tally of Bautista stray votes cannot be legally considered in the canvass, invoking Section 211(4) of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that when two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of them.

• Due Process: Whether the issuance of the questioned COMELEC order was attended by utter lack and disregard of due process.
• Inclusion of Separately Tallied Votes: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the inclusion, as part of petitioner's valid votes, of the votes that were separately tallied by the boards of election inspectors and the Board of Canvassers.

• Due Process: No. Petitioner was not denied due process, the proceedings being summary in nature and the opportunity to be heard through pleadings being sufficient.
• Inclusion of Separately Tallied Votes: Yes. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to count the separately tallied votes as valid votes for petitioner, the voters' intent being clearly ascertainable and the nuisance candidate's disqualification having become final.

• Due Process: The petition filed before the COMELEC fell under the category of special cases, specifically a pre-proclamation controversy raising the issue of the illegality of the proceedings of the board of canvassers under Section 3, Rule 27, Part V of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 2 of the same Rule provides that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily after due notice. The COMELEC need only issue summons and serve a copy of the petition; a hearing with oral argument is not required. Citing Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC, and Navarro III vs. Damaso, the right to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments — a party may also be heard through pleadings. Where the opportunity to be heard is accorded through either oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times essential in administrative proceedings. Petitioner was thus afforded sufficient opportunity to present his position.

• Inclusion of Separately Tallied Votes: The separately tallied votes were not genuinely stray votes. A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter, but that was not the situation here. The separate tallies were created precisely as a remedy ordered by COMELEC officials themselves — the Regional Election Director and the then COMELEC Chairman — to address the confusion caused by the pendency of Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration on election day. The COMELEC itself validated the separate tallies, as they were meant to be used later in the canvassing to determine the actual number of votes cast. Edwin Bautista had been declared a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code because his certificate of candidacy was filed to cause confusion among voters by similarity of names and because he had no bona fide intention to run — he was known as "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo," had no political line-up, no personal funds, no income tax returns, and no demonstrable accomplishments. In contrast, petitioner had served as Barangay Captain, Municipal Councilor, and Vice-Mayor of Navotas and was known by the appellation "Efren." The COMELEC's denial of Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration on May 13, 1998 was final, and the Supreme Court upheld that declaration in G.R. No. 133607. The approximately 21,016 separately tallied Bautista votes could only have been intended for petitioner, not for a disqualified nuisance candidate who obtained only 29 votes. Furthermore, the voters had constructive and actual knowledge of the COMELEC's action delisting Edwin Bautista, through newspaper releases and other notifications. Election laws are enacted to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter, and technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter when that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself. It was likewise improper to limit petitioner's votes to ballots bearing only "Cipriano," since it was public knowledge that he was also known as "Efren," which he registered as his nickname. The COMELEC's refusal to include the separately tallied votes thus constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Nuisance Candidate Doctrine — Under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon a verified petition refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if: (1) it was filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute; (2) to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates; or (3) by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the COMELEC's declaration of Edwin Bautista as a nuisance candidate, noting his lack of bona fide intention, his use of a false nickname, and the confusion his candidacy caused.

• Voter Intent Principle in Ballot Appreciation — In the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity, and extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. Election laws are enacted to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially when that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself. The Court applied this principle to hold that the separately tallied "Bautista" votes were not stray votes because the voters' intent was clearly ascertainable — the votes were meant for petitioner, the only bona fide Bautista candidate.

• Due Process in Summary Administrative Proceedings — The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. A party may be heard through pleadings; where opportunity to be heard is accorded either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the COMELEC's summary dismissal procedure in the pre-proclamation controversy.

• "Technicalities should not be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, especially so if that intention is discoverable from the ballot itself as in this case." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for reversing the COMELEC, establishing that voter intent prevails over procedural technicalities when ascertainable from the ballot.

• "A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar." — This defines the nature of a stray vote and distinguishes the present case, where voter intent was determinable, from genuine stray-vote scenarios.

• "True it is, the disqualification of Edwin Bautista was not yet final on election day. However, it is also true that the electorate of Navotas was informed of such disqualification." — This passage resolves the tension between the technical non-finality of the nuisance-candidate declaration on election day and the voters' actual knowledge, privileging the latter.

• Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 316 (1988) — Followed for the proposition that the right to be heard does not only refer to the right to present verbal arguments in court; a party may also be heard through pleadings, and where opportunity to be heard is accorded through either, there is no denial of procedural due process.

• National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123520, June 26, 1998 — Followed for the principle that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side.

• Navarro III vs. Damaso, 246 SCRA 260 (1995) — Followed for the holding that a formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and not in all instances essential to due process.

• Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36 SCRA 1 (1970) — Followed for the definition of a nuisance candidate as one whose certificate of candidacy is presented and filed to cause confusion among the electorate by similarity of names or by other circumstances demonstrating no bona fide intention to run.

• Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521 (1967) — Followed for the principle that in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity.

• Section 69, Omnibus Election Code — Authorizes the COMELEC to refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy when filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute, to cause confusion among voters by similarity of names, or by circumstances demonstrating no bona fide intention to run. Applied to sustain the declaration of Edwin Bautista as a nuisance candidate.

• Section 211(4), Omnibus Election Code — Provides that when two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of them, unless one is a surname of an incumbent who has served for at least one year. The COMELEC invoked this provision to justify treating the Bautista votes as stray, but the Court effectively distinguished it, holding that the provision did not apply because there was only one bona fide Bautista candidate.

• Sections 2 and 3, Rule 27, Part V, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Govern pre-proclamation controversies, providing that they shall be heard summarily after due notice. Applied to determine that the COMELEC's summary proceedings satisfied due process requirements.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concurred. Martinez, J., was on leave. Pardo, J., took no part.