Baterina vs. Musngi

A movant seeking the voluntary inhibition of a judge must present clear and convincing evidence of actual bias or partiality; bare allegations, speculations, and conjectures are insufficient to compel inhibition. The erroneous inclusion of a party’s name in a dispositive portion that is subsequently corrected by a nunc pro tunc order does not constitute proof of prejudgment, and the mere pendency of a request for inhibition does not suspend the ordinary course of judicial proceedings in the absence of a restraining writ.

Petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina served as Representative of the 1st District of Ilocos Sur from 1997 to 2007. The Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman filed complaints against him and several others involving the utilization of his 2007 Priority Development Assistance Fund allotment of ₱35,000,000.00, which was allegedly released through three Special Allotment Release Orders to the Technology Resource and Livelihood Center and then transferred to foundations for purported livelihood projects. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioner for three counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, three counts of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and one count of Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. The resulting Informations were raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.

The PDAF Charges and Proceedings
On November 29, 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a complaint against petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina, then Representative of the 1st District of Ilocos Sur, concerning the misuse of ₱35,000,000.00 in PDAF allotments for 2007 under Special Allotment Release Order No. 07-00710. On May 29, 2015, the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a broader complaint covering additional SAROs. After due proceedings, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution on May 4, 2016 finding probable cause to charge petitioner with three counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, three counts of Malversation, and one count of Direct Bribery. The Ombudsman denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on November 7, 2016. On March 17, 2017, seven Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan and raffled to its Second Division.

The Erroneous Resolution and Its Correction
On December 18, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution disposing of the Joint Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner’s co-accused — Mario L. Relampagos, Rosario S. Nuñez, Lalaine N. Paule, and Marilou D. Bare. Although petitioner did not join that motion, the dispositive portion erroneously stated: “the Joint Omnibus Motion filed by accused SALACNIB F. BATERINA is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.” On January 15, 2018, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution nunc pro tunc amending the dispositive portion to correctly reflect that the motion of the co-accused, not petitioner, was denied. Throughout the body of the December 18, 2017 Resolution, only the issues raised by the four co-accused were discussed.

Request for Inhibition and Arraignment
On February 22, 2018, petitioner filed a Request for Inhibition, asserting that the erroneous inclusion of his name in the December 18, 2017 dispositive portion showed that respondent justices had already prejudged his case. He further contended that the Sandiganbayan’s act of proceeding with his arraignment the following day, February 23, 2018, despite the pending Request, demonstrated bias. During the arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea, prompting the Sandiganbayan to order the entry of a not-guilty plea on his behalf.

Denial of the Request
On March 13, 2018, the Sandiganbayan denied the Request for Inhibition for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion on April 23, 2018, finding no compelling reason to reverse its earlier ruling. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.

• Bias from Erroneous Dispositive Portion: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan’s inclusion of his name in the dispositive portion of the December 18, 2017 Resolution — a motion he did not file — constituted prejudgment and demonstrated that the respondent justices were predisposed against him.

• Arraignment During Pendency of Inhibition Request: Petitioner maintained that the Sandiganbayan acted with bias when it ordered him to enter a plea on February 23, 2018 despite the pendency of his Request for Inhibition, thereby placing him in the position of being tried by a bench he alleged was partial.

• Violation of Continuous Trial Guidelines: Petitioner claimed that the Sandiganbayan took 18 days to resolve his Request, in contravention of the two-day period prescribed under A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC (Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases), which further evidenced partiality and prejudicial delay.

• Consolidation or Supplemental Petition: Petitioner sought the consolidation of the present petition with G.R. No. 236408 or, in the alternative, its treatment as a supplemental petition, given that the two cases allegedly shared intertwined and conjoined facts.

• No Basis for Inhibition: Respondent Justices, through the assailed Resolutions, maintained that the erroneous inclusion of petitioner’s name in the December 18, 2017 dispositive portion was a purely clerical mistake caused by inadvertence, properly corrected by the nunc pro tunc Resolution of January 15, 2018, and that no actual bias or prejudgment could be inferred from such error.

• Arraignment Not Suspended by Request: The Sandiganbayan held that the mere filing of a request for inhibition does not automatically suspend the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; absent any restraining order or writ from a higher court, it was proper to proceed with petitioner’s arraignment.

• Reasonable Period of Resolution: The Sandiganbayan asserted that the 18-day period taken to resolve the Request did not, by itself, constitute delay that would justify a finding of bias or partiality, and that the resolution of the Request was in compliance with the Rules.

• Bias from Erroneous Inclusion: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in finding that the erroneous inclusion of petitioner’s name in the dispositive portion of the December 18, 2017 Resolution did not establish bias or partiality warranting inhibition.

• Arraignment Pending Inhibition: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it ordered petitioner to enter his plea despite the pendency of his Request for Inhibition.

• Delay in Resolving the Request: Whether the 18-day period the Sandiganbayan took to resolve the Request for Inhibition, as opposed to the two-day period under A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC, constituted bias or grave abuse of discretion.

• Consolidation/Supplemental Petition: Whether the petition may be consolidated with G.R. No. 236408 or treated as a supplemental petition in the present certiorari proceeding.

• Bias from Erroneous Inclusion: The allegation of bias was unsubstantiated. The erroneous mention of petitioner’s name in the December 18, 2017 dispositive portion was an act of inadvertence, as shown by the body of the Resolution which discussed only the motions of the co-accused. The error was timely corrected through the nunc pro tunc Resolution of January 15, 2018. A nunc pro tunc order is designed to make the record speak the truth by reflecting a judicial action that had actually been taken; it does not supply omitted judicial action or correct judicial errors. Since the dispositive portion was made to conform to what the Sandiganbayan actually resolved, no inference of prejudgment or predisposition could be drawn. Petitioner failed to mention the corrective Resolution in his petition, rendering his claim of bias based on the uncorrected error nugatory.

• Arraignment Pending Inhibition: The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in proceeding with arraignment. The pendency of a request for inhibition does not, by itself, stay the proceedings; a writ of prohibition or temporary restraining order is required to halt the case. Petitioner’s refusal to enter a plea led the Sandiganbayan to order a not-guilty plea entered on his behalf, which is the proper course under the Rules. No clear and convincing evidence showed that this act demonstrated bias.

• Delay in Resolving the Request: The 18-day period to resolve the Request did not per se establish delay or bias. The requirement of A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC is directory for case management, and non‑compliance with its timeline, without more, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner failed to present strong and compelling proof that the Sandiganbayan acted with actual partiality or prejudice. The Court does not rule on conjectures and speculations but deals with facts and realities.

• Consolidation/Supplemental Petition: The issue of consolidation with G.R. No. 236408 falls outside the scope of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Certiorari is directed against a specific tribunal’s act alleged to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion; it is not the proper vehicle to seek consolidation of separate cases. The Court declined to discuss the matter further.

• Voluntary Inhibition under Rule 137, Section 1, Second Paragraph — The decision to voluntarily inhibit rests on the sound discretion of the judge, guided by conscience. The movant bears the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence of actual bias or partiality. Bare allegations, speculations, and conjectures do not satisfy this burden and cannot compel inhibition. The Supreme Court will not interfere with the exercise of this discretion absent a showing of grave abuse.

• Nunc Pro Tunc Judgments or Orders — A nunc pro tunc entry (“now for then”) is a procedural device used to correct inadvertent clerical errors or omissions in the record so that it reflects the judicial action actually taken at the earlier time. Its purpose is to make the record speak the truth, not to supply a missing judicial act or correct a judicial error. It presupposes that a judgment or order was actually rendered but was imperfectly or incompletely recorded. Such an order may be issued only when no party will be prejudiced. Here, the nunc pro tunc Resolution merely corrected the dispositive portion to match the action actually taken — the denial of the co‑accused’s motion — and did not prejudice petitioner.

• Certiorari under Rule 65 — Certiorari lies only upon a showing that a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and that there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petition must specifically allege the acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Issues extraneous to the rectification of an alleged jurisdictional error fall outside the scope of Rule 65.

• “Nunc pro tunc is a Latin phrase that means ‘now for then.’ A judgment nunc pro tunc is made to enter into the record an act previously done by the court, which had been omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. … Its sole purpose is to make a present record of a ‘judicial action which has been actually taken.’” — This passage defines the limited office of a nunc pro tunc order and anchors the conclusion that the corrected Resolution reflected the true judicial action, negating any inference of prejudgment.

• “[A judgment nunc pro tunc] may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken.” — The formulation from Lichauco v. Tan Pho, quoted with approval, underscores that nunc pro tunc entries are clerical corrections, not vehicles to rewrite judicial decisions.

• “The Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. The Court deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.” — This statement from Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ermita was applied to reject petitioner’s speculative charges of bias.

• “Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court … For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it must be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief.” — This extract from Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo sets the standard that petitioner failed to meet.

• Lai v. People, 762 Phil. 434 (2015) — Cited for the principle that voluntary inhibition is addressed to the sound discretion of the judge, who is guided by conscience. Followed and applied to the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the Request.

• Mercury Drug Corp., et al. v. Sps. Huang, et al., 817 Phil. 434 (2017) — Quoted extensively for the definition, nature, and limits of nunc pro tunc judgments or orders. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the nunc pro tunc Resolution cured the clerical error and erased any basis for the claim of prejudgment.

• Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, et al., 671 Phil. 320 (2011) — Invoked to define the nature and requisites of a petition for certiorari, against which the insufficiency of petitioner’s allegations was measured.

• Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, Resolution, November 17, 2020 — Cited for the rule that a movant seeking inhibition must present clear and convincing evidence of bias, reinforcing the burden of proof petitioner failed to discharge.

• Abakada Guro Party List v. Hon. Exec. Sec. Ermita, 506 Phil. 1 (2005) — Quoted for the admonition that courts do not rule on conjectural allegations but on facts and realities, used to dismiss petitioner’s speculative claims of partiality.

• Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court — Governs the disqualification and inhibition of judicial officers. Its first paragraph enumerates mandatory grounds; its second paragraph addresses voluntary inhibition, which is left to the judge’s sound discretion for “just or valid reasons.” The Court applied this provision to hold that petitioner’s request was a matter of voluntary inhibition requiring clear and convincing proof of bias, which he failed to supply.

• A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC (Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases) — Petitioner invoked the two‑day resolution period under these guidelines to argue bias from delay. The Court treated the timeline as directory in the context of determining grave abuse of discretion, finding that 18 days to resolve the inhibition request did not per se amount to bias or jurisdictional error.

Perlas-Bernabe, J. (Chairperson), Hernando, J., Gaerlan, J., and Rosario, J. (designated additional member per Special Order No. 2835).

N/A — The decision was unanimous.