Batangas Transportation Company vs. Gregorio Caguimbal, et al.

A common carrier is presumed at fault for the death of a passenger and is liable for damages unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance for the passenger's safety; the recklessness of a third-party driver does not relieve the carrier of liability where its own driver failed to take every precaution, such as placing the bus entirely off the asphalted portion of the road, and instead made the passengers' safety dependent on the diligence of another motorist.

Batangas Transportation Company operated a public utility bus line plying the regular route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, and Biñan Transportation Company operated a bus line traversing the same national highway in the opposite direction. Pedro Caguimbal, the Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a paying passenger aboard a BTCO bus driven by its regular driver, Tomas Perez, bound for his residence in Calansayan. The governing statutory backdrop is the Civil Code's regime for common carriers, which imposes extraordinary diligence in the vigilance for the safety of passengers, presumes the carrier at fault in case of death or injury to a passenger, and places upon the carrier the burden of proving that extraordinary diligence was observed.

At about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954, Pedro Caguimbal, the Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a paying passenger on a Batangas Transportation Company bus bearing plate TPU-507, then travelling south on its regular route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas under its regular driver, Tomas Perez. Caguimbal's destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. Coming from the opposite direction, north-bound, was a bus of the Biñan Transportation Company bearing plate TPU-820, driven by Marciano Ilagan. Along the national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas, a horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Biñan bus, was also proceeding northward.

The trial court credited the version of the Batangas Transportation Company. As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop because he was going to alight; upon hearing the conductor's signal, Perez slowed down his bus and swerved it farther to the right in order to stop. At that juncture, the calesa driven by Makahiya was several meters away, facing the BTCO bus from the opposite direction, while the Biñan bus was about 100 meters away, likewise going northward and following the calesa. Upon seeing the Biñan bus, the BTCO driver dimmed his lights, a fact established by Magno Ilaw, the conductor of the Biñan bus at the time of the accident. As the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from opposite directions, the Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa; without diminishing its speed of about seventy kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa, hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumping and striking the calesa, which was completely wrecked. The calesa driver was seriously injured and the horse was killed; the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open, and the BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion.

Two passengers of the BTCO bus died as a consequence of the occurrence — Pedro Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino — apart from others who were injured. The widow and children of Caguimbal instituted the present action to recover damages from BTCO, which in turn filed a third-party complaint against Biñan and its driver Ilagan; the Caguimbals subsequently amended their complaint to include Biñan and Ilagan as defendants, and the case was tried jointly with a similar action brought by the Tolentinos.

On the facts material to the Supreme Court's analysis, the record showed that in order to permit one of the passengers to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof, although the width of the shoulder was more than sufficient to accommodate the bus and he could have and should have placed it completely outside the asphalted portion and fully within the shoulder. When the passenger expressed his wish to alight, Ilagan had already seen the calesa, driven by Makahiya, a few meters away and coming from the opposite direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at a good speed.

• Liability for Damages: Petitioner Batangas Transportation Company contended that the Court of Appeals erred in finding it liable for damages, maintaining that the recklessness of the Biñan bus driver was the cause of the accident, and invoking Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc., where the public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident and could not have possibly avoided it because he had swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road.
• Award of Attorney's Fees: Petitioner argued that the award of attorney's fees was not authorized by law, because of the eleven cases specified in Article 1208 of the new Civil Code only the fifth and the last are relevant to the case at bar; the fifth case requires bad faith, which does not exist, and as regards the last case, which permits the award where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees should be recovered, the evidence on record does not show the existence of such just and equitable grounds.

• Liability of the Common Carrier: Whether Batangas Transportation Company is liable for damages for the death of its passenger Pedro Caguimbal notwithstanding that the immediate recklessness of the driver of the Biñan Transportation Company bus was a major factor in the occurrence of the accident.
• Award of Attorney's Fees: Whether the award of attorney's fees in favor of the respondents is authorized by law.

• Liability of the Common Carrier: Yes. As a common carrier, BTCO is presumed to have been at fault or negligent for the death of its passenger under Article 1756 of the new Civil Code, and is liable unless it proves that it observed the extraordinary diligence prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755; it failed to discharge that burden.
• Award of Attorney's Fees: Yes. The award is justified under the last case in Article 1208 of the new Civil Code, which permits recovery where the court deems it just and equitable, given that the respondents had been constrained to litigate for over thirteen years and that public utility operators must be impressed with the nature and extent of their responsibility for passenger safety.

• Liability of the Common Carrier: The recklessness of the Biñan driver was manifestly a major factor in the accident: as driver of the Biñan bus, he overtook Makahiya's calesa and passed between it and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough therefor, in consequence of which the Biñan bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa. That notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment against BTCO on the ground that its driver Perez had failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required by Article 1733 in the vigilance for the safety of his passengers. The record showed that Perez drove his bus partly to the right shoulder and partly on the asphalted portion thereof, when he could have and should have seen to it that the bus was completely outside the asphalted portion and fully within the shoulder, the width of which was more than sufficient to accommodate it. He could and should have done so because, when the passenger expressed his wish to alight, Ilagan had seen the calesa a few meters away coming from the opposite direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at a good speed. When Perez slowed down to permit the passenger to disembark, he must have known that the Biñan bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and the BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portion of the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa would not be enough to allow the Biñan bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped and was therefore reckless in not doing so, but he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO, unlike Perez, whose duty was to exercise utmost or extraordinary diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation that would be hazardous for his passengers and to refrain from making their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver. This obligation becomes more patent in light of the fact, of which the Court may take judicial cognizance, that motor vehicle drivers in the country, particularly those of public service utilities, have not distinguished themselves for their concern over the safety, comfort, or convenience of others. The Court quoted with approval the syllabus in Brito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc.: in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the damages sought by the passenger; by the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier under Article 1756. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. BTCO had not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. For this reason, Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc., relied upon by BTCO, is not in point, because in that case the public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident and could not have possibly avoided it, having swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road — which the driver in the present case had failed to do.
• Award of Attorney's Fees: The Court believed otherwise than petitioner urged. Two considerations supported the award: first, the accident in question took place on April 25, 1954, and the Caguimbals had been constrained to litigate for over thirteen years to vindicate their rights; and second, it was high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but also with Articles 1755 and 1756 thereof and the spirit of these provisions as disclosed by their letter and as elucidated by the Commission that drafted the same. The Code Commission's report, quoted in the decision, explains that the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated to protect passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation, a high standard of care imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury.

• Presumption of Fault of Common Carriers in Case of Death or Injury to Passengers — Under Article 1756 of the new Civil Code, in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. The Court applied the presumption against BTCO, holding that because it had not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part, liability attached notwithstanding that the immediate recklessness was that of the Biñan driver.
• Extraordinary Diligence of Common Carriers — Common carriers are bound, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case (Article 1733), and to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances (Article 1755). The standard was measured against the conduct of BTCO's driver, who left the bus partly on the asphalted portion of the road although the shoulder was more than sufficient to accommodate it entirely.
• Contract of Carriage — No Express Finding of Negligence Required — In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the damages sought by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence.
• Carrier's Duty to Anticipate Hazards Created by Other Motorists — A common carrier's driver, owing the utmost or extraordinary diligence for the safety of his passengers, is under obligation to avoid a situation that would be hazardous for them and must not make their safety dependent upon the diligence of another driver. Because the Biñan driver owed no especial obligation to BTCO's passengers, Perez was bound to foresee that the Biñan bus would overtake the calesa at about the time the calesa and the BTCO bus would be on the same line, and to keep his bus entirely off the asphalted portion of the road.
• Attorney's Fees as Just and Equitable Award — The last case enumerated in Article 1208 of the new Civil Code permits an award of attorney's fees where the court deems it just and equitable that they should be recovered. Prolonged litigation — over thirteen years in this case — and the public policy of impressing upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their responsibility for passenger safety, including greater care in the selection and supervision of drivers and conductors, constitute sufficient equitable grounds for the award.

• "In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code." — Quoted with approval from the syllabus of Brito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., this passage states the ratio decidendi on the carrier's burden: the carrier's liability arises from the contract of carriage itself, and the burden of proving extraordinary diligence rests on the carrier rather than on the passenger.
• "It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise 'utmost' or 'extraordinary' diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the Biñan driver." — This is the core of the Court's rejection of petitioner's proximate-cause argument: the recklessness of the third-party driver did not excuse the carrier's own driver, whose higher duty to his passengers obliged him to anticipate and avoid the hazard rather than to rely on another motorist's care.
• "In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. For this reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. relied upon by BTCO, is not in point, for, in said case, the public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident, and could not have possibly avoided it, for he 'swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road,' which the driver, in the present case, had failed to do." — The passage disposes of the principal assignment of error and distinguishes the precedent on which the carrier relied, fixing the decisive factual difference as the failure to place the bus entirely off the asphalted portion of the road.
• "A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. This extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transportation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury." — Quoted from the Report of the Code Commission, this passage supplies the policy rationale underlying Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 and is the formulation commonly invoked for the extraordinary diligence standard in Philippine common carrier jurisprudence.

• Brito Sy vs. Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., 102 Phil. 482 — Quoted with approval for the rule that in an action based on a contract of carriage no express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier is necessary, the injury to the passenger being right away attributable to the carrier's fault or negligence, and the burden being on the carrier to prove extraordinary diligence.
• Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc., 101 Phil. 1046 — Relied upon by petitioner BTCO but distinguished by the Court; in that case the public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident, having swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road, a precaution the BTCO driver failed to take.

• Article 1733, Civil Code of the Philippines — Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. This was the standard against which the conduct of BTCO's driver Perez was measured and found wanting.
• Article 1755, Civil Code of the Philippines — A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Cited together with Article 1733 as the source of the diligence that BTCO failed to prove.
• Article 1756, Civil Code of the Philippines — In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755. This provision supplied the presumption of fault that shifted the burden of proof to BTCO and ultimately defeated its defense.
• Article 1208, new Civil Code (as cited in the text) — Enumerates eleven cases in which attorney's fees may be recovered; the fifth requires bad faith, while the last permits recovery where the court deems it just and equitable. The Court upheld the award under the last case, citing the thirteen years of litigation and the need to impress upon public utility operators the extent of their responsibility for passenger safety.

Reyes, J.B.L.; Dizon; Makalintal; Zaldivar; Sanchez; Castro; Angeles; and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Bengzon, J.P., J., took no part.