Batac vs. People of the Philippines

Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed only where the issuance of the postdated or unfunded check is the efficient cause or inducement for the offended party to part with his money or property, and not where the check was issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation; conviction therefor is separate and distinct from liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, since deceit and damage are essential elements of estafa but are not required in the latter offense. The penalty imposable is governed by the amount of the fraud as reclassified by Republic Act No. 10951.

Petitioner Iluminada Batac was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, a provision penalizing the making, issuing, or delivery of a postdated check, or a check in payment of an obligation, when the offender had no funds in the bank or the funds deposited were insufficient to cover the amount of the check. The offense is distinct from violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, which punishes the mere issuance of a check that is subsequently dishonored. At the time of the offense, the penalty for estafa was governed by the original text of Article 315; it was later amended by Republic Act No. 10951, which adjusted the penalties according to the amount of the fraud and made the reclassified penalties applicable to pending cases.

On November 8, 1998, Iluminada Batac and one Erlinda Cabardo went to the store of Roger L. Frias, located inside the public market of the Municipality of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, to have Batac's checks rediscounted. Batac assured Frias that the checks were hers and were duly funded, and this representation persuaded him to buy a total of fourteen checks at a rediscounted rate of five percent of the total aggregate amount of P103,500.00. Batac thereafter affixed her signature on the face of the checks in the presence of Frias. In an effort to support her misrepresentation and further persuade Frias to believe her, Batac conveyed to him that she was a school teacher, presumably as a guarantee of her good reputation, and signed the postdated checks in his presence, presumably as a measure of good faith and an assurance that the signature therein was genuine.

Upon the due dates stated on the checks, Frias attempted to deposit them to his bank accounts. The drawee bank, Prime Bank, Calasiao Branch, Poblacion West, Calasiao, Pangasinan, refused payment for the reason "Account Closed" and returned the checks to Frias. Frias then proceeded to Batac's house to demand payment of the equivalent amount of the checks, giving her five days within which to complete payment. Batac failed to do so, prompting Frias to file the present case for estafa.

Batac, for her part, maintained that it was Erlinda who issued and delivered the checks to Frias for rediscounting, and that she had never met nor transacted business with Frias. She further argued that doubt was cast on Frias' assertions by the fact that the proceeds being claimed still amounted to P103,500.00, the aggregate amount of the checks involved, when there should have been a rediscounting fee of five percent, thus raising the question of whether there was a rediscounting transaction at all. Consequently, Batac asserted, there was reasonable doubt that she committed estafa, and if she had any criminal liability at all, it would only be for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

After trial, the RTC found Batac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, ruling that it was Batac's representations that the checks were funded which induced Frias to buy them at a rediscounted rate to his damage and prejudice, and that Batac's knowledge of the insufficiency of funds was clearly established by her express admission. Both the RTC and the CA gave credence to Frias' testimony that Batac, together with Erlinda, personally met with him at his store and represented to him that the checks were funded, a testimony corroborated by his sister Ivy Luna Frias, who testified that she was present during the transaction and that the exchange between Batac and Frias, as narrated by the latter, was consistent with her recollection. During trial, Batac expressly admitted that at the time she issued the checks, she had only a little over one thousand pesos in her account.

• Identity of the Perpetrator: Petitioner maintained that it was Erlinda Cabardo, and not she, who issued and delivered the subject checks to Frias and defrauded him; she claimed that she had never met nor transacted business with Frias, and that her mere denial refuted the prosecution's identification.
• Doubt on the Rediscounting Transaction: Petitioner argued that the proceeds being claimed by Frias amounted to P103,500.00, the aggregate amount of the checks involved, when there should have been a rediscounting fee of five percent, thereby casting doubt on whether there was a rediscounting transaction at all and raising reasonable doubt as to her commission of estafa.
• Liability at Most under B.P. Blg. 22: Petitioner asserted that if she had any criminal liability at all, it would only be for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, instead of estafa.

• Review of Factual Findings: Whether the factual finding that Batac, and not Erlinda Cabardo, issued and delivered the subject checks and defrauded Frias may be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Estafa: Whether Batac's guilt for the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Distinction from B.P. Blg. 22: Whether Batac may be held liable only for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 instead of estafa.
• Modification of Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed should be modified in view of the amendments embodied in Republic Act No. 10951.

• Review of Factual Findings: No. The contention that Erlinda, and not Batac, issued and delivered the checks raises a question of fact, which may not be raised in a petition for review on certiorari; none of the recognized exceptions to the rule was alleged, substantiated, and proven, and the factual findings of the courts a quo are binding upon the Court.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Estafa: Yes. All the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code were established beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution having shown that Batac's representation that the checks were funded induced Frias to part with his money and that she knew she had insufficient funds at the time of issuance.
• Distinction from B.P. Blg. 22: No. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are separate and distinct offenses pertaining to different causes of action, because deceit and damage are essential elements of estafa but are not required in B.P. Blg. 22.
• Modification of Penalty: Modified. Under Republic Act No. 10951, the amount of P103,500.00 falls within the range of over P40,000.00 but not exceeding P1,200,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence is reduced to 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum and 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional as maximum.

• Review of Factual Findings: Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Where the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, as Batac's contention does, the question posed is one of fact. While the Court has admitted exceptions to this rule, none of those exceptions was alleged, substantiated, and proven by Batac; thus, the factual findings of the courts a quo are binding upon the Court. Both the RTC and the CA correctly gave credence to Frias' testimony that Batac, together with Erlinda, personally met with him at his store and represented to him that the checks were funded, a testimony corroborated by his sister Ivy Luna Frias, who was present during the transaction and whose recollection was consistent with Frias' narration. To controvert Frias' positive identification, Batac merely offered the defense of denial, insisting that it was Erlinda who committed the crime without laying any basis for such a conclusion. Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical; there was no reason to doubt the credibility of the identification made by Frias as corroborated by Ivy, and the RTC's finding on this fact, affirmed by the CA, is binding upon the Court.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Estafa: Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the act of postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation, when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and provides that the failure of the drawer to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or payee or holder that the check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. Jurisprudence has consistently held that such estafa consists of the following elements: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. It has been settled that in this form of estafa, it is not the nonpayment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. Deceit has been defined as the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. For estafa under this provision to prosper, the issuance of the check must have been the inducement for the other party to part with his money or property; the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation and, as such, should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated or not; it must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. The prosecution sufficiently demonstrated Batac's deceit when it established that she induced Frias into buying the checks at a rediscounted rate by representing to him that she had enough funds in her account to cover them. In an effort to support her misrepresentation and further persuade Frias to believe her, Batac conveyed to him that she was a school teacher, presumably as a guarantee of her good reputation, and signed the postdated checks in Frias' presence, presumably as a measure of good faith and an assurance that the signature therein was genuine. All these induced Frias to part with his money. Further highlighting Batac's deceit was her knowledge, at the time she issued the subject checks, that she had no sufficient funds in her account to cover the amount involved; during trial, she expressly admitted that at the time she issued them, she only had a little over one thousand pesos in her account. Moreover, when informed by Frias of the dishonor of the checks, Batac failed to pay the amounts thereon within the five-day grace period given to her, prompting him to file the case. Batac's attempt to cast doubt on the transaction by pointing out that the proceeds claimed amounted to P103,500.00, the aggregate amount of the checks, when there should have been a five percent rediscounting fee, yields no cloud of suspicion from this fact alone: Frias was defrauded of the aggregate amount of the checks she had issued, as this was the amount Frias expected to secure from the transaction, precisely because he was induced to buy the subject checks by the guarantee that he would obtain the amounts stated therein on the dates so stated, but at a price lower than the aggregate amounts on the date of the transaction. The aggregate amount therein is the subject of Batac's deceit and the amount of which Frias was defrauded. Batac's deceit and the damage to Frias having been duly proven by the former's own admissions and the clear, credible, and positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, to which Batac offered no sufficient refutation but a mere denial, her conviction for estafa must be upheld.

• Distinction from B.P. Blg. 22: There is no merit to Batac's contention that, at most, she can only be held liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. While sourced from the same act, that is, the issuance of a check subsequently dishonored, estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct from each other because they pertain to different causes of action. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22; under the latter law, the mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence is punishable, which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two offenses include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; and (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.

• Modification of Penalty: The penalty imposed by the CA must be modified in view of the amendments embodied in Republic Act No. 10951, Section 85 of which further amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Under the amended provision, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period is imposed if the amount of the fraud is over Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00). Considering that the amount involved in the subject transaction is P103,500.00, the proper imposable penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, with a minimum period of 4 months and 1 day to 1 year, a medium period of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months, and a maximum period of 1 year, 8 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term, which is left to the sound discretion of the court, should be within the range of the penalty next lower than the aforementioned penalty; the penalty next lower is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, with a range of 1 month and 1 day to 4 months, and the Court fixed the minimum at 4 months. The maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code; under Article 64 thereof, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, and since none of these circumstances are attendant in the case, the maximum term is the medium period of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum, at 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months. In line with current policy, the Court also modified the rate of interest imposed by the CA; such interest shall be imposed at the legal rate of six percent per annum on the monetary award, from the date of finality of the Decision until fully paid.

• Estafa by Issuance of a Bouncing Check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), RPC — The offense consists of three elements: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. The provision also establishes that the failure of the drawer to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or payee or holder that the check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. The Court applied the three elements to Batac's admitted insufficiency of funds and Frias' induced surrender of P103,500.00.

• Check as the Efficient Cause of Defraudation — In estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), it is not the nonpayment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. The act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation and, as such, should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud; the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated or not. The check must have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. The Court found this requisite satisfied because Batac's representation that the checks were funded induced Frias to buy them at a rediscounted rate.

• Deceit, Defined — Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. Batac's assurances of funding, her claim of being a school teacher, and her signing of the checks in Frias' presence were all treated as constituent acts of deceit.

• Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) Distinguished from Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — The two offenses, though sourced from the same act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored, are separate and distinct because they pertain to different causes of action. Deceit and damage are essential elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) but are not required in B.P. Blg. 22, under which the mere issuance of a dishonored check gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds. The four additional distinctions are: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 even if he issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each offense; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; and (4) violations of Article 315 are mala in se, while those of B.P. Blg. 22 are mala prohibita.

• Rule 45 — Questions of Law Only; Binding Effect of Factual Findings — Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Where the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. The factual findings of the courts a quo are binding upon the Court where none of the recognized exceptions to the rule was alleged, substantiated, and proven.

• Positive Identification vis-à-vis Denial — Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical. A bare denial that lays no basis for its conclusion cannot overcome a credible and categorical identification corroborated by another eyewitness.

• Penalty for Estafa under Republic Act No. 10951 — Under the amendatory provisions, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period is imposed where the amount of the fraud is over P40,000.00 but does not exceed P1,200,000.00. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods applies where the amount is over P1,200,000.00 but does not exceed P2,400,000.00; and the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period applies where the amount is over P2,400,000.00 but does not exceed P4,400,000.00.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law and Article 64, RPC — The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is left to the sound discretion of the court and should be within the range of the penalty next lower than the penalty prescribed by law. The maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code; under Article 64, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances.

• Interest on Monetary Awards — In line with current policy, the monetary award shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent per annum from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid.

• "To constitute estafa under this provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. The offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check, whether postdated or not. It must be shown that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the other party. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation." — This passage, drawn from People vs. Reyes and quoted with emphasis by the Court, supplies the controlling test for the third element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) and is the ratio decidendi on why Batac's conviction was sustained.

• "It has been settled in jurisprudence that in the above-defined form of estafa, it is not the nonpayment of a debt which is made punishable, but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check." — This states the doctrinal core of the offense: the gravamen is the deceit accompanying issuance, not the subsequent failure to pay, which is why the transaction's rediscounting character mattered to the Court's analysis.

• "What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) [of the] Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code." — Quoted from Rimando vs. Aldaba, this passage is the canonical formulation of the distinction between estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 and disposes of Batac's subsidiary argument that she could only be liable under the Bouncing Checks Law.

• "The Court has held that 'positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.'" — This passage, citing People vs. Anticamara, grounds the Court's rejection of Batac's denial and its refusal to disturb the factual findings of the RTC and the CA on the identity of the perpetrator.

• People vs. Reyes, 298 Phil. 661 (1993) — Controlling precedent on the third element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d); quoted at length for the rule that the issuance of the check must be the efficient cause of the defraudation and the inducement for the surrender of money or property, not payment of a pre-existing obligation.
• Lopez vs. People, 578 Phil. 486 — Cited for the three elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), for the rule that it is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punished, and for the definition of deceit.
• Rimando vs. Aldaba, 745 Phil. 358 (2014) — Cited for the distinction between estafa under Article 315 (2-d) and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, including the enumeration of the four other differences between the two offenses.
• People vs. Anticamara, 666 Phil. 484 (2011) — Cited for the rule that positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent where the identification is credible and categorical.
• Pascual vs. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167 (2016) — Cited for the ten recognized exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, none of which Batac invoked.
• Vasquez vs. People, 566 Phil. 507 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence is left to the sound discretion of the court.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016), citing Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Cited as the basis for modifying the rate of interest on the monetary award to the legal rate of six percent per annum from finality until fully paid.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885 — Defines the offense of estafa by postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and provides that the drawer's failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction, finding all three elements present.
• Section 85, Republic Act No. 10951 — Further amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by reclassifying the penalties according to the amount of the fraud. The Court applied the third paragraph thereof, which imposes arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period where the amount of the fraud is over P40,000.00 but does not exceed P1,200,000.00, to recompute the penalty for the P103,500.00 involved.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. The Court applied this to fix the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence at the medium period of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum.
• Section 1, Indeterminate Sentence Law — Governs the fixing of the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty. The Court applied it by setting the minimum within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the amended Article 315.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limits petitions for review on certiorari to questions of law. The Court applied it in declining to review Batac's factual contention that Erlinda, not she, issued and delivered the checks.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.