Basilonia vs. Villaruz

A penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence does not prescribe until the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of imprisonment; consequently, prescription never commences for an accused who has never been committed to prison. The civil liability arising from a felony is extinguished if the judgment creditor fails to move for execution within five years from entry of judgment and does not file an independent action to revive the judgment within ten years from finality, unless the delay is caused by the judgment debtor or other compelling equitable circumstances are present.

On June 19, 1987, the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City convicted Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John Basilonia of murder and frustrated homicide, imposing indeterminate prison sentences and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim, Atty. Isagani Roblete. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal on January 23, 1989, for failure to file the appellants’ brief. Entry of judgment followed on September 18, 1989, and the records were remanded to the trial court on October 4, 1989. No action to enforce the judgment was taken for almost two decades.

• Nature of the Criminal Cases: On September 15, 1983, in Roxas City, petitioners Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John “Jojo” Basilonia were charged in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete, in Criminal Case No. 1775 for frustrated murder (later convicted of frustrated homicide) against Rene Gonzales, and in Criminal Case No. 1774 for illegal possession of firearm, along with other accused who were ultimately acquitted.

• The Judgment of Conviction: On June 19, 1987, the RTC, Branch 18, Roxas City, found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt: Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John Basilonia were sentenced for murder to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years, 1 month and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with accessory penalties, and ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Atty. Roblete ₱32,100.00 for funeral and burial expenses and ₱30,000.00 as death indemnity. John Basilonia was separately sentenced for frustrated homicide to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

• Appeal and Finality: Petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on January 23, 1989, because no appellants’ brief had been filed despite extensions. The resolution became final and executory on September 18, 1989, when it was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment. The entire records were returned to the trial court on October 4, 1989. No further action was taken to enforce the judgment for nearly twenty years.

• Motion for Execution After 20 Years: On May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. He alleged that despite his request, the City Prosecutor had failed to move for execution. Acting on the court’s directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion for Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest on May 22, 2009.

• Trial Court’s Orders: Petitioners opposed the motion, raising, among others, the nearly twenty-year delay. On December 3, 2009, respondent Judge Delano F. Villaruz granted execution, ordering the bondsmen to surrender petitioners within ten days. The motion for reconsideration was denied on January 4, 2010. Following petitioners’ failure to appear, their bail bonds were forfeited and a writ of execution was issued on January 25, 2010.

• Petition for Certiorari: Petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a Rule 65 petition, arguing that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting execution after almost two decades.

• Prescription of Penalty and Extinction of Civil Liability: Petitioners argued that both the penalty of imprisonment and the civil liability had prescribed and were extinguished by the lapse of nearly twenty years from the date of entry of judgment. They maintained that pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to order execution, as the motion was filed beyond the five-year period for execution by motion.

• Jurisdiction of the Trial Court: Petitioners contended that respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion for execution despite the long delay, and that the execution orders were null and void.

• Unenforced Judgment: Private respondent Roblete claimed that the judgment had remained unenforced because the public prosecutor failed to act on his request to file a motion for execution, implying that the delay was not attributable to the heirs of the victim.

• Imprescriptibility of Penalty: The Solicitor General, appearing for the public respondent, maintained that the penalty of imprisonment had not prescribed because petitioners were never committed to prison; they could not have evaded service of sentence as required by Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code for prescription to commence, and thus execution remained proper.

• Prescription of Penalty: Whether the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the final judgment prescribed under Articles 92 and 93 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to order its execution after nearly twenty years.

• Execution of Civil Liability: Whether the civil liability arising from the offense was extinguished by the lapse of time under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting the motion for its execution.

• Prescription of Penalty: The penalty of imprisonment did not prescribe. Under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription of penalties commences to run only from the date the convict evades service of sentence. Evasion of service of sentence presupposes that the convict is already serving his sentence in a penal institution and escapes during the term of imprisonment. Petitioners were never committed to prison; they never commenced serving their sentence. Thus, the prescriptive period never began to run. The trial court, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and granting it with respect to the penalty of imprisonment.

• Execution of Civil Liability: The civil liability was extinguished and could no longer be enforced by motion. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides two modes of enforcing a final judgment: by motion within five years from entry of judgment, or by independent action within ten years from finality pursuant to Articles 1144(3) and 1152 of the Civil Code. The motion for execution was filed almost twenty years after entry of judgment—well beyond both periods. The heirs of Atty. Roblete neither moved for execution within five years nor filed an independent action to revive the judgment within ten years. Moreover, no compelling equitable reason justified the delay; the bare allegation that the prosecutor failed to act did not fall within the recognized exceptions, which generally require that the delay be occasioned by the judgment debtor. The heirs’ inaction evidenced lack of interest, amounting to a waiver. Consequently, the trial court’s order granting execution of civil liability constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Prescription of Penalties — Evasion of Service of Sentence (Article 93, RPC) — The prescription of penalties imposed by final sentence commences to run only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment. Evasion of service of sentence requires that the offender is a convict by final judgment, is serving a sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty, and escapes during that term. One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have evaded service; consequently, prescription does not begin to run in his favor.

• Execution of Judgments under Section 6, Rule 39 — A final and executory judgment may be enforced by motion within five years from the date of its entry. After five years but before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the judgment may be enforced only by an independent action. The prescriptive period for an action upon a judgment is ten years from the date the judgment became final (Articles 1144(3) and 1152, Civil Code). A writ of execution issued after the expiration of the applicable period is null and void, and the court’s non-compliance with the time bar goes to its jurisdiction and cannot be cured by the parties’ failure to object.

• Exceptions to the Strict Time Bar for Execution — The Court may allow execution beyond the prescribed period when the delay is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor, or when the strict application of the rules would result in injustice to the prevailing party who is without fault, such as: dilatory tactics by the judgment obligor, an agreement to defer execution, or circumstances where the prevailing party did what was required but satisfaction was beyond his control.

• Duty of Trial Courts Upon Finality of Conviction — Once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment without need of a motion. It should cancel the bail bond, issue a warrant of arrest if the accused is not detained, and issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for transfer to the National Penitentiary. The filing of a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal does not stay the issuance of the commitment order unless a special order from the appellate court directs otherwise.

• “The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription. … [O]ne who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.”

• “A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. … [A] writ issued after the expiration of the period is null and void. The limitation … goes to the very jurisdiction of the court.”

• “The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for executing judgments or orders is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. Indeed, inaction may be construed as a waiver.”

• “Once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial court has the ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment … A motion to execute judgment of conviction is not necessary.”

• Tanega v. Masakayan, et al., 125 Phil. 966 (1967) — Controlling precedent defining evasion of service of sentence: prescription of penalty of imprisonment commences only upon escape during the term of imprisonment. Applied to rule that petitioners, never having been confined, could not be said to have evaded service.

• Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, 92 Phil. 310 (1952) — Earlier case establishing that evasion of service is an essential element of prescription of penalties.

• Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo, 442 Phil. 442 (2002) and Pangan v. Hon. Gatbalite, 490 Phil. 49 (2005) — Followed Tanega and reiterated that prescription applies only to those serving sentence who escape.

• Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, et al., 117 Phil. 39 (1963) — Recognized that the period for execution is tolled when execution is stayed by agreement, injunction, appeal operating as supersedeas, or by actions of the debtor; cited for the exceptions to the time bar.

• Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171626, August 6, 2014 — Applied for the rule that after five years, execution by independent action is mandatory, and that the writ issued beyond the period is void.

• Articles 92 and 93, Revised Penal Code — Prescription of penalties: death and reclusion perpetua in 20 years, other afflictive penalties in 15 years, correctional penalties in 10 years (except arresto mayor in 5 years). Prescription commences when the convict evades service of sentence. Held: inapplicable because petitioners never commenced service.

• Articles 100, 112, Revised Penal Code — Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable; civil liability is extinguished in the same manner as other obligations in accordance with civil law. Applied to subject the civil liability to the rules on execution and prescription under the Civil Code and Rules of Court.

• Section 6, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Execution by motion within five years from entry of judgment; thereafter by independent action before barred by the statute of limitations. Applied to hold that the motion for execution of civil liability was filed out of time.

• Articles 1144(3) and 1152, Civil Code — Actions upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the judgment became final. Applied to bar enforcement of civil liability where no independent action was filed within ten years.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Villarama, Jr., Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ.