Bascos vs. Court of Appeals

A person or entity engaged in the trucking business, offering transportation services for compensation, is a common carrier under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, regardless of the scale of operations or the selectivity of clientele. As such, they are bound to observe extraordinary diligence over goods and are presumed negligent upon loss or deterioration. To escape liability for loss due to hijacking, the carrier must prove the robbers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

Rodolfo A. Cipriano, doing business as Cipriano Trading Enterprises (CIPTRADE), subcontracted with Estrellita M. Bascos (doing business as A.M. Bascos Trucking) to transport 400 sacks of soya bean meal from Manila to Calamba, Laguna. The cargo, valued at P156,404.00, was hijacked en route and never delivered. Cipriano, liable to his own client under their contract, demanded reimbursement from Bascos, who refused. Cipriano then filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages.

• Nature of the Action: The case was a civil action for breach of contract, specifically for recovery of a sum of money and damages arising from the non-delivery of cargo.
• The Contract: CIPTRADE subcontracted the transportation of 400 sacks of soya bean meal to Bascos's trucking business. The cargo was loaded onto a truck driven by Bascos's employee, Maximo Sanglay, and accompanied by her employee, Juanito Morden. A cargo receipt was signed by Sanglay.
• The Hijacking Incident: On October 21, 1988, the truck was hijacked along Canonigo St., Paco, Manila. The cargo was stolen and never recovered. Bascos reported the incident to CIPTRADE and the police.
• Lower Court Findings: Both the RTC and CA found that Bascos was a common carrier. They based this on her judicial admission of being in the trucking business, the issuance of a cargo receipt, and the fact that her employees had control of the goods. The courts also found her evidence insufficient to prove the hijacking was attended by grave or irresistible force.
• Bascos's Defense: Bascos claimed the contract was a lease of the truck, not a contract of carriage. She presented affidavits (her own and that of Jesus Bascos) referring to the agreement as a "lease." She argued that hijacking constituted force majeure, absolving her of liability.

• Contract as Lease: Petitioner argued that the true agreement was a lease of the cargo truck, not a contract of carriage, as evidenced by affidavits characterizing it as such and because her services were offered only to select customers, not the general public.
• Hijacking as Force Majeure: Petitioner maintained that the loss of the cargo was due to force majeure (hijacking), which exempted her from liability under the law on obligations and contracts.

• Existence of a Contract of Carriage: Respondent countered that petitioner's own judicial admission of being in the trucking business established her as a common carrier. The nature of the contract is defined by law, not by the parties' label.
• Failure to Overcome Presumption of Negligence: Respondent argued that hijacking is not force majeure per se under the Civil Code provisions on common carriers. The petitioner, as a common carrier, was presumed negligent and failed to adduce sufficient proof that she exercised extraordinary diligence or that the hijackers used grave or irresistible force.

• Status as Common Carrier: Whether petitioner Estrellita M. Bascos is a common carrier under Article 1732 of the Civil Code.
• Liability for Hijacking: Whether the loss of the cargo due to hijacking constitutes force majeure that exculpates petitioner from liability.

• Status as Common Carrier: Petitioner is a common carrier. Her judicial admission of being in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move, satisfies the definition under Article 1732. The law makes no distinction between a principal or ancillary business, regular or occasional service, or service to the general public versus a select segment. The contract is one of carriage because its essence is the transport of goods for compensation, regardless of the parties' characterization.
• Liability for Hijacking: The hijacking does not absolve petitioner. Under Articles 1735 and 1745 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is presumed negligent upon loss of goods unless it proves extraordinary diligence. Hijacking is not among the fortuitous events listed in Article 1734 that exempt the carrier from the presumption. To escape liability for robbery, the carrier must prove the robbers acted with "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." Petitioner's evidence (affidavits) was insufficient to prove this, as the affiants were available as witnesses and their accounts were not firsthand or detailed. The presumption of negligence thus became conclusive against her.

• Definition and Test of a Common Carrier — Under Article 1732, a common carrier is any person or entity engaged in the business of carrying goods for compensation, offering their services to the public. The test is whether the undertaking is part of the business held out to the public as an occupation, not the quantity or extent of business. The law does not distinguish between principal or sideline activities, regular or occasional service, or service to the entire public versus a narrow segment.
• Presumption of Negligence and Burden of Proof in Common Carriage — Common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary diligence over goods. If goods are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or negligent (Article 1735). This presumption is rebuttable only by proof of extraordinary diligence. The burden of proof shifts to the carrier to overcome the presumption.
• Hijacking and Carrier Liability — Hijacking is not considered a natural disaster or calamity under Article 1734. Therefore, loss due to hijacking falls under Article 1735, and the carrier is presumed negligent. To be exempt from liability for acts of robbers, the carrier must prove the robbers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force, as stipulated in Article 1745(6). Failure to prove this makes the carrier liable.

• "The test to determine a common carrier is 'whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacted.'"
• "It must be understood that a contract is what the law defines it to be and not what it is called by the contracting parties."
• "The presumption of negligence was raised against petitioner. It was petitioner's burden to overcome it. Thus, contrary to her assertion, private respondent need not introduce any evidence to prove her negligence. Her own failure to adduce sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence made the presumption conclusive against her."

• De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 612 (1988) — Controlling precedent applied. The Court reiterated De Guzman's interpretation that Article 1732 makes no distinction regarding the regularity of service or the breadth of the clientele served. It also followed De Guzman's ruling that hijacking is not force majeure absolving a carrier, and that liability attaches unless the robbers used grave or irresistible force.
• Solivio v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 119 (1990) — Cited for the rule that judicial admissions are conclusive and require no further proof.
• Schmid and Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corp., 166 SCRA 493 (1988) — Cited for the principle that a contract is what the law defines it to be, not what the parties call it.
• Ayco v. Fernandez, 195 SCRA 328 (1991) — Cited for the rule that affidavits are not the best evidence if the affiants are available as witnesses.

• Article 1732, Civil Code — Defines a common carrier. Applied to hold petitioner liable as a common carrier.
• Article 1733, Civil Code — Imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence on common carriers for the vigilance of goods and safety of passengers.
• Article 1734, Civil Code — Enumerates the exclusive causes (fortuitous events) that exempt a common carrier from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of goods. Hijacking is not included.
• Article 1735, Civil Code — Establishes the presumption that a common carrier is at fault or negligent if goods are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, unless it proves extraordinary diligence.
• Article 1745(6), Civil Code — Declares as unjust and contrary to public policy any stipulation that diminishes or dispenses with a carrier's liability for acts of thieves or robbers who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.

• Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
• Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
• Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
• Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo
• Justice Jose A. R. Melo