Barut vs. People of the Philippines

An extrajudicial sworn statement that is not formally offered as evidence cannot be considered by the trial or appellate court; accordingly, any contradiction between such a statement and the witness’s in-court testimony furnishes no ground to overturn a conviction. In imposing the indeterminate sentence for homicide where no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the maximum term must be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Moral damages and civil indemnity for death are automatically granted in homicide cases without need of pleading or proof, and temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 may be awarded in lieu of actual damages when the amount of pecuniary loss cannot be proved with certainty.

At around 6:00 p.m. on September 24, 1995, SPO4 Vicente Ucag, his wife, and their 16-year-old son Vincent were returning to Taguig from a picnic in Laguna. Vicente rode in a passenger jeepney driven by his brother Rolando; his wife and Vincent traveled in an owner-type jeep driven by Rico Villas. When Villas exited at the Sucat Interchange on the South Luzon Expressway, PNCC guards Conrado Ancheta and Emeritu C. Barut flagged him down for driving without headlights. Ancheta demanded Villas’s driving license and, upon its eventual surrender, issued a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket. The passenger jeepney carrying Vicente Ucag stopped at the same location. Vicente alighted with co-passenger Danilo Fabiano to inquire about the situation. After being told the reason for the stop, Vicente asked Ancheta to return Villas’s license. Ancheta refused. A heated argument ensued. Vicente eventually turned away to avoid further conflict and instructed Villas to retrieve the license the next day. Ancheta, apparently provoked, dared Vicente to settle the matter immediately, drew his .38 caliber revolver, and fired several shots, hitting Vicente in both thighs. Vicente returned fire with his .45 caliber pistol and struck Ancheta. While the two wounded men lay on the ground, Vincent rushed toward his father. Before Vincent could reach him, Barut shot Vincent in the chest. Vincent collapsed and was taken to the Parañaque Medical Center, where he died during emergency surgery. The slug recovered from Vincent’s body came from a .38 caliber revolver, not from Vicente’s .45 caliber firearm.

• The Roadside Stop and Shooting: On September 24, 1995, PNCC guards Ancheta and Barut flagged down the owner-type jeep driven by Rico Villas at the Sucat Interchange for lacking headlights. Ancheta asked for Villas’s driving license, but Villas delayed producing it. After Villas finally surrendered the license, Ancheta issued a TVR ticket. A passenger jeepney carrying SPO4 Vicente Ucag and Danilo Fabiano arrived. Ucag and Fabiano approached the guards. Upon learning the reason for the stop, Ucag requested the license’s return. Ancheta refused. Ucag argued with Ancheta and Barut but eventually turned away to avoid further escalation, telling Villas to reclaim the license the following day. Ancheta then dared Ucag to resolve the matter immediately and drew his .38 caliber revolver, firing multiple shots that hit Ucag in both thighs. Ucag fired back with his .45 caliber pistol and wounded Ancheta. Both men fell to the ground bleeding.

• The Fatal Shooting of Vincent Ucag: Vincent Ucag, seeing his father shot, ran toward him. Before Vincent could reach his father, Barut fired at Vincent, hitting him in the chest. Vincent attempted to return to the jeep where his mother waited but collapsed. He was brought to the Parañaque Medical Center and died during emergency surgery. The slug extracted from Vincent’s body was from a .38 caliber revolver, matching Barut’s service firearm rather than Ucag’s .45 caliber pistol.

• Prosecution Evidence: Eyewitnesses Rico Villas and Danilo Fabiano testified clearly and consistently that Barut shot Vincent. The trial court found that neither the wounded Ucag nor the wounded Ancheta could have fired the fatal shot; both were already incapacitated on the ground. The ballistics evidence established that the fatal slug came from a .38 caliber weapon.

• Defense Evidence: Barut denied firing at Vincent. He invoked an extrajudicial sworn statement executed by Villas on September 25, 1995—the day after the shooting—in which Villas allegedly declared he had not seen Barut fire a gun. Barut contended this declaration contradicted Villas’s in-court identification and that Villas’s trial testimony was ambiguous. The extrajudicial sworn statement, however, was never formally offered or admitted as evidence by either party.

• Lower Courts’ Findings: The RTC found the testimonies of Villas and Fabiano positive, categorical, and credible. Barut’s bare denial could not overcome their positive identification. The CA concurred, holding that it discerned no compelling reason to reverse the trial court’s factual assessment.

• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals overlooked or neglected facts favorable to him, particularly the extrajudicial sworn statement of Villas declaring that Villas had not seen Barut fire a gun. He maintained this statement contradicted Villas’s later court testimony and demonstrated that the identification was not clear and convincing.

• Credibility and Ambiguity: Petitioner contended that the supposed consistency of the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies was a sweeping conclusion. He pointed to Villas’s answer “Maybe he was hit” when asked why Vincent was weak as ambiguous, raising doubt as to who actually shot and killed the victim—whether it was Ancheta (who exchanged fire with the victim’s father) or Barut.

• Deference to Trial Court’s Findings: Respondent maintained that the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility, affirmed by the CA, was supported by the record and should not be disturbed. The positive and consistent identification of Barut as the shooter by Villas and Fabiano outweighed Barut’s denial.

• Procedural Bar: Respondent submitted that the extrajudicial sworn statement of Villas had never been formally offered in evidence, and therefore could not be considered by any court. Even if considered, any inconsistency should be resolved in favor of the sworn testimony given in open court.

• Credibility and the Unoffered Extrajudicial Statement: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming Barut’s conviction despite the alleged inconsistency between Villas’s extrajudicial sworn statement (which was not formally offered) and his trial testimony.

• Correct Penalty: Whether the indeterminate sentence imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA—with a maximum of 17 years and eight months of reclusion temporal—conformed to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, considering that no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the homicide.

• Civil Liability: Whether the lower courts correctly awarded P250,000.00 as a lump sum for actual and moral damages without specifying the amounts corresponding to civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages, and whether the imposed interest rate was proper.

• Credibility and the Unoffered Extrajudicial Statement: The conviction was upheld. Factual findings of the trial court on witness credibility are accorded great respect, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because the trial judge had the unique advantage of directly observing the witnesses’ demeanor. Villas and Fabiano positively and categorically identified Barut as the person who shot Vincent; Barut’s bare denial could not overcome this. The extrajudicial sworn statement of Villas was never formally offered as evidence by either party. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, courts may consider only evidence formally offered for a specified purpose, as the rule protects the adverse party’s right to due process by allowing timely objection and proper rebuttal. The exception—where the evidence was duly identified by testimony and incorporated in the records—did not apply because the prosecution never offered it. Even if the statement had been considered, a contradiction between an extrajudicial statement and in-court testimony is resolved in favor of the latter. Villas’s answer “Maybe he was hit” did not create reasonable doubt; the trial court had already established from the testimonies and physical evidence that neither Ucag nor Ancheta could have fired the fatal shot, and that the slug came from a .38 caliber revolver.

• Correct Penalty: The indeterminate sentence was modified. The maximum term of 17 years and eight months fell within the maximum period of reclusion temporal, but because neither the RTC nor the CA found any aggravating circumstance, the maximum should have been taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal (14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months). The maximum was thus reduced to 17 years and four months, while the minimum of 10 years of prision mayor was retained.

• Civil Liability: The lump-sum award of P250,000.00 was set aside and restructured. In homicide cases, civil indemnity for death and moral damages are mandatory and fixed at P75,000.00 each, because the loss of life invariably occasions moral and spiritual suffering that requires neither pleading nor proof. Actual damages were not substantiated with receipts, but temperate damages of P25,000.00 were awarded pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of temperate damages when a pecuniary loss is certain but the amount cannot be proved with precision. The interest rate on all damages was fixed at six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of finality of the judgment until full satisfaction, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Formal Offer of Evidence Rule — Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider only evidence that has been formally offered. The offer must specify the purpose for which the evidence is presented, ensuring the adverse party’s right to object and to meet the evidence. This rule is relaxed only when: (1) the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded, and (2) it was incorporated in the records of the case. It does not apply when judicial notice is taken, when judicial admissions are relied upon, or when a trial court assesses witness demeanor pursuant to Section 1, Rule 132. Here, because Villas’s extrajudicial statement was never formally offered, it could not be considered to impeach his trial testimony.

• Deference to Trial Court’s Credibility Findings — Findings of fact by the trial court, especially those relating to the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect on appeal, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This deference rests on the trial judge’s singular opportunity to observe the demeanor, manner, and sincerity of witnesses during testimony. Absent any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts of substance that would alter the result, the findings stand.

• Indeterminate Sentence for Homicide Without Aggravating Circumstances — The maximum term of the indeterminate sentence for homicide (penalized by reclusion temporal) must be taken from the medium period of the penalty when no aggravating circumstance is present. The medium period of reclusion temporal ranges from 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four months.

• Mandatory Nature of Death Indemnity and Moral Damages in Homicide — Civil indemnity for death and moral damages are automatically granted in homicide and murder cases without need of allegation or proof, because the violent death of a person inherently brings emotional pain, anguish, and a definite loss to the heirs. The amount for each is P75,000.00 when the crime is a gross offense.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Unsubstantiated Actual Damages — Article 2224 of the Civil Code permits the recovery of temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. In homicide cases where burial and related expenses are not supported by receipts, temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are warranted.

• “It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. … A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only—and strictly—upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. To allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to consider it as evidence may draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility.” — This passage from Candido v. Court of Appeals, quoted with approval, encapsulates the ratio for excluding the unoffered extrajudicial statement.

• “x x x a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them.” — This rationale, taken from People v. Panado, justifies the automatic award of moral damages without proof.

• “The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated in the records of the case.” — The Court here restates the narrow exception to the formal-offer rule, which did not aid Barut.

• Candido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107493, February 1, 1996 — Followed as controlling authority on the rule that courts may consider only evidence formally offered. The Court quoted the decision at length to underscore the due-process rationale behind the rule.

• Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680, December 7, 1992 — Cited to support the principle that credibility of witnesses is a factual issue generally beyond the Supreme Court’s review in a petition for review on certiorari.

• Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106472, August 7, 1996 — Applied for the doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great respect and finality.

• People v. Napat-a, G.R. No. 84951, November 14, 1989; People v. Mate, 103 SCRA 484 (1981); Vda. de Oñate v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116149, November 23, 1995 — Cited for the two-pronged exception to the formal-offer rule.

• People v. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000 — Relied upon for the doctrine that moral damages and death indemnity need neither pleading nor proof in homicide because death always occasions moral suffering.

• People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009 — Applied for the rule that temperate damages of at least P25,000.00 are awarded when actual damages for burial expenses are not substantiated by receipts.

• Sison v. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012 — Followed for the imposition of interest at six percent (6%) per annum on all civil liability items from the finality of judgment until fully paid.

• Section 34, Rule 132, Rules of Court (Formal Offer) — The court shall consider no evidence that has not been formally offered, and the offer shall state the specific purpose for which the evidence is presented. Applied to exclude Villas’s extrajudicial sworn statement from the court’s consideration.

• Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court (Discretionary Judicial Notice) — Enumerated as one exception to the formal-offer rule; inapplicable here because no matter of public knowledge or unquestionable demonstration was at issue.

• Section 4, Rule 129, Rules of Court (Judicial Admissions) — Another exception to the formal-offer rule; inapplicable because no party made a judicial admission in the proceedings.

• Section 1, Rule 132, Rules of Court (Examination in Open Court) — The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility based on demeanor observed during open-court testimony is recognized as an implicit exception to the formal-offer requirement for that purpose.

• Article 2224, Civil Code — Temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Applied to justify the award of P25,000.00 in lieu of unsubstantiated actual damages.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, and Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred.