Barrientos vs. Daarol

A lawyer who obtains a woman's sexual consent through deceit—by concealing his existing marriage and falsely promising marriage—commits grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment, as good moral character is a continuing qualification required of all members of the Bar, not merely a condition precedent to admission.

The complainant, Victoria Barrientos, was a single college student approximately 20 years old, residing in Dipolog City with her family—her father being the Assistant Principal of the local public high school. The respondent, Transfiguracion Daarol, was a 41-year-old married lawyer serving as General Manager of the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO), who had been separated from his wife, Romualda Sumaylo, whom he married on September 24, 1955, for about 16 years. The Barrientos family had known respondent for years—he was a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and a former classmate of her mother at Andres Bonifacio College. The disbarment proceeding was initiated under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes disbarment or suspension for deceit or grossly immoral conduct.

The complainant Victoria Barrientos, a single college student born on December 23, 1952, met respondent Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 through her sister Norma, whom respondent used to visit at their residence in Dipolog City. Respondent, born on August 6, 1932, was the General Manager of the Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and lived alone in Dipolog City, having been separated from his wife, Romualda Sumaylo—whom he married on September 24, 1955 in a Catholic ceremony—for about 16 years. The Barrientos family had long known respondent: he was a former student of complainant's father in 1952 and a former classmate of her mother at Andres Bonifacio College. Respondent lived alone in Dipolog City, and although his son was also studying there, the son lived separately. Respondent never introduced his son and went around with friends as though he were never married.

On June 27, 1973, respondent invited complainant, with her father's consent, to serve as an usherette at the Mason's Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30. He fetched her from her residence each morning and took her home after each day's activities. On July 1, 1973, respondent invited her for a joy ride to Sicayab beach, where he proposed his love and promised to marry her within six months if she accepted. After a week of courtship, complainant accepted his proposal on July 7, 1973, and they agreed to marry in December 1973. Respondent visited her almost every night thereafter, pressing her for a decision and courting her persistently.

On August 20, 1973, with her father's consent, respondent invited complainant to a party at the Lopez Skyroom. After leaving the party at about 10:00 p.m., respondent invited her for a joy ride and drove to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City, parking his jeep by the beach where there were no houses around. Inside the jeep, respondent reiterated his promise to marry her, began caressing her, and, despite her protest that she was afraid because they were not yet married, persuaded her by saying "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you" and "anyway, December is very near, the month we have been waiting for," then pleaded "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid." Because she loved him, complainant agreed to sexual intercourse on the back seat of the jeep. Afterward, she wept, and respondent again promised marriage. From August to October 1973, respondent continued to take her out two to three times a week, usually ending at the airport where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Complainant consented because she loved him and believed his promises.

Sometime in mid-September 1973, complainant noticed her menstruation had not come. A pregnancy test confirmed she was pregnant. When she informed respondent, he suggested abortion; she objected and he did not insist. Respondent then assured her they would marry within one month and that he would speak to her parents. On October 20, 1973, respondent met with complainant's parents, and it was agreed that the marriage would be celebrated in Manila to avoid scandal, as complainant was already pregnant. Complainant and her mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973, while respondent was to follow by plane. They stayed at the house of complainant's sister Delia and her husband Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila.

On October 26, 1973, when respondent visited complainant and her mother in Manila, he disclosed for the first time that he was already married. Complainant's mother reacted with anger, saying "Trans, so you fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" Respondent reassured them that he had been separated from his wife for 16 years and would work for an annulment, then marry complainant. He promised monthly support of ₱250.00 and instructed complainant to deliver the child in Manila. He returned to Dipolog and sent the promised support, visiting complainant in January, February, and March 1974, each time telling her the annulment would soon be approved. However, respondent never filed any annulment proceedings. Complainant eventually went to Cebu City in April 1974, where her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill. She delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor Hospital, naming the child "Dureza Barrientos."

After returning to Dipolog City in late June 1974, complainant tried to contact respondent by phone and through her brother, but to no avail. She fell ill and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical treatment. Respondent never came to see her. She consulted a lawyer and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National Electrification Administration, which was referred to ZANECO and dismissed. On August 20, 1975, she filed the sworn disbarment complaint with the Supreme Court. Respondent testified on his own behalf, claiming that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage from the start, that no force or deceit was used, and that the complaint was motivated by his failure to provide financial support. He also claimed to have embraced Islam in 1953, suggesting he could enter into multiple marriages, and stated "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." The Court found these claims unpersuasive, noting that respondent lived alone, never introduced his son, and went around as though he were never married—circumstances that belied his claim that complainant's family knew of his marital status.

• Deceit: Complainant sought disbarment on the ground that respondent deceived her by concealing his marital status and falsely promising marriage to obtain her sexual consent, revealing his existing marriage only after she became pregnant.
• Grossly Immoral Conduct: Complainant alleged that respondent's conduct—courting a young woman while married, engaging in sexual relations through deception, impregnating her, suggesting abortion, and abandoning her and the child—constituted grossly immoral conduct unworthy of a member of the Bar.

• Awareness of Marital Status: Respondent claimed that complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at the very start of his courtship, as he had mentioned to complainant his being estranged from his wife.
• Absence of Deceit or Force: Respondent maintained that complainant consented to sexual intercourse because of her love for him, and that he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit, or cajolery.
• Islamic Faith Defense: Respondent alleged that he was a Moslem convert since 1953 and, as such, could enter into multiple marriages, inquiring into the possibility of marrying complainant.
• Motive for Complaint: Respondent claimed the disbarment case was filed against him because of his failure to give money to support complainant while she was in Cebu waiting for delivery of the child, and to meet her medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical check-up.
• No Moral Wrong: Respondent stated that he saw nothing wrong with the relationship despite his being married.

• Grounds for Disbarment: Whether respondent's conduct constituted deceit and grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• Deceit: Whether respondent committed deceit by concealing his existing marriage and falsely promising marriage to obtain complainant's sexual consent.
• Islamic Faith Defense: Whether respondent's claim of being a Moslem convert exempted him from liability for grossly immoral conduct.

• Grounds for Disbarment: Yes. Respondent was found guilty of grossly immoral conduct and deceit, warranting disbarment, as good moral character is a continuing qualification essential for remaining in the practice of law.
• Deceit: Yes. Respondent deceived complainant by concealing his marital status and falsely promising marriage, securing her sexual consent through repeated assurances he never intended to fulfill.
• Islamic Faith Defense: No. Respondent's claim of being a Moslem convert did not excuse his conduct, as he himself admitted he could not validly marry complainant because she was a Christian and his first marriage was solemnized in a civil ceremony.

• Grounds for Disbarment: Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law but also a continuing qualification essential for remaining in it. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for deceit or grossly immoral conduct. Under Section 2, Rule 138, good moral character is a condition for admission to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon admission. Respondent's conduct—deceiving a young woman into sexual relations, impregnating her, suggesting abortion, breaching his promise to marry, and abandoning her and the child—demonstrated moral delinquency rendering him unfit for continued membership in the legal profession. The Court emphasized that the practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to exacting standards of mental and moral fitness, and that lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be, leading a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.

• Deceit: The Court found it indubitable that complainant was never informed of respondent's real status as a married individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed only after complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as eligible to remarry, claiming he would work for an annulment, though he never filed any annulment proceedings. The Court noted that respondent knew all along that mere separation is not a ground for annulment and does not vest legal capacity to contract another marriage. Respondent lived alone, never introduced his son, and went around with friends as though he were never married—circumstances that belied his claim that complainant's family knew of his marital status. The Court concluded that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant, observing that it was not in accordance with the nature of complainant's educated and respectable family to allow a daughter to have an affair with a married man.

• Islamic Faith Defense: Respondent's claim of having embraced Islam was unsupported by any evidence save his self-serving testimony. More critically, respondent himself admitted that despite being a Moslem, having been married in a civil ceremony, he could not validly enter into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because complainant was a Christian. The Court reasoned that if respondent knew he could not marry complainant notwithstanding his being a Moslem convert, then it was grossly immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with her because he knew of the legal impediment. The defense was therefore rejected as a dubious attempt to escape responsibility.

• Good moral character as a continuing qualification — Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice. A lawyer who exhibits debased morality or moral delinquency may be suspended or disbarred. The Court applied this doctrine by finding respondent morally delinquent and unfit for continued membership in the Bar, emphasizing that the requirement of good character is not dispensed with upon admission.

• Grossly immoral conduct as a ground for disbarment — Grossly immoral conduct—such as deceiving a woman into sexual relations by concealing one's existing marriage and falsely promising marriage—constitutes a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court held that respondent's acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to satisfy his sexual desires amply demonstrated his moral delinquency, warranting the most severe disciplinary action.

• Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be — As officers of the court, lawyers must not only refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that they are flouting moral standards. The Court applied this principle by finding that respondent's conduct scandalized the institution of marriage and the moral standards expected of members of the Bar.

• "Good moral character is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess" — This passage articulates the foundational principle that moral fitness is a continuing requirement for Bar membership, not merely a threshold for admission, and serves as the doctrinal basis for the disbarment.

• "The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness." — This passage defines the Court's view of legal practice as a privilege contingent upon sustained moral and intellectual qualification, justifying the imposition of the most severe disciplinary action where a lawyer exhibits debased morality.

• "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community." — This passage establishes the dual requirement of actual and apparent moral rectitude for lawyers, requiring conduct that avoids even the appearance of flouting community moral standards.

• Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981] — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that a married man's act of making love to another woman while his marriage is valid and existing is contrary to honesty, justice, decency, and morality, making a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage.

• Piatt vs. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933] — Cited for the principle that good character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law but its continued possession is essential for remaining in practice, drawing on Justice George A. Malcolm's formulation that courts retain the power to discipline attorneys whose character is bad.

• People vs. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990] — Cited for the principle that good moral character is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess, supporting the disbarment of a lawyer who no longer meets that standard.

• Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989] — Cited alongside People vs. Tuanda for the continuing qualification requirement.

• Terre vs. Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992 — Cited as a recent analogous disbarment case involving a lawyer who deceived a woman about her prior marriage, married her, begot a child, abandoned her and the child, and married another woman.

• Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21 [1989] — Cited for the requirement that lawyers must behave so as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that they are flouting moral standards, itself citing Toledo vs. Toledo and Royong vs. Oblena.

• Quingwa vs. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967] — Cited in conclusion for the proposition that a morally delinquent lawyer should not be allowed continued membership in the legal profession.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Authorizes the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar for deceit, malpractice, or other grossly immoral conduct. The Court applied this provision by finding respondent guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct and ordering his disbarment.

• Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Requires good moral character as a condition for admission to the Bar. The Court relied on this provision to establish that good moral character is a continuing qualification not dispensed with upon admission, and that its absence warrants disbarment.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.