Barrameda vs. Court of Appeals

A person who receives money in trust with the duty to deliver it, denies receipt to the prejudice of another after demand, is guilty of estafa by misappropriation or conversion under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, and venue lies where any essential element, including demand, occurred.

Lolita Watanabe was working in Japan as a caretaker, while petitioner Wilma Barrameda was her aunt, being the wife of her mother's brother. Papiniana Barrameda Paguinto, Watanabe's mother, resided in the Philippines and was the intended recipient of money sent from Japan. The governing statute was Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code punishing estafa through misappropriation, conversion, or denial of receipt of property received in trust with duty to deliver or return.

Lolita Watanabe, then working in Japan, was connected to petitioner Wilma Barrameda as niece to aunt, Barrameda being the wife of the brother of Watanabe's mother, Papiniana Barrameda Paguinto. At around 6:00 p.m. on November 26, 1984, Watanabe, together with her brother and some Japanese friends, visited Barrameda at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Edmund Guiking at Atsugi Base, as Barrameda was leaving for the Philippines the following day.

According to the prosecution, Watanabe decided to send money to her mother through Barrameda, consisting of US$1,400.00 and 400,000 yen, equivalent to more or less P50,000.00. Watanabe counted the money in Barrameda's presence, placed it inside an envelope with a letter, and handed it to Barrameda, who likewise counted it before putting it inside her bag. That same day Watanabe informed her mother by long-distance call that she was sending money through Barrameda, as evidenced by a receipt dated November 26, 1984.

On November 27, 1984, Paguinto went to the Manila International Airport to fetch Barrameda. Upon seeing each other they embraced, after which Barrameda, trembling and feeling cold, said the money sent by Watanabe had been misplaced and could have been in the baggages, and proposed looking for it in the baggage. At Barrameda's suggestion they proceeded to the house of Paguinto's brother at Cabrera, Pasay City to open the baggage, but because many people were there, the place being a beer-house, Barrameda suggested opening her baggage instead at her home in Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna. From Cabrera, Paguinto placed a long-distance call to Japan; Watanabe also spoke with Barrameda, who said she was still looking for the money among her baggage. Paguinto did not accompany Barrameda to Laguna since it was far and late, relying on Barrameda's assurance that she would deliver the money the following morning.

When Barrameda failed to deliver the following day, Paguinto and her husband went to Barrameda's house in Pacita Complex, where Barrameda said the money had not yet been found but she would continue looking for it. Despite repeated demands, Barrameda never gave the money to Paguinto. Petitioner, for her part, denied ever receiving the US$1,400.00 and 400,000 yen, alleging instead that Watanabe had only asked her to bring two boxes of assorted goods for her parents, which she left at the airport as excess baggage because Watanabe gave no money for freight charges, and that she asked the Guiking couple to inform Watanabe thereof. She opined that her estranged husband connived with Paguinto and Watanabe to file the case to prevent her from leaving for Japan. The trial court found the prosecution's account proved: Watanabe positively testified to personal delivery, corroborated by Paguinto's testimony on the airport admission and subsequent demands and by Ruben Barrameda's testimony on overheard telephone conversations confirming the remittance through petitioner.

• Jurisdiction and Venue: Petitioner argued that not a single element of estafa occurred within Pasay City, so the RTC of Pasay City lacked jurisdiction, the complaint having properly belonged in Japan where turnover allegedly occurred or in San Pedro, Laguna where delivery was demanded, and that estafa did not even reach its incipient stage because no demand was ever made.
• Credibility and Sufficiency of Turnover Proof: Petitioner maintained that the uncorroborated testimony of Lolita Watanabe on the alleged turnover of fourteen US$100 bills and forty 10,000-yen bills should not have been credited and did not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• November 15, 1984 Letter: Petitioner argued that the contents and veracity of the letter allegedly sent by Watanabe (Exh. A) were erroneously appreciated based on the biased testimonies of Watanabe and her mother, and that it was not properly identified without testimony from "Nancy" through whom it was sent.
• Telephone Receipts: Petitioner argued that admission of the telephone receipts (Exhs. B, B-1, B-2) was grave abuse of discretion because they were written in Japanese without translation, and that weight should not have been given to them.
• Bias of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner maintained that the testimonies of Papiniana Paguinto and Ruben Barrameda were biased, being the mother and uncle of the complainant, uncorroborated, and unworthy of credence.

• Jurisdiction and Venue: Whether the RTC of Pasay City had jurisdiction where the alleged turnover occurred in Japan and delivery was to be in Laguna, and whether demand, as an element of estafa, occurred within Pasay City.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Credibility: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received US$1,400.00 and 400,000 yen in trust for delivery, in light of alleged inconsistencies, bias, and lack of corroboration.
• Admissibility of Documentary Evidence: Whether the November 15, 1984 letter and the telephone bill receipts were properly admitted and given weight despite objections on identification and foreign language entries.
• Correct Indeterminate Penalty: Whether the indeterminate sentence imposed for estafa involving P50,000.00 was correct under Article 315 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Jurisdiction and Venue: Yes. Jurisdiction validly vested in the RTC of Pasay City because demand, an essential element of estafa, occurred at the Manila International Airport within its territory.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Credibility: Yes. Receipt in trust and subsequent denial were established by positive, corroborated testimony, while mere denial could not prevail and trial court credibility findings are entitled to great respect.
• Admissibility of Documentary Evidence: Yes. The letter was properly identified by its writer and recipient, and the telephone receipts with English or numerical entries corroborated the calls; in any event, other evidence sufficed.
• Correct Indeterminate Penalty: No, in part. The 10-year maximum was correct but the minimum was corrected to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, within the penalty next lower in the absence of aggravating circumstances.

• Jurisdiction and Venue: Prosecution for estafa by misappropriation requires (1) receipt in trust or under duty to deliver or return, (2) misappropriation, conversion, or denial of receipt, (3) prejudice to another, and (4) demand by the offended party. Criminal actions are instituted and tried where the offense was committed or where any essential ingredient took place. Papiniana Paguinto's presence at the airport upon petitioner's arrival was for no other purpose than to collect the entrusted money, and inquiry as to its whereabouts is tantamount to demand even without using the specific word "demand." Since the airport is within Pasay City, one element occurred there.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Credibility: Watanabe positively declared counting the dollars and yen, placing them with a letter in an envelope, handing them to petitioner, and watching petitioner recount and place them in her bag. This was strongly corroborated by Paguinto, who recounted petitioner's airport admission that the money was misplaced, the aborted search at Ruben Barrameda's beer-house in Cabrera, the promise to deliver the next morning, and continued failure despite demands, and by Ruben Barrameda, who overheard telephone conversations confirming the remittance through petitioner and heard petitioner tell Watanabe not to worry. Appellate courts do not disturb trial court credibility findings absent overlooked facts of substance and value, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and mere denial is feeble against positive eyewitness testimony and the record.
• Admissibility of Documentary Evidence: The November 15, 1984 letter enclosing US$400.00 and stating that the equivalent of P50,000.00 would be sent through petitioner was properly identified by Watanabe as writer and Paguinto as recipient; testimony of the intermediary "Nancy" would have been merely corroborative and unnecessary. The telephone receipts showed through English or numerical entries the date, type, destination or origin, and the party called "Paguinto," supporting that calls on November 26 and 27 to the Philippines occurred. They were merely supporting evidence of the conversations showing remittance through petitioner, so exclusion would still leave ample proof of non-delivery.
• Correct Indeterminate Penalty: For fraud over P12,000.00 but not exceeding P22,000.00, the penalty is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, imposed in its maximum period with one year added per additional P10,000.00, not exceeding twenty years. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum is that properly imposable under the Code considering circumstances, and the minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower. The 10-year prision mayor maximum was therefore sustained, but with no aggravating circumstances the minimum was fixed within prision correccional minimum at 2 years and 4 months, plus indemnification of P50,000.00 and costs.

• Estafa by misappropriation or conversion — The elements are (1) receipt by the offender of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other obligation involving duty to deliver or return the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion thereof or denial of receipt; (3) prejudice to another; and (4) demand by the offended party. Applied here, all four concurred: entrustment in Japan, false denial, loss to Watanabe and her mother, and demand beginning at the airport.
• Venue in criminal prosecutions — The action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any one of its essential ingredients took place. Applied here, proof that demand occurred at the Manila International Airport sustained venue and jurisdiction in the RTC of Pasay City.
• Demand as element of estafa — The specific word "demand" need not be used; a query as to the whereabouts of the money is tantamount to demand. Applied here, Paguinto's airport inquiry and follow-up demands satisfied the element despite absence of formal wording.
• Credibility of witnesses and denial as defense — Findings of the trial court on credibility, having heard witnesses and observed demeanor, are entitled to great respect and highest consideration when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and mere denial cannot prevail over positive eyewitness testimony and corroborating evidence. Applied here, petitioner's uncorroborated, inconsistent denial was rejected.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law in estafa — If punished under the Revised Penal Code, the indeterminate sentence's maximum is that properly imposable under the Code in view of attending circumstances, while the minimum must be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed. Applied here to fraud of P50,000.00, the maximum of 10 years of prision mayor was retained and the minimum corrected to prision correccional range.

• "It must be noted that the specific word "demand" need not be used to show that demand had indeed been made upon the person charged of the offense." — States the controlling rule on proving demand in estafa, allowing informal inquiry to satisfy the element.
• "a query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to demand" — Applies the demand rule to Paguinto's airport inquiry, supplying both the element and venue in Pasay City.
• "it is axiomatic that appellate courts will usually not disturb the findings of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance and value had been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case" — Defines the deference accorded to credibility findings, sustaining reliance on Watanabe, Paguinto, and Ruben Barrameda over petitioner's denial.
• "By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;" — Quotes the statutory definition of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) under which liability was imposed.

• Fontanilla vs. People, 258 SCRA 460 — Cited as authority for the four elements of estafa by misappropriation or conversion.
• Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202 — Cited jointly as authority for the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).
• People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77 — Cited as authority that criminal actions are instituted and tried where the offense was committed or where any essential ingredient took place.
• Tubb vs. People, 101 Phil. 114 — Cited as authority that a query as to the whereabouts of money is tantamount to demand.
• People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31 — Cited for deference to trial court credibility findings and for the rule that denial is a feeble defense against positive testimony.
• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 542 — Cited for the rule that trial court credibility findings affirmed by the Court of Appeals command great respect and highest consideration.

• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — Punishes defraudation with unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by misappropriating, converting, or denying receipt of money or property received in trust or under duty to deliver or return; applied to petitioner's receipt of foreign currency for delivery to Paguinto and subsequent denial and non-delivery.
• Article 315, first paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Fixes prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum for fraud over P12,000.00 up to P22,000.00, imposed in maximum period with one year per additional P10,000.00 not exceeding twenty years; applied to compute the sentence for P50,000.00 fraud as 10 years maximum.
• Section 1, Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Requires an indeterminate penalty with maximum properly imposable under the Code and minimum within the next lower penalty; applied to correct the minimum to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional absent aggravating circumstances.

Melo, J., Vitug, J., Panganiban, J. and Purisima, J., concur.