Baritua vs. Court of Appeals

The term "resides" in Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. The Court held that for purposes of venue, actual residence requires physical presence and actual stay with continuity and consistency; a plaintiff who has fixed his abode abroad for over a year prior to filing suit cannot rely on his former Philippine domicile to establish venue in that locality.

On January 19, 1988, a bus owned by petitioner Jose Baritua rammed a car owned by private respondent Roy R. Domingo along the Maharlika Highway in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Private respondent left for the United States on April 25, 1988. On February 18, 1988, prior to his departure, he executed a special power of attorney before the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California, declaring himself a resident of Los Angeles. On June 26, 1989, private respondent, through his attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan, alleging that he was a resident of Rosales before moving to the United States.

• The Incident: On January 19, 1988, a bus owned by petitioner Jose Baritua, operator of J.B. Bus Lines, collided with private respondent Roy R. Domingo's car in Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
• Private Respondent's Departure: Private respondent left for the United States on April 25, 1988. On February 18, 1988, he executed a special power of attorney in favor of Crispin A. Domingo before the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles, California, declaring himself a resident of Los Angeles.
• The Complaint: On June 26, 1989, private respondent, represented by his attorney-in-fact, filed a complaint for actual and exemplary damages in the RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan. In the complaint, he alleged that he was a resident of Poblacion, Rosales, Pangasinan before moving to the United States, where he currently lived at 4525 Leata Lane, La Canada, California. His attorney-in-fact resided in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner's business address was in Pasay City, though petitioner claimed actual residence in Gubat, Sorsogon.
• Motion to Dismiss: Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, arguing that private respondent was not a resident of the Philippines and the action should have been filed where the defendant resides.
• Lower Court Findings: The trial court denied the motion, finding that private respondent was merely temporarily out of the country and did not lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan. The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding.

• Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the venue, as the evidence overwhelmingly showed that the action was improperly laid.
• Petitioner maintained that private respondent had remained an actual resident of Los Angeles, California, since February 18, 1988, up to the present, thereby disqualifying Rosales, Pangasinan as the proper venue for the plaintiff under Section 2(b) of Rule 4.

• Respondent countered, relying on the lower courts' findings, that private respondent was merely temporarily out of the country and did not lose his legal residence in Rosales, Pangasinan.
• Respondent implied that the temporary nature of private respondent's "working non-immigrant" visa in the United States preserved his Philippine residence for venue purposes.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues: Whether venue was properly laid in Rosales, Pangasinan, given private respondent's residence in the United States at the time the complaint was filed.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive: The Court ruled that venue was improperly laid. Under Section 2(b) of Rule 4, the plaintiff in a personal action may file the complaint where the plaintiff or defendant "resides." The word "resides" means actual residence—physical presence and actual stay with continuity and consistency—and not legal residence or domicile. At the time the complaint was filed, private respondent had fixed his abode in Los Angeles, California, and stayed there continuously and consistently for over a year. His own complaint and special power of attorney expressly declared his residence in the United States. The temporary nature of his "working non-immigrant" visa did not negate his actual residence in the U.S., as there was no indication of when his employment would end or that he had returned to the Philippines. Because neither party resided in Rosales, Pangasinan at the commencement of the action, the venue was improper.

• Actual Residence for Purposes of Venue — For purposes of venue under Section 2(b) of Rule 4, "resides" connotes actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. Actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e., physical presence and actual stay thereat, which must be more than temporary and must possess continuity and consistency. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that private respondent's continuous and consistent stay in Los Angeles, California, for over a year prior to filing the complaint constituted his actual residence, rendering his former domicile in Rosales, Pangasinan, irrelevant for venue purposes.

• "The word 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence' or 'domicile.' Actual residence may in some cases be the legal residence or domicile, but for purposes of venue, actual residence is the place of abode and not necessarily legal residence or domicile."
• "When the complaint was filed in Rosales, Pangasinan, not one of the parties was a resident of the town. Private respondent was a resident of Los Angeles, California while his attorney-in-fact was a resident of Cubao, Quezon City."

• Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 298 (1976) — Followed. The Court relied on this case to emphasize that a plaintiff's manifested intention to return to a domicile to justify venue is of no moment; what is paramount is where the plaintiff actually resided at the time the action was brought.
• Bejer v. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 566 (1989) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that "resides" means actual residence and that such physical presence must be more than temporary, possessing continuity and consistency. Distinguished from the facts therein where petitioners were declared mere occasional visitors.
• Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124 (1977) — Followed. Cited for the definition of "resides" as actual residence rather than domicile.

• Section 2(b), Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the venue of personal actions in the Regional Trial Court, providing that they may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. The Court applied this provision to determine that because the plaintiff actually resided in the United States and not Rosales, Pangasinan, the chosen venue was improper.

Regalado, Romero, and Torres, Jr., JJ. (Mendoza, J., took no part).