Barcelo vs. Riparip

The nature of an ejectment action — whether forcible entry or unlawful detainer — is determined by the allegations in the complaint and by the nature of the defendant's entry into the land, not by the plaintiff's subsequent acts of tolerance; where the defendant's entry was illegal from the very beginning, the action is one for forcible entry, and the plaintiff's tolerance of the occupancy cannot convert it into unlawful detainer. Corollarily, a Torrens certificate of title evidences ownership and carries with it the right to possession, and its validity cannot be assailed collaterally in an ejectment case.

The controversy concerns a 36,435-square-meter parcel located at Barangay Conversion, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, registered under Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-1805 in the name of Adolfo G. Barcelo, husband of petitioner Susana Barcelo and father of the remaining petitioners, who succeeded to the property upon his death on October 5, 2004. Respondents trace their claim to Marcelino Riparip, their grandfather, who they assert had tilled and cultivated the land beginning in 1980, and who they say was succeeded in possession by themselves upon his death in 2000. The dispute thus pits a Torrens title issued pursuant to a free patent application against a competing claim of long-continued cultivation and possession, and is resolved within the summary ejectment framework of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Adolfo Barcelo was the registered owner of a 36,435-square-meter parcel of land covered by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-1805 and situated at Barangay Conversion, Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija. Adolfo's family had possessed the property by tilling and cultivating it and by planting vegetables and mango trees. Upon his death on October 5, 2004, his widow Susana Barcelo and his children Catherine B. Flores, Clariza B. Biato, Chesca B. Macapagal, Carlo Barcelo, and Camille Barcelo succeeded to the property and continued its cultivation.

Sometime in 2006, petitioners discovered that respondent Dominador Riparip had clandestinely encroached upon one hectare, more or less, of the subject property. Petitioners asked him to vacate, but he refused; he constructed a nipa house and fenced the perimeter of the encroached area. Petitioners filed a complaint before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee against Dominador, but no settlement was reached because he insisted that the encroached portion had been given to him by Adolfo, without presenting any document to prove the transfer. Because of financial constraints, petitioners did not immediately file an action in court and allowed Dominador to remain in possession of that portion, even against their will.

Sometime in June 2013, petitioners learned that Dominador, together with Romeo Riparip, Romeo Riparip, Jr., and Daniel Tamallana, had through strategy and stealth occupied the remaining area of the subject property. Petitioners' demands to vacate fell on deaf ears, and respondents even threatened to hurt them. The matter was brought to the barangay, but mediation failed. Petitioners caused a written demand to vacate dated August 5, 2013 to be served on respondents, who received it on August 8, 2013, and on February 28, 2014 they filed a complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Trial Court of Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija.

In their Answer with Special and Affirmative Defense and Motion to Dismiss, respondents countered that their grandfather, Marcelino Riparip, had originally been in possession of the subject property and had tilled and cultivated it in 1980, and that upon Marcelino's death in 2000 they continued the possession and cultivation by planting mango trees. They claimed that the subject property was formerly public land and that Adolfo and his wife had obtained a certificate of title by forging documents and by misrepresenting in their application for a Free Patent from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that they were in possession of the property. On that premise they argued that petitioners' title was null and void and that petitioners had no right to eject them, and they sought dismissal on the ground that the cause of action had prescribed because more than one year had lapsed from the 2006 demand to vacate. In their Reply, petitioners explained that the demand letter to vacate was given to respondents on August 8, 2013 while the complaint for ejectment was filed on February 28, 2014, so that their cause of action had not prescribed.

The lower courts' factual findings centered on possession. In her Judicial Affidavit, petitioner Susana Villaflor Barcelo stated that while Adolfo was alive, respondents had been prohibited from entering the subject property and had been stopped, but that after Adolfo's death on October 5, 2004, respondent Dominador took courage again and entered the property on July 25, 2006, occupying one hectare thereof; on the same day Susana immediately complained to the BARC Chairman, but Dominador ignored her demands and declared that her documents were fake. These allegations stood unrefuted. The property remained registered in the name of Adolfo G. Barcelo and was declared for taxation purposes; petitioners had been tilling and cultivating it by planting vegetables and mango trees; and upon discovering the stealthy intrusion, they immediately filed a complaint with the barangay and thereafter an ejectment complaint before the MTC.

• Propriety of the Action Not Raised on Appeal: Petitioners argued that in their petition for review before the Court of Appeals, respondents did not even put in issue the propriety of the action brought against them, and that the CA therefore erred in annulling the RTC Decision on the ground that the complaint for unlawful detainer rested solely on a bare allegation of tolerance despite that issue never having been raised by respondents.
• Nature of the Action as Determined Below: Petitioners maintained that the RTC had already determined, upon its re-evaluation of the records and evidence, that the complaint was one for forcible entry, and that the CA gravely erred in disregarding this.
• Primacy of the Torrens Title: Petitioners asserted that their Torrens title should prevail, and that respondents' claim constituted a collateral attack on their certificate of title, which is not allowed.

• Duty of the Courts to Resolve the Proper Remedy: Respondents averred that although the issue as to the cause of action was not raised by them, the CA or any court for that matter cannot simply turn a blind eye to, and must resolve, petitioners' failure to file the proper case, which is forcible entry and not unlawful detainer.
• Judicial Admissions in the Pleadings: Respondents contended that petitioners admit in their complaint and in all subsequent pleadings they filed that respondents' entry into the subject property was effected clandestinely or stealthily, which gives rise to an action for forcible entry.

• Nature of the Ejectment Action: Whether petitioners' complaint for ejectment was properly dismissed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it stated a case for unlawful detainer rather than forcible entry.
• Torrens Title and Collateral Attack: Whether respondents' claim that petitioners' certificate of title was fraudulently obtained may be raised as a defense in the ejectment case.

• Nature of the Ejectment Action: No. The dismissal was improper; the allegations of the complaint and the nature of respondents' entry — illegal from the very beginning — made out a case of forcible entry under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and tolerance extended after such illegal entry could not convert the action into unlawful detainer.
• Torrens Title and Collateral Attack: No. The validity of petitioners' Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally in a forcible entry case; a certificate of title evidences ownership, and from it the right to possession follows.

• Nature of the Ejectment Action: As a general rule the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally embark on the evaluation of evidence, but the rule admits of exceptions, among them instances when the findings of fact of the trial court are conflicting or contradictory with those of the CA, as in this case. What determines the nature of the action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint; in ejectment cases the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer: in forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, while in illegal detainer the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. The complaint, although merely titled "Ejectment," alleged that petitioners and their predecessor were in possession of the subject property, that Dominador clandestinely encroached a portion of more or less one hectare in 2006 and constructed a fence and nipa hut thereon, and that in June 2013 respondents, by stealth and strategy, occupied the remaining area without permission. The CA therefore erred in stating that the complaint filed was an unlawful detainer case; while the MTC held that the action was one of unlawful detainer, the RTC Decision was clear in ruling and correcting that the complaint was a forcible entry case, and the RTC's characterization was supported by the allegations, the Judicial Affidavits, and the Demand Letter. While there may be allegations that petitioners tolerated respondents' possession after the latter clandestinely occupied more than a hectare of the subject property, what is controlling is the fact that respondents' entry into the subject property was illegal from the very beginning. It is the nature of the defendant's entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer; if the entry is illegal, the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. In an unlawful detainer case, the possession was initially lawful but later became unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with the owner's demand to vacate, and the acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Here, the first illegal entry occurred in 2006 when petitioners discovered that Dominador clandestinely encroached one hectare, constructed a nipa house, and fenced the perimeter; although petitioners tolerated his possession thereafter, that tolerance could not convert the case into unlawful detainer. The second illegal entry occurred in June 2013 when respondents, through strategy and stealth, occupied the remaining area, refusing to vacate despite demands. In a forcible entry case the one-year prescriptive period is generally reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land, but if forcible entry is done through stealth, the period is counted from the time the plaintiff discovered the entry; in contrast, the one-year period in unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate. Consequently, petitioners' action against the 2006 entry through stealth could not be brought by way of a summary action for ejectment, the one-year period having prescribed in 2007, and for that one-hectare portion they should have filed an accion publiciana. As to the illegal entry of the remaining area, the forcible entry case was filed well within the one-year prescriptive period, the stealth having been discovered in June 2013 and the complaint filed in February 2014. Nevertheless, because the property subject matter of the case pertains to only one parcel of land covered by one certificate of title and the intruders are the same, the Court gave due course to the filing of the instant forcible entry case for the whole area; filing an accion publiciana for the one-hectare portion and another forcible entry case for the remaining area would be splitting the cause of action aiming for the same result and would be inconsistent with the summary nature of ejectment proceedings, which is meant to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property and to provide for a speedy settlement and action to recover possession and quell social disturbances. For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. Petitioners proved that respondents' entry was through strategy and stealth; it was established that petitioners were in prior physical possession, the primary consideration in a forcible entry case, as shown by Susana's Judicial Affidavit stating that respondents had been prohibited by Adolfo from entering the property while he was alive and were stopped then, but that upon his death on October 5, 2004, Dominador took courage again to enter on July 25, 2006 and occupied one hectare, prompting Susana to complain immediately to the BARC Chairman, whose demands Dominador ignored by declaring that her documents were fake. Respondents did not refute these allegations.
• Torrens Title and Collateral Attack: The subject property was registered in the name of petitioners' predecessor, Adolfo G. Barcelo, under Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-1805, and was declared for taxation purposes; petitioners had been tilling and cultivating it by planting vegetables and mango trees, and when they discovered the stealthy intrusion they immediately filed a complaint with the barangay and subsequently an ejectment complaint before the MTC. The issuance of a certificate of title in favor of petitioners' predecessor, pursuant to a free patent application, evidences ownership, and from it a right to the possession of the property follows; well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to its possession. The issue as to the validity of petitioners' title is a collateral attack on the title and is not allowed in a forcible entry case, a certificate of title being insusceptible to collateral attack and incapable of being altered, modified, or cancelled except only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

• Nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the complaint — The character of an ejectment suit, and the court's jurisdiction over it, is fixed by the facts alleged in the complaint, which must show enough on its face to bring the case within the summary remedy of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court without resort to parol evidence. The Court applied this rule by disregarding the complaint's mere caption of "Ejectment" and the MTC's erroneous label of unlawful detainer, and by looking instead to the allegations of clandestine encroachment and occupation by stealth, which placed the case squarely within forcible entry.
• Forcible entry distinguished from unlawful detainer — In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; in unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied. The Court held that the complaint alleged the former, not the latter.
• The nature of the defendant's entry determines the cause of action — It is the nature of the defendant's entry into the land which determines whether the action is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, the action that may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry.
• Tolerance must be present from the inception of possession — In unlawful detainer, possession is initially lawful and becomes unlawful only when the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with the owner's demand to vacate; the acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered. Because respondents' entry was illegal from the very beginning, petitioners' subsequent tolerance of their occupancy could not convert the case into unlawful detainer.
• Requisites of forcible entry — For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) prior physical possession of the property; (b) deprivation of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession. All three were established in this case.
• Prescriptive period in forcible entry through stealth — In a forcible entry case, the one-year prescriptive period is generally reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land; however, if the forcible entry is done through stealth, the period is counted from the time the plaintiff discovered the entry. By contrast, the one-year period in unlawful detainer is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate. Applying this, the 2006 encroachment had prescribed by 2007 and required an accion publiciana, while the June 2013 occupation was timely sued upon in February 2014.
• Splitting a cause of action and the summary nature of ejectment — Where one parcel of land is covered by a single certificate of title and the intruders are the same, requiring the plaintiff to file an accion publiciana for one portion and a separate forcible entry case for the remainder would split the cause of action for the same result and defeat the summary nature of ejectment, which exists to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right of possession and to quell social disturbances. The Court accordingly treated the entire case as one for forcible entry.
• Torrens title as basis of the right to possession; prohibition on collateral attack — The issuance of a certificate of title pursuant to a free patent application evidences ownership, and from it a right to possession follows; a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to its possession. A certificate of title cannot be subjected to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law; hence, respondents' claim of fraudulent procurement of the title was not a permissible defense in the forcible entry case.

• "What determines the nature of the action, as well as which court has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint." — This is the threshold rule on which the entire disposition turns; it explains why the complaint's caption and the MTC's label of unlawful detainer were immaterial and why the RTC's recharacterization as forcible entry controlled.
• "It is the nature of defendant's entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer." — The canonical formulation of the controlling distinction between the two summary remedies, and the basis for rejecting the CA's contrary premise that tolerance could arise from an entry illegal at inception.
• "In an unlawful detainer case, the possession was initially lawful but later became unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with the owner's demand to vacate. The acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered." — States the requisite of inception-time tolerance, the element whose absence the CA misapplied and which the Court used to hold that the complaint could not be dismissed as a defective unlawful detainer suit.
• "For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and; (c) that the action was filed within one year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property." — The enumerated requisites of forcible entry, applied element by element to sustain the ejectment complaint for the whole area of the subject property.

• Spouses Fahrenbach vs. Pangilinan, 815 Phil. 696 (2017) — The principal controlling precedent, cited repeatedly for the rule that it is the nature of the defendant's entry which determines the cause of action, that the acts of tolerance must be present from the start of possession, that the one-year period in forcible entry through stealth runs from discovery, and that a Torrens titleholder is entitled to possession.
• Zacarias vs. Anacuy, 744 Phil. 201 (2014) — Cited for the rule that what determines the nature of the action and the court's jurisdiction are the allegations in the complaint, and for the distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70.
• Spouses Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39 (2006) — Cited, through Fahrenbach, for the requirement that the acts of tolerance be present from the inception of the possession sought to be recovered.
• Sarona vs. Villegas, 131 Phil. 365 (1968) — The earlier authority, cited through Valdez and Fahrenbach, for the same inception-of-tolerance rule.
• Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Citi Appliance M.C. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546, October 9, 2019 — Cited for the definition of unlawful detainer as involving possession that was initially lawful but later became unlawful upon the possessor's refusal to comply with the owner's demand to vacate.
• Go, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172 (2001) — Cited, through Fahrenbach, for the summary nature of ejectment proceedings as a means of expeditiously protecting actual possession or the right of possession.
• Munguser vs. Uguy, 749 Phil. 372 (2014) — Cited for the three requisites of a forcible entry suit.
• Spouses Santiago vs. Northbay Knittings, Inc., 820 Phil. 157 (2017) — Cited for the rule that a certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Governs the summary remedy of ejectment, which may be either forcible entry or unlawful detainer; the provision supplied both the substantive classification of the action and the one-year prescriptive period applied by the Court. The complaint was held to fall within forcible entry because it alleged deprivation of possession by strategy and stealth, and the action was held timely as to the June 2013 occupation because it was filed within one year from discovery.
• Rule 42, Rules of Court — The provision under which respondents filed their Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals from the RTC's decision in the ejectment case, which petition the CA granted before the Supreme Court set its ruling aside.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The provision under which petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court by Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the CA Decision dated February 20, 2019 and Resolution dated October 18, 2019.

Gesmundo, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Gaerlan, JJ., concur. Justice Lazaro-Javier was designated as an Additional Member per Raffle dated February 17, 2020.