Baranda vs. Gustilo

A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled even before final judgment upon proper showing that it is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused its registration, and the duty of the Register of Deeds to register or annotate instruments on torrens certificates of title is ministerial in nature, such that the Register of Deeds has no legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of a court order directing cancellation.

Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia hold Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 over Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Competing claims to the same lot were advanced by Gregorio Perez, Maria Provido Gotera, and the Provido family, who held Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25772. The Supreme Court had previously resolved the title dispute in two companion cases — G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 — declaring TCT No. 25772 fraudulently obtained and null and void, and upholding TCT No. 106098 as valid and subsisting, with both decisions having become final and executory. The instant petition concerns the refusal of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, and the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel a notice of lis pendens annotated on the petitioners' newly issued certificates of title on account of a separate action, Civil Case No. 15871, filed by the Providos and then pending on appeal before the Court of Appeals.

The dispute centers on Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana Hitalia. Reconstitution proceedings were filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, resulting in the cancellation of OCT No. 6406 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 in the names of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia. A writ of possession was issued, but Gregorio Perez, Maria Provido Gotera, and Susana Silao refused to honor it, asserting their own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25772 over the same lot. The trial court, after considering the opposition and finding TCT No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered the writ of possession carried out, and a writ of demolition followed on March 29, 1982.

Perez and Gotera elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari and prohibition, but the petition was denied on August 6, 1982. They then filed G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme Court, which denied the petition on January 7, 1983, with the denial becoming final on March 25, 1983. Meanwhile, Baranda and Hitalia filed G.R. No. 64432, seeking immediate implementation of the writs and dismissal of Civil Case No. 00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court, which they characterized as a dilatory tactic. The Supreme Court resolved G.R. No. 64432 on December 29, 1983, directing the Intermediate Appellate Court to dismiss Civil Case No. 00827 and ordering immediate implementation of the writs. The resolution became final on May 20, 1984, after denial with finality of a motion for reconsideration.

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's resolutions of September 17, 1986 and October 8, 1986 directing execution, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23, presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo, issued orders on November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to register the September 5, 1984 order and to require Gotera to surrender TCT No. 25772. In compliance, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso cancelled TCT No. 25772, cancelled TCT No. 106098, and issued new certificates of title — T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562 — in the names of Baranda and Hitalia. However, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on the new titles on account of Civil Case No. 15871, a complaint for recovery of ownership over Lot No. 4517 filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido, and Perfecta Provido before the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 23, then pending on appeal before the Court of Appeals after the trial court had dismissed it on October 24, 1984.

Petitioners filed an urgent ex-parte motion to cancel the lis pendens. Judge Gustilo granted the motion in his order dated February 12, 1987, directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the lis pendens on TCT Nos. T-106098, T-111560, T-111561, and T-111562. The Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and arguing that the lis pendens could only be cancelled upon registration of a certificate of the clerk of court stating the manner of disposal of the pending action, and that only the Court of Appeals, not the trial court in cadastral proceedings, could order the cancellation. Adopting these arguments and additionally noting that some or all of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the cases affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, Judge Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the motion for reconsideration. This prompted the petitioners to file the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction.

• Privity of the Providos: Petitioners maintained that the Providos, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, were privies to G.R. No. 62042, as Maria Provido Gotera — one of the petitioners therein — was acting on behalf of her co-owners, the Providos, who held TCT No. 25772 together with her.
• Dilatory Purpose of Lis Pendens: Petitioners argued that the notice of lis pendens was being used to delay the full implementation of the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432, which had declared their titles valid and subsisting.
• Ministerial Duty of the Register of Deeds: Petitioners contended that the duties of the Register of Deeds under the law are purely ministerial, requiring registration of all orders, judgments, and resolutions of the court without discretion to oppose or seek reconsideration.

• Statutory Bar to Cancellation: Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Saclauso argued that under the second paragraph of Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens may be deemed cancelled only upon registration of a certificate of the clerk of court of the action in which the lis pendens was registered, stating the manner of disposal thereof, and that since Civil Case No. 15871 was still pending with the Court of Appeals, only that court — not the trial court in cadastral proceedings — could order the cancellation.
• Lack of Privity: Respondent Judge Gustilo sustained the position that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the cases affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, and therefore the pendency of their appeal prevented cancellation of the lis pendens.

• Cancellation of Lis Pendens: Whether the pendency of the appeal in Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from cancelling the notice of lis pendens on the certificates of title of the petitioners, which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
• Nature of the Register of Deeds' Duty: Whether the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or cancel a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title is ministerial in nature.

• Cancellation of Lis Pendens: No. The pendency of the appeal does not prevent cancellation. The Providos were privies to G.R. No. 62042, and the final judgment therein had declared TCT No. 25772 null and void before Civil Case No. 15871 was even filed. Under the first paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled before final judgment upon showing that it is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused its registration.
• Nature of the Register of Deeds' Duty: The duty is ministerial. Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529 uses the mandatory term "shall," and the Register of Deeds has no legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of a court order directing cancellation. In case of doubt, the proper remedy is a consulta with the Commissioner of Land Registration under Section 117.

• Cancellation of Lis Pendens: The Providos, though not formally impleaded in G.R. No. 62042, were privies to that case because Maria Provido Gotera — a petitioner therein — acted on behalf of her co-owners, including the Providos, as evidenced by TCT No. 25772 issued in her name and the names of the Providos. One of the issues raised in G.R. No. 62042 was precisely whether the trial court had authority to declare TCT No. 25772 null and void. The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March 25, 1983, long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed. The Providos were therefore attempting to relitigate the validity of their title through a separate action, using the lis pendens to delay execution of the final judgments. The purpose of lis pendens is to protect the real rights of the party causing its registration by warning prospective purchasers that the property is in litigation. The Providos were not entitled to this protection because their title had already been declared null and void in a final proceeding to which they were privies. Applying the rule in Victoriano vs. Rovira, Municipal Council of Paranaque vs. CFI of Rizal, and Sarmiento vs. Ortiz, a court has discretionary power to cancel a notice of lis pendens under peculiar circumstances, such as where the notice is used to molest the adverse party or where the plaintiff's evidence does not bear out the main allegations of the complaint. Respondent Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in relying solely on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529 while ignoring the first paragraph, which expressly authorizes cancellation before final judgment upon proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party or is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused its registration.
• Nature of the Register of Deeds' Duty: Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that it "shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration" which complies with all requisites, and that if the instrument is not registrable, the Register of Deeds shall deny registration and inform the presentor in writing, advising of the right to appeal by consulta under Section 117. The word "shall" is mandatory, expressing command or obligation. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to registration of deeds, encumbrances, and instruments is therefore ministerial in nature. The Acting Register of Deeds had no legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's order directing cancellation of the lis pendens. In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken, the Register of Deeds should have sought the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration (now the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration) pursuant to Section 117, rather than opposing the court's order. The ultimate responsibility for the delays, however, fell on respondent Judge Gustilo, who should not have allowed himself to become part of dilatory tactics based on the erroneous impression that Civil Case No. 15871 involved a separate set of parties.

• Cancellation of Lis Pendens Before Final Judgment — Under the first paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled before final judgment upon order of the court after proper showing that (a) the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or (b) it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused its registration. It may also be cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who caused the registration. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that the Providos' lis pendens was intended to delay implementation of final Supreme Court decisions and was unnecessary to protect their rights, as their title had already been declared null and void.
• Ministerial Duty of the Register of Deeds — The duty of the Register of Deeds to register instruments dealing with real or personal property is ministerial in nature, as mandated by the use of the word "shall" in Section 10 of P.D. No. 1529. The Register of Deeds has no discretion to refuse registration of a court order and no legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. Where the Register of Deeds is in doubt, the proper remedy is a consulta with the Commissioner of Land Registration under Section 117, not opposition to the court's directive.
• Privity in Interest for Res Judicata Purposes — Parties who, though not formally impleaded, act through a co-owner who is a party in prior litigation involving the same property and title, are deemed privies to that litigation. The Providos were held privies to G.R. No. 62042 because Maria Provido Gotera, a petitioner therein, was acting on behalf of her co-owners, including the Providos, as shown by TCT No. 25772 issued in their joint names.

• "Before final judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be registered." — This is the first paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529, which the Court held respondent Judge Gustilo erroneously disregarded in favor of the second paragraph, and which served as the statutory basis for cancelling the lis pendens despite the pendency of the appeal.
• "the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the second issue, defining the scope and limits of the Register of Deeds' authority in the torrens system.
• "the proper court has discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the case to the prejudice of the defendant." — This formulation, quoted from Victoriano vs. Rovira and related cases, establishes the discretionary power of courts to cancel lis pendens even while the action is pending, which the Court applied to the facts of this case.

• Victoriano vs. Rovira, 55 Phil. 1000 — Followed. Established the rule that a court has discretionary power to cancel a notice of lis pendens under peculiar circumstances, such as where the notice is used to molest the adverse party or where the plaintiff's evidence does not support the complaint's allegations.
• Municipal Council of Paranaque vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 70 Phil. 363 — Followed. Cited alongside Victoriano for the same proposition regarding discretionary cancellation of lis pendens.
• Sarmiento vs. Ortiz, 10 SCRA 158 — Followed. Cited as part of the same line of authority on discretionary cancellation of lis pendens.
• Natano vs. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481 — Cited for the definition and purpose of lis pendens as a mechanism to protect the real rights of the party causing its registration and to warn prospective purchasers that the property is in litigation.
• Aparri vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231 — Cited for the rule in statutory construction that when the words of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed.
• Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 — Cited alongside Aparri for the same principle of statutory construction.

• Section 77, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Governs the cancellation of lis pendens. The first paragraph authorizes cancellation before final judgment upon court order upon showing that the notice is for molesting the adverse party or is not necessary to protect the registrant's rights. The second paragraph provides for automatic cancellation upon registration of a clerk of court's certificate stating the manner of disposal of the action. The Court held that respondent Judge Gustilo erroneously relied solely on the second paragraph while ignoring the first.
• Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Defines the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register instruments presented for registration that comply with all requisites, and to deny registration of non-registrable instruments with written notice. The Court construed the mandatory term "shall" as making the Register of Deeds' function ministerial in nature.
• Section 117, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Provides the remedy of consulta: where the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to the proper step to take, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration. The Court held that this, rather than a motion for reconsideration, was the proper course for the Acting Register of Deeds.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.