Banogon vs. Zerna

A petition for review of a cadastral court decision may be filed at any time after rendition of the decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration; however, an unreasonable delay in filing such petition, such as thirty-one years, constitutes laches that bars the petition. The Court held that litigation must end at some point, and once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict through mere subterfuge.

The case involved a cadastral court decision rendered on February 9, 1926, concerning land in Negros Oriental. The petitioners were successors-in-interest of Filomeno Banogon, who was the alleged predecessor-in-interest of the parties. The private respondents were in possession of the land in dispute. The applicable statutory framework was Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, which provided for a petition for review of a decree of registration on the grounds of fraud, to be filed within one year after entry of the decree.

The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court on February 9, 1926, concerning a parcel of land in Negros Oriental. The petitioners, Encarnacion Banogon, Zosima Munoz, and Davidina Munoz, were successors-in-interest of Filomeno Banogon, who was their alleged predecessor-in-interest. The private respondents, Melchor Zerna, Consejo Zerna de Cornelio, and Francisco Zerna, were in possession of the land in dispute.

On March 6, 1957, thirty-one years after the original decision, a motion to amend that decision was filed. This was followed by an amended petition for review of the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. The petition for review was filed on the ground that the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents. The petitioners argued that the judgment would become final only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.

On October 11, 1971, or after fourteen years from the filing of the petition for review, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed by the private respondents. The petition was dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February 14, 1972. The respondent judge dismissed the petition on the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty-one years too late, and that laches had operated against the petitioners.

The private respondents argued that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after thirty days, the same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. They noted that Filomeno Banogon lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not challenge it until his death in 1945, and that the petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for review.

• Non-Finality of Judgment: Petitioners contended that the 1926 judgment had not yet become final and executory because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents, and that the judgment would become final only after one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.
• Laches Against Private Respondents: Petitioners argued that if anyone was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their names pursuant thereto.
• Premature Filing: Petitioners rationalized that if an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the case within one year after the issuance of the decree, the same party should not be denied this remedy before the decree is issued, citing Rivera vs. Moran.

• Finality of Judgment: Private respondents argued that the decision of February 9, 1926, became final and executory after thirty days, the same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period.
• Laches Against Petitioners: Private respondents contended that the petitioners slept on their rights for thirty-one years before questioning the judgment of the cadastral court, and that their alleged predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision without challenging it until his death in 1945.
• Delay in Filing: Private respondents pointed out that the petitioners waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for review.

• Laches: Whether the petitioners' petition for review of the 1926 cadastral court decision, filed thirty-one years later, was barred by laches.
• Finality of Judgment: Whether the 1926 decision had become final and executory notwithstanding the fact that the land had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.
• Timeliness of Petition for Review: Whether the petition for review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act could be filed at any time before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.

• Laches: Yes. The petitioners' delay of thirty-one years in filing the petition for review constituted laches that barred their petition. The Court held that the petitioners' position was "clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense."
• Finality of Judgment: Yes. The 1926 decision became final and executory after thirty days, the same not having been appealed by the petitioners during that period. The Court noted that the petitioners' alleged predecessor-in-interest lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision without challenging it.
• Timeliness of Petition for Review: No. Under the doctrine in Rivera vs. Moran, a petition for review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act may be filed at any time after rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration. The petitioners' delay of thirty-one years, not thirty-one days, was barred by laches.

• Laches: The Court found that the petitioners' reliance on Rivera vs. Moran was against their contentions. Under that doctrine, the petitioners should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty-one days but for thirty-one years. The Court emphasized that "litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict." The Court cited Li Kim Tho vs. Go Siu Ko and Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo for the proposition that courts must guard against any scheme calculated to prolong litigation.
• Finality of Judgment: The Court noted that the petitioners' argument that the 1926 decision had not yet become final and executory because the land had not yet been registered was unavailing. The Court observed that the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit to challenge it until his death in 1945. The petitioners themselves waited another twelve years, or until 1957, to file their petition for review.
• Timeliness of Petition for Review: The Court held that under Rivera vs. Moran, a petition for review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act may be filed at any time after rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration. The Court reasoned that there can be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. However, the petitioners' delay of thirty-one years was unreasonable and constituted laches.
• Delay in Moving for Dismissal: The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the dismissal of the petition for review. The Court pointed out that an opposition thereto had been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the petition. Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal, since they were the parties asking for relief.
• Misinterpretation of Law: The Court expressed its disapproval of the "adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to circumvent or violate" the law. The Court noted that lawyers, as officers of the court, have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice and do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

• Laches — Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thereby resulting in prejudice to the adverse party. In this case, the petitioners' delay of thirty-one years in filing the petition for review constituted laches that barred their petition.
• Finality of Judgment — Once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict through a mere subterfuge. Courts must guard against any scheme calculated to prolong litigation. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the dismissal of the petitioners' petition for review.
• Petition for Review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act — A petition for review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act may be filed at any time after rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration. The Court applied this doctrine from Rivera vs. Moran to hold that the petitioners should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud.

• "It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on March 6, 1957, thirty one years later." — This passage sets the tone for the Court's incredulity at the extraordinary delay in this case and frames the central issue of laches.
• "A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense." — This passage states the Court's application of the Rivera vs. Moran doctrine and its conclusion that laches barred the petitioners' petition.
• "Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." — This passage articulates the policy rationale behind the doctrine of finality of judgment and the Court's disapproval of attempts to prolong litigation.
• "One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law." — This passage expresses the Court's disapproval of the petitioners' counsel's interpretation of the law and emphasizes the responsibility of lawyers as officers of the court.

• Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil. 836 — Controlling precedent cited by the petitioners but applied against them. The Court held that under this doctrine, a petition for review under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act may be filed at any time after rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration, and that the petitioners should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud.
• Li Kim Tho vs. Go Siu Ko, 82 SCRA 776 — Cited for the proposition that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and that once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
• Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo, 36 SCRA 137 — Cited for the proposition that courts must guard against any scheme calculated to prolong litigation and should frown upon any attempt to prolong controversies.
• Villaflor vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 394 — Cited for the proposition that there should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the judiciary is too valuable to be wasted by efforts to evade the operation of a decision final and executory.
• Alonso vs. Villamor (1910) — Cited for the proposition that the aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law, and that procedural rules are designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.

• Section 38, Land Registration Act — This provision provides for a petition for review of a decree of registration on the grounds of fraud, to be filed within one year after entry of the decree. The Court applied this provision in conjunction with the doctrine in Rivera vs. Moran to hold that a petition for review may be filed at any time after rendition of the court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, and Paras, JJ., concurred. Gancayco, J., was on leave.