Banguis-Tambuyat vs. Balcom-Tambuyat

A land registration court may resolve an oppositor's objections in a Section 108 proceeding when the oppositor actively participates and submits evidence without objecting to jurisdiction, because such participation amounts to acquiescence and invocation of the court's jurisdiction, barring later impugnment.

Adriano M. Tambuyat and respondent Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat were married on September 16, 1965. Petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat, at all times material to the case, remained married to Eduardo Nolasco under a subsisting and unannulled marriage solemnized on October 15, 1975. Banguis was employed at Ocean East Agency Corporation, a business owned and operated by Adriano. During Adriano's marriage to Wenifreda, he acquired a 700-square meter parcel of land in Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan on November 17, 1991. Banguis signed the deed of sale as a witness, but the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) was issued in the name of "ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS." Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998.

Adriano M. Tambuyat and Wenifreda Balcom-Tambuyat were married on September 16, 1965. During their marriage, Adriano acquired several real properties, including a 700-square meter parcel of land in Barangay Muzon, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, purchased on November 17, 1991. The deed of sale was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the signing witnesses was petitioner Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat, who signed as "Rosario Banguis." When Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) was issued, however, it was made under the name of "ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E. BANGUIS." At all times material, Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco, whom she had wed on October 15, 1975; that marriage subsisted and was never annulled.

Adriano died intestate on June 7, 1998. On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation of TCT T-145321 with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, docketed as LRC Case No. P-443-99. She alleged that she was Adriano's surviving spouse; that the title was erroneously registered in Banguis's name as Adriano's spouse due to an insidious machination; that Banguis was still married to Nolasco and thus could not have been married to Adriano; and that she suffered damages as a result. She prayed for cancellation of the title, issuance of a new one in Adriano's name with her as the indicated spouse, surrender of Banguis's owner's duplicate copy, and an award of moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and costs.

In her Opposition, Banguis denied that the subject property was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda during their marriage. She claimed that she alone bought the property using her personal funds; that she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988 and lived together as husband and wife, producing a son born on April 1, 1990; that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the petition was a summary proceeding while the case required a determination of whether the property was conjugal or exclusive; and that Wenifreda was guilty of forum-shopping because a prior similar case had been dismissed by another branch of the Malolos RTC. During the proceedings, Wenifreda presented documentary evidence including the marriage contract of Adriano and Wenifreda, the marriage contract of Banguis and Nolasco, Banguis's SSS records indicating Nolasco as her husband, a negative certification from the Civil Registrar of Bulacan that no record existed of a marriage between Adriano and Banguis supposedly solemnized on September 2, 1988, and a certification from the parish priest of St. Joseph Parish that no priest named Fr. Roberto de Guzman — who allegedly solemnized the marriage — had ever served there. Banguis testified that she and Adriano were married on September 2, 1988, that they had a son named Adrian, and that she paid for the property with her own money. On cross-examination, she admitted that she was married to Nolasco, that the marriage was still subsisting and had not been annulled, and that she knew Adriano was married to someone else.

The RTC rendered judgment on May 26, 2003, granting Wenifreda's petition, ordering cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a new title in Adriano's name with Wenifreda as spouse, and awarding moral and exemplary damages of ₱100,000.00 each, attorney's fees of ₱100,000.00, and costs. Banguis's counterclaim was dismissed. The RTC found that Wenifreda was Adriano's surviving spouse, that the subject property was acquired during their marriage, and that Banguis had a subsisting marriage with Nolasco when the title was erroneously issued. Banguis appealed to the CA. Meanwhile, Wenifreda moved for execution pending appeal; Banguis did not oppose the motion or appear at the scheduled hearings. The RTC issued a writ of execution on April 14, 2004, the old title was cancelled, and TCT T-433713(M) was issued in its place. On February 14, 2012, the CA partially granted the appeal, affirming the RTC's cancellation of the title but deleting the awards of damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The CA found that the preponderance of evidence established Wenifreda as Adriano's lawful spouse, that Banguis's name was included in the title by error, and that Banguis and Adriano could not have been co-owners because both had valid and subsisting marriages to other persons and Banguis failed to prove any contribution to the purchase. Banguis's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 26, 2012.

• Jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court: Petitioner argued that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply because her opposition raised contentious and controversial issues — including her claimed ownership and the hereditary rights of her son — that can only be threshed out in a separate proceeding before a court of general jurisdiction, citing Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, Liwag vs. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Arceo vs. Court of Appeals.
• Ownership and Possession: Petitioner maintained that she alone bought the subject property using her personal funds and money borrowed from her sister, that she has been in constant possession thereof, introducing improvements through the years, and that the CA erred in disregarding this proof of ownership.
• Article 148 of the Family Code: Petitioner contended that the CA erred in refusing to apply Article 148 of the Family Code, which provides for the sharing of properties acquired by persons united in a defective marriage, asserting that the subject property was acquired during her cohabitation with Adriano and is owned in common by them.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in granting execution pending appeal notwithstanding her seasonable appeal and the utter lack of good or special reasons justifying the same.
• Nature of the Proceeding: Petitioner asserted that the case was in reality a partition of Adriano's estate, which would transfer the subject property to Wenifreda and divest Banguis and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein.

• Jurisdiction: Respondent countered that the distinction between the trial court acting as a land registration court and as a court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated with the effectivity of PD 1529, so that trial courts are no longer fettered by their former limited jurisdiction and may grant relief in land registration cases even when adverse claims or serious objections are raised.
• Ownership: Respondent argued that petitioner's claim of ownership cannot stand because the evidence fails to indicate any contribution by petitioner to the purchase of the subject property, the deed of sale shows Adriano alone as vendee, and petitioner signed merely as a witness thereto.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Respondent explained that during the proceedings on the motion for issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, petitioner was accorded the opportunity to participate but did not, resulting in the cancellation of the old title and issuance of a new one.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC, sitting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction to hear and resolve the petition for cancellation under Section 108 of PD 1529 despite the serious and weighty objections of the petitioner, or whether a separate proceeding before a court of general jurisdiction was required.
• Ownership: Whether the RTC and CA erred in cancelling and correcting the entry in TCT T-145321 in disregard of the petitioner's proof of ownership and possession over the subject property.
• Article 148 of the Family Code: Whether the CA erred in failing to apply Article 148 of the Family Code, which provides for the sharing of properties acquired by persons united in a defective marriage.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Whether the trial court erred in granting immediate execution of its decision notwithstanding the petitioner's seasonable appeal and the alleged lack of good or special reasons justifying the same.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The RTC had jurisdiction to resolve the opposition because Banguis acquiesced and freely submitted her issues to the trial court by actively participating and adducing evidence without objecting to jurisdiction, and because Section 108 of PD 1529 authorizes correction when an error or mistake was made in entering a certificate or when there is reasonable ground for amendment.
• Ownership: No. Banguis failed to present sufficient proof of contribution to the purchase of the subject property, and the deed of sale showed Adriano alone as vendee; title to property is distinct from the certificate of title, and the correction proceeding did not require proof of ownership.
• Article 148 of the Family Code: No. Article 148 does not apply because both Banguis and Adriano had valid and subsisting marriages to other persons, and Banguis failed to prove any actual joint contribution to the acquisition of the property, which is a requisite for co-ownership under that provision.
• Execution Pending Appeal: Moot and academic. The issue became unnecessary to resolve in light of the ruling on the merits.

• Jurisdiction: The Court found that Banguis should be considered to have acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete determination when she went to trial and submitted all her relevant documentary and other evidence. Active participation coupled with failure to object to jurisdiction is tantamount to invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution, barring later impugnment. Under Section 108 of PD 1529, a proceeding for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title may be resorted to in seven enumerated instances, including when any error, omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate and when there is reasonable ground for amendment. The case falls under instances (3) and (7): the Registrar of Deeds committed an error in issuing TCT T-145321 in the name of "Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis" when Wenifreda — not Banguis — was Adriano's lawful spouse. While Section 108 proceedings are summary in nature and contemplate only clerical corrections rather than controversial issues, Banguis's opposition ostensibly raised controversial issues involving ownership and hereditary rights. However, evidence of Banguis's ownership was irrelevant to Wenifreda's petition, and the evidence indicated Banguis could not be the owner; resolution of succession was likewise unnecessary. The distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated by Section 2 of PD 1529.

• Ownership: The only issue requiring resolution was who should be included in the title as Adriano's spouse — Banguis or Wenifreda. It was unnecessary for Banguis to prove actual ownership because title to property is different from the certificate of title; registration is not the equivalent of title but merely the best evidence thereof. Nonetheless, Banguis was not precluded from presenting evidence of ownership, but the Court was not convinced. The CA's factual findings — that Banguis and Adriano could not have been co-owners because Banguis failed to prove contribution and the deed of sale showed Adriano alone as vendee — are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court as it is not a trier of facts. Banguis's contradictory statements — claiming sole purchase while acknowledging Adriano as co-owner — cast serious doubt on her claim. Her failure to explain why she allowed Adriano to be denominated sole vendee while she signed merely as a witness furnished a strong inference against her.

• Article 148 of the Family Code: Article 148 governs cohabitation not falling under Article 147 and provides that only properties acquired through actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common. The provision requires that the man and woman living together must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages, and co-ownership under case law requires that neither party be legally incapacitated to marry. Here, both Banguis and Adriano had valid and subsisting marriages to other persons, constituting a legal impediment. Moreover, Banguis failed to present even a modicum of evidence that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property. If one party is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrues to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in the valid marriage.

• Execution Pending Appeal: With the disposition on the merits affirming the CA's decision, the issues relating to the trial court's March 30, 2004 Order directing issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal and the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution became moot and academic, rendering their resolution unnecessary.

• Acquiescence to Jurisdiction by Active Participation — The active participation of a party against whom an action is brought, coupled with failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court where the action is pending, is tantamount to invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, barring the party from later impugning the court's jurisdiction. Applied here: Banguis went to trial, adduced evidence, and submitted her claims to the RTC without objecting to its jurisdiction, thus barring her from later challenging the RTC's authority to resolve her opposition.

• Distinction Between Title and Certificate of Title — Title as a concept of ownership is different from the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership, and mere issuance of a certificate in any person's name does not foreclose the possibility that the property may be under co-ownership with persons not named, or that the registrant may be a trustee. Applied here: Banguis's claim of ownership was irrelevant to the Section 108 proceeding, which sought only to correct the erroneous entry of her name as Adriano's spouse; the correction of the certificate did not determine ownership of the property.

• Section 108 of PD 1529 — Amendment and Alteration of Certificates of Title — A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property may apply by petition to the court for the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title on any of seven grounds: (1) registered interests have terminated and ceased; (2) new interests not appearing on the certificate have arisen; (3) any error, omission, or mistake was made in entering a certificate or memorandum; (4) the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5) the registered owner has married, or if registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and no right of heirs or creditors is affected; (6) a corporation owning registered land has been dissolved and has not conveyed the same within three years; and (7) any other reasonable ground. The proceeding is summary in nature, contemplating corrections of clerical mistakes but not controversial issues. Applied here: The case falls under grounds (3) and (7), as the Registrar of Deeds erred in issuing the title in Banguis's name as Adriano's spouse.

• Article 148 of the Family Code — Co-ownership in Defective Cohabitation — In cases of cohabitation not falling under Article 147, only properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, contributions and shares are presumed equal. If one party is validly married to another, his or her share accrues to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in the valid marriage. The forfeiture rules apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Applied here: Article 148 did not apply because both Banguis and Adriano had valid and subsisting marriages to other persons, and Banguis failed to prove any actual joint contribution to the acquisition of the property.

• "The active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction." — This passage articulates the doctrine of acquiescence by active participation, which the Court applied to hold that Banguis could no longer challenge the RTC's jurisdiction after fully litigating her opposition.

• "Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has." — This formulation, drawn from Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals as quoted in the decision, underpins the Court's distinction between title and certificate of title, explaining why Banguis's claim of ownership was irrelevant to the correction proceeding.

• "The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is – who should be included in the title to the subject property as Adriano's spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in placing Banguis's name in the title as Adriano's spouse?" — This passage defines the narrow scope of the Section 108 proceeding and explains why the Court found ownership and succession issues irrelevant to the petition for cancellation.

• Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 339 Phil. 377 (1997) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that a land registration court cannot resolve controversial issues requiring a separate proceeding. The Court effectively distinguished or overcame this line of authority by invoking the elimination of the distinction between land registration courts and courts of general jurisdiction under PD 1529, and by finding that Banguis had acquiesced to the RTC's jurisdiction.
• Liwag vs. Court of Appeals, 259 Phil. 913 (1989) — Cited by petitioner for the same proposition as Tagaytay-Taal; overcome by the same reasoning.
• Vda. de Arceo vs. Court of Appeals, 264 Phil. 59 (1990) — Cited by petitioner for the same proposition; overcome by the same reasoning.
• Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals — Quoted for the distinction between title (ownership) and certificate of title (evidence of ownership), and for the principle that registration does not vest title but is merely evidence thereof.
• Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 353 Phil. 45 (1998) — Cited for the doctrine that active participation without objection to jurisdiction amounts to invocation of jurisdiction, barring later impugnment.
• Bagayas vs. Bagayas, G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517, September 18, 2013 — Cited for the principle that Section 108 proceedings are summary in nature, contemplating clerical corrections but not controversial issues.
• Valino vs. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014 — Cited for the principle that Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages and that the term "spouse" in the Civil Code contemplates a lawfully wedded spouse.

• Section 108, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Authorizes the court to order the erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title upon petition, on grounds including error or mistake in entering a certificate and any other reasonable ground. Applied as the legal basis for the RTC's cancellation of TCT T-145321 and issuance of a corrected title, since Banguis's name was erroneously included as Adriano's spouse.
• Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Eliminates the distinction between the trial court sitting as a land registration court and as a court of general jurisdiction, conferring on Courts of First Instance exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such petitions. Applied to reject Banguis's argument that a separate proceeding before a court of general jurisdiction was required.
• Article 148, Family Code — Governs cohabitation not falling under Article 147, providing that only properties acquired through actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common, and that if one party is validly married to another, his or her share accrues to the absolute community or conjugal partnership in the valid marriage. The Court found it inapplicable because both Banguis and Adriano had subsisting marriages to other persons and Banguis failed to prove any contribution.

Brion (Acting Chairperson), Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen — all concurred in the decision.