Bangug vs. Dela Cruz

In an accion publiciana, the court may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership to determine who has a better right to possess the property, and such provisional adjudication does not constitute a collateral attack on a Torrens certificate of title prohibited under Section 48 of PD 1529. Where the evidence shows that the parties are co-owners of the disputed property, one co-owner cannot eject another from the co-owned property prior to partition.

The subject property was part of a larger parcel of land originally owned by Cayetana Guitang, who died sometime in 1935. Cayetana had seven children: Luisa, Severino, Juana, Herminia, Rufina, Leonarda, and Juliana. Rufina was the mother of petitioner Leonida Bangug, and Juliana was the mother of petitioner Venerandy Adolfo. Severino was the father of respondent George dela Cruz. The dispute centers on whether Severino validly adjudicated the entire estate of Cayetana to himself, and whether the subsequent transfer to respondent conferred exclusive ownership or whether the land remains subject to co-ownership among all of Cayetana's heirs.

The subject property is a 2,172-square-meter parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-388110, situated in Barrio Manaring, Ilagan City, Isabela, with an assessed value of ₱11,140.00. It forms part of a larger parcel of approximately 8,657 square meters originally owned by Cayetana Guitang, who died intestate sometime in 1935. Cayetana was survived by seven children: Luisa, Severino, Juana, Herminia, Rufina, Leonarda, and Juliana. Rufina was the mother of petitioner Leonida Bangug, and Juliana was the mother of petitioner Venerandy Adolfo. Severino was the father of respondent George dela Cruz.

In 1982, Severino executed an Affidavit of Adjudication claiming to be the "legitimate son and sole heir" of Cayetana, and caused the entire 8,657-square-meter property to be titled in his name under TCT No. T-120060, which originated from Original Certificate of Title No. 3367. In December 1983, Severino executed a Deed of Reconveyance stating that he had been "HOLDING IN TRUST" the land for certain transferees, subdividing it into five portions: Lot 1-A (2,172 sq.m.) to George dela Cruz; Lot 1-B (1,179 sq.m.) to Juanito dela Cruz; Lot 1-C (1,385 sq.m.) to Manuel dela Cruz; Lot 1-D (1,211 sq.m.) to Maria dela Cruz; and Lot 1-E (1,860 sq.m.) to the heirs of Rufina dela Cruz. Notably, the Deed of Reconveyance was not signed by Severino, and the other siblings of Severino — Luisa, Juana, Herminia, Leonarda, and Juliana — were excluded from the partition.

During Severino's lifetime, Leonida asked permission to temporarily build a house on a vacant portion of the property, and Venerandy asked permission to occupy a portion and build a temporary structure for storing corn during harvest season. In 2011, respondent George demanded that petitioners vacate the portions they occupied, but they refused. Petitioners asserted that their mothers, Rufina and Juliana, were children of Cayetana and had allowed them to build on the property, and that Severino's adjudication of the entire property to himself was invalid because Cayetana had other heirs.

Respondent George filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the MTCC. The MTCC ruled in his favor, holding that petitioners' possession was by tolerance and that their allegations constituted an impermissible collateral attack on respondent's Torrens title. The RTC affirmed, and the CA denied petitioners' Rule 42 petition, likewise holding that the challenge to respondent's title was a prohibited collateral attack under Section 48 of PD 1529. Petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 Petition.

• Provisional Resolution of Ownership: Petitioners contended that contrary to the CA's ruling, the issue of ownership may be provisionally passed upon in an accion publiciana if necessary to resolve the issue of possession, and such adjudication is not a final and binding determination of ownership nor a collateral attack on a Torrens title.
• Defective Adjudication and Reconveyance: Petitioners argued that they possessed the portions they occupied in the concept of an owner, having derived title through inheritance from their mothers, who were children of Cayetana. They maintained that the Deed of Reconveyance was defective because it was not signed by Severino, and that Severino's adjudication of the entire property to himself was dubious given that he was not the sole heir of Cayetana and had other siblings who were likewise heirs.
• Identity of the Property: Petitioners argued that respondent George failed to specifically identify the subject parcel of land allegedly being possessed by them vis-à-vis his purported property, given certain discrepancies between the actual areas of the disputed property and the adjoining lots.

• Provisional Resolution of Ownership in Accion Publiciana: Whether the issue of ownership may be provisionally resolved in an accion publiciana to determine who has a better right of possession, without constituting a collateral attack on a Torrens title.
• Co-ownership of the Subject Property: Whether the evidence adduced during trial proved sole ownership of the subject property by Severino or co-ownership among the heirs of Cayetana.
• Identity of the Property: Whether respondent George failed to specifically identify the subject parcel of land vis-à-vis his purported property given the alleged discrepancies in area.

• Provisional Resolution of Ownership in Accion Publiciana: Yes. The issue of ownership may be provisionally resolved in an accion publiciana to determine who has a better right to possess, and such resolution does not trigger a collateral attack on a Torrens title because it is never final or definitive.
• Co-ownership of the Subject Property: Co-ownership was provisionally found. The Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Reconveyance were ineffective to vest sole ownership in Severino, and petitioners and respondent were co-owners of the land left by Cayetana. As co-owners, petitioners cannot be ejected by respondent, who is himself a co-owner.
• Identity of the Property: No. The uniform factual findings of the lower courts, confirmed by ocular inspection, established that the portions occupied by petitioners were within the property covered by respondent's title, and such findings cannot be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition.

• Provisional Resolution of Ownership in Accion Publiciana: The lower courts erroneously treated petitioners' affirmative defenses — which alleged that their mothers were children of Cayetana and that Severino could not have validly executed the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Reconveyance without impairing the rights of other heirs — as a prohibited collateral attack on respondent's Torrens title. Relying on Heirs of Alfredo Cullado vs. Gutierrez and Supapo vs. Sps. de Jesus, the Court clarified that in an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's certificate of title because the resolution of the ownership issue is done only to determine the issue of possession. The adjudication is provisional, not conclusive, and the Torrens title is never in jeopardy of being altered, modified, or cancelled. Because the MTCC dodged the ownership issue on the mistaken belief that doing so constituted a prohibited collateral attack, it egregiously erred; the RTC and CA committed the same error.

• Co-ownership of the Subject Property: The evidence showed that Cayetana had seven children, a fact respondent George did not refute. Severino's Affidavit of Adjudication claimed he was the "sole heir," yet the Deed of Reconveyance itself stated that Severino had been "HOLDING IN TRUST" the land for the transferees, which included the heirs of his sibling Rufina. This proved that a co-ownership existed among the seven children of Cayetana. Under Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate is owned in common before partition. When Cayetana died in 1935, Rufina and Juliana became co-owners with their siblings. The partition under the Deed of Reconveyance was questionable because the other siblings of Severino were excluded. The Court provisionally found the Affidavit of Adjudication and Deed of Reconveyance ineffective to vest sole ownership in Severino, and that respondent George, who benefited from the defective Deed, could not claim exclusive ownership. Since petitioners' mothers had died, petitioners became co-owners by succession. Respondent George inherited his father Severino's share together with his three siblings. The Court provisionally found petitioners and respondent to be co-owners, with equal shares among Cayetana's seven children (approximately 1,236 square meters each, undivided). Relying on Anzures vs. Spouses Ventanilla, a co-owner cannot be ejected from co-owned property by another co-owner. Under Articles 484, 485, 486, and 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner has a pro indiviso right and may use the property provided he does not injure the interests of the co-ownership or prevent other co-owners from using it. Neither party can assert exclusive ownership and possession prior to partition.

• Identity of the Property: The lower courts' factual findings on the identity and location of the areas occupied by petitioners were uniform. The MTCC found, based on evidence and ocular inspection conducted on August 14, 2015, that the portions occupied by petitioners were within the property covered by respondent's title. The RTC affirmed this finding. The Court is bound by these factual findings in a Rule 45 petition, where only questions of law may generally be raised, and petitioners did not identify any exception warranting review.

• Provisional Resolution of Ownership in Accion Publiciana — In an accion publiciana, the court may provisionally resolve the issue of ownership to determine who between the parties has a better right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of ownership and does not constitute a collateral attack on a Torrens certificate of title. The Torrens title is never in jeopardy of being altered, modified, or cancelled. The defense of ownership raised by a defendant in an accion publiciana will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's title because the resolution of ownership is done only for purposes of resolving possession. The issue of ownership can only be settled with finality in a separate appropriate civil action.

• Co-owner Cannot Be Ejected by Another Co-owner — A co-owner of property cannot be ejected from the co-owned property by another co-owner. In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belongs to different persons, each holding the property pro indiviso and exercising rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. Until a division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every co-owner exercises joint ownership of the pro indiviso property. Neither party can assert exclusive ownership and possession prior to partition.

• Co-ownership Arises Upon Death of Decedent — Under Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. From the moment of death of the decedent, and pending actual partition, the heirs become co-owners of the estate, each having an undivided interest proportional to his or her share. The portions belonging to the co-owners are presumed equal unless the contrary is proved.

• "the defense of ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession." — This passage, drawn from the Court's clarification in Cullado, articulates the central ratio decidendi: that provisional resolution of ownership in an accion publiciana is not a collateral attack on a Torrens title.

• "The resolution of the issue of ownership in an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana is never final or definitive, but merely provisional; and the Torrens title is never in jeopardy of being altered, modified, or cancelled." — This formulation distinguishes the provisional adjudication of ownership in an accion publiciana from a direct attack on a certificate of title, correcting the error committed by all three lower courts.

• "Being a co-owner of the property as heir of Carolina, petitioner cannot be ejected from the subject property." — Quoted from Anzures vs. Spouses Ventanilla, this passage states the rule that a co-owner cannot be ejected by another co-owner, which the Court applied to hold that respondent George had no cause of action against petitioners.

• "the findings herein on the issue of ownership of the subject property are merely PROVISIONAL. The issue of ownership can ONLY be settled with FINALITY in the appropriate civil action that any interested party may subsequently file." — This closing emphasis underscores the limited, non-conclusive nature of the Court's ruling on ownership, preserving the parties' right to litigate title in a separate proceeding.

• Heirs of Alfredo Cullado vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, 911 SCRA 557 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this en banc decision to clarify that in an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's Torrens title because the resolution of ownership is done only to determine possession. The facts of Cullado were analogous: the defendant raised fraud in obtaining the plaintiff's certificate of title as an affirmative defense in an accion publiciana.

• Supapo vs. Sps. de Jesus — Followed. The Court quoted Supapo for the proposition that where parties raise the issue of ownership in an accion publiciana, courts may pass upon the issue to determine who has the right to possess, and such adjudication is not a final determination of ownership.

• Anzures vs. Spouses Ventanilla, 835 Phil. 946 (2018) — Followed. The Court relied on Anzures for the doctrine that a co-owner cannot be ejected from co-owned property by another co-owner, applying it directly to hold that respondent George had no cause of action to eject petitioners.

• Article 1078, Civil Code — Provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Applied to establish that upon Cayetana's death in 1935, her seven children became co-owners of her estate, including the subject land.

• Article 484, Civil Code — Defines co-ownership as existing whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Applied to characterize the relationship between petitioners and respondent over the land left by Cayetana.

• Article 485, Civil Code — Provides that the share of co-owners in benefits and charges shall be proportional to their respective interests, and that portions belonging to co-owners are presumed equal unless the contrary is proved. Applied to hold that in the absence of contrary evidence, the share of each of Cayetana's seven children was equal.

• Article 486, Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Applied to hold that petitioners, as co-owners, should be allowed to use the property to the extent they do not injure the co-ownership.

• Article 493, Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign, or mortgage it, except when personal rights are involved. Applied to confirm the pro indiviso, pro rata, pari passu nature of each co-owner's right.

• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The Court clarified that this provision was misapplied by the lower courts, because the provisional resolution of ownership in an accion publiciana does not constitute a collateral attack on a Torrens title.

Inting, Gaerlan, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concurred.