Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr.

A private prosecutor may intervene in criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 because the offended party is entitled to recover civil indemnity for the damage caused by the issuance of worthless checks, regardless of whether the special law expressly provides for civil liability. Civil liability arising from crime is founded on the obligation to repair damage caused to another, and every person criminally liable is also civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner Charmina B. Banal was the private complainant in fifteen separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 filed against respondent Rosario Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The cases were originally assigned to Branch 84, whose presiding judge inhibited himself upon Claudio's filing of a petition for recuse. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 105, then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina, who was later replaced by respondent Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos sought to enter his appearance as private prosecutor for the petitioner, but the respondent court rejected his appearance, prompting the present petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Fifteen separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913, were filed against respondent Rosario Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, originally assigned to Branch 84. The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19, 1986. The cases were re-raffled and assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105, then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina.

During the proceedings before Branch 105, Claudio was arraigned on November 20, 1986 and pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was set for January 8, 1987. In the meantime, Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.

On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor. The court reasoned that the charge was for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity, characterizing it as "not a crime against property but public order." The petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on March 10, 1987. Claudio filed her opposition on March 25, 1987, and on March 31, 1987, the respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, seeking to review and set aside the two orders of the respondent court, and via mandamus to compel the allowance of Atty. Bustos's appearance as private prosecutor in the criminal cases.

• Civil Liability Arising from Crime: Petitioner contended, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," that indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.

• Public Order Offense: Respondents argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order, making the State and the public the principal complainants, and therefore no civil indemnity is provided for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.

• Private Prosecution in B.P. Blg. 22 Cases: Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor in criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

• Private Prosecution in B.P. Blg. 22 Cases: No grave abuse of discretion could justify the exclusion; the petition was granted. Civil liability arises from the damage caused to the offended party, not from the statutory classification of the offense, and the offended party is entitled to intervene through a private prosecutor.

• Private Prosecution in B.P. Blg. 22 Cases: The basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Underlying this principle is the theory that a crime offends two entities: the State whose law was violated, and the individual member of society whose person, right, honor, chastity, or property was directly injured. However, civil liability does not truly arise from the crime itself but from the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether or not the same is punishable by law. Criminal liability gives rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the proximate cause thereof. Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter. Regardless of whether a special law so provides, indemnification may be had for the damage, loss, or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act. The petitioner, as payee of the worthless checks, suffered damage when the checks bounced after she had parted with money, property, or services on the assurance that the checks were good. The payee is entitled to receive payment and, having been damaged, is entitled to recompense. Excluding civil liability would leave the offended party defrauded and empty-handed, unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The petitioner's intervention is further justified by the constitutional mandate for speedy and inexpensive administration of justice (Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution), as a separate civil action would prove costly, burdensome, and time-consuming, and would cause a multiplicity of suits.

• Civil Liability Arising from Crime — Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Civil liability does not arise from the crime itself but from the obligation to repair the damage caused to another by one's act or omission, whether or not punishable by law. Criminal liability gives rise to civil liability only if the felonious act results in damage or injury to another and is the proximate cause thereof. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the offended payee of worthless checks issued in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is entitled to civil indemnity within the criminal proceedings, even though the special law does not expressly provide for civil liability, because the damage caused to the payee is the true foundation of the civil action.

• Avoidance of Multiplicity of Suits — Where the rights of the offended party may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate civil action to recover civil liability is unwarranted. The Court relied on this principle, anchored on the constitutional guarantee of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice (Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution), to justify the intervention of a private prosecutor in B.P. Blg. 22 cases rather than requiring the offended party to file a separate civil suit.

• "Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi that civil liability in special-law offenses exists independently of express statutory provision, grounded in the damage suffered by the offended party.

• "Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit." — This passage explains the policy rationale for allowing private prosecution in B.P. Blg. 22 cases, emphasizing that excluding civil liability would defeat the protective purpose of the law.

• "The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution." — This passage ties the right of private prosecution to the constitutional guarantee of speedy and inexpensive justice, establishing the doctrinal basis for avoiding multiplicity of suits.

• Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44 — Cited for the proposition that the indemnity a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime, itself citing Bagtas vs. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692.

• United States vs. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265 — Cited for the principle that every crime gives rise to a penal action for the punishment of the guilty party and also to a civil action for restitution, repair of damage, and indemnification for losses.

• Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986 — Cited for the recognition that the effects of a worthless check transcend private interests and touch the community at large, while simultaneously acknowledging the wrong done to the private party defrauded. The Court relied on this case to support the dual character of B.P. Blg. 22 violations as injuries to both the public and the private payee.

• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. The Court invoked this provision as the fundamental postulate establishing civil liability arising from crime, applicable even to offenses defined by special laws such as B.P. Blg. 22.

• Article 20, New Civil Code — Provides that every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter. The Court applied this provision to hold that indemnification may be had regardless of whether a special law expressly provides for civil liability, as the damage directly suffered by the offended party is the foundation of the civil action.

• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution (Bill of Rights) — Guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases. The Court relied on this provision to justify the intervention of a private prosecutor in the criminal proceedings, thereby avoiding a separate civil action that would prove costly, burdensome, and time-consuming.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.