Balunueco vs. Court of Appeals

Unlawful aggression is indispensable to defense of relatives, and without it the defense fails; intent to kill, as an essential element of frustrated or attempted homicide, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, failing which wounding constitutes only slight physical injuries. Applied here, admission of the killing without proof of real aggression by the deceased sustained homicide, while a single non-fatal leg wound inflicted without pursuit of the victim sustained only slight physical injuries.

On 2 May 1982 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening at Bagong Tanyag, Taguig, Amelia Iguico was coddling her youngest child in front of her house when she saw Reynaldo, Juanito, Ricardo and Ramon, all surnamed Balunueco, and Armando Flores chasing her brother-in-law Servando Iguico. With the five in hot pursuit, Servando scampered into Amelia's house for safety. Meanwhile, Amelia's husband Senando Iguico, who had been cooking supper, went out of the house unaware of the commotion outside. Upon seeing Senando, Reynaldo turned his attention to him and gave chase.

Senando fled toward the fields but was met by Armando, who hit him with a stone and made him dizzy. Reynaldo, Ricardo and Armando then cornered Senando near a canal and ganged up on him. According to Amelia, Armando placed a can on top of Senando's head while Ricardo repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on the head, shoulder and hand. At one point Ricardo lost his hold on the ax, but somebody tossed him a bolo and he continued hacking the victim, who fell on his knees. To shield her husband, Amelia put her arms around him, but Ricardo continued his assault and Amelia was also hit on the leg.

On 3 May 1982, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Maximo Reyes conducted a post-mortem examination on Senando and found two stab wounds and nine gaping hack wounds, with cause of death stated as hemorrhage, acute, profuse, secondary to multiple stab and hack wounds. Amelia's hack wound on the left leg required four days of medical attendance.

In defense, Ricardo testified that he was fetching water when he heard somebody shouting "Saya, saya, tinataga," referring to his brother Reynaldo. When he hurried to the place, he saw his brother Ramon embracing Senando, who was continuously hacking Reynaldo. Senando then shoved Ramon to the ground and, further enraged, turned his bolo on the fallen Ramon. Ricardo screamed "tama na yan, mga kapatid ko 'yan," but Senando hacked Ramon on the chest. At that point Servando threw an axe, but Reynaldo picked it up and smashed Senando with it. Defense witness Manuel Flores, who was doing carpentry work in front of his mother's house, gave a substantially similar account, describing Senando, a.k.a. "Bulldog," armed with a bolo and trailing Reynaldo, a.k.a. "Sayas," and Ramon toward Bagong Bantay, then hacking Reynaldo on the head, arm and stomach; Ramon embraced Senando but was shoved and attacked instead, and Ricardo, who went to rescue his brothers, was also hacked by Senando.

The trial court found Amelia's testimony clear, positive, straightforward, truthful and convincing, rejected Ricardo's denial as self-serving, and treated any wounds on Ricardo as inflicted while Senando was defending himself from Ricardo and his co-conspirators. The Court of Appeals gave full faith to Amelia's direct identification of Ricardo as the one who initially axed Senando on the head, shoulder and hand.

• Defense of Relatives: Petitioner argued that assuming he participated in the killing of Senando, he acted in defense of his full-blood relatives Reynaldo, whom he personally witnessed being boloed in the arms, head and stomach, and Ramon, who was pushed to the ground and attacked, giving rise to reasonable necessity to prevent or repel unlawful aggression without sufficient provocation on his part, justified under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due credence to the self-serving and baseless testimony of Amelia Iguico, the lone and biased witness for the prosecution.
• Injuries Sustained by the Defense: Petitioner argued that the several serious physical injuries sustained by him and his brother Reynaldo Balunueco were not considered and supported his claim that Senando was the aggressor.

• Defense of Relatives: Whether petitioner, assuming participation in the killing, acted in defense of relatives under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code.
• Credibility of Witness: Whether the testimony of Amelia Iguico, as lone prosecution eyewitness and relative of the deceased, should be given credence over the denial and version of petitioner.
• Stage of Felony for Wounding Amelia: Whether petitioner is liable for frustrated homicide, attempted homicide, or a lesser offense for the hack wound inflicted on Amelia Iguico's left leg.

• Defense of Relatives: No. Defense of relatives was not established, unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non not having been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• Credibility of Witness: The prosecution witness was properly credited. Amelia Iguico's direct and positive identification prevails over self-serving denial, with trial court findings on credibility entitled to the highest respect and relationship to the victim not alone implying bias.
• Stage of Felony for Wounding Amelia: Not frustrated or attempted homicide, but slight physical injuries only. Intent to kill was not indubitably established and the injury was slight, requiring four days of medical attendance.

• Defense of Relatives: The essential elements are (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) in case provocation was given by the person attacked, the defender had no part therein. Unlawful aggression requires an actual attack or material aggression positively determining intent to cause injury; mere threatening attitude does not suffice. Having admitted the killing, petitioner bore the burden of proving these elements by clear and convincing evidence on the strength of his own evidence. Proof failed: the claim that Senando repeatedly hacked Reynaldo before Reynaldo retaliated was implausible in light of two stab wounds and nine gaping hack wounds causing profuse hemorrhage on the deceased compared with non-fatal injuries on three assailants, indicating Senando vainly warded off assault; petitioner failed to present himself to authorities after accompanying Reynaldo to the hospital, contrary to the natural impulse of one who killed in defense, especially with two co-accused at large; his recollection was erratic, vividly recalling Reynaldo's injuries but not events leading to the fatal wounding and inconsistently stating who axed whom; and the killing occurred within or near the deceased's premises, belying the claim that Senando initiated aggression.
• Credibility of Witness: Amelia positively pointed to petitioner as the one who repeatedly struck Senando with an ax on the head, shoulder and hand and continued with a bolo after losing the ax. Denial, being self-serving and calculated to extricate petitioner, cannot prevail over such clear testimony, and any wounds on petitioner were consistent with Senando defending himself from petitioner and co-conspirators. Relationship with the deceased does not disqualify a witness nor automatically taint testimony with bias.
• Stage of Felony for Wounding Amelia: Intent to kill, essential to frustrated or attempted homicide, must be proved with the same certainty as other elements and may not be inferred without circumstances sufficient to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The record showed the opposite: while petitioner repeatedly assaulted the deceased, Amelia embraced her husband to avert further harm, and petitioner hit her only once on the left leg, a wound of slight nature, then did nothing more and allowed her to scurry away, indicating she was hit in the line-of-fire or merely to deter interference. Had killing been intended, vital body parts would have been targeted or repeated blows inflicted. With injuries not necessarily fatal and requiring four days of medical attendance, liability under Art. 266, par. (1), of The Revised Penal Code is only slight physical injuries, punishable by arresto menor of one to thirty days under Art. 27.

• Defense of relatives; elements — Defense of relatives under Art. 11, par. (2), of The Revised Penal Code requires (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. Petitioner invoking it failed on the first requisite and therefore on the defense as a whole.
• Unlawful aggression as condition sine qua non — Unlawful aggression must be an actual attack or material aggression positively showing the aggressor's intent to cause injury; a merely threatening or intimidating attitude is insufficient to justify an act punishable per se. No such positively strong act of real aggression by Senando was proved except through self-serving allegations.
• Burden of proof upon admission of killing — One who admits the killing bears the burden of proving justifying circumstances by clear and convincing evidence and must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not the weakness of the prosecution's. Even weak prosecution evidence cannot be disbelieved where the accused admitted the killing but failed to prove justification.
• Credibility of witnesses; deference to trial court — Findings of trial courts on credibility are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. Full faith was thus given to Amelia Iguico's direct, positive and straightforward identification of petitioner.
• Relationship of witness to victim — Relationship to the deceased does not disqualify a witness from testifying nor automatically sully testimony with bias. Amelia's relationship to Senando therefore did not impair her credibility.
• Intent to kill in frustrated and attempted homicide — Intent to kill is an essential element and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence with the same certainty as other elements; it should not be inferred absent circumstances sufficient to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. A single slight leg wound, without targeting vital parts or repeated blows and without pursuit, negated homicidal intent toward Amelia and reduced liability to slight physical injuries.

• "Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified." — States the controlling threshold for defense of relatives and why petitioner's justification failed at the outset.
• "In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative." — Gives the canonical definition of unlawful aggression applied to reject petitioner's version.
• "The unbending jurisprudence is that findings of trial courts on the matter of credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal." — Explains deference to the trial court's acceptance of Amelia Iguico's testimony over petitioner's denial.
• "the intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and with the same degree of certainty as required of the other elements of the crime." — States the evidentiary standard, drawn from People v. Villanueva, that required reduction of liability for Amelia's wounding to slight physical injuries.

• United States vs. Guy-Sayco, 13 Phil. 292 (1909) — Cited as authority for the meaning of unlawful aggression and that a merely threatening attitude does not justify a punishable act claimed as self-defense or defense of relative.
• People vs. Emberga, G.R. No. 116616, 26 November 1999, 319 SCRA 304 — Cited for the rule that one who admits the killing must prove justifying circumstances by clear and convincing evidence on his own evidence and cannot rely on weakness of the prosecution.
• People vs. Mana-ay, G.R. No. 132717, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 213 — Cited to support deference to trial court findings on witness credibility.
• People vs. Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488 (1928) — Followed for the rule that intent to kill in frustrated or attempted homicide must be proved by clear and convincing evidence with the same certainty as other elements.

• Art. 11, par. (2), The Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives with its three requisites; applied to reject petitioner's claim for failure to prove unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity.
• Art. 266, par. (1), The Revised Penal Code — Punishes slight physical injuries; applied because Amelia's leg wound was slight, not necessarily fatal, and required four days of medical attendance, with no proven intent to kill.
• Art. 27, The Revised Penal Code — Fixes the duration of arresto menor from one to thirty days; applied as the penalty framework for the slight physical injuries imposed.

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.