Baltazar vs. People

A trial court does not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting a motion to withdraw an information when it makes an independent assessment and evaluation of the evidence and finds no probable cause to hold the accused for trial. The judge's determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is distinct from the prosecutor's preliminary investigation proper, and the judge may reverse his earlier finding of probable cause upon a supervening event such as a DOJ resolution directing the withdrawal of the information, provided the grant or denial is based on the judge's own evaluation of the merits of the motion.

Petitioner Severino C. Baltazar is one of the children of the deceased Erlinda Baltazar and brother of the injured Rolando Baltazar. Private respondent Armando C. Bautista was charged with Murder for the death of Erlinda Baltazar and Frustrated Murder for the injuries suffered by Rolando Baltazar, arising from a vehicular incident on 21 April 2002 in Pulilan, Bulacan. The case involves the interplay between the prosecutorial power to determine probable cause during preliminary investigation and the trial court's exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of a case once an Information has been filed, as well as the review power of the Department of Justice over prosecutorial resolutions.

At about 8:30 p.m. of 21 April 2002, in the province of Bulacan, a silver/gray colored car with Plate No. TNM-606, traveling from the direction of Calumpit and going towards the direction of Pulilan Public Market, suddenly hit a pedicab. Because of the impact, the passengers of the pedicab — Erlinda Baltazar and her son, Rolando Baltazar — were thrown out of the pedicab. Witnesses Cristobal Atienza and Louie Reyes claimed in their respective sworn statements that after hitting the pedicab, they saw the car stop, maneuver into reverse, and run over the hapless victims, before fleeing the crime scene. As a result, Erlinda Baltazar died while Rolando Baltazar suffered injuries and was brought to Good Shepherd Hospital in Pulilan, Bulacan.

In the course of the investigation, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Simplicio Santos of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Pulilan, Bulacan, traced the ownership of the car and discovered that the registered owner was a certain Celso Bautista, who had already sold the vehicle to private respondent Armando Bautista. PO1 Santos then went to private respondent's residence where he recovered the car stained with blood. Consequently, petitioner Severino C. Baltazar, one of the children of the deceased Erlinda Baltazar and brother of the injured Rolando Baltazar, filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pulilan, Bulacan two separate criminal complaints against private respondent, one for the Murder of Erlinda Baltazar and the other for Frustrated Murder for the injuries suffered by Rolando Baltazar.

Hon. Horacio Viola, Jr., Presiding Judge of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, and upon its termination, issued his Resolution dated 23 July 2002 recommending the dismissal of the Murder charge against private respondent in view of the admission of his nephew, Joel Santos, in a sworn statement, that he was the one driving the car when the deadly incident occurred. The MTC Resolution recommended that the cases for Murder and Frustrated Murder be dismissed and instead an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide and Frustrated Homicide be filed against Joel Santos. The records of the cases were eventually transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan for appropriate action.

Upon receipt of the case records by the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, petitioner prayed for and was granted a reinvestigation. By a Resolution dated 23 September 2002, the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan reversed the findings of Judge Viola, Jr. and found probable cause to merit the indictment of private respondent for the murder of Erlinda Baltazar. The Information dated 21 October 2002 charged private respondent with murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and use of a Mitsubishi Sedan car. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3042-M-2002 and raffled to the sala of Hon. Judge Crisanto Concepcion, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.

Acting on the criminal case, Judge Concepcion issued an Order dated 14 November 2002 for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of private respondent, having fully determined probable cause from a personal evaluation of the facts as alleged in the information and its supporting documents. On 28 February 2003, private respondent filed a Motion for Reinvestigation before the RTC, which was denied in an order dated 7 March 2003. On 23 May 2003, private respondent filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a Petition for Review of the Resolution dated 23 September 2002 of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. About a year later, on 27 May 2004, on the strength of the warrant of arrest, private respondent was apprehended and detained pending trial.

Private respondent was set to be arraigned on 15 June 2004, but Judge Concepcion postponed the arraignment upon motion of private respondent who invoked the pendency of his Petition for Review with the DOJ. On 9 July 2004, private respondent's rescheduled arraignment again did not push through because he presented before the RTC a copy of the Resolution dated 8 July 2004, issued by Acting DOJ Secretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, reversing the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. The DOJ Resolution held that respondent could not be held criminally liable for murder as there was no malice or intent to cause injury (dolo) to the victims, nor could he be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide as there was no sufficient proof of negligence (culpa), declaring the incident an accident, an exempting circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The DOJ directed the immediate withdrawal of the information for murder and less serious physical injury filed against private respondent.

Pursuant to the DOJ Resolution, a Motion to Withdraw Information dated 28 July 2004 was filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor with the RTC and was granted by Judge Concepcion in an Order issued on 30 July 2004. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the private prosecutor, but Judge Concepcion denied the same in another Order dated 23 November 2004, explaining that the witnesses' statements to the police soon after the accident mentioned nothing of intentional killing, that the later affidavit claiming the car moved backwards intentionally to run over the victim was suspect as a mere afterthought, that the police investigator appeared not impartial, and that the admission of Joel Santos to being the driver should not have been ignored.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that Judge Concepcion correctly found in his Order dated 14 November 2002 that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest against private respondent, and that despite the supervening event of the DOJ Resolution, Judge Concepcion still had full control of the case and committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the Information.
• Error of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued before the Court of Appeals that respondent Judge gravely erred in appreciating the evidence presented, thus seriously abusing his discretion, an act amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, correctible by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner alleged that he was denied due process in the withdrawal of the Information.

• Independent Assessment: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agreed that petitioner's allegation of denial of due process was without factual basis, noting that the motion to withdraw information was furnished to the parties concerned, and petitioner appeared in court on the date of hearing and argued for the denial of the withdrawal, thus affording him the opportunity to be heard.
• No Grave Abuse: The Court of Appeals found that respondent Judge did not rely solely on the resolution of the Acting Secretary of Justice, as his Order dated 23 November 2004 demonstrated an independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence or the lack thereof against accused Bautista, showing he had studied and evaluated the Acting Secretary's recommendation as well as the sworn statements or evidence submitted.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner's arguments — that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the prosecution's motion without taking into consideration his earlier finding of probable cause, and that the pieces of evidence on record were more than sufficient to establish probable cause against the private respondent — cannot be properly raised in the Petition for Certiorari filed before it.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the withdrawal of the Information for Murder, as Judge Concepcion made an independent assessment and evaluation of the evidence and found no probable cause to hold private respondent for trial. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court defined probable cause as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor, subject to the power of review by the DOJ, which may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor and direct the prosecutor to file the corresponding information or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information.

The Court distinguished the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released, citing People vs. Inting. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge, while the preliminary investigation proper is the function of the prosecutor. The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the Judge; it merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause for issuance of the warrant of arrest.

The Court found that a closer scrutiny of Judge Concepcion's Order dated 30 July 2004 revealed that he reversed his earlier finding of probable cause and allowed the withdrawal of the Information based on the following grounds: (1) witnesses to the crime failed to categorically identify private respondent as the culprit; (2) private respondent's nephew, Joel Santos, voluntarily admitted in his affidavit that he was the one driving the car, which he borrowed from private respondent, and who accidentally hit the pedicab; (3) private respondent could not be held criminally liable for murder as there was no malice or intent to cause injury (dolo) to Erlinda Baltazar; and (4) this was just a simple case of criminal negligence or reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or less serious physical injury.

The Court cited Crespo vs. Mogul for the rule that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, or after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

The Court further held, citing Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, that although it is more prudent to wait for a final resolution of a motion for review or reinvestigation from the Secretary of Justice before acting on a motion to dismiss or withdraw an information, a trial court nonetheless should make its own study and evaluation of said motion and not rely merely on the awaited action of the secretary. The trial court has the option to grant or deny the motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal, provided that such grant or denial is made from its own assessment and evaluation of the merits of the motion.

The Court concluded that Judge Concepcion's Order granting the withdrawal of the Information was not issued with grave abuse of discretion, as there was no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law." To the contrary, Judge Concepcion came to the conclusion that there was no probable cause for private respondent to commit murder by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the facts, allegations, and evidence on record.

• Doctrine of Judicial Disposition of Cases (Crespo Doctrine) — Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case, whether dismissal or conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court, which has the option to grant or deny the same, whether before or after the arraignment of the accused, or after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. The trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution.

• Distinction Between Judicial Probable Cause and Prosecutorial Probable Cause — The preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is distinct from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge, while the preliminary investigation proper is the function of the prosecutor. The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the Judge; it merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause for issuance of the warrant of arrest. The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him.

• Definition of Probable Cause — Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law." An error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and which is correctible by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

• "The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." — This is the canonical formulation of the Crespo doctrine, which establishes that the trial court has exclusive jurisdiction and competence over the disposition of a case once an Information has been filed.

• "Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is the function of the prosecutor." — This passage from People v. Inting articulates the distinction between judicial probable cause for arrest and prosecutorial probable cause for trial, which is central to the Court's analysis.

• "It is . . . imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons." — This passage from Jimenez v. Jimenez emphasizes the duty of the judge or fiscal to relieve the accused from trial when evidence is insufficient, and the requirement that findings of probable cause must not disregard the facts before the judge.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, G.R. No. L-53373, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 462 — Controlling precedent establishing the rule that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the Court, and a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court which has the option to grant or deny the same.

• People vs. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA 788 — Followed for the distinction between the preliminary inquiry determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest (made by the Judge) and the preliminary investigation proper ascertaining whether the offender should be held for trial (function of the prosecutor).

• Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106695, 4 August 1994, 235 SCRA 39 — Followed for the rule that a trial court should make its own study and evaluation of a motion to dismiss or withdraw an information and not rely merely on the awaited action of the Secretary of Justice.

• Jimenez vs. Jimenez, G.R. No. 158148, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 516 — Cited for the principle that the judge or fiscal should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial, as this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right.

• People vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 492 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that the determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor, which exclusively pertains to said executive officer for crimes cognizable by the RTC.

• Roberts, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568 (1996) — Cited in connection with the distinction between judicial and prosecutorial probable cause.

• People vs. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998) — Cited for the definition of probable cause as a set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.

• Odin Security Agency, Inc. vs. Sandiganbayan, 417 Phil. 673 (2001) — Cited for the rule that once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed, the court may grant or deny it in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion, and the trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused.

• Section 1, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court — Defines preliminary investigation as an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. Applied to distinguish the prosecutor's function in conducting preliminary investigation from the judge's function in determining probable cause for arrest.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties. Applied to the DOJ Resolution dated 8 July 2004 directing the withdrawal of the Information.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision penalizing murder, under which private respondent was charged in the Information dated 21 October 2002.

• Article 12, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code — The exempting circumstance of accident, which the DOJ Resolution applied in finding that the death of the deceased was due to an accident without any negligence on the part of the driver, citing United States vs. Tayongtong, 21 Phil. 476.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — The provision on Imprudence and Negligence, under which the Provincial Prosecutor decreed that Armando Bautista should be charged for the injury sustained by Rolando Baltazar under Criminal Case No. 02-8308.

• Consuelo Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson)
• Antonio T. Carpio (designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated 16 July 2008)
• Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez
• Ruben T. Reyes

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.