Baltazar vs. Miguel

The 30-day period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code within which a co-owner must exercise legal redemption is a condition precedent, not a prescriptive period; failure to consign the redemption price within that period is a non-compliance that must be raised as an affirmative defense at the earliest opportunity, and a vendee who unreasonably delays in asserting that defense waives it and may be barred by laches. Actual knowledge of the sale—such as possession of a copy of the deed—suffices to trigger the period, but the procedural defect of late consignation is not jurisdictional and can be waived.

Baltazar, Florencio Hernando, and Hipolita Hernando were registered pro-indiviso co-owners of a 750-square-meter parcel in Laoag City under TCT No. T-19383. Florencio and Hipolita died and were survived by their respective heirs, the respondents (except Miguel). In September 2003, the heirs adjudicated to themselves and sold the aggregated two-thirds share of the property to respondent Rolando V. Miguel for P200,000.00 via a Deed of Adjudication with Sale. No written notice of the sale was furnished to Baltazar.

• Co-ownership and Sale: Baltazar, Florencio Hernando, and Hipolita Hernando were pro-indiviso co-owners of a 750-sqm property in Laoag City, covered by TCT No. T-19383. After the deaths of Florencio and Hipolita, their respective heirs—respondents Patrocinio (Florencio’s heir) and Angelito, Hipolito, Aurea, Edilberta, and Jose (Hipolita’s heirs)—sold their undivided two-thirds interest to respondent Miguel for P200,000.00 under a Deed of Adjudication with Sale dated September 9, 2003. No written notice was given to Baltazar.
• Pre-suit Offer and Rejection: Baltazar, having become aware of the sale, offered Miguel a sum exceeding the purchase price in an attempt to redeem. Miguel rejected the offer.
• Filing of Action and Procedural Delay: On February 2, 2006, Baltazar filed an Action for Legal Redemption, attaching a copy of the Deed of Adjudication with Sale. Miguel answered, contesting the right of redemption; the other respondents adopted his answer. The proceedings languished for over a decade as both parties caused repeated postponements, and the case never proceeded to pre-trial.
• Motion to Dismiss and Belated Consignation: In December 2016, respondents moved to dismiss on the sole ground that Baltazar had failed to comply with the condition precedent of tendering or consigning the redemption price. Only then, on January 20, 2017, did Baltazar consign P200,000.00 with the trial court and file an opposition, insisting that written notice was a prerequisite to the running of the 30-day period.
• Lower Courts’ Findings: The RTC found that Baltazar had actual knowledge of the sale by virtue of the attached deed, obviating written notice, and that no valid redemption had been exercised for lack of timely tender or consignation. The CA interpreted the dismissal as grounded on prescription, noting that Baltazar’s cause of action had prescribed, and alternatively that he was barred by laches for taking nearly 10 years to pursue the case after the 2003 sale.

• No Written Notice Received: Baltazar maintained that the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623 never commenced because he did not receive the mandatory written notice of sale from either the vendors or vendee.
• Erroneous Dismissal: He argued that the CA erred in treating the dismissal as based on prescription and laches, asserting that the reglementary period under Article 1623 is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent, and that his substantial right had not been extinguished.

• Failure to Comply with Condition Precedent: Respondents contended that Baltazar’s non-tender and non-consignation of the redemption price rendered his complaint without cause of action, warranting dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
• Prescription and Laches: The CA, sustaining the respondents’ stance, held that Baltazar’s actual knowledge of the sale triggered the 30-day prescriptive period, which had long expired, and that his nearly 10-year delay in prosecuting the action constituted laches.

• Nature of Redemption Period: Whether the 30-day period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code is a prescriptive period or a condition precedent, and whether the CA erred in affirming dismissal on the ground of prescription.
• Waiver of Condition Precedent Defense: Whether respondent Miguel waived the defense of non-compliance with a condition precedent by failing to raise it in his answer or at the earliest opportunity, and whether the trial court could validly dismiss the case on that ground a decade later.
• Laches: Whether Baltazar himself was barred by laches from enforcing his right of legal redemption.

• Nature of Redemption Period: The 30-day period under Article 1623 is a condition precedent, not a statute of limitations or prescriptive period. Its purpose is to restrict the time within which the redemptioner must act, not to extinguish the right of action. The CA committed reversible error in treating it as a prescriptive period and in affirming dismissal on that basis.
• Waiver of Condition Precedent Defense: Non-compliance with the condition precedent of tender or consignation is not jurisdictional; it is a procedural imperfection that must be raised as an affirmative defense at the earliest opportunity—either in a motion to dismiss before answer, or in the answer itself—pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court and Section 12, Rule 8 of the 2019 Amendments. Miguel filed an answer without alleging the defect and only moved to dismiss more than 10 years after the action commenced. By that decade-long delay, he waived the ground. Moreover, Miguel’s own neglect for an unreasonable length of time constituted laches, barring him from asserting the defense. The trial court’s dismissal of the case on that waived ground was erroneous.
• Laches: Baltazar was not barred by laches. Miguel failed to establish the precise date when Baltazar acquired actual knowledge of the sale before filing suit; the only certain point of actual knowledge was when Baltazar attached the deed to the complaint. The protracted proceedings were at least partly attributable to both parties’ postponements. No inequity prevented Baltazar from pursuing his substantive right of redemption.

• Legal Redemption Period as Condition Precedent — Under Articles 1620 and 1623 of the Civil Code, the 30-day period within which a co-owner may exercise the right of legal redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent to its valid exercise. It limits the time for action without extinguishing the right itself. (Citing Hermosa v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 703.)
• Actual Knowledge as Substitute for Written Notice — The written notice requirement in Article 1623 may be relaxed. A co-owner who possesses a copy of the deed of sale and thus has actual knowledge of the alienation is deemed notified in a manner equivalent to written notice, and the 30-day period runs from such actual knowledge. (Citing Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 471; Aguilar v. Aguilar, 514 Phil. 376.)
• Requisites for Valid Exercise of Redemption — To validly exercise legal redemption, the redemptioner must either make a formal offer to redeem (tender the price) or file an action in court together with consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period. Consignation serves to guarantee the seriousness and good faith of the offer and is not a jurisdictional requirement. (Citing Lee Chuy Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 185; Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 671.)
• Waiver of Affirmative Defenses — Under Rule 16 in relation to Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses such as non-compliance with a condition precedent must be pleaded at the earliest opportunity (in a motion to dismiss or in the answer). Failure to do so constitutes a waiver. Only lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription may be raised at any stage and can ground a motu proprio dismissal. Non-compliance with a condition precedent is not among those exceptions. (Citing Lansangan v. Caisip, 838 Phil. 252; Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., 818 Phil. 595.)
• Laches Against a Defendant — A party who unreasonably delays in asserting a procedural ground for dismissal may be barred by laches from invoking it, particularly where the delay manifests an intention to abandon the right or acquiescence to the validity of the action. (Citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556.)

• “The period of legal redemption is not a prescriptive period but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of redemption. It is a period set by law to restrict the right of the person exercising the right of legal redemption. It is not one of prescription.”
• “Being a mere procedural imperfection, it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court. … Miguel was required under Section 1 of Rule 16 … to raise or assert Baltazar's non-compliance with a condition precedent, at the earliest opportunity, either by filing a motion to dismiss on such ground or raising the same in his answer. Unfortunately, Miguel raised Baltazar's non-compliance … only after filing his answer and more than 10 years after the action was initiated … which rendered such ground for dismissal deemed waived.”
• “Miguel's neglect to assert the subject ground for the dismissal of the action within a reasonable time translated into his intention to abandon his right to anymore ask for the dismissal of the action on the ground of petitioner's non-compliance with a condition precedent, if not his acquiescence to the correctness, timeliness and completeness of the action.”

• Etcuban v. Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 471 (1987) — Followed for the rule that furnishing a copy of the disputed deed of sale to a redemptioner constitutes sufficient written notice under Article 1623; a co-owner with actual knowledge is not entitled to a separate written notice.
• Aguilar v. Aguilar, 514 Phil. 376 (2005) — Applied for the proposition that a co-owner with actual knowledge of the sale does not require further written notice, and the 30-day redemption period runs from such actual knowledge.
• Lee Chuy Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 185 (1995) — Relied upon for the requirement that filing an action for legal redemption must be coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the reglementary period, failing which there is no valid exercise of the right.
• Alvarado v. Ayala Land, Inc., 818 Phil. 595 (2017) — Cited to distinguish categories of motions to dismiss; certain grounds, including non-compliance with a condition precedent, must be raised before or in the answer, otherwise they are waived.
• Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556 (1968) — Invoked for the doctrine of laches: a party’s unreasonable delay in asserting a right estops that party from later enforcing it.

• Article 1620, Civil Code — Establishes the right of a co-owner to redeem shares sold to a third person. Applied to Baltazar’s status as a pro-indiviso co-owner.
• Article 1623, Civil Code — Prescribes the 30-day period from written notice within which legal redemption must be exercised. Construed as a condition precedent rather than a prescriptive period; its written notice requirement relaxed through actual knowledge evidenced by possession of the deed.
• Section 1, Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Court — Enumerates grounds for a motion to dismiss, including “[t]hat a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with” (par. j). The provision anchors the rule that such ground must be invoked at the earliest opportunity.
• Section 12, Rule 8, 2019 Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Mandates that affirmative defenses, including non-compliance with a condition precedent, be raised in the answer, failing which they are waived.
• Section 1, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of Court / 2019 Amendments — States that defenses and objections not pleaded are waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription. Applied to demonstrate that non-compliance with a condition precedent is not among the excepted grounds and was deemed waived.

Leonen, J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ., concurred.