Baltao vs. Falcis III

A lawyer's use of profane, intemperate, and offensive language on social media constitutes simple misconduct and violates Canon II, Section 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, which mandates that lawyers use only dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in all personal and professional dealings, whether made through traditional or electronic means, including social media. The lawyer's right to freedom of expression is not absolute and is limited by the lawyer's oath and duties to maintain the dignity of the legal profession.

The respondent, Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III, is a member of the Philippine Bar. The complainant, Jason Gene H. Baltao, filed an administrative complaint against the respondent for violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The case involves the respondent's use of obscene language on his personal Twitter account, which is governed by the ethical standards imposed on lawyers under the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA), particularly Canon II, Section 4, which requires lawyers to use dignified language in all dealings, and Canon II, Sections 36 and 37, which mandate the responsible use of social media.

Kris Aquino, a famous television personality and ex-business partner of complainant Jason Gene H. Baltao, filed multiple counts of qualified theft against Nicko Falcis, the brother of respondent Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III. On November 15, 2018, Atty. Falcis III posted on his Twitter account a message containing the words "pakyu" and "gago" directed at supporters of Aquino, whom he referred to as "dilawans." The post read: "Yung mga biased na dilawan dyan, halata kayo. Sa allegations ni Kris, paniwalang paniwala na kayo agad. Pero sa allegations namin na she threatened my brother, wala ako naririnig sa inyo? Pakyu kayo mga gago haha check your cognitive biases."

Atty. Falcis III defended his brother from the false accusations raised in several media platforms. Consequently, Baltao filed a complaint before the IBP-CBD against Atty. Falcis III because he used the obscene words "pakyu" and "gago" in his Twitter account, which was clearly unbecoming of a lawyer. In his Verified Answer-Affidavit, Atty. Falcis III argued that he cannot be held liable for violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, invoking prior decisions of the Court where it ruled that the word "putang ina" is not really meant to defame but an expression of anger or displeasure. He also claimed that he did not commit any prior administrative violations, asserting that he was only previously cited for direct and indirect contempt and the dispositive portion therein only imposed a stern warning, which was not a penalty.

A mandatory conference was conducted, and the parties submitted their respective position papers. Baltao reiterated that the use of "pakyu" and "gago" undermines the respectability of the legal profession, and argued that this was not Atty. Falcis III's first infraction, as he was already cited in direct and indirect contempt and meted the penalty of PHP 5,000.00 in a September 3, 2019 Decision of the Court. Atty. Falcis III countered that lawyers are entitled to free speech and expression, especially in his case where he was only defending his brother from false accusations.

After a thorough examination of the evidence, the IBP-CBD submitted its Report and Recommendation recommending that respondent be held guilty of violating Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA for use of abusive, intemperate, offensive or otherwise improper language. The IBP-Board of Governors modified the Report and Recommendation, finding respondent guilty of a light offense with one aggravating circumstance of indirect contempt offset by one mitigating circumstance of being a first-time offender, and recommended a fine of PHP 17,500 and reprimand with stern warning.

• Violation of Ethical Standards: Baltao argued that the use of "pakyu" and "gago" undermines the respectability of the legal profession.
• Prior Infractions: Baltao argued that this was not Atty. Falcis III's first infraction, noting that Atty. Falcis III was already cited in direct and indirect contempt and meted the penalty of PHP 5,000.00 in a September 3, 2019 Decision of the Court.

• Expression of Anger: Atty. Falcis III argued that he cannot be held liable for violation of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, invoking prior decisions of the Court where it ruled that the word "putang ina" is not really meant to defame but an expression of anger or displeasure.
• No Prior Administrative Violations: He claimed that he did not commit any prior administrative violations, asserting that he was only previously cited for direct and indirect contempt and the dispositive portion therein only imposed a stern warning, which was not a penalty.
• Freedom of Speech: Atty. Falcis III countered that lawyers are entitled to free speech and expression, especially in his case where he was only defending his brother from false accusations.

• Administrative Liability under Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA: Whether respondent Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III should be administratively liable for violation of Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA for his use of profane and offensive language on Twitter.

• Administrative Liability under Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA: Yes. The respondent was found guilty of simple misconduct, which is classified as a less serious offense under Canon VI, Section 34 of the CPRA, for his use of profane and offensive language on social media. The Court imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year.

• Administrative Liability under Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA: The Court emphasized that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed only to those who possess and continue to possess the qualifications for the legal profession. Lawyers are duty-bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA provides that a lawyer shall use only dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in all personal and professional dealings, and shall not use language which is abusive, intemperate, offensive or otherwise improper, oral or written, and whether made through traditional or electronic means, including all forms or types of mass or social media.

The respondent justified his use of the words "pakyu" and "gago" by explaining that he only uttered such words out of passion to express his anger and displeasure against the supporters of Aquino and that he only acted in defense of his brother and the latter's reputation. However, the Court found that the respondent could have remained in the realm of legal discourse by showing the news articles regarding the cases they filed against Aquino and make solid arguments. Rather, he used profanity to verbally attack what he referred to as "dilawans" or supporters of Aquino. Clearly, this behavior falls short of the expected conduct of a lawyer.

The Court further noted that as a lawyer, respondent must understand the consequences of uttering vulgar words in his Twitter account, its risks, and ethical implications, including the likelihood of it spreading indiscriminately, becoming available to anyone on social media, and the influence that it could have on lawyers and non-lawyers alike, not to mention the children who have been exposed to social media. The respondent failed to take these implications and consequences into account, and in doing so, he likewise failed in upholding the directive to responsibly use social media.

The Court cited Malabed vs. Atty. De la Peña, which reminded lawyers to refrain from using improper language because it undermines the dignity of the legal profession. It also cited Saberon vs. Larong, which stated that while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. The Court likewise cited Sps. Nuezca vs. Atty. Villagarcia, which emphasized that though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.

The Court held that the respondent cannot exculpate himself by claiming that he was only defending his brother, as the manner in which it was done should be consistent with the high standards of conduct and morality expected from the members of the Bar. While freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution, the lawyer's oath and their duties and responsibilities ultimately serve as a limit thereto. Lawyers should be cautious in their postings online and are reminded to always practice restraint in their conduct, be it in real life or in social media.

The Court found that at the time respondent made his post on Twitter, a case was already pending before the appropriate court against a charge for which respondent may help the cause of his brother by advancing the appropriate legal arguments. However, instead of advancing legal arguments before the appropriate tribunal, respondent resorted to personal attacks against persons who are supporting not only the cause of Aquino but the group of "dilawan," publicly known to support the administration of then President Benigno Aquino III. This was even published through social media, which has a wide reach, giving the impression that lawyers may throw invectives against supporters of a litigant in a case. This is a misconduct that tends to discredit the legal profession.

The Court classified the respondent's transgression as simple misconduct, which is classified as a less serious offense under Canon VI, Section 34 of the CPRA, there being no manifest elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules. As regards the penalty, the Court resolved to increase the penalty imposable against respondent due to his previous administrative infractions of direct and indirect contempt and the gravity of his action in using profane and obscene words. Applying Canon VI, Section 39 of the CPRA, which provides that if one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed, the Court imposed the penalty of suspension of one year from the practice of law.

• Simple Misconduct — Simple misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, distinguished from grave misconduct by the absence of the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule. In this case, the respondent's use of profane and offensive language on Twitter was classified as simple misconduct, a less serious offense under Canon VI, Section 34 of the CPRA, because none of the elements of grave misconduct were manifest.

• Responsible Use of Social Media — Canon II, Sections 36 and 37 of the CPRA mandate that lawyers have the duty to understand the benefits, risks, and ethical implications associated with the use of social media, and shall ensure that their online posts uphold the dignity of the legal profession and shield it from disrepute. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the respondent failed to take into account the risks and ethical implications of his Twitter post, which had a wide reach and gave the impression that lawyers may throw invectives against supporters of a litigant in a case.

• Limits on Lawyers' Freedom of Expression — While freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution, the lawyer's oath and their duties and responsibilities ultimately serve as a limit thereto. Lawyers should be cautious in their postings online and are reminded to always practice restraint in their conduct, be it in real life or in social media. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the respondent's defense that he was merely exercising his right to free speech in defending his brother.

• Manner of Imposing Penalties under Canon VI, Section 39 of the CPRA — If one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances are present, the Supreme Court may impose the penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed under the CPRA. The Court applied this provision in increasing the respondent's penalty to one year of suspension, considering his previous administrative infractions of direct and indirect contempt and the gravity of his action in using profane and obscene words.

• "A lawyer shall use only dignified, gender-fair, child-and culturally-sensitive language in all personal and professional dealings. To this end, a lawyer shall not use language which is abusive, intemperate, offensive or otherwise improper, oral or written, and whether made through traditional or electronic means, including all forms or types of mass or social media." — This is the canonical formulation of Canon II, Section 4 of the CPRA, which was the primary provision the respondent was found to have violated.

• "While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive." — This quotation from Saberon v. Larong articulates the standard of conduct expected of lawyers in presenting their cases, which the Court applied to the respondent's social media post.

• "Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum." — This quotation from Sps. Nuezca v. Atty. Villagarcia emphasizes the requirement that lawyers maintain dignity and respect in their language, which the Court applied in finding the respondent liable.

• "The more viral online content is, as assessed from the volume of people who saw the original post or by way of shared posts within the same platform or cross-posting other social media, the greater its effect and propensity to affect the public. The language employed may also be deliberately used to infuriate the public to generate more public engagement." — This quotation from ABS-CBN Corporation v. Ampatuan, Jr. was cited in the concurring opinion to explain the risks of social media posts and their potential to polarize and create antagonism among political groups.

• Malabed vs. Atty. De la Peña, 780 Phil. 462 (2016) — Cited as controlling precedent reminding lawyers to refrain from using improper language because it undermines the dignity of the legal profession.

• Saberon vs. Larong — Cited for the principle that while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.

• Sps. Nuezca vs. Atty. Villagarcia, 792 Phil. 535 (2016) — Cited for the principle that though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.

• Falcis vs. Civil Registrar General, 861 Phil. 388 (2019) — Cited to establish the respondent's previous administrative infraction of direct and indirect contempt, for which he was ordered to pay a fine of PHP 5,000.00.

• Lao vs. Atty. Causing, 930 Phil. 538 (2022) — Cited for the principle that the rule of law may totally be circumvented and rendered nugatory by blatantly seeking public sympathy on social media.

• Request of the Public Attorney's Office to Delete Section 22, Canon III of the Proposed Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, 951 Phil. 638 (2024) — Cited as a case where a lawyer was penalized for failure to take into account the risks and ethical implications associated with social media.

• Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Guevarra, 801 Phil. 570 (2016) — Cited in the concurring opinion as a case where a lawyer was suspended for one year for posting insulting statements on Facebook.

• Felix vs. Atty. Gadon, 951 Phil. 620 (2024) — Cited in the concurring opinion as a case where a lawyer was penalized for hurling offensive and insulting language, including "putang ina" and "mga bobong dilawan," on a radio-television show.

• Canon II, Section 4, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision requiring lawyers to use only dignified, gender-fair, child- and culturally-sensitive language in all personal and professional dealings, and prohibiting the use of language which is abusive, intemperate, offensive or otherwise improper, whether made through traditional or electronic means, including social media. The respondent was found to have violated this provision.

• Canon II, Section 2, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision requiring lawyers to respect the law, the courts, tribunals, and other government agencies, and to act with courtesy, civility, fairness, and candor towards fellow members of the bar, and prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on one's fitness to practice law or scandalous behavior to the discredit of the legal profession.

• Canon II, Section 36, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision mandating that a lawyer shall have the duty to understand the benefits, risks, and ethical implications associated with the use of social media. The Court found that the respondent failed to comply with this mandate.

• Canon II, Section 37, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision requiring that a lawyer shall ensure that their online posts, whether made in a public or restricted privacy setting that still holds an audience, uphold the dignity of the legal profession and shield it from disrepute, as well as maintain respect for the law.

• Canon VI, Section 34, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision classifying less serious offenses, which include simple misconduct, or such misconduct without the manifest elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules. The respondent's transgression was classified as simple misconduct under this provision.

• Canon VI, Section 37, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision prescribing the sanctions for serious, less serious, and light offenses. The Court applied this provision in determining the appropriate penalty for the respondent's simple misconduct.

• Canon VI, Section 38(b), Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision enumerating aggravating circumstances, including a finding of previous administrative liability where a penalty is imposed, regardless of nature or gravity, and lack of remorse. The Court considered the respondent's previous administrative infractions as an aggravating circumstance.

• Canon VI, Section 39, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — The provision governing the manner of imposition of penalties when modifying circumstances are present, allowing the Supreme Court to impose penalties of suspension or fine for a period or amount not exceeding double of the maximum prescribed when one or more aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances are present. The Court applied this provision in imposing the penalty of one year of suspension.

Lazaro-Javier, Kho, Jr., and Villanueva, JJ., concurred. Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), filed a separate concurring opinion.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided text.