Balitaan vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II

In a prosecution for estafa through grave abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code, evidence of checks and of false representations does not constitute a variance from the Information where the prosecution's theory remains abuse of confidence; matters of evidence need not be alleged, and deceit may co-exist with abuse of confidence.

Luz E. Balitaan owned a baby dress mending shop in Barrio Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas, and Rita de los Reyes was employed as the person in charge of its management, including the procurement of unsewed baby dresses from and the delivery of finished dresses to Uniware, Inc. in Makati, Rizal. The case concerns the distinction between estafa through grave abuse of confidence under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code and estafa through false pretenses or fraudulent acts under paragraph 2(a) of the same article. It also involves the rule that an Information must allege every element of the offense but need not plead evidentiary matters.

Luz E. Balitaan owned a baby dress mending shop in Barrio Aplaya, Bauan, Batangas. Rita de los Reyes was her employee and was in charge of managing the business, including procuring unsewed baby dresses from and delivering finished dresses to Uniware, Inc. in Makati, Rizal. An Information filed in the Municipal Court of Bauan charged de los Reyes with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that she collected and received P127.58 from Uniware, Inc. as payment for work done on baby dresses, was obliged to account for and deliver it to Balitaan, and despite repeated demands, misappropriated it with unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence.

At the initial hearing on September 18, 1973, Balitaan testified as the first prosecution witness. She identified a cash voucher dated April 27, 1972, marked Exhibit A, showing total payment of P1,632.97 for baby dresses delivered by de los Reyes to Uniware, Inc. Payment was made by three checks: No. 17000703 for P500, No. 17000702 for P500, and No. 17000704 for P632.97. De los Reyes received the checks in Makati.

Defense counsel objected and moved to strike out the testimony regarding Exhibit A and the checks, arguing variance because the Information did not allege the voucher or the checks and charged only P127.58. The Municipal Court overruled the objection. Balitaan continued: de los Reyes delivered the checks and voucher to her and represented that baby dresses with style Nos. 648, 151, 161, and 203 belonged to Cesar Dalangin, whose payment of P127.58 was included in the checks. Balitaan instructed de los Reyes to cash the checks and pay Dalangin. De los Reyes returned the next day with the cash minus P127.58. Two or three weeks later, Balitaan noticed that many baby dresses were lost and verified the receipts. She went to Cesar Dalangin, who denied that the styles were his, denied receiving any amount from de los Reyes, and denied knowing her. When confronted, de los Reyes could not talk, turned pale, and later admitted having kept the amount.

At the close of direct examination, defense counsel moved to strike out the foregoing testimonies, but the Municipal Court denied the motion. De los Reyes then filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Batangas, Branch II, to annul the orders. The CFI found that the testimony tended to prove estafa by false pretenses under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), rather than the abuse-of-confidence estafa alleged, and ordered the testimonies stricken from the record.

• Variance Between Information and Proof: Petitioner argued that the CFI erred in holding that there was a variance between the Information for estafa and the proof established by her testimony, because the existence of the checks and their total amount were evidentiary matters that did not vary the allegation that de los Reyes misappropriated P127.58.
• Scope of Certiorari: Petitioner maintained that the CFI erred in deciding the merits of Criminal Case No. 2172 instead of limiting itself to determining whether the writ of certiorari should issue, since only two motions were denied by the Municipal Court and the CFI went beyond them without giving the adverse party a chance to argue and receive evidence.
• Grant of Certiorari: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in granting the writ of certiorari to annul the orders of the Municipal Court of Bauan, Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 2172.

• Different Kind of Estafa: Respondent argued that the evidence tended to prove estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, committed by false pretenses or fraudulent acts, rather than the estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), charged in the Information, because the essence of the criminal act shown by the testimony was deceit.
• Information Must Allege Elements: Respondent maintained that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, and since the Information charged misappropriation and abuse of confidence, proof of false representation that P127.58 belonged to Cesar Dalangin was at variance with the charge.
• Checks Not Alleged: Respondent argued that the testimonies regarding the checks and cash voucher were at variance with the Information because it did not allege the existence of the voucher and the three checks, nor that the accused received or cashed the checks or received a portion for delivery to Cesar Dalangin.

• Variance Between Information and Proof: Whether the CFI erred in holding that the testimonies of Luz E. Balitaan were at variance with the Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised Penal Code.
• Allegation of Checks and Total Amount: Whether the existence of the three checks and their total amount of P1,632.97 had to be alleged in the Information charging misappropriation of P127.58.
• Proof of Deceit in Abuse-of-Confidence Estafa: Whether proof that the accused falsely represented that P127.58 belonged to Cesar Dalangin converted the charge into estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), or constituted a fatal variance.
• Scope of Certiorari Proceedings: Whether the CFI improperly decided the merits of Criminal Case No. 2172 instead of limiting itself to determining whether the writ of certiorari should issue.

• Variance Between Information and Proof: No. The testimonies did not vary from the Information; the prosecution's theory remained estafa through abuse of confidence, and deceit may co-exist with abuse of confidence.
• Allegation of Checks and Total Amount: No. The existence of the checks and their total amount are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information; proof thereof was material to show that P127.58 was part of the total sum misappropriated.
• Proof of Deceit in Abuse-of-Confidence Estafa: No. Proof of deceit did not change the offense; where a relation of trust and confidence exists, estafa is by abuse of confidence even if deceit co-exists, and the deceit is merely incidental or absorbed.
• Scope of Certiorari Proceedings: No. The issue of variance was raised in the certiorari proceedings, as shown by the motion to strike out and the memorandum, so the CFI did not act on an unraised matter; however, its conclusion on variance was erroneous.

• Variance Between Information and Proof: The Court began from the rule that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, determined by the definition and essentials of the specific crime. For estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), the Information must contain: (a) personal property received in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery or return, even if guaranteed by a bond; (b) conversion or diversion by the recipient; (c) injury to another; and (d) demand for return. The purpose is to enable the accused to prepare a defense. However, matters of evidence need not be averred; reasonable certainty suffices. The existence of the three checks was evidentiary and need not be alleged. The total amount of P1,632.97 did not vary the allegation that de los Reyes misappropriated P127.58, because proof of the checks and their total amount was material evidence that the P127.58 was part of the total sum. Thus, no variance existed.
• Allegation of Checks and Total Amount: The Court applied the general rule that matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. The checks and their total amount were not elements of the estafa charged; they were proof of the source and context of the P127.58 misappropriated. The Information sufficiently charged the crime under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), and the evidence on the checks did not alter the offense alleged.
• Proof of Deceit in Abuse-of-Confidence Estafa: The Court distinguished estafa under paragraph 1(b) from paragraph 2(a). Paragraph 1(b) requires receipt of money or personalty in trust, commission, administration, or other obligation to deliver or return, misappropriation to another's prejudice, and previous demand. Paragraph 2(a) requires deceit or false representation to defraud and damage, with no demand required. They are essentially different offenses. But proof of deceit in a paragraph 1(b) prosecution is not prohibited; abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit is present, abuse of confidence characterizes the estafa, with deceit merely incidental or absorbed by abuse of confidence. As long as a relation of trust and confidence exists between complainant and accused, even if induced by false representations and continued by active deceit, the estafa is by abuse of confidence. In estafa by deceit, the false statement must be the very cause or only motive inducing the complainant to part with the thing. Here, the false representation that P127.58 belonged to Cesar Dalangin did not change the prosecution's theory that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. The Municipal Court properly denied the motion to strike.
• Scope of Certiorari Proceedings: The Court rejected petitioner's contention that the CFI went beyond the motions raised. The record showed that, aside from the two motions, private respondent moved to strike out testimony relating to the receipt of the voucher and the three checks and their cashing by de los Reyes, on the ground that these were at variance with the Information. The issue of variance was also raised in private respondent's memorandum dated February 3, 1974, before the CFI. Thus, the CFI did not resolve an unraised issue; its error lay in its conclusion that a variance existed.

• Variance Between Information and Proof — Every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information, but matters of evidence need not be averred; reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices. The purpose of alleging the elements is to enable the accused to prepare a defense. In this case, the existence of the three checks and their total amount were evidentiary matters, not elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), and did not vary the Information alleging misappropriation of P127.58.
• Estafa by Abuse of Confidence and Estafa by Deceit — Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), requires that the offender received money or personalty in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or return the same, and misappropriated it to the prejudice of another, with previous demand. Estafa under paragraph 2(a) requires deceit or false representation to defraud and damage caused thereby, and no demand is necessary. The two offenses are essentially different. However, abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist; where a relation of trust and confidence exists, the estafa is by abuse of confidence even if deceit co-exists, and the deceit is merely incidental or absorbed. In estafa by deceit, the false statement must be the very cause or only motive inducing the complainant to part with the thing. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the false representation about Cesar Dalangin did not convert the charge into estafa under paragraph 2(a).
• Purpose of Alleging Elements in the Information — The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare a defense, since the accused is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense. The Court used this principle to assess whether the Information sufficiently charged estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).

• "It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes." — This passage states the foundational rule on sufficiency of an Information and frames the Court's analysis of whether the checks and total amount had to be alleged.
• "Applying these principles, We rule that the existence of the three checks need not be alleged in the Information. This is an evidentiary matter which is not required to be alleged therein." — This is the ratio decidendi on the alleged variance regarding the checks; it directly holds that evidentiary matters need not be pleaded.
• "Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confidence win characterize the estafa as the deceit will be merely incidental or as the Supreme Court of Spain held, is absorbed by abuse of confidence." — This passage articulates the Court's core doctrine distinguishing and reconciling estafa by abuse of confidence and estafa by deceit.
• "It has also been held that as long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the accused and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false representations and pretense and which is continued by active deceit without truthfully disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence although deceit co-exists in its commission." — This excerpt states the controlling rule that a relation of trust and confidence characterizes the estafa as abuse of confidence despite accompanying deceit.

• People vs. Torres, 1 CA Rep. 833 — Cited by the Court for the distinction between estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), which requires prior demand, and estafa under paragraph 2(a), which requires deceit or false representation and no demand.
• US vs. Lim, 30 Phil. 682 — Cited for the rule that where a relation of trust and confidence exists between complainant and accused, the estafa is by abuse of confidence even if the relationship was induced by false representations and continued by active deceit.
• People vs. Gines, et al., 5 CA Rep. 249 — Cited for the rule that in estafa by means of deceit, the false statement or fraudulent representation must be the very cause or only motive inducing the complainant to part with the thing.
• Mead vs. State, 53 NJ Law 601, 23 Atl. 209 — Cited as an illustration that matters of evidence, such as the manner of defrauding in forgery, need not be alleged in the information.

• Article 315, paragraph 1(b), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa through grave abuse of confidence. The Court held that the Information sufficiently charged this offense and that the evidence of checks and false representation did not vary from it.
• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts. The Court distinguished it from paragraph 1(b) but held that proof of deceit does not convert a paragraph 1(b) charge where abuse of confidence remains the theory.

Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, and de Castro, JJ., concurred. Escolin, J., concurred in the result. Aquino, J., filed a separate concurring opinion stating that the CFI grievously erred in entertaining the certiorari petition because appeal, not certiorari, is the remedy for correcting errors in the reception of evidence; certiorari is a remedy for errors of jurisdiction and is confined to extraordinary cases where the action of the inferior court is wholly void, citing Nocon vs. Geronimo, 101 Phil. 735, and Herrera vs. Barreto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245, 271. Barredo, J. (Chairman), concurred for the reasons stated in Justice Aquino's concurring opinion.