Balindong vs. Court of Appeals

The issuance by the trial court of a warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implies that the judge has determined probable cause for the offense charged; the accused may not thereafter seek a separate judicial determination of probable cause, especially where the proper offense has already been finally settled in a prior final and executory decision. Contempt of court requires willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice; a judge’s suspension of arrest warrants out of judicial courtesy, absent bad faith, is not contempt.

Zenaida M. Limbona is the widow of Dante Limbona, one of the victims in the criminal cases instituted against Mayor Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, Mayor Amer Oden Balindong, and Ali Balindong. The cases had already generated prior final rulings, including G.R. No. 159962, which settled the proper offenses to be charged, and G.R. No. 173290, which cited Judge Ralph S. Lee and Balindong, et al. for indirect contempt. The present consolidated proceedings arise from subsequent RTC orders affecting those charges and the enforcement of arrest warrants, and from a contempt charge against Judge Alexander S. Balut.

On May 11, 1998, a shooting incident in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur killed Dante Limbona and Ante Maguindanao and seriously wounded Azis Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. Zenaida M. Limbona, the widow of Dante Limbona, became the private complainant in the criminal cases. The investigating prosecutor found probable cause to charge Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong, PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden Balindong, and Ali Sarip Balindong with Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder, and the corresponding Information was filed before the RTC of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, Branch 12.

After a reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the charges against Cota, Anwar, and Kennedy and dropped Amer Oden and Ali from the case. Limbona filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice. On August 4, 1999, Secretary Serafin Cuevas modified the assailed resolution and directed the filing of two informations for frustrated murder with attempted murder, two informations for frustrated murder, and an information for attempted murder against the private respondents. On December 1, 1999, Secretary Cuevas denied their motion for reconsideration and modified the dispositive portion to direct the filing of two informations for murder with attempted murder, two informations for frustrated murder, and an information for attempted murder against Datu Anwar Berua Balindong, Lt. Col. Jalandoni Cota, PO1 Kennedy Macaborod Balindong, Datu Amer-Oden Sarip Balindong, and Datu Ali Sarip Balindong. The Amended Informations were filed before the RTC of Maguindanao, Cotabato City, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 2503, 2573, 2574, 2575, and 2576.

Balindong, et al. filed a second motion for reconsideration, which Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero denied on March 16, 2000 with finality and with a warning that no further pleadings would be entertained. They nonetheless filed a third motion for reconsideration, which Secretary Hernando B. Perez granted on March 12, 2001; he directed the filing of an amended information for double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide against Anwar, Cota, and Kennedy, and dropped Amer Oden and Ali. Limbona sought reconsideration, but the same was denied on July 24, 2001. She then filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66858. On May 22, 2003, the CA set aside Secretary Perez’s issuances and reinstated the DOJ Resolutions dated August 4, 1999, December 1, 1999, and March 16, 2000; the CA denied reconsideration on September 23, 2003.

Later, Criminal Case Nos. 2503 and 2573 were re-raffled to the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219, and re-docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Q-01-100542-43, and Q-01-100594. Pursuant to the CA’s May 22, 2003 Decision, the RTC-Branch 219 issued a resolution finding probable cause to charge the private respondents for Murder with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-998992-93 [sic], Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100542-43, and Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. Q-01-100594. Warrants of arrest were accordingly issued. Balindong, et al. went to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 159962. On December 16, 2004, the Supreme Court denied the petition, affirmed the CA Decision dated May 22, 2003, lifted the Temporary Restraining Order, and ordered the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 219, to implement its December 3, 2003 Resolution relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest against all the accused. Their motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on June 6, 2005, the Court declaring that there was no longer any obstacle to the implementation of the existing warrants of arrest. Despite this, Balindong, et al. filed another motion purportedly for clarification. On August 14, 2005, the Supreme Court expunged their urgent motion for clarification and admonished them and their counsel to pay heed to the Court’s directives and to desist from further unauthorized pleadings under pain of contempt. The Decision in G.R. No. 159962 became final and executory on July 5, 2005.

Due to the inhibition of the presiding judge of RTC-Branch 219, the criminal cases were raffled to RTC-Branch 100, whose presiding judge was expressly ordered by the Supreme Court in a December 12, 2005 Resolution to enforce the warrants of arrest with utmost dispatch. After issuing the order relative to the enforcement of the warrants, the presiding judge of RTC-Branch 100 inhibited herself, and the cases were re-raffled to RTC-Branch 83, presided by Judge Ralph S. Lee. Balindong, et al. filed before RTC-Branch 83 a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal – Even of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides. Limbona moved for Judge Lee’s inhibition when he failed to act upon a motion for the issuance of alias warrants of arrest. Before voluntarily inhibiting himself, Judge Lee issued the May 12, 2006 Order granting the motion for redetermination of probable cause and ordering the downgrading of the crimes charged. The cases were then re-raffled to RTC-Branch 77, presided by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, who issued the October 18, 2006 Order denying the motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2006 Order and setting the arraignment on November 3, 2006. Limbona filed a motion for Judge Baclig’s voluntary inhibition; he denied it and reset the arraignment to December 11, 2006 in a November 22, 2006 Order.

Aggrieved by the May 12, 2006 and October 18, 2006 Orders, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97121, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On November 20, 2006, the Supreme Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 173290, adjudging Judge Lee and Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect contempt. The Court found that they had filed motions that rehashed issues already resolved with finality and that Judge Lee had contravened the directive in G.R. No. 159962 by granting the motion for reconsideration and redetermination of probable cause and downgrading the charges. Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases, which were re-assigned to Branch 91 of the RTC, presided by Judge Lita Tolentino-Genilo. On May 24, 2007, Judge Tolentino-Genilo issued an order reinstating the charges against Balindong, et al. for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder to conform with G.R. No. 159962, issuing alias warrants of arrest, and inhibiting herself from further hearing the cases. The criminal cases were subsequently re-raffled to Branch 76, presided by Judge Alexander S. Balut. Balindong, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest. Judge Balut deferred action to await the Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177600 and suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants issued for their arrest. Limbona then commenced G.R. No. 178684.

The CA, on April 24, 2007, promulgated its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121. Balindong, et al. appealed that ruling in G.R. No. 177600. Limbona, in turn, filed G.R. No. 178684 to cite Judge Balut and Balindong, et al. for contempt for the July 16, 2007 Order suspending the enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause (Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 177600): Petitioners argued that despite the finality of G.R. No. 159962, they were not precluded from seeking from the RTC a judicial determination of probable cause because the Supreme Court had only upheld the executive determination of probable cause; the Court did not prevent resort to available judicial remedies, such as filing proper motions for judicial determination of probable cause under Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court.
• Exhaustion of Remedies (Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 177600): Petitioners maintained that after exhausting preliminary investigation through the DOJ, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court, the RTC and/or the accused could still invoke Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 19, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
• Contempt (Limbona, G.R. No. 178684): Limbona argued that Judge Balut’s acts of willfully disobeying the decisions and resolutions in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290 constituted indirect contempt because they tended to impede or obstruct the administration of justice; the suspension of the alias warrants had the same effect as a temporary restraining order and pre-empted the Court’s resolution of her prayer for a TRO or injunction.

• Judicial Courtesy and Discretion (Judge Balut, G.R. No. 178684): Judge Balut justified his July 16, 2007 Order by invoking judicial courtesy and asserting his judicial discretion. He argued that a petition for review in G.R. No. 177600 was pending before the Supreme Court and that the May 12, 2006 Order downgrading the offenses was a supervening fact that divided the procedural antecedents into “prior to the order” and “after said order”; the legal milieu had changed, and he suspended the alias warrants to avert conflicting determinations.
• No Willful Disobedience (Judge Balut, G.R. No. 178684): He maintained that he was not unmindful of G.R. No. 159962, the June 6, 2005 and December 12, 2005 Resolutions, and G.R. No. 173290, and that he merely exercised judicial discretion in suspending the enforcement of the alias warrants.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause (G.R. No. 177600): Whether, after the final and executory ruling in G.R. No. 159962 sustaining the charges for murder with attempted murder, frustrated murder, and attempted murder, the RTC and/or Balindong, et al. are precluded from invoking Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 19, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure to seek a judicial redetermination of probable cause and a downgrading of the charges.
• Contempt of Court (G.R. No. 178684): Whether Judge Balut’s July 16, 2007 Order deferring action on the motion and suspending enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest, pending G.R. No. 177600, constituted indirect contempt for willfully disobeying the decisions and resolutions in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause (G.R. No. 177600): No. The petition is denied. The trial court’s issuance of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implies a determination of probable cause; Section 14, Rule 110 applies only where the public prosecutor mistakenly charged the proper offense, and no such mistake existed because the proper offenses had been finally settled in G.R. No. 159962.
• Contempt of Court (G.R. No. 178684): No. The contempt petition is dismissed. Judge Balut did not disobey the Court’s decisions; absent bad faith, willfulness, or deliberate intent, his suspension of the alias warrants out of judicial courtesy was at most an error of judgment and not contumacious.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause (G.R. No. 177600): The Court recalled that G.R. No. 159962 was an appeal by Balindong, et al. to review the CA judgment of May 22, 2003, which had granted Limbona’s petition for certiorari, set aside the March 12, 2001 DOJ Resolution of Secretary Perez acting on the third motion for reconsideration, and reinstated the DOJ Resolutions dated August 4, 1999, December 1, 1999, and March 16, 2000. Secretary Perez had dropped Amer Oden and Ali and directed the filing of an amended information for double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide against Anwar, Cota, and Kennedy. The CA had declared that Secretary Perez committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70, which prohibits second or further motions for reconsideration, and by acting on the third motion despite the grounds having been previously raised and passed upon. In G.R. No. 159962, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA. The language of that Decision was clear: the proper criminal charges were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder. By ordering the RTC to implement its December 3, 2003 Resolution relative to the issuance of warrants of arrest, the Court did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination of probable cause independently of the executive determination. The trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found probable cause against Balindong, et al. The act of issuing the warrant upon filing of the information and supporting papers implied that the judge had determined probable cause for the offenses charged. It was therefore superfluous for the accused to seek judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act independently of the executive determination. Rule 112, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that within ten days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the prosecutor’s resolution and supporting evidence; he may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence clearly fails to establish probable cause; if he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest; in case of doubt, he may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. Balindong, et al. could not rely on Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119. Section 14 applies only to a situation in which the public prosecutor made a mistake in charging the proper offense. The Court asked whether the public prosecutor made a mistake, and answered no. There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses. Balindong, et al. had fully exhausted the procedure to determine the proper offenses, and their quest was ultimately settled with finality when the Secretary of Justice denied their second motion for reconsideration. Their attempt to undo that determination through a third motion for reconsideration initially succeeded before Secretary Perez, but the CA nullified that action, and the Supreme Court affirmed the nullification in G.R. No. 159962. The Court thereby issued its judicial imprimatur on the probable cause for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder. Reliance on Section 14 to allow the RTC to reach a different determination of probable cause was untenable.
• Contempt of Court (G.R. No. 178684): The Court examined Judge Balut’s July 16, 2007 Order, in which he stated that, without addressing the merits of whether the alias warrants should be recalled, and to avert conflicting determinations, he deemed it prudent to defer action because Balindong, et al.’s petition for review in G.R. No. 177600 was still pending before the Supreme Court. He suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants dated May 25, 2007 while awaiting resolution of G.R. No. 177600. Judge Balut justified his actions by invoking judicial courtesy and judicial discretion. He explained that five consolidated criminal cases had been filed, that a legal battle had ensued over the appropriate crime, and that after flip-flopping charges and the inhibition of five trial judges, the cases landed in his sala with a pending incident: the accused’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest. Aware that any resolution would spark controversy and delay, he resolved to withhold action and observe judicial courtesy. He noted that a petition for review assailing the CA decision reversing the May 12, 2006 and October 18, 2006 Orders was pending. He also stated that he was not unmindful of the December 16, 2004 Decision in G.R. No. 159962, the June 6, 2005 and December 12, 2005 Resolutions, and the November 20, 2006 Decision in G.R. No. 173290, and that he merely exercised judicial discretion. He submitted that the issuance of the order downgrading the offenses was a supervening fact dividing the procedural antecedents into “prior to the order dated May 12, 2006” and “after said order,” and that the legal milieu had changed. The Court held that Judge Balut did not disobey the decisions in G.R. No. 159962 and G.R. No. 173290. There was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants, or that he had acted with willful and deliberate intent to disobey or ignore the Court’s bidding, or to cause injustice to any party. Absent a clear showing of bad faith, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he could not be held to account. The history of the criminal cases—from the transfer of venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City, to the successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges, to the succession of petitions for certiorari—probably persuaded him to tread the path of prudence and caution. He expressed the desire “to avert any conflicting determinations” pending the promulgation of G.R. No. 177600. His actuations were entirely different from Judge Lee’s, who downgraded the offenses and ordered the issuance of warrants for the downgraded offenses, thereby directly contradicting G.R. No. 159962. The Court defined contempt of court as disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity; it signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of court orders but also conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or to impede the due administration of justice. The power to punish for contempt is inherent but must be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice. Judge Balut’s suspension of the alias warrants did not meet this standard.

• Judicial Determination of Probable Cause Implied from Issuance of Arrest Warrant — The issuance by the trial court of a warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implies that the judge has determined probable cause for the offense charged. It is superfluous for the accused to seek a separate judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act independently of the executive determination of probable cause. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Balindong, et al. could no longer seek a redetermination of probable cause after the RTC had issued warrants of arrest and after G.R. No. 159962 had finally settled the proper offenses.
• Section 14, Rule 110 Limited to Mistake in Charging the Proper Offense — Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court applies only where the public prosecutor has made a mistake in charging the proper offense. The Court found no such mistake because the proper offenses had been finally determined by the DOJ and affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 159962. Consequently, Balindong, et al. could not invoke these provisions to compel the RTC to redetermine probable cause or downgrade the charges.
• Finality of Prior Decision Bars Re-litigation of the Proper Offense — Once the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 159962 finally settled the proper charges, all issues relative to the determination of the proper offenses were laid to rest. The Court applied this doctrine against Balindong, et al., holding that their continued attempts to seek a different determination of probable cause and to downgrade the charges were untenable.
• Contempt of Court Requires Willfulness, Bad Faith, or Deliberate Intent — Contempt of court is disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity; it includes conduct tending to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or to impede the due administration of justice.
• The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts but must be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously.
• Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious.
• An act, to be contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.
• Judicial Courtesy Not Contempt When Exercised Without Bad Faith — A judge’s deferral of action and suspension of arrest warrants pending resolution of a related petition in the Supreme Court, undertaken to avoid conflicting determinations and without bad faith or contumacious intent, is not punishable as contempt. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the contempt charge against Judge Balut.

• “The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper offense.” — This passage states the ratio decidendi for G.R. No. 177600, establishing that the issuance of an arrest warrant already constitutes a judicial determination of probable cause and that a separate redetermination is unnecessary.
• “Ostensibly, Section 14, supra, applies only to a situation in which there has been a mistake on the part of public prosecutor in charging the proper offense. It becomes logical to ask: Did the public prosecutor make a mistake in charging the proper offenses against Balindong, et al.? The answer is no. There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses.” — This passage defines the limited scope of Section 14, Rule 110 and explains why Balindong, et al. could not invoke it to force a downgrading of the charges.
• “Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.” — This passage provides the canonical definition of contempt of court relied upon by the Court in resolving the contempt charge against Judge Balut.
• “Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.” — This passage states the standard for punishing contempt and is the basis for dismissing the contempt petition against Judge Balut.

• Balindong vs. Court of Appeals, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 200 — The prior final and executory decision in G.R. No. 159962. The Court relied on it as having settled the proper offenses and the existence of probable cause, and held that the RTC could not revisit those matters.
• Lu Ym vs. Mahinay, G.R. No. 169476, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 253, 261-262 — Cited for the definition of contempt of court.
• Sison vs. Caoibes, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1771, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 258 — Cited for the inherent contempt power of courts and its purpose of protecting the dignity of the court and the administration of justice.
• De Guia vs. Guerrero, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1099, August 1, 1994, 234 SCRA 625, 630 — Cited for the rule that contempt power must be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously.
• In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, G.R. No. 150274, August 6, 2006, 497 SCRA 626, 631 — Cited for the requirement that an act be contumacious only if it manifests willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

• Section 6, Rule 112, Rules of Court — When warrant of arrest may issue. The Court cited this provision to show that the RTC judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s resolution and supporting evidence and, if probable cause is found, issues a warrant of arrest; thus, the issuance of the warrant implies a judicial determination of probable cause.
• Section 14, Rule 110, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Amendment or substitution. The Court held that it applies only where the public prosecutor has made a mistake in charging the proper offense; because there was no mistake, Balindong, et al. could not use it to compel a redetermination or downgrading of the charges.
• Section 19, Rule 119, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Dismissal of the original complaint or information upon filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the accused is not placed in double jeopardy. The Court found it inapplicable because no mistake in charging the proper offense existed.
• Section 13, DOJ Circular No. 70 — Prohibits second or further motions for reconsideration in appeals. The Court recounted that the CA had found Secretary Perez guilty of grave abuse of discretion for entertaining the third motion for reconsideration despite this prohibition, a ruling affirmed in G.R. No. 159962.

• Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice)
• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
• Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
• Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe