Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. vs. Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc.

A complaint's jurisdictional sufficiency in ejectment cases is determined solely by its allegations, not by the caption or the parties' characterizations; where the allegations show the defendant's possession was unlawful from the beginning, the action is forcible entry, not unlawful detainer — and if the complaint fails to allege how and when the entry or dispossession was effected, the MTC acquires no jurisdiction, and the proper remedy is a plenary action before the RTC.

Petitioner PBSBC is the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements (Lot 3, Blk. 35 of (LRC) Pcs-2364, covered by TCT No. 82587) located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City. Petitioner BFBC is a church organization that borrowed money from PBSBC under a contract of simple loan dated March 7, 1990 to purchase the subject property, thereafter occupying it for religious activities. Respondent FCJBC is a church organization allegedly formed by respondent Reynaldo Galvan, who had begun attending BFBC's religious services at the subject property. The Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC) served as an ecclesiastical body that adjudicated disputes among affiliated Southern Baptist congregations.

On March 7, 1990, PBSBC and BFBC entered into a contract of simple loan (mutuum) under which PBSBC lent BFBC money to purchase the subject property — Lot 3, Blk. 35 of (LRC) Pcs-2364, covered by TCT No. 82587, located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City. BFBC took possession of the property and conducted its religious activities thereat. According to BFBC, while it was in possession, Reynaldo Galvan and his companions began attending BFBC's religious services at the subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan formed and incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.

Respondents presented a different account. FCJBC contended that it had existed since 1984, formerly known as "Faith Baptist Church" (FBC), which initially held services at the Tacipit family residence before moving to a building along MacArthur Highway in the same subdivision. Sometime in 1990, some FBC members availed of a loan from the Church Loan Fund of the Foreign Mission Board, SBC, Philippine Baptist Mission to purchase the subject property, embodied in the same Contract of Simple Loan dated March 7, 1990. Rolando Santos served as FBC's pastor from 1993 to 2000, but due to a misunderstanding within the church group, Santos left FBC with some members and in February 2001 formed BFBC, duly registered with the SEC. FBC continued to occupy the subject property and on January 9, 2001 organized itself into FCJBC.

Galvan's actuations were brought to the attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist Churches, Inc. (LCSBC), which in a letter dated September 5, 2001 upheld BFBC's right over the subject property and recognized Rev. Rolando T. Santos as its legitimate pastor. Despite this, FCJBC continued to occupy the property. On September 4, 2002, BFBC sent a demand letter requiring FCJBC to vacate within five days and to pay ₱10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 as reasonable compensation. FCJBC did not comply.

Meanwhile, FCJBC alleged that since June 2001 it had been willing and able to pay the installments due on the subject property, but PBSBC refused to accept payment. On October 9, 2002, FCJBC filed a Petition for Consignation of Payment before the RTC, Branch 62, Angeles City (Civil Case No. 10713), praying that PBSBC be required to accept ₱240,615.53 as full payment of the loan. On October 29, 2002, FCJBC moved to suspend the ejectment proceedings pending resolution of the consignation case. Due to FCJBC's non-compliance with the demand to vacate, BFBC and PBSBC filed the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and Galvan on September 24, 2003 before the MTC.

• Jurisdiction of the MTC: Petitioners maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer and ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
• Propriety of CA Raising Issues Sua Sponte: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in raising issues on the sufficiency of the complaint and MTC jurisdiction which were not brought out by the parties.
• Duty to Decide on the Merits: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled to dismiss the complaint instead of deciding the case on the merits in light of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

• Nature of the Action: Whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or forcible entry.
• Jurisdiction of the MTC: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer and ruling that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
• Sua Sponte Consideration of Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in raising issues on the sufficiency of the complaint and MTC jurisdiction which were not brought out by the parties.
• Dismissal vs. Decision on the Merits: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled to dismiss the complaint instead of deciding the case on the merits in light of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

• Nature of the Action: The complaint, as pleaded, alleged facts constituting forcible entry rather than unlawful detainer, because the allegations showed FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and bereft of contractual or legal basis, with no allegation of tolerance or permission by the plaintiffs.

• Jurisdiction of the MTC: No. The MTC had no jurisdiction. Even treating the complaint as one for forcible entry, it was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to allege how FCJBC's entry was effected and when dispossession started. The proper recourse was a plenary action for recovery of possession before the RTC.

• Sua Sponte Consideration of Jurisdiction: No error. A court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, because jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action.

• Dismissal vs. Decision on the Merits: The dismissal was proper. Because the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the complaint as pleaded, the complaint could not be decided on the merits in the ejectment proceedings.

• Nature of the Action: The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, as articulated in Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, is determinative. In forcible entry, possession is illegal from the beginning and the issue is who has prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful upon expiration or termination of the right to possess. The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. Applying the four requisites for unlawful detainer set out in Cabrera vs. Getaruela — (1) initially, possession by contract with or tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) possession became illegal upon notice of termination; (3) defendant remained in possession; and (4) complaint filed within one year from last demand — the complaint's own allegations failed. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the complaint characterized FCJBC's occupancy as unlawful from the start, with no allegation of tolerance or permission by BFBC or PBSBC. Paragraphs 7 and 8 described the occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters were sent. These allegations are constitutive of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer.

• Jurisdiction of the MTC: While the complaint's allegations pointed to forcible entry, the complaint was equally defective under that cause of action. BFBC sufficiently alleged prior physical possession, but failed to allege how FCJBC's entry was effected or when dispossession started. The bare allegation that Galvan "formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of the subject premises" showed only that FCJBC entered without consent, but did not specify the manner or date of entry. The one-year period for forcible entry is counted from the date of actual entry on the land (or from discovery when entry was through stealth). Without an allegation of when and how dispossession occurred, the complaint failed to establish the jurisdictional facts necessary for an ejectment suit. Where dispossession did not occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, the proper recourse is a plenary action to recover possession with the RTC. Consequently, the MTC had no jurisdiction.

• Sua Sponte Consideration of Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all — it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation, and all acts performed pursuant to it have no legal effect. The Court of Appeals therefore did not err in considering the jurisdictional issue even if not raised by the parties.

• Dismissal vs. Decision on the Merits: Because the MTC lacked jurisdiction over the complaint as pleaded, and because the complaint could not be sustained as either unlawful detainer or forcible entry, dismissal was the proper disposition. The Court did not separately address Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as the jurisdictional defect was dispositive.

• Determinative Nature of Complaint Allegations in Ejectment — The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of action is not what the designation or caption states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible entry; jurisdiction cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization by one party or on the defenses set up in the answer.

• Distinction Between Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer — In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied; possession was originally lawful but became unlawful, and the issue of rightful possession is decisive.

• Requisites of Unlawful Detainer — A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

• Implied Force in Forcible Entry — In forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.

• Jurisdiction May Be Raised at Any Stage — A court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, because jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and render judgment. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all and can never become final.

• "The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court." — This passage states the controlling principle that the complaint's own allegations, not the caption or the parties' characterizations, govern the classification of the ejectment action and the court's jurisdiction.

• "In this case, paragraphs 5 and 6 make it clear that FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise, no allegation that BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the subject property." — This is the ratio decidendi applying the unlawful detainer requisites to the complaint's allegations, concluding that the action as pleaded did not constitute unlawful detainer.

• "Unfortunately, BFBC and PBSBC's failure to allege when the dispossession took place and how it was effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground." — This passage articulates the decisive reason for the dismissal: even as forcible entry, the complaint failed to allege the jurisdictional facts of how and when entry was effected.

• Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372 — Controlling authority cited for the distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, defining the elements and issues unique to each cause of action.

• Cabrera vs. Getaruela, 604 Phil. 59 (2009) — Followed for the four requisites that a complaint must allege to sufficiently state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

• Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752 (1918) — Followed for the doctrine that in forcible entry, no actual force is necessary; the act of entering and excluding the lawful possessor implies force.

• Nunez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., 632 Phil. 143 (155) (2010) — Followed for the rule that the one-year prescriptive period in forcible entry is counted from the date of actual entry, or from discovery when entry was through stealth.

• Spouses Ong vs. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045 (2001) — Followed for the rule that where dispossession did not occur by any of the means in Section 1, Rule 70, the proper recourse is a plenary action for recovery of possession before the RTC.

• Zacarias vs. Anacay, G.R. No. 202354, Sept. 24, 2014, 736 SCRA 508 — Followed for the doctrines that the complaint must show jurisdiction on its face without resort to parol testimony, and that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage and a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Defines forcible entry and unlawful detainer as distinct causes of action. Applied to determine that the complaint's allegations, which showed unlawful occupation from the beginning without tolerance or contractual basis, fell under forcible entry rather than unlawful detainer, and that the failure to allege how and when entry was effected precluded MTC jurisdiction.

• Section 8, Rule 140, Rules of Court — Cited by petitioners as ground for the CA to decide the case on the merits rather than dismiss; the Court did not sustain this argument, the jurisdictional defect being dispositive.

Velasco, Jr., J. (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concurred.