Balanoba vs. Madriaga

The prohibition against second motions for reconsideration under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court applies to any party—winning or losing—but only to judgments or final orders, not to interlocutory orders incident to the execution of a final judgment; a final and executory judgment may no longer be amended except for clerical errors or in exceptional cases; and the wage exemption under Article 1708 of the Civil Code applies only to manual laborers and must be clearly established by proof.

Spouses German and Elisa Balanoba offered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 7815 for sale to respondent Manuel D. Madriaga, who paid a partial amount through broker Abraham de Sagun, brother of petitioner Elisa Balanoba. Rebecca de Sagon Madriaga, joined as a petitioner before the Supreme Court, is the wife of respondent Manuel D. Madriaga; she claimed a share in the monetary judgment on the theory that it formed part of the community property of their marriage. The dispute centers on the execution phase of a collection case that had gone to default judgment, raising questions about the proper scope of procedural rules governing motions for reconsideration during execution, the right of a non-party spouse to intervene in a final judgment, and the statutory exemption of laborers' wages from garnishment.

On June 5, 1996, respondent Manuel D. Madriaga filed an action for collection of a sum of money with damages against spouses German and Elisa Balanoba. Respondent claimed that the spouses had offered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 7815 for sale to him; that he paid a partial payment of ₱200,000 through Abraham de Sagun, the broker and brother of petitioner Elisa Balanoba; that the remaining balance of ₱250,000 was to be paid within sixteen months from February 11, 1993 until June 11, 1994; that on April 25, 1993, he paid US$600 to the petitioners; but that before the lapse of the sixteen-month period and without his knowledge, the petitioners sold the same lot to one Yolanda C. Aguilon. In May 1994, respondent offered to settle the remaining balance, but the petitioners refused to convey the property and, despite demands, failed to reimburse him.

For failure of the petitioners to file their answer, the trial court, upon motion of respondent, declared them in default and allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. On November 21, 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent. The decision became final and executory, and respondent obtained partial execution of the money judgment. On August 9, 2000, respondent filed a Motion for Issuance of a Notice of Garnishment, praying that the trial court direct garnishee Bandila Maritime Services, Inc.—petitioner German Balanoba's employer—to deliver goods, effects, money, or other personal property belonging to petitioner sufficient to satisfy the judgment.

On August 15, 2000, the petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that the money judgment formed part of the community property of respondent and his wife, Rebecca de Sagon Madriaga; that Rebecca was entitled to one-half of the monetary judgment; and that Rebecca, through her attorney-in-fact and counsel, had condoned and waived her right to one-half of the monetary award in favor of the petitioners. The trial court denied respondent's motion on August 22, 2000, citing procedural defects: failure to comply with Section 5, Rule 15 (notice of hearing), failure to indicate the unsatisfied balance, and the rule that the branch sheriff—not the court—issues notices of garnishment. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 25, 2000, which was denied on September 8, 2000, because it was not filed by counsel of record and the amounts did not tally with the sheriff's partial returns. Respondent then filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration on September 18, 2000, rectifying the discrepancy and stating the outstanding balance as ₱221,911.11 as of September 19, 2000. The trial court denied the second motion on September 22, 2000, on the ground that the original writ had expired, but admonished respondent to move instead for an alias writ.

Petitioners filed a Comment and/or Opposition on September 26, 2000, arguing that under Section 5, Rule 37, no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution on October 12, 2000. On November 15, 2000, the trial court directed respondent and the branch sheriff to submit a computation under oath of the satisfied amount. Respondent filed a Compliance on November 27, 2000, asserting ₱148,790.39 had been satisfied, leaving ₱236,696.20 as the balance. On November 29, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that respondent was still married to Rebecca, that he had refused to give financial support to his wife and son since April 1999, and that he had personally pocketed the amounts collected without giving anything to his wife and child. On December 15, 2000, the trial court found respondent's Compliance not in accordance with its Order and directed strict compliance. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that Order on January 2, 2001.

On January 3, 2001, Rebecca de Sagon Madriaga filed a Manifestation and Motion, alleging that the money judgment was part of the community property between her and respondent; that, as his wife with a pending case for declaration of nullity of their marriage, she was entitled to one-half of the monetary judgment; and that she had condoned, waived, or abandoned in favor of the petitioners her right to one-half of the award. She prayed that respondent's motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution be dismissed. Respondent opposed, arguing that the manifestation was in the nature of an intervention not in accordance with Rule 19, that it unduly delayed or prejudiced his rights under a final and partially executed decision, and that Rebecca's claim, if any, should be ventilated in a separate proceeding. On January 31, 2001, the trial court denied Rebecca's Manifestation and Motion—because she was not a party to the case and no waiver of rights was allowed during marriage except in case of judicial separation of property—and ordered the issuance of an alias writ to enforce the unpaid balance of ₱251,643.398 as of November 21, 2000.

• Scope of the Prohibition on Second Motions for Reconsideration: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Section 5, paragraph 2 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure refers only to the aggrieved party and not likewise to the winning party, maintaining that the prohibition should apply to any party filing a second motion for reconsideration.
• Standing of Rebecca de Sagon Madriaga: Petitioners contended that the CA erred in declaring that Rebecca was not a party to the case and therefore could not ask for the reliefs prayed for, asserting that as respondent's wife, she had a share in the judgment and, having condoned her share in petitioners' favor, the balance of the money judgment should be reduced accordingly.
• Exemption from Garnishment: Petitioners argued that the CA erred in declaring that petitioner German Balanoba failed to demonstrate that he was a mere laborer whose wages were exempt from execution under Article 1708 of the Civil Code, maintaining that his salary as a seafarer should be exempt.

• Nature of the Motions Filed: Respondent maintained that the series of motions he filed were not second motions for reconsideration of a judgment or final order, but were aimed at correcting procedural defects and effecting full execution of the final judgment in his favor.
• Rebecca's Lack of Standing: Respondent countered that Rebecca's Manifestation and Motion was in the nature of an intervention not in accordance with Rule 19, that it unduly delayed or prejudiced his rights under a decision that had become final and partially executed, and that Rebecca's claim, if any, could rightfully be ventilated in a separate proceeding.
• No Exemption Established: Respondent argued that German Balanoba had not proven that he was a mere laborer, as merely describing him as a "seafarer" without specifying his position, functions, duties, and responsibilities did not establish that he was a laborer within the contemplation of Article 1708 of the Civil Code.

• Second Motions for Reconsideration: Whether the prohibition against second motions for reconsideration under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court applies only to the aggrieved party and not to the winning party, and whether it extends to orders incident to execution rather than only to judgments or final orders.
• Standing of Non-Party Spouse: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Manifestation and Motion of petitioner Rebecca de Sagon Madriaga on the ground that she was not a party to the case.
• Exemption from Execution: Whether petitioner German Balanoba's salary as a seafarer was exempt from execution under Article 1708 of the Civil Code.

• Second Motions for Reconsideration: No, the CA's pronouncement was overly broad, but its result was correct. The prohibition under Section 5, Rule 37 applies to any party—winning or losing—but only to judgments or final orders, not to interlocutory orders incident to execution. Respondent's successive motions were directed at execution, not at the final judgment itself.
• Standing of Non-Party Spouse: No error was committed. The judgment had become final and executory and could no longer be amended; Rebecca was not a party to the case, and her post-judgment motion was in the nature of an intervention that should have been filed before rendition of judgment.
• Exemption from Execution: No. The exemption under Article 1708 of the Civil Code favors only laboring men or women whose work is manual, and the claim for exemption must be clearly established by proof, which petitioners failed to provide.

• Second Motions for Reconsideration: The Court clarified that Section 5, Rule 37 states that "no party" shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order, meaning the prohibition applies to any party—whether winning or losing. However, what is proscribed is a second motion for reconsideration of a "judgment or final order." The provision is consonant with public policy against piecemeal impugnment of judgments and the policy that litigation must come to an end. In this case, the November 21, 1996 Decision was already final and executory, and respondent had obtained only partial execution. The series of motions he filed referred to matters attendant to a complete execution of the decision—not for reconsideration of the final judgment itself. Except for respondent's first Motion for Reconsideration, his succeeding motions were actually in compliance with procedural defects noted and ordered corrected by the trial court. The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in allowing these motions, as the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of his rightful victory by any subterfuge of the losing party or by minor procedural lapses of his lawyer.

• Standing of Non-Party Spouse: At the time Rebecca's Motion and Manifestation was filed, the judgment in respondent's favor had already become final and executory. It is well-settled that once a final judgment becomes final and executory—more so when it has already been executed—it may no longer be amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes, and only in a few exceptional cases, none of which obtained here. A final judgment stands immutable; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Moreover, Rebecca's post-judgment Motion and Manifestation was in the nature of a motion for intervention, which under Section 2 of Rule 19 must be filed before rendition of judgment. As the case was already terminated, intervention was no longer possible. Prior to judgment, petitioners could have tried to include Rebecca as a party under Sections 4 and 9 of Rule 3, but they did not.

• Exemption from Execution: The basic evidentiary rule is that whoever alleges a fact must prove it with the required quantum of proof. Litigations cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or presumptions with no basis in evidence. The Court reiterated the rule in Gaa vs. Court of Appeals that the exemption under Article 1708 of the Civil Code favors only laboring men or women whose work is manual—workers who usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support. The exemption does not encompass any and all workers, and any claim for exemption must be clearly established. Because it was not proven that German Balanoba was a mere laborer, no error could be ascribed to the CA for ruling that his salary was not exempt from execution.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — Once a judgment or final order becomes final and executory, it may no longer be amended or corrected by the court, except for clerical errors or mistakes, and only in a few exceptional cases (such as supervening events or when execution becomes impossible or unjust). A final judgment stands immutable; otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. A judgment that has attained finality constitutes the ultimate adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and becomes valid and binding upon them and their successors in interest. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Rebecca Madriaga's post-judgment claim could not be admitted, as the judgment had already become final and executory.

• Prohibition Against Second Motions for Reconsideration (Section 5, Rule 37) — No party—whether winning or losing—shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order. The prohibition is consonant with public policy against piecemeal impugnment of judgments and the principle that all litigations must come to an end. However, the prohibition applies only to judgments or final orders, not to interlocutory orders incident to execution. The Court clarified that the CA's pronouncement—that the prohibition applied only to the aggrieved party—was overly broad, but sustained the result because respondent's successive motions were directed at execution, not at the final judgment.

• Time for Intervention (Section 2, Rule 19) — A motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Once the case is terminated upon rendition of final judgment, intervention is no longer possible. The Court applied this rule to hold that Rebecca Madriaga's post-judgment Manifestation and Motion, being in the nature of an intervention, was properly denied.

• Exemption of Laborer's Wages from Execution (Article 1708, Civil Code) — The laborer's wages shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and medical attendance. The exemption favors only laboring men or women whose work is manual—workers who look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support. The exemption does not encompass any and all workers, and any claim for exemption must be clearly established by proof. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that German Balanoba's salary was not exempt, there being no proof that he was a mere laborer.

• Burden of Proof for Exemptions — Whoever alleges a fact must prove it with the required quantum of proof. Litigations cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or presumptions with no basis in evidence. The Court applied this principle to hold that the claim of exemption from execution was not proven.

• "No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order." — This is the Court's reading of Section 5, Rule 37, clarifying that the prohibition applies to any party but only as to judgments or final orders, not interlocutory orders incident to execution.

• "It is a well-settled rule that once a final judgment or order becomes final and executory — more so when it has already been executed — it may no longer be amended or corrected by the court, except for clerical errors or mistakes and only in a few exceptional cases, none of which obtains in the present case." — This passage articulates the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, the controlling rationale for denying Rebecca Madriaga's post-judgment claim.

• "the exemption under Article 1708 of the Civil Code favors only laboring men or women whose work is manual. Belonging to this class are the workers who usually look to the reward of a day's labor for immediate or present support. They, more than any other persons, are the ones in need of the exemption which, needless to say, does not encompass any and all workers." — This defines the scope of the wage exemption from execution, limiting it to manual laborers and excluding all other categories of workers.

• Gaa vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985) — Followed as controlling authority for the rule that the exemption under Article 1708 of the Civil Code favors only laboring men or women whose work is manual, and that the exemption does not encompass any and all workers.
• Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 412 Phil. 77 (2001) — Cited for the principle that a prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of a rightful victory by any subterfuge of the losing party.
• Secretary of Agrarian Reform vs. Tropical Homes, Inc., 414 Phil. 389 (2001) — Cited for the rule that intervention must be filed before rendition of judgment and is no longer possible after the case is terminated.
• Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. CA, 440 Phil. 1 (2002) — Cited in footnote for the exception to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments based on supervening events.
• Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation, 441 Phil. 386 (2002) — Cited in footnote for the exception that a final judgment may be modified when its execution becomes impossible or unjust.

• Section 5, Rule 37, Rules of Court — Provides that no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order. The Court clarified that the prohibition applies to any party but only to judgments or final orders, not to interlocutory orders incident to execution.
• Section 2, Rule 19, Rules of Court — Provides that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Applied to hold that Rebecca Madriaga's post-judgment manifestation, being in the nature of intervention, was properly denied.
• Sections 4 and 9, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Section 4 provides that husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law; Section 9 governs non-joinder of necessary parties. The Court noted that petitioners could have included Rebecca as a party prior to judgment under these provisions but did not.
• Section 5, Rule 15, Rules of Court — Requires a notice of hearing for litigated motions. The trial court initially denied respondent's motion for garnishment for failure to comply with this provision.
• Article 1708, Civil Code — Provides that the laborer's wages shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing, and medical attendance. Applied to hold that the exemption favors only manual laborers and must be clearly established by proof.
• Section 1, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence — Cited in footnote for the rule on quantum of proof, supporting the principle that whoever alleges a fact must prove it.

Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, and Cancio C. Garcia concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.