Bala vs. Martinez

Probation is not coterminous with its period; it terminates only upon the court's issuance of an order of final discharge based on the probation officer's report and recommendation, and until such issuance, the court retains jurisdiction to revoke probation for violation of its conditions. A probationer's change of residence within the same judicial region does not divest the granting court of jurisdiction, as venue in criminal cases is an element of jurisdiction and jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the individual judge or branch.

Petitioner Manuel V. Bala was convicted by the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, Branch XX, of falsification of a public document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code for removing and substituting the photograph in a United States passport. After the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, he applied for and was granted probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law), the governing statute at the time. The probation regime established by P.D. No. 968 provides for court-supervised conditional release of a convicted offender, subject to specified terms and conditions, with termination contingent upon a judicial order of final discharge rather than mere lapse of the probation period. The dispute arose from the interaction between the probation period's expiration, the probation officer's failure to submit a final report, and subsequent proceedings initiated to revoke probation for alleged violations.

Petitioner Manuel V. Bala was indicted for removing and substituting the photograph of Maria Eloisa Criss Diazen attached to her United States passport with that of Florencia Notarte, thereby falsifying a genuine public document. On January 3, 1978, the then CFI of Manila, Branch XX, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of a public document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, a fine of ₱1,800.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs. The petitioner appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in toto on April 9, 1980.

After the case was remanded for execution of judgment, the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in an order dated August 11, 1982. He was placed under probation for one year, subject to several conditions, including that he reside at BF Homes, Las Piñas and not change said address nor leave the territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four hours without first securing prior written approval of his probation officer, that he be gainfully employed and a productive member of society, and that he cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation. The probation period should have expired on August 10, 1983.

On September 23, 1982, the petitioner asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision, 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Piñas. The probation officer verbally granted the request, finding nothing objectionable to it. However, no written court approval was obtained as required by the probation order and Section 10 of P.D. No. 968. The order of final discharge could not be issued because the probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of the petitioner.

On December 8, 1983, the People of the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the petitioner's probation before the RTC of Manila, Branch XX, alleging violation of the terms and conditions of probation. The petitioner filed his opposition on January 4, 1984, contending that his probation period had already expired on August 10, 1983, and that no valid reason existed to revoke it. On January 6, 1984, the probation officer filed a motion to terminate the probation with a progress report, but on January 10, 1984, he manifested that he was not pursuing the motion to terminate and instead submitted a supplemental report recommending revocation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."

The petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the probation period had expired and that his change of residence had transferred venue to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati, which had jurisdiction over Las Piñas, pursuant to Section 13 of P.D. No. 968. The respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit on April 2, 1984, prompting the present petition.

The records further revealed that on April 30, 1984, the RTC of Manila, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two others, for falsification of public documents (U.S. passports) in five separate criminal cases, imposing a prison term of two years to four years of prision correccional in each case. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment with modification, and it had become final. For failure of the petitioner to appear for execution of judgment despite notice, the trial court ordered his arrest on July 10, 1989; a warrant was issued on July 12, 1989 but remained unimplemented because the petitioner had absconded.

• Expiration of Probation Period: Petitioner argued that his probation period had already expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order granting probation was issued, and that no valid reason existed to revoke the same since he was no longer under probation.
• Transfer of Venue: Petitioner maintained that his change of residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Piñas automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati, invoking Section 13 of P.D. No. 968, which provides for transfer of control over a probationer who resides in a place under the jurisdiction of another court.
• Verbal Permission for Transfer: Petitioner claimed that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence from his probation officer, which he treated as sufficient compliance.

• Prematurity of Petition: The Solicitor General submitted that the present petition was premature, noting that what was actually resolved and denied was only the motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation, which disposed of only the issue of the petitioner's transfer of residence and did not touch on the timeliness of revoking probation, as the respondent judge had not yet heard or received evidence on the matter.
• Inapplicability of P.D. 1990: Respondent acknowledged that P.D. 1990, which bars probation for defendants who have perfected an appeal, was inapplicable because it took effect on January 15, 1985 and could not be given retroactive effect as it would be prejudicial to the accused.

• Termination of Probation: Whether the expiration of the probation period automatically terminates probation, thereby barring the court from revoking it.
• Transfer of Jurisdiction: Whether the petitioner's change of residence from one subdivision to another within Las Piñas automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the RTC of Manila to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Makati.
• Sufficiency of Verbal Permission: Whether verbal permission from the probation officer sufficed to authorize the petitioner's change of residence.

• Termination of Probation: No. The expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation; an order of final discharge by the court, based on the probation officer's report and recommendation, is required before the case is deemed terminated. The Court revoked the probation for cause, finding that the petitioner violated its conditions.
• Transfer of Jurisdiction: No. The petitioner's change of residence within Las Piñas did not divest the Manila RTC of jurisdiction, as venue in criminal cases is an element of jurisdiction and the granting court retains control; coordinate branches of the RTC within the same judicial region constitute a single court.
• Sufficiency of Verbal Permission: No. Section 10 of P.D. No. 968 and the probation order itself required prior written approval from the court for any change of residence; verbal permission from the probation officer did not suffice.

• Termination of Probation: Section 16 of P.D. No. 968 provides that after the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer, and only upon such issuance is the case deemed terminated. Nowhere in the probation law is there any provision for ipso facto termination of probation upon mere lapse of the period. Probation is not coterminous with its period. The probation officer's neglect in failing to submit his final report prevented the trial court from issuing the order of final discharge, but this neglect did not operate to terminate the probation automatically. In the absence of such order, probation subsists unless revoked for cause. The Court found compelling cause for revocation: the petitioner had been convicted in five additional falsification cases while on probation, had absconded from execution of judgment in those cases, and had failed to comply with the conditions of his probation requiring gainful employment and cooperation with the rehabilitation program. These violations defeated the purposes of the probation law—correction and rehabilitation of the offender, opportunity for reformation, and prevention of further offenses. Probation being a mere privilege, the State was not barred from revoking it when the probationer proved unrepentant. Furthermore, the probation order is not a "sentence" but a suspension of the imposition of sentence, an interlocutory judgment; accordingly, the one-year probation period cannot be deducted from the originally imposed penalty.

• Transfer of Jurisdiction: In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. The Manila RTC, which granted the probation, was not deprived of jurisdiction over the probation case by the petitioner's change of residence. The petitioner was already a resident of Las Piñas when he applied for probation in the CFI of Manila; he merely moved from one subdivision to another within the same municipality. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Las Piñas is included in the National Capital Judicial Region with a seat at Makati. The RTC of Makati and the RTC of Manila are coordinate and co-equal courts forming part of the single Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges; the case does not attach to the branch or judge. To uphold the petitioner's contention would mean that the Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant probation in the first place, rendering the probation void. Section 13 of P.D. No. 968, which the petitioner invoked, applies when a probationer resides in a place under the jurisdiction of another court; here, both Manila and Makati fall within the same judicial region and the same RTC.

• Sufficiency of Verbal Permission: Section 10 of P.D. No. 968 explicitly requires that the probationer reside at premises approved by the court and not change residence without its prior written approval. The probation order of August 11, 1982 likewise required prior written approval from the probation officer before any change of address. The petitioner's verbal request to the probation officer, even if granted verbally, did not satisfy the statutory and contractual requirement of prior written approval.

• Probation is not coterminous with its period — The expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. Under Section 16 of P.D. No. 968, the court must issue an order of final discharge based on the probation officer's report and recommendation before the case is deemed terminated. Until such order issues, the court retains jurisdiction to revoke probation for violation of its conditions. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner's probation subsisted despite the lapse of the one-year period, because no order of final discharge had been issued.

• Probation is a mere privilege, not a right — Probation is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred by law, a special prerogative granted to some persons. Its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. If the probationer proves unrepentant, the State is not barred from revoking the privilege. The Court invoked this principle to justify revocation upon the petitioner's demonstrated lack of reformation.

• Probation order is a suspension of sentence, not a sentence — An order placing a defendant on probation is not a "sentence" but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is an interlocutory judgment, a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under court supervision for reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharge if conditions are complied with, or by a final judgment if conditions are violated. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the one-year probation period cannot be deducted from the originally imposed penalty.

• Venue is an element of jurisdiction in criminal cases — In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. The Court applied this principle to hold that the Manila RTC's jurisdiction over the probation case was not lost by the petitioner's change of residence within the same judicial region, as the granting court's jurisdiction attached to the case.

• Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges — The various branches of the RTC within the same region are coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which constitutes only one Regional Trial Court. The case does not attach to the branch or judge. The Court applied this to hold that RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, retained control and supervision over the petitioner despite his move within Las Piñas.

• "Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated." — This passage articulates the central ratio decidendi: that probation does not end by mere lapse of time but requires a judicial order of final discharge.

• "Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on 'probation' is not a 'sentence,' but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence." — This defines the legal character of a probation order as a suspension rather than a sentence, with the consequence that the probation period is not credited against the original penalty.

• "Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge." — This states the principle that coordinate branches of the RTC within the same judicial region constitute a single court, precluding the argument that a change of residence within the region transfers jurisdiction.

• "Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. ... If the probationer has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred from revoking such a privilege." — This frames probation as a statutory privilege subject to revocation upon demonstrated non-reformation, reinforcing the State's interest in the integrity of the probation program.

• Baclayon vs. Mutia, G.R. No. 59298, April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148 — Cited for the proposition that a probation order is not a "sentence" but a suspension of the imposition of sentence, an interlocutory judgment in the nature of a conditional order. The Court relied on this to hold that the probation period cannot be deducted from the original penalty.
• Tolentino vs. Alconcel, G.R. No. 63400, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 92 — Cited for the principle that the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court, exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
• Ragpala vs. Tubod, G.R. No. 15375, 109 Phil. 373 — Cited for the doctrine that in criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction.
• Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, October 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 519 — Cited for the principle that jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, and that the case does not attach to the branch or judge.
• Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. C.A., G.R. No. L-37783, January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 357 — Cited in support of the Court's decision to revoke probation directly rather than remand for further proceedings, in the interest of the expeditious administration of justice.

• Section 16, P.D. No. 968 (Probation Law) — Provides that after the period of probation and upon consideration of the probation officer's report and recommendation, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer, whereupon the case is deemed terminated. Applied to hold that probation does not automatically terminate upon lapse of the period.
• Section 10(j), P.D. No. 968 — Requires the probationer to reside at premises approved by the court and not to change residence without its prior written approval. Applied to hold that the petitioner's verbal permission from the probation officer was insufficient.
• Section 13, P.D. No. 968 — Provides for transfer of control over a probationer who resides in a place under the jurisdiction of another court. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the petitioner's new residence remained within the same judicial region.
• Section 15, P.D. No. 968 — Authorizes the court to issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for violation of probation conditions at any time during probation, and to revoke or continue probation after a hearing. Applied to support the revocation and order of arrest.
• Section 2, P.D. No. 968 — States the purposes of the probation law: correction and rehabilitation of the offender, opportunity for reformation, and prevention of offenses. Cited to show that the petitioner's violations defeated these purposes.
• P.D. No. 1990 — Amends Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 to bar probation for defendants who have perfected an appeal. Held inapplicable because it took effect on January 15, 1985 and could not be given retroactive effect as it would be prejudicial to the accused.
• Sections 13 and 14, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) — Apportion the regional trial courts, placing Las Piñas within the National Capital Judicial Region with a seat at Makati. Applied to show that Manila and Makati RTCs are coordinate branches of the same court.
• Article 172, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes falsification of a public document, the crime for which the petitioner was originally convicted and subsequently convicted again while on probation.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.