Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. vs. COMELEC

The minimum system capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369 — including the provision for a voter verified paper audit trail — are mandatory, and the Commission on Elections may be compelled by writ of mandamus to implement them when it unlawfully neglects to do so. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires that (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have counted their votes, and (b) the verification at minimum should be paper-based; the paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical ballot itself.

Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. is a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating through Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines, a national political party duly registered with the Commission on Elections. Former Senator Richard J. Gordon is a registered voter, taxpayer, official senatorial candidate for the 2016 elections, and Chairperson of Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc.; he authored Republic Act No. 9369, the law that amended Republic Act No. 8436, otherwise known as the Automated Election System Law. The Commission on Elections is the constitutional entity vested with authority to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Republic Act No. 8436, enacted on December 22, 1997, authorized COMELEC to use an automated election system for electoral exercises; nearly a decade later, Republic Act No. 9369 amended it, introducing significant changes including the specification of minimum system capabilities for the automated election system. For the 2016 National and Local Elections, COMELEC opted to use Vote-Counting Machines, which are paper-based automated election systems reported to be more powerful than the previously used PCOS machines and capable of producing the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail in the form of a printed receipt and a touch screen reflecting the votes cast.

On November 10, 2015, Bagumbayan-VNP, Inc. sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Andres D. Bautista demanding the implementation of the VVPAT feature for the May 9, 2016 elections. The Commission on Elections never answered the letter. Petitioners alleged that the inclusion of VVPAT, a mandatory requirement under the automated election laws, had been flagrantly violated by COMELEC during the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that previous demands to reactivate the VVPAT security feature had "fell on deaf ears." In those prior elections, all a voter received from the voting machines were the words, "Congratulations! Your vote has been counted," or a similar phrase.

On February 9, 2016, petitioners learned from ABS-CBN News Online that, by a vote of 7-0, the COMELEC En Banc had decided not to implement the VVPAT for the 2016 elections. Other news reports indicated that COMELEC had ruled similarly against voting receipts in 2010 and 2013. On February 11, 2016, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 10057, providing rules and general instructions on the process of testing and sealing, voting, counting, and transmission of election results. Adopted by a 7-0 vote, the Resolution made no mention of using VVPAT receipts for the 2016 national elections; the manner of voting under Section 40 thereof merely required the voter to insert the ballot into the vote-counting machine, after which the machine would display "YOUR VOTE HAS BEEN CAST" and the ballot would drop into the ballot box.

At the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee on the Automated Election System on February 16, 2016, COMELEC Chairperson Bautista explained the reasons for refusing to issue paper receipts. First, politicians could use the receipts for vote-buying; second, printing receipts would extend the voting period to five to seven hours, as each receipt took approximately thirteen seconds to print; and third, losing candidates might instruct their supporters to claim that the printed receipt was incorrect regardless of its contents. Petitioners countered that these fears were "baseless and speculative," citing the position paper of Atty. Glenn Ang Chong, who recommended using old yellow ballot boxes alongside the voting machines: after voting, the voter would verify the receipt and drop it into the old ballot box, ensuring no voter could sell a vote using the receipt. At the end of polling, the old ballot boxes would be turned over for manual verification count, the results of which could be compared with the automated count.

On March 4, 2016, after the Supreme Court had already required COMELEC to comment on the petition, Chairperson Bautista announced at a press conference that COMELEC had decided "to err on the side of transparency" and resolved to allow voters a fifteen-second on-screen verification of their votes through the vote-counting machine screen, without printing a receipt. This on-screen verification was estimated to add two hours to the voting period. The COMELEC En Banc meeting to pass this resolution was held on March 3, 2016, three days after the Court's order to file a comment. Petitioners filed the petition for mandamus seeking to compel COMELEC to comply with Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, which the Court resolved by granting the writ.

• Mandamus is proper: Petitioners argued that mandamus is proper to enforce a public right and compel the performance of a public duty, and that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution and Rule 65, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. They maintained there is no reglementary period for a special civil action for mandamus.
• VVPAT is mandatory: Petitioners contended that the law prescribes "minimum" criteria, and the use of the word "must" in Section 6 makes it mandatory to have a paper audit trail "separate and distinct from the ballot." They argued that COMELEC has neither leeway nor right to claim that the ballot itself is the paper audit trail.
• "Voter verified" requires voter participation: Petitioners maintained that the words "voter verified" in VVPAT mean the voter, not COMELEC, must be the one verifying the accuracy of the vote cast.
• COMELEC's fears are baseless: Petitioners argued that COMELEC's fears of vote-buying are "baseless and speculative," and that there is greater risk of mass-scale digital cheating if VVPAT is not implemented, as digital cheating is more difficult to detect than isolated cases of vote-buying.
• COMELEC's non-implementation is felonious: Petitioners claimed that under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9369, amending Section 35 of Republic Act No. 8436, anyone interfering with or impeding the use of computer counting devices and the processing, storage, generation, and transmission of election results commits a felonious act, which COMELEC allegedly did by refusing to implement VVPAT.

• Vote-buying concerns: Respondent, through its Chairperson, argued that the VVPAT receipts might be used by politicians for vote-buying, as voters could present the printed receipts as proof of their votes.
• Extended voting time: Respondent maintained that printing receipts would extend the voting period to five to seven hours, since each receipt takes approximately thirteen seconds to print, meaning each machine would have to run for that duration for every voter.
• Losing candidates may challenge results: Respondent expressed concern that losing candidates might instruct their supporters to claim that the printed receipt was incorrect regardless of its actual contents, potentially causing disruption at polling precincts.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Whether a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel COMELEC to enable the VVPAT feature of the vote-counting machines.
• Mandatory Nature of Minimum System Capabilities: Whether the minimum system capabilities under Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, including the VVPAT, are mandatory requirements that COMELEC must implement.
• COMELEC's Discretion vs. Statutory Duty: Whether COMELEC may decline to implement the VVPAT feature based on policy objections such as vote-buying concerns and extended voting time.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Yes. Mandamus lies when a government entity unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from its office, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Mandatory Nature of Minimum System Capabilities: Yes. The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, are mandatory, constituting the most basic safeguards to ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy of elections.
• COMELEC's Discretion vs. Statutory Duty: No. COMELEC is given ample discretion to administer elections, but its constitutional duty is to enforce the law, not to amend or modify it. Policy objections to a statutory requirement must be addressed to Congress, not resolved by administrative non-compliance.

• Propriety of Mandamus: Mandamus is the proper remedy when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Through a writ of mandamus, courts compel the performance of a clear legal or ministerial duty imposed by law. The petitioner must show the legal basis for the duty and that the respondent failed to perform it. Here, petitioners demonstrated that Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, imposes a clear legal duty on COMELEC to implement the VVPAT, and that COMELEC's Resolution No. 10057 made no provision for it. COMELEC's inaction in rendering the VVPAT feature inoperative constituted unlawful neglect of a duty enjoined by law. The Court also noted the urgency of the matter, given that the right of voters to verify whether vote-counting machines properly recorded their votes is not only a statutory right but one that enables individual participation in governance as sovereign.

• Mandatory Nature of Minimum System Capabilities: The declaration of policy behind Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, states that it is the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed elections by adopting an automated election system that will ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election documents, so that the process shall be transparent and credible and the results reflective of the genuine will of the people. By setting the minimum system capabilities, the law intends to achieve these purposes. A mechanism allowing the voter to verify his or her choice ensures a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed election. The law is clear: a "voter verified paper audit trail" requires that (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have counted their votes, and (b) the verification at minimum should be paper-based. The paper audit trail cannot be considered the physical ballot, because there may be instances where the machine translates the ballot differently or the voter inadvertently spoils the ballot. The use of the word "must" in Section 6 makes the enumerated capabilities mandatory. Compliance with minimum system capabilities entails costs on the state and taxpayers; if these capabilities are met but not utilized, they constitute a waste of resources and an affront to the citizens who paid for them.

• COMELEC's Discretion vs. Statutory Duty: While the Constitution empowers COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, and while the State recognizes COMELEC's mandate and authority to prescribe the adoption and use of the most suitable technology, COMELEC's constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." It is not given constitutional competence to amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold. Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, is law; should there be policy objections to it, the remedy is to have Congress amend it. COMELEC cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures, and COMELEC has the power to choose the appropriate procedure to enforce the VVPAT requirement while balancing it with the constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. The Court cited Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections, where physical ballots were tampered to invalidate votes through double-shading, a situation that could have been avoided had the paper audit trail feature been utilized. The credibility of election results depends on the confidence of each voter that his or her individual choices have actually been counted, and that confidence begins at the local precinct after the voter casts the ballot.

• Mandamus — Mandamus is the proper remedy when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The writ compels the performance of a clear legal or ministerial duty imposed by law. The petitioner must establish the legal basis for the duty and demonstrate that the respondent failed to perform it. In this case, the Court found that Section 6(e), (f), and (n) of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, imposed a clear ministerial duty on COMELEC to implement the VVPAT, and that COMELEC's non-implementation constituted unlawful neglect warranting the writ.

• Minimum System Capabilities as Mandatory Safeguards — The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, are mandatory requirements. The use of the word "must" in the statutory provision makes compliance obligatory, not discretionary. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy of elections. A "voter verified paper audit trail" requires: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have counted their votes; and (b) the verification at minimum should be paper-based. The paper audit trail cannot be equated with the physical ballot itself.

• COMELEC's Duty to Enforce, Not Amend, the Law — While COMELEC is given ample discretion to administer elections, its constitutional duty is to "enforce the law." It is not given constitutional competence to amend or modify the law it is sworn to uphold. Policy objections to a statutory requirement must be addressed through legislative amendment, not through administrative non-compliance. COMELEC may choose the appropriate procedure to enforce a statutory requirement, but it cannot opt to breach the requirement itself.

• "The law is clear. A 'voter verified paper audit trail' requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based." — This passage articulates the Court's definitive interpretation of the statutory term "voter verified paper audit trail," establishing the two indispensable elements that constitute the ratio decidendi for compelling COMELEC's compliance.

• "The Commission on Elections cannot opt to breach the requirements of the law to assuage its fears regarding the VVPAT. Vote-buying can be averted by placing proper procedures." — This passage defines the boundary between COMELEC's administrative discretion and its duty to comply with statutory mandates, establishing that policy concerns do not justify non-implementation of a legal requirement.

• "The credibility of the results of any election depends, to a large extent, on the confidence of each voter that his or her individual choices have actually been counted. It is in that local precinct after the voter casts his or her ballot that this confidence starts." — This passage articulates the philosophical and constitutional rationale for the VVPAT requirement, connecting voter verification to the integrity of the democratic process.

• Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections, 706 Phil. 214 (2013) — Cited as illustrative of the consequences of failing to implement the VVPAT. In that case, physical ballots were tampered to invalidate votes through double-shading, while digital printouts showed only single shades. The Court reasoned that the situation could have been avoided had COMELEC utilized the paper audit trail feature, reinforcing the necessity of the VVPAT as a safeguard against electoral fraud.

• Pacheco vs. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 200 (2000) — Cited for the definition of mandamus as a remedy that compels the performance of a clear legal or ministerial duty imposed by law upon the respondent by operation of his or her office, trust, or station.

• Roque vs. COMELEC, 615 Phil. 149 (2009) — Cited in a footnote for the proposition that automation is a key towards clean and credible elections, reducing the long wait and discouraging cheating.

• Capalla vs. COMELEC, 687 Phil. 617 (2012) — Cited by petitioners in support of the proposition that electronically generated results can be audited and verified through comparison with paper records.

• Section 6(e), (f), and (n), Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369 (Automated Election System Law) — This provision enumerates the minimum system capabilities of the automated election system, including: (e) provision for voter verified paper audit trail; (f) system auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of reported election results; and (n) provision of a system of verification for the voter to find out whether or not the machine has registered his or her choice. The Court held these to be mandatory requirements, the implementation of which may be compelled by mandamus.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369 (Declaration of Policy) — Declares it the policy of the State to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, credible, and informed elections by adopting an automated election system that will ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, so that the process shall be transparent and credible and the results reflective of the genuine will of the people. The Court relied on this declaration to construe the minimum system capabilities as essential safeguards serving the law's overarching purpose.

• Article IX-C, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Empowers the Commission on Elections to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections. The Court emphasized that this constitutional grant of authority imposes a duty to enforce, not to amend or modify, the law.

• Article VIII, Section 5(1), 1987 Constitution — Confers on the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over petitions for mandamus, providing the jurisdictional basis for the direct filing of the petition before the Court.

• Rule 65, Section 3, Rules of Court — Defines mandamus as the relief available when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Article V, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Referenced in connection with COMELEC's constitutional mandate to secure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot, which the Court held must be balanced with — not set against — the statutory requirement to implement the VVPAT.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concurred. Brion, J., was on leave.