Bagcat-Gullas vs. Gullas

The legitimate children of an adopter who are at least ten years old are indispensable parties in adoption proceedings and must be personally served summons; their written consent is required under Section 9(c) of Republic Act No. 8552, and a judgment rendered without impleading them and serving summons is void, so the rule on immutability of judgments does not apply. A Rule 45 petition that raises a substantially factual issue may be denied.

Petitioner Nena Bagcat-Gullas is the wife of Jose R. Gullas, and respondents Joselito F. Gullas, Joie Marie F. Gullas Yu, and John Vincent F. Gullas are Jose's legitimate children. The dispute concerns the adoption of minor Jo Anne Maria Ariraya, whose biological mother is Settie Asiah Ariraya and who has no known father. At the time of the adoption proceedings, Republic Act No. 8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, governed and required the written consent of specified persons, including the legitimate children of the adopter who are at least ten years old. Republic Act No. 11642, the Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act, was later enacted, creating the National Authority for Child Care and making domestic adoption an administrative process.

On May 5, 2016, Bagcat-Gullas, together with her husband Jose R. Gullas, filed a Petition for Adoption and Correction of Entries in the Birth Record of minor Jo Anne Maria Ariraya before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cebu City, docketed as SP Proc. No. R-CEB-16-02302-SP. Jo Anne's biological mother was Settie Asiah Ariraya, and she had no known father. Jo Anne and Settie lived at the house of Bagcat-Gullas and Jose, who supported them because Settie had no source of income. For unknown reasons, Settie left Jo Anne and never came back; despite diligent efforts, Bagcat-Gullas and Jose failed to find her. From then on, they provided Jo Anne with all her needs and showered her with love and care as if she were their own child.

On October 24, 2017, the RTC issued an Order finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance and setting it for hearing on December 1, 2017. The RTC ordered publication once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the cities and Province of Cebu, and directed that copies of the Petition and Order be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, the Regional Director of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Cebu City, and the RTC Social Worker. The RTC Social Worker was directed to conduct a social case study on Jose and Bagcat-Gullas, the minor sought to be adopted, and the minor's biological parents. When the case was called for hearing on December 1, 2017, the Petition was read thrice in open court, and no person objected to or filed any opposition.

On May 18, 2018, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the Petition for Adoption. On June 6, 2018, the Wee Lim and Salas Law Firm filed an Entry of Appearance for respondents Joselito F. Gullas, Joie Marie F. Gullas Yu, and John Vincent F. Gullas, the children of Jose. On June 8, 2018, the RTC ruled that the Entry of Appearance was without basis because the respondents were not parties of record. On July 16, 2018, the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality stating that the May 18, 2018 Decision had become final and executory on July 4, 2018.

On July 17, 2018, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the June 8, 2018 Order denying their Entry of Appearance. They argued that as the legitimate children of Jose, they were real parties in interest and indispensable parties, and that as children of the adopter, their consent to the adoption was necessary. On August 20, 2018, Bagcat-Gullas and Jose filed a Comment Ad Cautelam in opposition, arguing that the respondents were not indispensable parties and that the respondents had already executed an Affidavit of Consent signifying their knowledge of and consent to the adoption, so there was no basis to allow them to intervene.

On October 3, 2018, the RTC granted the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration and Formal Entry of Appearance. It vacated the adoption Decision, set aside the July 16, 2018 Certificate of Finality, reinstated the case in the docket, and issued summons to be served upon the respondents. The RTC ruled that the children of the adopter are indispensable parties in a petition for adoption, so service of summons upon them was necessary to protect their substantive rights and to vest the court with jurisdiction; without such service, the subsequent judgment is null and void. On November 21, 2018, the RTC denied Bagcat-Gullas and Jose's Motion for Reconsideration, resolving that the rule on immutability of judgments does not apply because the judgment is void, there being no summons served upon the children of the adopter, who are indispensable parties.

On appeal, the CA denied the Petition for Certiorari and denied the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction as moot and academic. Citing Republic Act No. 8552, the CA held that legitimate children of the adopter are indispensable parties. On the Affidavit of Consent, the CA held that although it evidently contained the signatures of the respondents, it did not appear to be genuine: upon closer inspection of the notarial register of Atty. Gonzales, the documentary details revealed an Affidavit of Loss dated September 30, 2017 of a certain Jovito Aquiles Remulta who lost his Social Security System Identification Card sometime in 2012, matching the information in the Notarial Register of Atty. Jaime O. Gonzales under Entry No. 95, with a signed name of Jovito A. Remulta matching the competent evidence of identity in the Affidavit of Loss. The CA further held that the case is an exception to the principle of immutability of judgments because a void judgment never attains finality and produces no legal or binding effect. It was undisputed that the respondents were all over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings.

• Indispensable Parties: Petitioner Bagcat-Gullas, together with Jose, argued before the RTC that the respondents were not indispensable parties to the adoption case.
• Affidavit of Consent: They maintained that the respondents had already executed an Affidavit of Consent signifying their knowledge of and consent to the adoption, so there was no basis to allow the respondents to intervene.
• CA Error: Petitioner assailed the CA Decision and Resolution, raising whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC and in ruling that the Affidavit of Consent executed by the respondents is not genuine.

• Indispensable Parties: Respondents argued that as the legitimate children of Jose, they are real parties in interest and indispensable parties.
• Consent of Adopter's Children: They maintained that as children of the adopter, their consent to the adoption is necessary.
• Entry of Appearance: They filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the June 8, 2018 Order denying their Entry of Appearance.

• Indispensable Parties and Consent: Whether the legitimate children of the adopter, ten years of age or over, are indispensable parties whose written consent is required for a petition for adoption to prosper under Section 9(c) of Republic Act No. 8552.
• Service of Summons and Jurisdiction: Whether the failure to personally serve summons on the adopter's legitimate children renders the adoption judgment void for lack of jurisdiction.
• Immutability of Judgments: Whether the rule on immutability of judgments applies to a void judgment.
• Affidavit of Consent / Question of Fact: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the Affidavit of Consent executed by the respondents is not genuine, and whether such issue is reviewable under Rule 45.

• Indispensable Parties and Consent: Yes. The legitimate children of the adopter aged ten or over are indispensable parties, and their written consent is required under Section 9(c) of Republic Act No. 8552.
• Service of Summons and Jurisdiction: Yes. Personal service of summons on the adopter's legitimate children is necessary; without impleading them and serving summons, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction and the judgment is void.
• Immutability of Judgments: No. The rule on immutability applies only to a final and executory valid judgment; a void judgment never attains finality and produces no legal effect.
• Affidavit of Consent / Question of Fact: No. The issue is substantially factual; Rule 45 limits review to errors of law, and the Court is not a trier of facts. The CA's finding that the Affidavit of Consent was not genuine is not reviewable.

• Indispensable Parties and Consent: Section 9(c) of Republic Act No. 8552 requires the written consent of the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any. The law is clear. The respondents were undisputed to be over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings, so their written consent was necessary for the adoption to be valid. Castro vs. Gregorio explains that consent of the adopter's other children ensures harmony among prospective siblings and puts them on notice that they will share their parent's love and care, as well as future legitimes, with another person. Their interest is material because an adoption decree affects not only the adoptee's rights vis-à-vis the adopter but also the rights of the adopter's other children. Thus, they are indispensable parties.
• Service of Summons and Jurisdiction: For the adoption to be valid, personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure their substantive rights are protected; constructive notice is not enough. The Court in Castro vs. Gregorio held that surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights, and since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on the children, it never validly acquired jurisdiction. In this case, the respondents, as children of Jose, should have been personally served summons. Without impleading them and absent service of summons, the judgment rendered by the RTC is void. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void; the court has no authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present (Quilatan vs. Heirs of Quilatan).
• Immutability of Judgments: Under the doctrine of finality or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. However, the rule is not a hard and fast rule; the Court may relax it for substantial justice under People vs. Layag, considering matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; special or compelling circumstances; the merits; a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored; lack of showing that review is merely frivolous or dilatory; and no unjust prejudice to the other party. In this case, the rule does not apply because the judgment is void. The respondents are indispensable parties, and the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. A void judgment never attains finality and produces no legal or binding effect, so the CA correctly held that immutability did not bar relief.
• Affidavit of Consent / Question of Fact: When an issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. The Court is not a trier of facts; in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, its function is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts. To do otherwise would defeat the essence of Rule 45. On this ground alone, the petition ought to be denied. Even on the merits, the petition must fail because the consent of the adopter's legitimate children aged ten or over is required, and the CA's finding that the Affidavit of Consent was not genuine was factual and not reviewable.

• Indispensable Parties in Adoption Proceedings — Legitimate and adopted children of the adopter, ten years of age or over, are indispensable parties in adoption proceedings. Their written consent is required under Section 9(c) of Republic Act No. 8552. Their interest is material because an adoption decree affects not only the adoptee's rights vis-à-vis the adopter but also the rights of the adopter's other children, including future legitimes. Without impleading them and personally serving summons, the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction, and any judgment rendered is void. The Court applied this in denying the petition and affirming the CA.
• Void Judgment and Immutability of Judgments — The doctrine of immutability of judgments applies only to a final and executory valid judgment. A void judgment never attains finality, produces no legal or binding effect, and is an exception to the rule. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, and the court has no authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present. The Court applied this to hold that the RTC's adoption decision and certificate of finality were void and that the immutability rule did not apply.
• Rule 45 and Questions of Fact — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing errors of law. When an issue invites a review of the evidence, the question is one of fact, and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it defers to the factual findings of trial courts. The Court applied this to deny the petition, which raised the substantially factual issue of whether the Affidavit of Consent was genuine.
• Consent of Adopter's Children — The written consent of the adopter's legitimate or adopted children aged ten or over is required for adoption. The consent ensures harmony among prospective siblings and sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will share their parent's love and care, as well as future legitimes, with another person. The Court applied this because the respondents were over ten years old and their consent was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

• "The law could not be any clearer. The consent of the adopter's legitimate children, who are, at least, of the age of 10, is required for the petition for adoption to prosper." — This states the statutory requirement under Section 9(c) of Republic Act No. 8552 and is the basis for holding that the respondents' consent was necessary.
• "The respondents' interest is material as an adoption decree not only affects the rights of the adoptee vis-à-vis the adopter, but also the rights of the other children of the adopter, Jose in this case. Further, it is not enough to rely on constructive notice. The respondents, as children of Jose, should have been personally served summons by the trial court. Without impleading the respondents, and absent service of summons upon them, the judgment rendered by the RTC is void." — This is the ratio on indispensable parties, personal service of summons, and lack of jurisdiction.
• "In this case, the rule on immutability of judgments does not apply because the judgment is void. The respondents, being the legitimate children of one of the adopters, Jose, are without a doubt, indispensable parties. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, as such the court has no authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present." — This is the ratio on the immutability exception and the effect of absence of an indispensable party.
• "It must be emphasized that when an issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact." — This states the Rule 45 limitation that led the Court to deny the petition for raising a substantially factual issue.

• Castro vs. Gregorio, 745 Phil. 523 (2014) — Cited by the Court for the rule that the consent of the adopter's other children is necessary to ensure harmony among prospective siblings and to put them on notice of sharing parental love, care, and future legitimes; personal service of summons on the spouse and all legitimate children is required, and constructive notice is insufficient to vest jurisdiction.
• People vs. Layag, 797 Phil. 386 (2016) — Cited for the doctrine of immutability of judgments and the Court's power to relax it for substantial justice under the enumerated circumstances.
• Quilatan vs. Heirs of Quilatan, 614 Phil. 162 (2009) — Cited for the rule that the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, and the court has no authority to act not only as to the absent party but also as to those present.
• Falalimpa vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 240591, September 29, 2021 — Cited for the rule that when an issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
• Heirs of Villanueva vs. Heirs of Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172 (2017) — Cited for the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and that a Rule 45 petition is limited to reviewing errors of law, with factual findings of trial courts accorded finality.

• Section 9(c), Republic Act No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) — Requires the written consent of the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any. The Court applied this to hold that the respondents, who were over ten years old, were indispensable parties whose consent was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari and limits the Court's review to errors of law; the Court is not a trier of facts. The Court applied this to deny the petition because it raised a substantially factual issue on the genuineness of the Affidavit of Consent.
• Republic Act No. 11642 (Domestic Administrative Adoption and Alternative Child Care Act) — Approved on January 6, 2022; provides a simpler and more expeditious domestic administrative adoption process, creates the National Authority for Child Care, and allows parties in pending judicial domestic adoption proceedings to withdraw and avail of its benefits. The Court recognized its passage and noted that the option to withdraw may or may not be available to Bagcat-Gullas depending on the status of the RTC proceedings.
• Section 6, Republic Act No. 11642 — Vests the National Authority for Child Care with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to alternative child care, including domestic administrative adoption. The Court cited this as a salient feature of the new law.
• Section 56, Republic Act No. 11642 — Transitory clause allowing all judicial petitions for domestic adoption pending in court upon the effectivity of the Act to be immediately withdrawn, with parties given the option to avail of the benefits of the Act. The Court noted this option in relation to the pending RTC proceedings.

Justice Singh penned the Decision. Justices Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao concurred.