Baetiong vs. Dela Cruz-Malaton

A judge's disregard of the mandatory three-day notice rule for litigious motions, as by resolving a motion for reconsideration ex parte the day after it was filed and reducing bail without any request, constitutes gross ignorance of the law and procedure, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as further amended. Rule 140, as further amended, applies retroactively to all pending and future administrative disciplinary cases.

Atty. Joselito M. Baetiong was the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 3033, a prosecution for falsification by private individuals under Article 172(1), in relation to Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Baler-San Luis, Aurora. After the presiding judge and the provincial prosecutor voluntarily inhibited, the case was assigned to respondent Presiding Judge Jo Anne N. Dela Cruz-Malaton of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Casiguran-Dilasag-Dinalungan, Aurora. The administrative complaint concerns her handling of motions for reconsideration filed by the accused after they failed to appear at the January 28, 2020 arraignment and pretrial. The proceedings are governed by Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as further amended, which classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge and applies to pending administrative cases.

Atty. Joselito M. Baetiong was the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 3033, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Rachelle Vida Longalong Reyes, et al.," for falsification by private individuals under Article 172(1), in relation to Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code, then pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Baler-San Luis, Aurora. On September 3, 2018, Provincial Prosecutor Jobert D. Reyes filed a Manifestation for Voluntary Inhibition of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora after complainant alleged that the defense counsel was his sister-in-law. An Assistant Regional Prosecutor substituted for the provincial prosecutor, and the case was eventually assigned to respondent Presiding Judge Jo Anne N. Dela Cruz-Malaton after the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Baler-San Luis also voluntarily inhibited upon complainant's motion.

During the arraignment and pretrial on January 28, 2020, the Assistant Regional Prosecutor and complainant appeared, but the accused and their counsel were absent despite due notice. As prayed for by the Assistant Regional Prosecutor, respondent issued an Order dated January 28, 2020 cancelling the bail previously posted by the accused, ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest against them, and fixing bail at PHP 36,000.00 for each of them.

On the same day, accused Rachelle Vida Longalong Reyes and Reynon C. Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the court received at 5:35 p.m., alleging that they did not receive the Notice of Hearing of the arraignment and pretrial and that it was their first failure to attend. The other accused, Virginia B. Idia, also moved for reconsideration, received at 5:35 p.m. of the same day, explaining that she completely forgot about the hearing and that it was also the first instance she was absent. Both motions set the hearing at 8:00 a.m. the following day, January 29, 2020. On January 29, 2020, respondent issued an Order ex parte denying the two Motions for Reconsideration. She nevertheless reduced the amount of bail for each accused from PHP 36,000.00 to PHP 18,000.00, considering that it was the first time they failed to attend the hearing.

Months later, on December 7, 2020, complainant filed the present administrative complaint alleging that respondent issued her January 29, 2020 Order without justification and in violation of the "3-day notice rule," showing ignorance of the law and procedure. He also averred that respondent acceded to the accused's contention that it was their first time to fail to attend without confirming the same with the records, which he claimed amounted to bad faith and gross incompetence. Complainant added that, contrary to respondent's findings, it was not the first time the two accused were absent; respondent herself had noted their absence in her Order dated November 27, 2018, resulting in the resetting of the arraignment and pretrial. In her Comment dated January 25, 2021, respondent argued that the complaint failed to specify the charges. She claimed that Criminal Case No. 3033 was related to four other criminal cases she had already decided against complainant, making the filing highly suspect, especially since complainant requested transfer of venue after she was assigned to hear the five criminal cases, which the Supreme Court denied in its Resolution dated January 8, 2020. She also noted that after the administrative case was filed, complainant moved for her inhibition, resulting in the designation of Judge Jonald E. Hernandez of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Aurora-Dipaculao to hear the case. Respondent explained that she resolved the two Motions for Reconsideration outright because all the accused, one of whom was a senior citizen, were in danger of spending the night or two in jail; that the "3-day notice rule" is a procedural rule to be liberally construed; that Rule 15, Section 4 allows hearing on shorter notice for good cause; and that no prejudice was caused since the Order merely reduced bail. She further pointed out that the assailed Order was dated January 28, 2020, while the complaint was filed on December 7, 2020, and that complainant participated in the proceedings in the interim.

In his Reply dated February 17, 2021, complainant argued that the accused had the means to engage a Makati-based lawyer and had readily posted cash bonds, so respondent's reasons for immediately acting on the Motions for Reconsideration and reducing bail were baseless. He added that Rule 15, Section 5 of the 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states that a motion for reconsideration is a litigious motion, which must be heard. Respondent, in a Letter dated February 22, 2021, asserted that complainant's Reply was a rehash of the allegations in the Complaint. Subsequently, complainant filed a Supplemental Complaint dated June 11, 2021, stating that in serving him a copy of respondent's February 22, 2021 Letter, respondent failed to pay for the postage required to deliver the same and thus violated the franking privilege granted to the Judiciary under Presidential Decree No. 26. He attached the original envelope addressed to him containing a copy of the Letter. Respondent filed a Comment dated October 15, 2021 praying for dismissal, arguing that it was reckless to assume she did not pay postage just because the Letter lacked postage stamps; that she had neither authority nor supervision over Philippine Postal Corporation personnel; and that she duly paid, as evidenced by a Sertipikasyon issued by the Postmaster of Casiguran confirming receipt of payment for the postage stamp fee. Complainant filed a Reply reiterating his arguments and highlighting that while respondent claimed she received the Supplemental Complaint on July 5, 2021, the Sertipikasyon was dated June 18, 2021, or prior to her receipt of the said complaint.

• Violation of the Three-Day Notice Rule: Complainant argued that respondent issued the January 29, 2020 Order without justification and in violation of the "3-day notice rule," showing ignorance of the law and procedure.
• Gross Incompetence and Bad Faith: Complainant averred that respondent acceded to the accused's contention that it was their first time to fail to attend the scheduled hearings without confirming the same with the records, which was patent and egregious and amounted to bad faith, constituting gross incompetence; contrary to respondent's findings, the accused had been absent before, as shown by respondent's November 27, 2018 Order resetting arraignment and pretrial.
• No Basis for Immediate Action: Complainant argued that the accused had the means to engage a Makati-based lawyer and readily posted cash bonds, so respondent's reasons for immediately acting on the Motions for Reconsideration and reducing bail were baseless; Rule 15, Section 5 of the 2019 Amendments explicitly states that a motion for reconsideration is a litigious motion that must be heard.
• Franking Privilege Violation: In the Supplemental Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent failed to pay postage for her February 22, 2021 Letter, violating the franking privilege under Presidential Decree No. 26; he attached the original envelope.
• Misdeclaration: Complainant reiterated that while respondent claimed receipt of the Supplemental Complaint on July 5, 2021, the Sertipikasyon was dated June 18, 2021, prior to receipt.

• Insufficient Complaint: Respondent argued that the complaint failed to specify the charges to enable her to comment fully and comprehensively.
• Suspect Filing and Related Cases: Respondent claimed Criminal Case No. 3033 was related to four other criminal cases she had already decided against complainant, making the filing highly suspect; complainant requested transfer of venue after she was assigned to hear the five criminal cases, which the Supreme Court denied in its January 8, 2020 Resolution; complainant also moved for her inhibition, resulting in the designation of Judge Jonald E. Hernandez.
• Urgency and Liberal Construction: Respondent explained she resolved the Motions for Reconsideration outright because all accused, one a senior citizen, were in danger of spending the night or two in jail; the 3-day notice rule is procedural and should be liberally construed; Rule 15, Section 4 allows hearing on shorter notice for good cause; no prejudice was caused since the Order merely reduced bail.
• Delay and Waiver: Respondent pointed out that the assailed Order was dated January 28, 2020, while the complaint was filed December 7, 2020; complainant participated in the proceedings in the interim and should have raised the issue immediately.
• Franking Privilege: Respondent argued the Supplemental Complaint lacked basis; it was reckless to assume she did not pay postage just because the Letter lacked postage stamps; she had no authority or supervision over Philippine Postal Corporation personnel; she duly paid, as evidenced by the Sertipikasyon issued by the Postmaster of Casiguran.

• Gross Ignorance of Law and Procedure: Whether respondent should be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure for resolving the Motions for Reconsideration ex parte and reducing bail without observing the three-day notice rule.
• Gross Incompetence: Whether respondent is liable for gross incompetence for allegedly accepting the accused's claim of first-time absence without checking the records.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of a PHP 50,000.00 fine, with a stern warning, is proper under Rule 140, as further amended.
• Franking Privilege Violation: Whether respondent violated Presidential Decree No. 26 by allegedly failing to pay postage for her February 22, 2021 Letter.
• Complainant's Abuse of Court Processes: Whether complainant should be required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for abusing court processes and making malicious imputations.

• Gross Ignorance of Law and Procedure: Yes. Respondent is administratively liable. She violated the mandatory three-day notice rule under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by resolving the Motions for Reconsideration ex parte the day after they were filed and reducing bail without any request.
• Gross Incompetence: No. The Judicial Integrity Board found respondent's explanation sufficient to justify her actions and recommended dismissal of this charge; the Court adopted the Board Proper's findings and recommendations with modifications.
• Penalty: Fine of PHP 50,000.00, with a stern warning. Gross ignorance is a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 14(j); first offense is mitigating under Sections 19(1)(a) and 20; respondent had more than 19 years of service.
• Franking Privilege Violation: No. The Supplemental Complaint lacks basis; the envelope bore Registry Receipt No. RE 446 826 748 ZZ, allowing the reasonable inference that postage was paid, rebutting any violation of the judiciary's franking privilege.
• Complainant's Abuse of Court Processes: Yes. Complainant is ordered to show cause within 10 days from notice why he should not be held administratively liable for abusing court processes and making malicious imputations of crime.

• Gross Ignorance of Law and Procedure: The Court adopted the findings of the Judicial Integrity Board Proper. Section 24 of Rule 140, as further amended, provides that it applies to all pending and future administrative disciplinary cases, so the Court resolved the case under that framework. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence; a judge may be administratively liable if motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in ignoring, contradicting, or failing to apply settled law. Not every judicial error warrants sanction if committed in good faith, but a patent disregard of simple, elementary, and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance even absent malicious intent. At the time pertinent, Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure required every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant, with notice served so as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the hearing, unless the court for good cause set a shorter notice. The rule is mandatory; a motion not complying is a mere scrap of paper, and the court has no authority to act on it. The Motions for Reconsideration were filed on January 28, 2020 at 5:35 p.m. and set for hearing on January 29, 2020 at 8:00 a.m. The proximity between service and hearing confirmed that the adverse party could not receive the motions at least three days before the hearing. Respondent nevertheless proceeded to hear the motions ex parte the following day and reduced bail without any prayer or request from the accused. Nothing in the records showed that the adverse party was given notice or opportunity to study the motions and meaningfully oppose them. Although Rule 15, Section 4 allows a shorter notice for good cause, a notice of hearing must still be served on the adverse party; here, the motions were served on the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, not the Assistant Regional Prosecutor who had taken over the case, and a copy served at 4:59 p.m. on January 28, 2020 would not reach the Assistant Regional Prosecutor by 8:00 a.m. on January 29, 2020. Thus, respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule.
• Gross Incompetence: The Judicial Integrity Board – Office of the Executive Director recommended dismissal of the charge of gross incompetence after finding respondent's explanation sufficient to justify her actions. The Judicial Integrity Board Proper adopted that recommendation, and the Court adopted the findings and recommendations with modifications. No administrative liability for gross incompetence was imposed.
• Penalty: Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under Section 14(j) of Rule 140, as further amended. Section 17(1) provides that serious charges may be penalized by dismissal, suspension, or a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00. Section 19(1)(a) recognizes first offense as a mitigating circumstance, and Section 20 allows the Court to impose a fine for an amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed. Considering that respondent had been in the service for more than 19 years and this was her first administrative charge, the Court imposed a fine of PHP 50,000.00 with a stern warning. The Court modified the Judicial Integrity Board's directive to pay within 30 days from notice because Section 22 of Rule 140, as further amended, requires payment within a period not exceeding three months from promulgation; if unpaid, the amount may be deducted from salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits, and such deduction is not tantamount to forfeiture.
• Franking Privilege Violation: Complainant alleged that respondent violated Presidential Decree No. 26 by failing to pay postage for her February 22, 2021 Letter. Respondent explained that she had neither authority nor supervision over Philippine Postal Corporation personnel and that she duly paid, as evidenced by the Sertipikasyon issued by the Postmaster of Casiguran. The envelope used to transmit the Letter bore Registry Receipt No. RE 446 826 748 ZZ. Since the envelope carried a Philippine Postal Corporation registry receipt, it could be reasonably inferred that the postage fee was duly paid, rebutting any allegation of violation of the judiciary's franking privilege. Complainant's claim of a misdeclaration by respondent regarding receipt of the Supplemental Complaint appeared to trifle with the matter.
• Complainant's Abuse of Court Processes: The Court took judicial notice of the various actions taken by complainant against respondent following her designation as hearing judge in Criminal Case No. 3033 and the four related criminal cases. Complainant moved for the inhibition of the previously assigned judge, the provincial prosecutor, and respondent; he requested transfer of venue, which the Court denied in its January 8, 2020 Resolution; and he filed a Supplemental Complaint alleging violation of the franking privilege despite respondent's reasonable explanation and the registry receipt on the envelope. Taken together, these actions portrayed a hostile demeanor and a determined and obstinate effort to ensure that respondent was held administratively liable through the use or apparent misuse of court processes. The Court therefore required complainant to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for abusing court processes and making malicious imputations of the crime of abusing the franking privilege of the Judiciary in violation of Presidential Decree No. 26.

• Gross ignorance of the law — Defined as the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption in ignoring, contradicting, or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. Not every judicial error warrants sanction if committed in good faith, but a patent disregard of simple, elementary, and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance even absent malicious intent. Applied: respondent violated the three-day notice rule.
• Three-day notice rule — Under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, every written motion required to be heard must be set for hearing by the applicant, with notice served so as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets a shorter notice. The rule is mandatory; a motion not complying is a mere scrap of paper, and the court has no authority to act on it. Applied: the Motions for Reconsideration were set for hearing less than three days after service, yet respondent resolved them ex parte.
• Procedural due process and opportunity to be heard — The three-day notice rule is an integral component of procedural due process, designed to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give sufficient time to study the motion and meet its arguments. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard and time to study and meaningfully oppose the motion. Applied: the prosecution was deprived of this opportunity.
• Litigious motion (motion for reconsideration) — Under the 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, effective May 1, 2020, a motion for reconsideration is expressly listed as a litigious motion, and the adverse party is required to file an opposition within five days from notice. The Court noted this in assessing the nature of the motions.
• Retroactive application of Rule 140, as further amended — Section 24 of Rule 140, as further amended, provides that its provisions apply to all pending and future administrative disciplinary cases involving Members, officials, employees, and personnel of the Judiciary. Applied: the Court resolved the case under the amended Rule 140.
• Substantial evidence — The amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Applied: respondent's administrative liability was established by substantial evidence.
• Franking privilege under Presidential Decree No. 26 — Judges may transmit in the mail, free of charge, all official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings; use for private or unauthorized purposes is punishable. Applied: the Court found no violation because the envelope bore a Philippine Postal Corporation registry receipt, allowing the inference that postage was paid.
• Abuse of court processes and malicious imputation — A party's determined and obstinate effort to ensure a judge is administratively liable through the use or misuse of court processes, including unsupported allegations of crime, may warrant an order to show cause. Applied: complainant was ordered to show cause.

• "Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence." — This passage defines the administrative offense of gross ignorance of the law and states the circumstances under which a judge may be held liable.
• "The Court has held time and again that the three-day notice requirement is mandatory. As a rule, a motion which does not comply with the foregoing requirement is a mere scrap of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and over which the court has no authority to act upon." — This passage states the mandatory character of the three-day notice rule and the consequence of non-compliance.
• "It is settled that the three-day notice rule is an integral component of procedural due process which was established not for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of avoiding surprises upon the adverse party who must be granted sufficient time to study the motion and meet the arguments interposed therein before resolution of the court." — This passage explains the rationale of the three-day notice rule as a component of procedural due process.
• "Consequently, the Court finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice rule. Indeed, where the applicable legal provisions are crystal clear and need no interpretation, a judge's failure to apply the same constitutes gross ignorance of the law." — This passage is the ratio decidendi on respondent's administrative liability for gross ignorance of the law.

• Department of Justice vs. Mislang, 791 Phil. 219 (2016) — Per Curiam En Banc ruling quoted by the Court to define gross ignorance of the law and the circumstances under which a judge may be administratively liable.
• Enriquez vs. Judge Caminade, 519 Phil. 781 (2006) — Held that judges must exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws; lack of conversance with a basic and elementary legal principle constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
• Philippine National Construction Corporation vs. Mupas, 889 Phil. 641 (2020) — Cited for the principle that a patent disregard of simple, elementary, and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, even absent malicious intent.
• Jehan Shipping Corporation vs. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166 (2005) and Sule vs. Judge Biteng, 313 Phil. 398 (1995) — Cited for the mandatory nature of the three-day notice rule and the rule that a non-compliant motion is a mere scrap of paper.
• Cabrera vs. Ng, 729 Phil. 544 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the three-day notice rule is an integral component of procedural due process and for the opportunity-to-be-heard test.
• P/Sr. SUPT. Mabutas vs. Judge Perello, 498 Phil. 410 (2005) — Cited for the principle that where the applicable legal provisions are crystal clear and need no interpretation, a judge's failure to apply them constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
• Tan vs. Alvarico, 888 Phil. 345 (2020) — Cited for the definition of substantial evidence.
• Cabili vs. Balindong, 672 Phil. 398 (2011) — Cited in Mupas for the rule that when the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to the office to know and apply it.

• Article 172(1), in relation to Article 171(4), Revised Penal Code — The offense charged in Criminal Case No. 3033, falsification by private individuals, which formed the backdrop of the administrative complaint.
• Rule 15, Section 4, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant, with notice served so as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before the hearing, unless the court for good cause sets a shorter notice. Applied: respondent violated this rule.
• Rule 15, Section 5, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires the notice of hearing to be addressed to all parties concerned and to specify the time and date of hearing, which must not be later than ten days after filing. Cited in the discussion of the three-day notice rule.
• Rule 140, Section 14(j), Rules of Court, as further amended — Classifies gross ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious charge. Applied: respondent was found guilty of this charge.
• Rule 140, Section 17(1), Rules of Court, as further amended — Provides the sanctions for serious charges, including dismissal, suspension, or a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00. Applied in determining the imposable penalty.
• Rule 140, Section 19(1)(a), Rules of Court, as further amended — Recognizes first offense as a mitigating circumstance. Applied: respondent had no prior administrative charge.
• Rule 140, Section 20, Rules of Court, as further amended — Allows the Court to impose suspension or fine for a period or amount not less than half of the minimum prescribed. Applied to reduce the fine to PHP 50,000.00.
• Rule 140, Section 22, Rules of Court, as further amended — Governs payment of fines, requiring payment within a period not exceeding three months from promulgation; if unpaid, may be deducted from salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits. Applied to modify the Judicial Integrity Board's 30-day payment directive.
• Rule 140, Section 24, Rules of Court, as further amended — Provides retroactive effect to all pending and future administrative disciplinary cases. Applied: the Court resolved the case under the amended Rule 140.
• Presidential Decree No. 26 — Grants judges the franking privilege for official communications and papers directly connected with judicial proceedings and penalizes use for private or unauthorized purposes. Applied: the Court found no violation because the envelope bore a registry receipt.
• Section 6, Rule 133, 2019 Amendments to the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence (A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC) — Cited in Tan vs. Alvarico for the definition of substantial evidence. Applied: liability was established by substantial evidence.
• Rule 144, 2019 Proposed Amendments to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Cited for the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a litigious motion. The Court noted it in the discussion.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier (Working Chairperson), and M. Lopez, JJ., concurred. J. Lopez, J., was on leave.