Badua vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration

Tribal courts of indigenous cultural communities are not part of the Philippine judicial system and do not possess judicial power; their decisions may be enforced or set aside only through the regular courts. Where the Cordillera Autonomous Region was never legally created, tribal courts within that region cannot be deemed indigenous special courts under Republic Act No. 6766 and have no jurisdiction to render executory judgments in land disputes.

Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua claimed ownership of farmland in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra, which was also claimed by David Quema. The Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians inhabiting the interior mountain town of Villaviciosa, Abra, and forms part of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, whose military arm is the Cordillera People's Liberation Army. The tribal court, composed of a council of elders, operates under the customs and traditions of the community and settles disputes without the intervention of lawyers. Executive Order No. 220 created the Cordillera Bodong Administration, while Republic Act No. 6766 provided for the establishment of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras, including indigenous special courts — but the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected in a plebiscite held on January 23, 1990 by all provinces and the city of the region except Ifugao.

In 1966, David Quema, owner of two parcels of land in Lucaga, Lumaba, Villaviciosa, Abra — evidenced by Tax Declarations Nos. 4997 and 4998 — mortgaged the land for ₱6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. Twenty-two years later, on August 14, 1988, long after the mortgagee had died, Quema redeemed the land by paying ₱10,000 to the mortgagee's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. Rosa Badua, wife of petitioner Leonor Badua, claimed that the same land had been sold to her by Dra. Valera during her lifetime, but could not produce the deed of sale because it was allegedly in the possession of Vice-Governor Benesa.

When Quema was prevented by Rosa Badua from cultivating the land, he first filed a case before the Barangay Council, which failed to settle the dispute. A certain Judge Cacho advised Quema to file his complaint in the provincial-level courts. Instead, Quema brought the matter before the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. The tribal court conducted a trial on February 19, 1989 and rendered a decision awarding the land to Quema, ordering the Baduas to pay the persons to whom the land had been mortgaged, to reimburse Quema's expenses of ₱2,000, and to pay a fine of ₱5,000 for allegedly lying about having purchased the land from Dra. Valera. The decision was based on the "PAGTA," the customary law of the tribe.

When the Baduas did not immediately vacate the land, they received on June 30, 1989 a "warning order" from Ka Blantie, Zone Commander of the CPLA's Abra Zone-1, reiterating the tribal court's order and threatening armed intervention if the Baduas attempted to bring the case to another court. Fearful for his life, Leonor Badua went into hiding. In September 1989, Rosa Badua was arrested by the CPLA and detained for two days.

On April 2, 1990, the Baduas filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking a writ of preliminary injunction, prohibition against the respondents' usurpation of judicial power, and clarification of the legal personality of the CBA and CPLA. The respondents, through counsel, filed their comment on October 26, 1990, contending that the tribal court operates under customary law and that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are not part of the judicial system, while conceding that the petitioners should test the tribal court's decision in the trial courts rather than the Supreme Court.

• Lack of Due Process: Petitioners alleged that the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration is null and void because they were denied due process or a formal hearing.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that the Cordillera Bodong Administration has no judicial power or jurisdiction over them or over the private respondent, as neither party are members of the Maeng Tribe.

• Customary Law Authority: Respondents alleged that the Maeng Tribe is a cultural minority group of Tingguians, that the tribal court or council of elders is composed of prominent and respected residents, and that it settles disputes more speedily than regular courts without the intervention of lawyers, with decisions respected and obeyed by parties, officials, and the community, ostracism being the penalty for disobedience.
• Lack of Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Respondents contended that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over tribal courts because they are not part of the judicial system.
• Proper Forum: Respondents conceded that if the petitioners wished to test the wisdom of the tribal court's decision, they should file the necessary suit in the trial courts where evidence can be presented, not in the Supreme Court.

• Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts: Whether a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute.
• Legal Existence of the CBA and CPLA: Whether the Cordillera Bodong Administration and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army legally exist as governmental entities with judicial or police powers.

• Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts: No. The Maeng Tribal Court is not part of the Philippine judicial system and does not possess judicial power; its decision in the land dispute was annulled for lack of jurisdiction.
• Legal Existence of the CBA and CPLA: No. Because the Cordillera Autonomous Region was rejected in the January 23, 1990 plebiscite, the CBA, the CPLA, and any indigenous special courts contemplated under R.A. No. 6766 do not legally exist as constituted governmental entities.

• Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts: The Philippine judicial system consists of the Supreme Court and lower courts established by law under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Tribal courts are not among them. In Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections, the Court en banc declared that the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence because all provinces and the city of the Cordillera region except Ifugao rejected its creation in the January 23, 1990 plebiscite. As a logical consequence, the CBA created under Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous special courts contemplated under R.A. No. 6766, and the CPLA as a regional police force do not legally exist. The Maeng Tribal Court was therefore never constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766 and remains an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community. Such tribal courts, like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508, are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring parties together to settle, compromise, or arbitrate. Their decisions based on compromise or arbitration may be enforced or set aside only through the regular courts, as provided in P.D. No. 1508.

• Legal Existence of the CBA and CPLA: The Court's ruling in Ordillo declared null and void the Comelec resolution upholding the creation of an autonomous region, the relevant memoranda, Administrative Order No. 160, and R.A. No. 6861, while declaring Executive Order No. 220 still in force. However, because the Cordillera Autonomous Region itself was never legally created, the mechanisms that R.A. No. 6766 would have established — including the CBA as a governmental entity with judicial functions, indigenous special courts, and the CPLA as a regional police force — could not come into legal existence. The tribal court's decision was thus without legal force and could not be enforced independently of the regular judicial system.

• Nature of Tribal Courts — Tribal courts of indigenous cultural communities are not part of the Philippine judicial system as constituted under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. They do not possess judicial power. They are advisory and conciliatory bodies analogous to the pangkats or conciliation panels under P.D. No. 1508, whose principal function is to amicably settle disputes. Their decisions based on compromise or arbitration may be enforced or set aside only through the regular courts, not by their own authority or through armed enforcement.
• Conditional Legal Existence of Cordillera Autonomous Institutions — The Cordillera Bodong Administration, indigenous special courts, and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army as a regional police force derive their legal existence from the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region under R.A. No. 6766. Where the autonomous region is rejected in a plebiscite, these institutions do not legally exist and cannot exercise governmental, judicial, or police powers.

• "Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: tribal courts lack judicial power because they are not part of the judicial system established by law under the Constitution.

• "Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise." — This defines the doctrinal character of tribal courts by analogy to barangay conciliation panels, clarifying their limited function.

• "Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come to be, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community." — This establishes the logical link between the failed plebiscite and the tribal court's lack of statutory authority.

• Ordillo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990 — Controlling precedent. The Court en banc held that the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come into legal existence because all provinces and the city of the Cordillera region except Ifugao rejected its creation in the January 23, 1990 plebiscite. This ruling was the direct basis for concluding that the CBA, CPLA, and indigenous special courts under R.A. No. 6766 do not legally exist.

• Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Defines the Philippine judicial system as consisting of the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be established by law. Applied to establish that tribal courts are not part of the judicial system and do not possess judicial power.
• Republic Act No. 6766 — The law providing for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region, including indigenous special courts (Sec. 1, Art. VII) and the CPLA as a regional police force (Secs. 2 and 4, Art. XVIII). Applied to show that these institutions could not legally exist because the autonomous region was rejected in the plebiscite.
• Executive Order No. 220 — Created the Cordillera Bodong Administration under Section 13. Declared still in force by Ordillo, but insufficient to confer judicial power on tribal courts absent the creation of the autonomous region.
• Presidential Decree No. 1508 — The Katarungang Pambarangay Law, which created pangkats or conciliation panels in the barangays. Applied by analogy to characterize tribal courts as advisory and conciliatory bodies whose compromise settlements may be enforced only through the regular courts (Secs. 11 and 14).

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.