Badillo vs. Court of Appeals

Exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enforce statutory and contractual obligations of subdivision owners and developers, including claims for specific performance relating to subdivision roads and the conversion of open spaces, lies with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. An appeal from a Regional Trial Court decision involving only a question of law must be taken to the Supreme Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 is improper and will be dismissed.

Petitioners owned several lots adjoining Apollo Street (Lot 369-A-29), a subdivision road lot that connected their properties to the main road. The road lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-20895 in the name of respondent Pedro del Rosario. An annotation on the title, Entry No. 605/T-22655 (18 August 1953), stated that the street lot shall not be closed or disposed of without prior court approval. Del Rosario sold an unsegregated portion of the road lot to respondents Conejero and Sonoron without first obtaining court approval. Del Rosario, Conejero, and Sonoron then partitioned the land into four lots, resulting in the partial cancellation of the original title and the issuance of new titles. One of the resulting lots was later sold to Goldkey Development Corporation, which constructed cement fences that allegedly blocked petitioners’ ingress and egress. The Office of the Building Official of Quezon City had previously ruled that the property was a residential lot, not a road lot, and the HLURB had issued a development permit to Goldkey for a townhouse project.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioners sought to annul the sale and partition of a subdivision road lot and to void the titles issued to respondents, alleging that the transfer violated a court-ordered annotation and blocked their access to the main road.

• The Road Lot and Annotation: Petitioners owned several lots adjoining Lot 369-A-29 (Apollo Street), a road lot shown in subdivision plan Psd-37971. The road lot was registered under TCT No. RT-20895 in the name of respondent Pedro del Rosario. An annotation (Entry No. 605/T-22655, dated 18 August 1953) on the title stated: “It is hereby made of record that as per order of the Court, the street lot covered by this title shall not be closed or disposed of by the registered owner without previous approval of the court.”

• Sales and Partition: Without prior court approval, del Rosario sold an unsegregated portion of the road lot to respondents Josefa Conejero and Ignacio Sonoron. The three then executed a partition agreement dividing the road lot into four lots, leading to the partial cancellation of TCT No. RT-20895 and the issuance of new titles (TCT Nos. 35899 and 35100 in Conejero’s name, TCT No. 35101 in del Rosario’s name, and TCT No. 35102 in Sonoron’s name). Del Rosario subsequently sold TCT No. 35101 to Goldkey Development Corporation.

• Administrative Determinations: In May 1991, petitioners initiated a case before the Office of the Building Official of Quezon City (Building Case No. R-10-91-006) against Goldkey’s construction activities. That office issued a decision, which became final and executory, declaring the disputed property a residential lot, not a road lot. On 10 September 1991, the HLURB issued a Development Permit to Goldkey for a residential townhouse project, classifying the project as in accordance with the Quezon City Zoning Ordinance. Neither ruling was appealed by petitioners.

• Proceedings Below: Petitioners filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10510 on 4 November 1991. The trial court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, citing the final findings of the building official and the HLURB permit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because the only assigned error—whether the trial court had jurisdiction—was a pure question of law, and because the dispute fell within the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction.

• HLURB Jurisdiction Over Annulment: Petitioners argued that while they could file a specific performance case to compel compliance with the duty to maintain the road lot, complete relief required the voiding of the sales and the partition, an action for annulment of title that only regular courts could entertain. They maintained that the HLURB’s jurisdiction to decide specific performance cases did not extend to declaring titles void.

• Effect of Annotation: Petitioners contended that the annotation on TCT No. RT-20895 required prior court approval before any closure or disposition of the road lot; respondents violated that condition, giving the regular courts jurisdiction to enforce the annotation and annul the resulting titles.

• Propriety of Appeal and Certiorari: Petitioners asserted that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for raising only a question of law, and that the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy against that dismissal.

• Exclusive HLURB Jurisdiction: Goldkey Development Corporation argued that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 and related laws, because the complaint sought to enforce contractual and statutory obligations of a subdivision developer concerning a road lot. It pointed out that the building official and the HLURB had already determined the property was residential, and those determinations were final.

• Improper Appeal: Goldkey maintained that petitioners’ sole assigned error—the trial court’s jurisdiction—was a pure question of law; hence, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Supreme Court under Rule 45, not by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals thus correctly dismissed the appeal.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal: Goldkey contended that petitioners used the Rule 65 petition as a substitute for an appeal that was lost through their own procedural error, which is impermissible.

• HLURB Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal on the ground that jurisdiction over the subject matter lay with the HLURB, not the regular courts.

• Question of Law: Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the appeal on the ground that petitioners assigned only an error of law.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy for petitioners.

• HLURB Jurisdiction: The HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. The complaint was, in essence, one for specific performance—to enforce the subdivision owner’s statutory and contractual obligations to maintain roads and open spaces—falling squarely within Section 1(c) of PD 1344 and Section 8(11) of Executive Order No. 648. Section 22 of PD 957 prohibits the alteration of subdivision roads without HLURB permission and consent of the lot buyers. The annotation on the title, entered in 1953, was impliedly modified by the subsequent enactment of PD 957 (1976), PD 1344 (1978), and EO 648 (1981), such that conversion disputes now fall under the HLURB’s jurisdiction. As a quasi-judicial agency with expertise over the real estate trade, the HLURB may grant complete relief, including declaring sales void if necessary; split jurisdiction is disfavored. The dismissal of the appeal therefore did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

• Question of Law: The appeal was properly dismissed. The sole error assigned—whether the trial court had jurisdiction—is a pure question of law, as it concerns the correct application of legal provisions to admitted facts without need to reevaluate evidence. Under Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from an RTC decision involving only questions of law must be taken directly to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court of Appeals correctly applied Section 2, Rule 50, which mandates dismissal of an improper appeal raising only questions of law.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Certiorari under Rule 65 was not a proper remedy. A petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, especially when the loss resulted from petitioner’s erroneous choice of remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive; since an appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 was available, certiorari would not lie. No manifest failure or miscarriage of justice warranted a liberal relaxation of the rules.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of the HLURB Over Subdivision Cases — Under PD 957, PD 1344, and EO 648 (as amended by EO 90), the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims for refund and other claims by lot or unit buyers against developers; and (c) specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman. The agency’s jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter, and the parties. In this case, the action to compel maintenance of a subdivision road and to challenge its conversion was held to be a specific performance case within the HLURB’s exclusive competence.

• Implied Modification of Judicial Annotations by Subsequent Legislation — A court-ordered annotation on a certificate of title requiring prior court approval for closure or disposition of a subdivision road lot may be impliedly modified by later statutory enactments that vest jurisdiction over such matters in the HLURB. The later laws supersede the earlier annotation with respect to the forum that must approve the conversion.

• Quasi-Judicial Bodies May Grant Complete Relief — When an administrative agency is vested with quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter within its specialization are deemed included within its jurisdiction. The HLURB may award damages, declare transactions void, and grant other relief necessary to dispose of the case fully, even if such powers are traditionally judicial. Split jurisdiction is not favored.

• Definition of a Question of Law — A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not require examination of the probative value of evidence because the truth or falsity of facts is admitted.

• Modes of Appeal from the Regional Trial Court — Under Rule 41, Section 2, an appeal from an RTC decision in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is taken: (a) by ordinary appeal (notice of appeal) to the Court of Appeals if questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law are raised; or (b) by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 if only questions of law are raised. An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals on pure questions of law shall be dismissed outright and will not be transferred to the appropriate court.

• Certiorari Not a Substitute for Lost Appeal — The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is a limited remedy of last recourse, available only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot replace an appeal that was lost through the party’s own procedural error, unless a manifest miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.

• “The question on jurisdiction is undoubtedly one of law. We have held that ‘a question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.’”

• “In Peña v. GSIS, the Court ruled that when an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction. Split jurisdiction is not favored.”

• “The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions relating to subdivisions. This intention was aimed to provide for an appropriate government agency, which is the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse.” (Osea v. Ambrosio)

• “A petition for certiorari cannot be a substitute for an appeal from a lower court decision. Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternate or successive.” (David v. Cordova)

• Osea v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 162774, 7 April 2006 — Followed to define the scope of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction and the legislative intent to encompass all subdivision-related questions.

• Peña v. GSIS, G.R. No. 159520, 19 September 2006 — Relied upon for the principle that quasi-judicial agencies may resolve all controversies within their specialization and that split jurisdiction is disfavored.

• C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada, G.R. No. 80916, 9 November 1990 — Cited to support the competence of administrative bodies to award damages and exercise quasi-judicial powers as an incident of their regulatory function.

• Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125339, 22 June 1998 — Applied to confirm that questions concerning compliance with requisites for the conversion of subdivision lots fall within the NHA/HLURB’s jurisdiction, not the regular courts.

• Sevilleno v. Carilo, G.R. No. 146454, 14 September 2007 — Summarized the three modes of appeal from RTC judgments, used to determine that petitioners’ appeal raising only a question of law should have been filed with the Supreme Court.

• David v. Cordova, G.R. No. 152992, 28 July 2005 — Applied to reiterate that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal and that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive.

• Section 22, PD 957 — Prohibits the alteration of roads, open spaces, and other subdivision facilities without HLURB permission and consent of the homeowners association or majority of lot buyers. Applied to classify petitioners’ grievance as a specific performance case falling within the regulatory ambit of the HLURB.

• Section 1, PD 1344 — Vests the NHA (predecessor of the HLURB) with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices, claims for refund, and cases of specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations. Served as the primary basis for concluding that the HLURB had jurisdiction over the subject matter.

• Section 8, EO 648 — Transferred NHA’s regulatory functions to the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (later HLURB) and enumerated among them the approval of conversion of roads and open spaces and the hearing of specific performance cases.

• Section 2, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Defines the modes of appeal from RTC decisions, distinguishing ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals (questions of fact or mixed questions) from appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (pure questions of law). Applied to hold that petitioners’ appeal was improperly brought to the Court of Appeals.

• Section 2, Rule 50, Rules of Court — Mandates dismissal of an improper appeal to the Court of Appeals that raises only questions of law, and provides that an erroneously taken appeal shall not be transferred to the proper court. Applied to affirm the dismissal of the appeal.

N/A (the text does not list the concurring justices of the Supreme Court).