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Bacarro vs. Pinatacan

Respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan was allowed to take the lawyer’s oath. The administrative complaint filed by Carmen E. Bacarro charged him, a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and lack of proper character after he allegedly seduced her by promises of marriage, eloped with her, caused her pregnancy, urged abortion, deserted her, and denied paternity. Although the Court found that these acts failed to meet the high moral standard required for Bar membership, it held that eight years of exclusion could be sufficient punishment and retribution. His legal acknowledgment of the child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan and undertaking of support showed reformation. Admission was allowed, with an admonition that continued membership depended on compliance with his moral and legal obligations as father.

Primary Holding

Prior moral delinquency does not permanently disqualify a Bar candidate where the Court finds, after a substantial period of exclusion, that he has acknowledged his child, undertaken support, and shown reformation; admission may be allowed subject to an admonition that continued membership depends on compliance with his moral and legal obligations as a father.

Background

Complainant Carmen E. Bacarro and respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City and became sweethearts. Respondent was a 1975 successful Bar candidate. Admission to the Philippine Bar is governed by Rule 138, Section 2, which requires every applicant to be of good moral character and to produce satisfactory evidence thereof; the Supreme Court has the power, jurisdiction, and duty to pass upon the qualifications, ability, and moral character of candidates.

History

  1. Supreme Court, Sept. 2, 1975 — administrative case filed by Carmen E. Bacarro charging Ruben M. Pinatacan, a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity and lack of proper character required of a member of the Bar.

  2. Supreme Court, June 10, 1976 — referred the case to the Judicial Investigator for investigation, report, and recommendation.

  3. City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, July 27, 1976 — upon complainant’s request prompted by financial difficulties, she was allowed to present her evidence before the City Fiscal.

  4. City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, Aug. 30 and Sept. 27, 1976 — hearings were conducted; respondent failed to attend, and complainant presented oral and documentary evidence.

  5. Supreme Court, Feb. 16, 1977 — respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that, based on complainant’s evidence and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer’s oath.

  6. Supreme Court, Feb. 24, 1977 — Court’s Investigator Atty. Victor Sevilla reported that the intimacy between the parties was neither so corrupt nor so immoral as to warrant respondent’s permanent exclusion from the Philippine Bar and recommended that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

  7. Supreme Court, Dec. 12, 1977 — respondent submitted a Manifestation stating that he was to recognize and give support or financial assistance to complainant’s child Maria Rochie, although he could not assure immediate support because he was without a source of income.

  8. Supreme Court, Oct. 11, 1979 — required respondent, as proof of sincerity and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil registrar’s office his paternity over the child Maria Rochie and to send the original to complainant and a duplicate copy to the Court within ten days.

  9. Supreme Court, Oct. 19, 1979 — respondent submitted proof of compliance with the Court’s Resolution.

  10. Supreme Court, Jan. 31, 1984 — En Banc allowed respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan to take the lawyer’s oath, with an admonition that his admission and continued membership in the Bar depended on compliance with his moral and legal obligations as father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

Facts

Carmen E. Bacarro and Ruben M. Pinatacan were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de Oro City. After about a year of courtship, they became sweethearts on March 17, 1967. According to complainant, they had their first sexual intercourse on March 21, 1971, after respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City, where they stayed for about a week.

They returned to Cagayan de Oro, and respondent left complainant allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and to make the necessary arrangements for their intended marriage. He came back in May 1971 but only to inform her that they could not get married because of his parents’ objections. When complainant told him she was pregnant, he told her to have an abortion. She refused, and they quarreled. Thereafter, she did not see or hear from him until after the birth of their baby girl, Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan, on December 4, 1971. Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time she had a relationship with respondent.

In July 1973, complainant brought the child to see respondent in Cavite City, and he promised to support the child. He did not make good on that promise, so she went to see him again; he made several more promises, none of which were fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer named Annie Sarabillo. The records included, aside from complainant’s testimony, the child’s birth certificate, numerous letters written by respondent from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971 professing his love and assurances of sincerity and loyalty, a letter dated January 13, 1975 from a certain Margie, whom complainant identified as respondent’s sister, and pictures of the child Maria Rochie with Margie Pinatacan.

Respondent’s version differed. In his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit, he admitted that complainant had been his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of her child. He claimed that their relationship started to cool down in January 1971 when, over her vigorous objection and opposition, he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine Constabulary. He returned to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March 1971 for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in June 1971 he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again returned to Cagayan de Oro City. As far as he knew, complainant was working from 1970 to 1971 in Cagayan de Oro City. He likewise denied that he ever promised marriage to complainant or that he ever cohabited with her.

On September 2, 1975, Bacarro filed an administrative case charging Pinatacan, a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude and depravity and lack of the proper character required of a member of the Bar. She averred that she and respondent fell in love and became engaged while studying at the Liceo de Cagayan; that she became pregnant as a result of their relationship; that respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his promise to marry her; that she gave birth to a baby girl on December 4, 1971; and that because of respondent’s betrayal, she, her daughter, and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress, and anxiety. She asserted that these acts rendered him unfit to become a member of the Bar.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Moral Turpitude and Depravity: Complainant charged that respondent’s conduct—abandoning her after she became pregnant and failing to fulfill his promise to marry—constituted moral turpitude and depravity and showed lack of the proper character required of a member of the Bar.
  • Betrayal and Resulting Harm: She averred that because of respondent’s betrayal, she, her daughter, and her family suffered shame, disrepute, moral distress, and anxiety, rendering him unfit to become a member of the Bar.
  • Unreliability and Disregard of Moral Values: In her sworn statement, she maintained that respondent was unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a word of honor; that he repeatedly promised to support their child but did not even give the child something to buy candy; and that his insistence that the child be aborted proved utter disregard of moral values and Christian doctrines, making him unfit or unsuitable for the legal profession.
  • Not Motivated by Revenge: She stressed that she was not motivated by revenge, aware that whatever fortunes respondent might have would also benefit their child as an heir, but that after serious and profound consideration she believed respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to the legal profession.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Denial of Paternity: Respondent admitted complainant had been his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied that he was the father of her child.
  • Cooling Relationship and No Marriage Promise: He claimed the relationship cooled in January 1971 when he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine Constabulary over complainant’s objection; he left for Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, in June 1971 and never returned to Cagayan de Oro City; and he denied ever promising marriage or cohabiting with complainant.
  • No Case to Bar Admission: In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977, respondent argued that based on complainant’s evidence and even assuming her averments to be true, no case had been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer’s oath.
  • Support Commitment: In a Manifestation dated December 12, 1977, he stated that he was to recognize and give support or financial assistance to complainant’s child Maria Rochie, although he could not assure immediate support because he was without a source of income.

Issues

  • Good Moral Character: Whether respondent’s pre-marital sexual relationship with complainant, induced by alleged promises of marriage, and his subsequent abandonment and denial of paternity constituted lack of good moral character required for admission to the Bar.
  • Disqualification and Reformation: Whether such moral delinquency permanently disqualified respondent from taking the lawyer’s oath, or whether the eight-year period of exclusion, his acknowledgment of paternity, and his undertaking of support warranted allowing him to take it.
  • Condition on Admission: Whether respondent’s admission to the Bar should be conditioned on compliance with his moral and legal obligations as father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

Ruling

  • Good Moral Character: Yes. The acts—seduction by promises of marriage, elopement, pregnancy, urging abortion, desertion, and sworn denial of paternity—failed to meet the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar.
  • Disqualification and Reformation: No. Permanent exclusion was not warranted; eight years could be punishment and retribution enough, and respondent’s legal acknowledgment of the child and undertaking of support showed he had realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct.
  • Condition on Admission: Yes. Respondent was allowed to take the lawyer’s oath but was admonished that his admission and continued membership depended on compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.

Ruling Rationale

  • Good Moral Character: Rule 138, Section 2 requires every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar to be of good moral character. This requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and dignity of the legal profession; only those known to be honest and to possess good moral character should be admitted. A lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen, setting an example not only for respect for the law but also for clean living. Becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations; a candidate must satisfy the Court, which has the power, jurisdiction, and duty to pass upon the qualifications, ability, and moral character of candidates, that he has measured up to the rigid and ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation. The Court found no question that complainant and respondent had been sweethearts for several years, had been sexually intimate, and that the child Maria Rochie was the result of such pre-marital relations. Following Bitangcor vs. Tan and Peredo vs. Tan, where Rodolfo M. Tan fell short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar for violating the honor of two women, having sexual relations with both complainants without marriage, and siring a daughter by complainant Bitangcor, Pinatacan also failed to live up to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage, eloped with her, got her pregnant, told her to have an abortion, deserted her when she refused, caused her to track him down to ask for support for their child born out of wedlock, made promises he apparently did not intend to keep, and denied the paternity of his child in a sworn Affidavit. These acts taken together did not speak well of his character and were indicative of his moral delinquency.
  • Disqualification and Reformation: Although the acts showed moral delinquency and the years he had been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved, eight years could be punishment and retribution enough. Considering that respondent had legally recognized and acknowledged complainant’s child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own and had undertaken to give financial support to the child, the Court held that he had realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and was now prepared to turn over a new leaf. The Court also reiterated what had been stated in Barba vs. Pedro that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. Thus, permanent exclusion was not warranted.
  • Condition on Admission: In allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court admonished him that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar were dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan. The Court’s earlier Resolution of October 11, 1979 required him to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly notarized and registered in the local civil registrar’s office his paternity over the child and to send the original to complainant and a duplicate copy to the Court; he submitted proof of compliance on October 19, 1979. This supported the condition imposed on his admission.

Doctrines

  • Good Moral Character Requirement — Under Rule 138, Section 2, every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be of good moral character. The requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and dignity of the legal profession, and only persons known to be honest and to possess good moral character should be admitted. A lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. Becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar examinations; the candidate must satisfy the Supreme Court, which has the power, jurisdiction, and duty to pass upon qualifications, ability, and moral character, that he has measured up to the rigid and ideal standard of moral fitness required by his chosen vocation. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that Pinatacan’s conduct failed the required standard.
  • Reformation as Basis for Allowing Admission After Moral Delinquency — Prior moral delinquency may disqualify a Bar candidate, but it does not necessarily require permanent exclusion. In this case, the Court held that eight years could be punishment and retribution enough, and that respondent’s legal acknowledgment of his child and undertaking of support showed he had realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and was prepared to turn over a new leaf. On that basis, he was allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
  • Conditional Admission and Continuing Membership — Admission to and continued membership in the Bar may be conditioned on compliance with moral and legal obligations. The Court allowed respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but admonished him that his admission and continued membership depended, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
  • Shared Blame in Offenses of This Character — Citing Barba vs. Pedro, the Court reiterated that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. This principle was considered in allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath.

Key Excerpts

  • "One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral character." — This states the controlling rule on Bar admission and frames the Court’s analysis of respondent’s conduct.
  • "As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage." — This is the Court’s ratio on the moral character issue, applying the Tan cases to Pinatacan’s conduct.
  • "Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough. Moreover, considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant's child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf." — This explains why the Court did not permanently exclude respondent despite finding moral delinquency.
  • "In allowing respondent to take the lawyer's oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan." — This states the condition attached to respondent’s admission and continuing membership in the Bar.

Precedents Cited

  • Bitangcor vs. Tan and Peredo vs. Tan, Adm. Cases Nos. 528-SBC and 529-SBC, February 25, 1982 — The Court followed these consolidated cases, where successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan was held to have fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar for violating the honor of two women, having sexual relations without marriage, and siring a daughter by complainant Bitangcor. The Court used this precedent to find that Pinatacan likewise failed the high moral standard demanded for Bar membership.
  • Barba vs. Pedro, Adm. Case No. 545-SBC, December 26, 1974, 61 SCRA 484, 488 — Cited for the proposition that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone. The Court reiterated this principle in allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath.
  • In Re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230 — Cited in the discussion of the good moral character requirement as maintaining high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession.
  • Blanza vs. Arcangel, 21 SCRA 1, 4 — Cited for the principle that a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen.

Provisions

  • Rule 138, Section 2, Rules of Court — Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar: every applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. The provision was applied because respondent’s admission was contested on the ground of lack of good moral character; the Court found his conduct failed the requirement but allowed him to take the oath after finding reformation and imposing an admonition.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Fernando, C.J., Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., took no part.

Notable Dissenting Opinions

  • Justice Makasiar — Dissented; oath-taking should be deferred until 1985.
  • Justice Abad Santos — Dissented; voted that action be deferred until 1985.
  • Justice Melencio-Herrera — Dissented; voted to deny respondent’s admission to the Bar.