Bacabac vs. People

A conspirator need not be the actual triggerman to be held liable for murder qualified by treachery; firing a weapon while armed alongside co-accused constitutes moral assistance sufficient to establish conspiracy, and once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.

Petitioner Pat. Ricardo Bacabac was a policeman in San Joaquin, Iloilo. His nephews, Jonathan Bacabac and Edzel Talanquines, resided in the household of Edzel's father, Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. On the evening of December 23, 1990, a dance was held in Purok 4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City, attended by both the nephews and the eventual victims, Hernani Quidato and Eduardo Selibio, together with their companion Melchor Selibio. The nephews and the victims were previously unacquainted, and the dispute arose from a chance encounter after the dance.

In the evening of December 23, 1990, Hernani Quidato was at a dance hall in Purok 4, San Joaquin, Iloilo City, in the company of Eduardo Selibio and Melchor Selibio. Also present were Jonathan Bacabac and Edzel Talanquines, nephews of petitioner Pat. Ricardo Bacabac. Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall first; not long after, the victim and his companions also left and encountered Jonathan and Edzel on their way home, whereupon the two groups figured in a misunderstanding. Jesus Delfin Rosadio, who was also at the dance and was on his way home, noticed a commotion and saw Melchor "hugging" Edzel and "tying" Jonathan with his hands, and later saw the victim hit Edzel with a stick. Jesus informed the victim and his companions that Edzel was the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr., whereupon Eduardo told Jesus to go away for they might shoot him. Jesus left and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report to Edzel's father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan managed to flee.

The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home and met petitioner at the corner of M.H. Del Pilar and Sto. Domingo Streets. Petitioner was together with Edzel and Jonathan, as well as Edzel's father Jose, his mother, and two sisters. Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively. Jesus, who had reported to Jose's residence, pointed to the victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled Jonathan and Edzel. The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions had mistook Jonathan and Edzel for other persons. Jesus, however, blurted out, "You are just bragging that you are brave. You are only bullying small children." At that instant, petitioner fired his armalite into the air, while Jose fired his armalite at the victim and Eduardo, spraying his rifle from right to left, even hitting Jonathan in the thigh as Jonathan was moving to strike the victim with a piece of wood. Eduardo fell, and so did the victim, who was in a kneeling position and raising his hands in surrender when Jose shot him again. Melchor escaped.

The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the hospital. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival, while Eduardo died two hours later. Post-mortem examination showed that the victim sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal regions and one bullet wound in the extremities, dying due to "maceration of the internal organs due to bullet wounds." Eduardo sustained two bullet wounds in the thoraco-abdominal region and died of "hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds." Two Informations for Murder were filed with the RTC of Iloilo City against Jose, Edzel, Jonathan, Jesus, and petitioner, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 35783 and 35784, alleging conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation. The cases were jointly tried. The trial court found the presence of conspiracy among all accused and convicted them of murder qualified by treachery, crediting petitioner with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Absence of Conspiracy: Petitioner maintained that he merely fired a warning shot into the air in response to a public disturbance, in pursuance of his duty as a policeman to keep peace and order, and not as part of any community of design to kill the victims. He argued that his conduct after the shooting—standing by without doing anything, and being the first to officially report the shooting incident to the police station—was inconsistent with that of a co-conspirator. He further contended that the scenario of armed men waiting at a well-lighted street corner, accompanied by Jose's wife and two young daughters, and conversing with passers-by about waiting for those who mauled Edzel and Jonathan, was improbable and unnatural, casting doubt on the prosecution's version.
• Absence of Treachery: Petitioner argued that since he was not the triggerman, it was neither logical nor legal to hold him guilty of treachery.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Immediate Vindication: Petitioner asserted that, assuming his guilt, he should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner that his co-accused were so credited.
• Reasonable Doubt: Petitioner argued that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that, by the equipoise rule, he should have been acquitted.
• No Civil Liability: Petitioner contended that he should not be held civilly liable.

• Conspiracy: Whether petitioner may be deemed to have conspired with his co-accused in the killing of the victims.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing, notwithstanding that petitioner was not the triggerman.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether petitioner is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense under Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Reasonable Doubt: Whether petitioner's guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the equipoise rule should apply to warrant acquittal.
• Civil Liability: Whether petitioner is civilly liable.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through petitioner's overt acts—arming himself with an M-16, proceeding to the street corner with co-accused to wait for the victims, and firing his armalite—constituting moral assistance to the group, which need not be proved by direct evidence.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was present because the victims were unarmed, the attack was sudden and unexpected, and one victim was shot while kneeling in surrender, making retaliation impossible.
• Mitigating Circumstance: No. The offense committed against Edzel—being hit on the ear with a stick or bamboo pole—was not a "grave offense," and Edzel, being petitioner's nephew, is not a relative by affinity within the same degree contemplated by Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Reasonable Doubt: Yes, guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt. The equipoise rule did not apply because the evidence sufficiently established petitioner's participation in the conspiracy.
• Civil Liability: Yes. Petitioner, as a conspirator, is jointly and severally liable with his co-accused for the civil indemnity, moral damages, and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the crimes were perpetrated, the conduct of the accused before, during, and after their commission, and the conditions attendant thereto. Petitioner, a policeman, armed himself with an M-16 armalite upon learning that his nephews had been manhandled. He proceeded with his co-accused to a street corner where the culprits would pass by and waited. When the victims arrived and apologized, petitioner fired his armalite into the air almost simultaneously as Jose fired at the victims. His firing could not have amounted to anything other than lending moral assistance to his co-accused, indicating community of design. His failure to assist the victims after the shooting and his standing by as Jose shot the kneeling victim further reinforced the appreciation of conspiracy. That he was the first to report the shooting to the police station did not make him any less a conspirator, as voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence. Moreover, a conspirator who wishes to extricate himself must perform an overt act to dissociate from the unlawful plan while the felony is in progress; petitioner reported the incident only after the killings had already occurred, at which point there was no longer a conspiracy to repudiate. Petitioner's argument that it was improbable for armed men to wait at a well-lighted street corner was rejected, as crimes are known to have been brazenly committed by perpetrators undeterred by onlookers or peace officers. The appellate court's appreciation of conspiracy despite its finding of no evident premeditation was not erroneous, because while conspiracy presupposes evident premeditation, the converse is not true, and the link between the two is presumed only where conspiracy is directly established, not where it is merely implied.
• Treachery: Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. Petitioner and his co-accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver, while the victims and their companions were unarmed. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when he was shot a second time. The victims had no chance to defend themselves or retaliate. Petitioner's argument that he was not the triggerman failed, because once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, even if not all actually hit and killed the victim.
• Mitigating Circumstance: For the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense under Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code to be credited, the act must be committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree. The offense committed on Edzel was being hit on the ear with a stick or bamboo pole—an act that would not be classified as a "grave offense." Furthermore, Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence not a relative by affinity within the same degree contemplated by the provision.
• Reasonable Doubt: The evidence of petitioner's overt acts in concert with co-accused sufficiently established his participation in the conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. The equipoise rule, which applies where the evidence of the prosecution and defense are evenly balanced, did not apply because the prosecution's evidence preponderated.
• Civil Liability: As a conspirator found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner is jointly and severally liable with his co-accused for the civil indemnity, moral damages, and attorney's fees awarded by the trial court, the civil liability arising from the crime having been duly established.

• Conspiracy by Inference — Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be deduced from the mode and manner of the crimes' perpetration, the conduct of the accused before, during, and after commission, and the attendant conditions. Applied in this case to hold that petitioner's arming himself, waiting with co-accused, and firing his weapon constituted overt acts showing community of design.
• Moral Assistance as Evidence of Conspiracy — Firing a weapon, even into the air, while armed alongside co-accused constitutes moral assistance to the group, sufficient to indicate conspiracy. Petitioner's warning shot was held not to be a neutral act but an overt act in furtherance of the common design.
• Act of One is the Act of All — Once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all, even if not all actually hit and killed the victim. Applied to hold petitioner liable for treachery despite not being the triggerman.
• Repudiation of Conspiracy — A conspirator who wishes to extricate himself from criminal liability must perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan while the commission of the felony is in progress. Reporting the incident after the felony has already been committed does not constitute repudiation, as the conspiracy has already materialized.
• Voluntary Surrender and Non-Flight — Voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence. Petitioner's having been the first to report the shooting did not negate his conspiratorial liability.
• Treachery — Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure the crime's execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The decisive element is that the attack was executed so as to make retaliation impossible. Applied where victims were unarmed, the attack was sudden, and one victim was shot while kneeling in surrender.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense — Under Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication requires that the act be committed in immediate vindication of a grave offense to the offender, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree. Denied because the offense to petitioner's nephew (being hit on the ear with a stick) was not grave, and a nephew is not a relative by affinity within the same degree.
• Relationship Between Conspiracy and Evident Premeditation — While conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation, the converse is not necessarily true. The link between the two is presumed only where conspiracy is directly established, not where conspiracy is merely implied.

• "Petitioner's firing of his armalite could not have amounted to none other than lending moral assistance to his co-accused, thereby indicating the presence of conspiracy." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on conspiracy, establishing that firing a weapon in concert with armed co-accused constitutes moral assistance sufficient to prove community of design.
• "a conspirator who wants to extricate himself from criminal liability usually performs an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the unlawful plan to commit the felony while the commission of the felony is in progress." — This defines the doctrinal requirement for repudiation of conspiracy, distinguishing acts during the commission from those after the fact.
• "What is decisive in treachery is that 'the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.'" — This is the canonical formulation of the controlling test for treachery, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.
• "once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all even if not all actually hit and killed the victim." — This restates the fundamental principle of conspiratorial liability, applied to hold a non-triggerman liable for the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• People vs. Chua, G.R. No. 149538, July 26, 2004 — Cited for the proposition that crimes are known to have been brazenly committed by perpetrators undeterred by the presence of onlookers or peace officers, rejecting petitioner's improbability argument.
• People vs. Rojas, G.R. Nos. L-46960-62, January 8, 1987 — Cited for the principle that conspiracy is deduced from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
• Orodio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57519, September 13, 1988 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence.
• People vs. Luayon, 329 Phil. 560 (1996) — Cited for the principle that firing a weapon constitutes moral assistance to co-accused, indicating conspiracy.
• People vs. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996) — Cited for the doctrine that voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence.
• People vs. De los Reyes — Cited for the principle that a conspirator must perform an overt act to dissociate himself from the unlawful plan while the felony is in progress.
• People vs. Regalario, G.R. No. 101451, March 23, 1993 — Cited for the pronouncement that conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Herbias, 333 Phil. 422 (1996) — Cited for the distinction that the link between conspiracy and evident premeditation is presumed only where conspiracy is directly established, not where it is merely implied.
• People vs. Hingan, 311 Phil. 108 (1995) — Cited for the definition of treachery, specifically that the decisive element is whether the attack made retaliation impossible.
• People vs. Ambrocio, G.R. No. 140267, June 29, 2004 — Cited for the settled doctrine that once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.

• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as present when the offender commits any crime against the person employing means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Applied to qualify the killings as murder, given the victims' unarmed state, the suddenness of the attack, and the shooting of a victim already kneeling in surrender.
• Article 13, paragraph 5, Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against the offender, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree. Denied because the offense to petitioner's nephew was not grave and a nephew is not a relative by affinity within the same degree.

Puno, C.J. (designated member pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 75-2007), Carpio (Acting Chairperson), Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concurred. Quisumbing, J., was on leave.