Avenido vs. Avenido

A marriage certificate, while primary evidence of a marital union, is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage; the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — once due execution and loss or unavailability of the original document are established.

Two women — respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido and petitioner Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido — each claimed to have been validly married to the same man, Eustaquio Avenido, now deceased. Tecla alleged that she married Eustaquio on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol, and that the marriage records were destroyed during World War II. Eustaquio left Tecla and their four children in 1954, eventually cohabiting with another woman and later marrying Peregrina on 30 March 1979 in Davao City. Tecla sought declaration of nullity of Eustaquio's marriage to Peregrina on the ground of bigamy, to protect her children's hereditary rights over Eustaquio's properties.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido and petitioner Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido each claimed to be the lawful surviving spouse of Eustaquio Avenido, who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City. Tecla alleged that she married Eustaquio on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol, in rites officiated by the parish priest of the town. A marriage certificate was recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, but the records were destroyed during World War II; only a certification from the LCR survived. During their union, Tecla and Eustaquio had four children: Climaco (born 30 March 1943), Apolinario (born 23 August 1948), Editha (born 26 July 1950), and Eustaquio Jr. (born 15 December 1952).

Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts became unknown. In 1958, Tecla and her children learned that Eustaquio was living in Davao City with a woman named Buenaventura Sayson, who died in 1977 without issue. In 1979, Tecla discovered that Eustaquio had married Peregrina on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. Tecla filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of that marriage on 11 November 1998, asserting that it was bigamous and seeking to protect her children's rights over Eustaquio's properties.

Peregrina, in her answer with counterclaim filed on 12 April 1999, contended that she was the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio and that Tecla had merely been Eustaquio's common-law wife. She supported her position with a marriage contract dated 3 March 1979 and an affidavit executed by Eustaquio on 22 March 1985 declaring himself single when he married Peregrina, though acknowledging a common-law relationship with Tecla that produced four children. Peregrina also presented certifications from the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte, and a letter from Atty. Edgardo T. Mata to that office.

At trial, Tecla presented the testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Eustaquio's sister, who personally witnessed the 1942 wedding), Climaco Avenido (the eldest son), and Tecla herself. She also submitted documentary evidence including certifications from the LCR of Talibon and the National Statistics Office (NSO) confirming that civil registry records from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed during World War II, certifications of birth of three of her children, a certificate of baptism of Climaco indicating his parents as Eustaquio and Tecla, and a certification of marriage issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon. The RTC disregarded this evidence for failure to produce the marriage certificate itself and denied Tecla's complaint. The CA reversed, finding that the due execution and loss of the marriage contract were established and that secondary evidence was admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

• Validity of Her Marriage: Peregrina argued that the CA erred in failing to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, which was celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City, supported by a marriage contract and Eustaquio's affidavit declaring himself single at the time.
• Insufficiency of Evidence of First Marriage: Peregrina contended that Tecla failed to prove the existence of a prior valid marriage to Eustaquio, as no marriage certificate was presented and the certifications and testimonies offered were insufficient substitutes.
• Bad Faith of Respondent: Peregrina averred that the case was instituted in bad faith to deprive her of properties she owned in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio, entitling her to damages and attorney's fees.

• Prior Valid Marriage: Tecla maintained that she was the lawful wife of Eustaquio, their marriage having been solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol, and that the marriage records were destroyed during World War II, warranting reliance on secondary evidence.
• Bigamy of Second Marriage: Tecla argued that Eustaquio's marriage to Peregrina was bigamous and null and void, having been contracted during the existence of a valid prior marriage, and sought its declaration of nullity to protect her children's rights over Eustaquio's properties.

• Proof of Marriage Without Certificate: Whether the fact of marriage may be established by evidence other than the marriage certificate, specifically through secondary evidence, where the original document is lost or destroyed.
• Presumption of Marriage: Whether the presumption of marriage — that persons deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered a lawful marriage — may be relied upon to uphold the validity of a prior marriage against a subsequent one.
• Probative Value of Church-Issued Certification: Whether a certification of marriage issued by a parish priest has probative value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest being presented as a witness.

• Proof of Marriage Without Certificate: Yes. A marriage certificate is primary but not the sole evidence of marriage; the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — once due execution and loss of the original are established pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
• Presumption of Marriage: Yes. The presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered a lawful marriage applies, and is reinforced here by the birth certificates of their children, the baptismal certificate, and the testimonies of eyewitnesses to the ceremony.
• Probative Value of Church-Issued Certification: Yes, by implication. The certification of marriage issued by the parish priest of Talibon, together with testimonial evidence from eyewitnesses and the civil registry certifications of loss, constituted relevant, competent, and admissible evidence sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.

• Proof of Marriage Without Certificate: The trial court erred in holding that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of marriage could be accepted. Citing Añonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni and Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that a marriage certificate is primary evidence but not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the certificate, including birth certificates of children. The Court distinguished between evidence of due execution and loss of the document — which is necessarily collateral or primary evidence — and secondary evidence of the document's contents. Due execution was established by the testimony of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, who was present during the ceremony, and by Tecla herself as a party to the marriage. The loss was shown by certifications from the NSO and the LCR of Talibon confirming that civil registry records from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed during World War II. Because due execution and loss were clearly demonstrated, secondary evidence — both testimonial and documentary — was properly admissible to prove the fact of marriage under Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

• Presumption of Marriage: The Court anchored its analysis on the presumption of marriage, citing Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee: persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence to the contrary, to be in fact married. The rationale is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not married, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. In this case, Tecla and Eustaquio cohabited as husband and wife and begot four children. This presumption was reinforced by the testimonies of Adelina (Eustaquio's sister who witnessed the wedding), Climaco (their eldest son), and Tecla herself, as well as the unrebutted certification of marriage issued by the parish priest of Talibon. No evidence special to the case rebutted the presumption.

• Probative Value of Church-Issued Certification: The certification of marriage issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol, was treated as part of the corpus of relevant, competent, and admissible evidence proving the fact of marriage. The Court did not require the officiating priest to testify, as the due execution of the marriage was independently established by the testimonies of eyewitnesses present at the ceremony and by Tecla as a party. The parish certification, together with the civil registry certifications of loss and the birth and baptismal records of the children, collectively completed the evidentiary foundation for the marriage's existence.

• Presumption of Marriage (Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio) — Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The basis is that such is the common order of society; if the parties were not married, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. The Court applied this presumption to Tecla and Eustaquio, who cohabited as husband and wife and begot four children, and found no evidence rebutting the presumption.

• Marriage Certificate as Primary but Not Exclusive Evidence of Marriage — While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate, including birth certificates of children, testimonies of eyewitnesses to the ceremony, and certifications from officiating ministers. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Tecla's failure to produce the marriage certificate — destroyed during World War II — did not preclude proof of her marriage through secondary evidence.

• Admissibility of Secondary Evidence of Document Contents — Secondary evidence of the contents of a document is admissible upon proof of two conditions: (1) due execution of the document, and (2) its loss or unavailability. Evidence of due execution is necessarily collateral or primary evidence and may consist of parol testimony or extrinsic papers; it is not dependent on the existence of the document. Proof of loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of loss or by one who has made a sufficient examination where the document is usually kept and been unable to find it. The Court found both conditions satisfied: due execution by the testimonies of Adelina and Tecla, and loss by the certifications from the NSO and LCR of Talibon.

• "While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: that the marriage certificate, though primary evidence, is not exclusive, and other relevant evidence may prove the fact of marriage.

• "Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the presumption of marriage, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on marital status.

• "Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence." — This passage, quoted from Hernaez vs. Mcgrath via Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, clarifies the distinction between proof of a document's execution and proof of its contents, a critical evidentiary principle for admitting secondary evidence.

• Añonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, G.R. No. 178221, 1 December 2010 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that a marriage certificate is primary but not the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage, and that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the certificate, including a person's birth certificate.

• Vda. de Jacob vs. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999) — Followed. Cited for the principle that due execution and loss of a marriage contract are conditions sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, and that the trial court confused evidence of execution with secondary evidence of the document's contents. The case also incorporated the Hernaez doctrine on the distinction between execution and contents of a document.

• Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922) — Followed. Cited as the foundational source of the presumption of marriage in Philippine jurisprudence — that persons deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered a lawful marriage.

• Pugeda vs. Trias — Followed. Cited for the rule that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence, including the testimony of a party to the marriage, a witness to the ceremony, or the officiating minister.

• Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete — Distinguished in part. The trial court and CA relied on it, but the Court noted that even in Lim Tanhu, it was held that "marriage may be proven by other competent evidence."

• Section 3(a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court — Section 3(a) defines the original document as the best evidence of its contents. Section 5 provides that when the original is unavailable, secondary evidence may be admitted upon proof of the execution and loss of the original. The trial court relied on these provisions to exclude Tecla's evidence for failure to produce the marriage certificate; the Supreme Court held that the provisions were misapplied, as due execution and loss were sufficiently established, making secondary evidence admissible.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Justice Arturo D. Brion, Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, and Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred. No separate concurring opinions were noted.