Avelino vs. Court of Appeals

Where the decedent left no debts and all heirs are of age, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action for judicial partition under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court without first undergoing administration proceedings, and a trial court may convert a petition for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition upon motion of the majority of heirs.

Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate on April 10, 1989, survived by compulsory heirs from two marriages: his first wife Angelina Avelino and their children, including petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino; and his second wife Sharon Avelino, an American, and the remaining private respondents who are siblings of the petitioner. The estate consisted of real and personal properties whose character and extent had not yet been fully determined at the time of the dispute. The decedent left no debts, and all heirs were of legal age.

Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate on April 10, 1989, leaving an estate comprising real and personal properties. He was survived by compulsory heirs from two marriages: his first wife Angelina Avelino and their children, including petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino; and his second wife Sharon Avelino, an American national, together with the remaining private respondents — Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick Michael, and Mark Anthony, all surnamed Avelino — who are siblings of the petitioner. The decedent left no debts, and all the heirs were of legal age.

On October 24, 1991, Maria Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441, seeking her appointment as administratrix. On December 3, 1992, Angelina and the other heirs filed an opposition, moving instead to convert the proceedings into an action for judicial partition. Petitioner opposed the motion, contending that the character and extent of the estate had not yet been determined and that the estate was in danger of being dissipated without an administrator.

On February 16, 1993, the trial court granted the motion, reasoning that petitioner was the only heir not amenable to a simple partition while all other compulsory heirs desired an expeditious settlement. The court converted the petition into an action for judicial partition and directed the parties to submit a complete inventory of all real and personal properties left by the decedent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 16, 1993.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. The appellate court found that the decedent left no debts and that the heirs and legatees were all of age, and accordingly denied the petition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration before the appellate court was likewise denied, prompting the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Indeterminacy of the Estate: Petitioner argued that no partition was possible because the character and extent of the decedent's estate had not yet been determined, relying on Arcilles vs. Montejo, which held that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of settlement.
• Risk of Dissipation: Petitioner contended that the estate was in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
• Procedural Impropriety of Conversion: Petitioner maintained that the Rules of Court does not provide for the conversion of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration into an action for judicial partition, rendering the trial court's order procedurally infirm and without legal basis.

• Propriety of Partition: Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that judicial partition is proper under the circumstances.
• Procedural Validity of Conversion: Whether the trial court's conversion of a petition for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition has a basis in the Rules of Court.

• Propriety of Partition: No. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error. Where the decedent left no debts and all heirs are of age, Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court applies, and the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs.
• Procedural Validity of Conversion: No error. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which provides that where heirs disagree as to partition and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to.

• Propriety of Partition: Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies without leaving pending obligations, the heirs are not required to submit the estate for judicial administration or to apply for the appointment of an administrator. The heirs succeed immediately to all rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of death, pursuant to Article 777 of the Civil Code. The Court of Appeals found that the decedent left no debts and that all heirs and legatees were of age, bringing the case squarely within Section 1, Rule 74. Petitioner's argument that the nature and character of the estate had yet to be determined was unpersuasive, because a complete inventory of the estate may be accomplished during the partition proceedings themselves, especially since the estate had no debts. The more expeditious remedy of partition being available, the heirs — or the majority of them — could not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.

• Procedural Validity of Conversion: Section 1, Rule 74 expressly provides that where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to. This provision supplied the legal basis for the trial court's conversion of the petition for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition upon motion of the private respondents. The conversion was therefore procedurally proper, and no reversible error could be attributed to the Court of Appeals in so ruling.

• Immediate Succession under Article 777, Civil Code — The heirs succeed to all the rights and properties of the decedent at the moment of death. This principle undergirds the rule that when a decedent leaves no debts, administration is not necessary, and the heirs may proceed to partition.
• Preference for Partition over Administration Where No Debts Exist — Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, if the decedent left no will and no debts and all heirs are of age or duly represented, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without securing letters of administration. If they disagree, they may resort to an ordinary action for partition. Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available, the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings.
• Inventory May Be Accomplished During Partition Proceedings — The need to determine the character and extent of the estate does not necessitate administration proceedings where there are no debts; a complete inventory may be done during the partition proceedings themselves.

• "When a person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court." — This passage articulates the controlling rule that dispensation with administration is proper where the decedent left no debts, forming the ratio decidendi for upholding the conversion to judicial partition.
• "We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings." — This formulation establishes the preference for partition over administration and is the doctrinal basis for the Court's affirmance of the lower courts' rulings.

• Arcilles vs. Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that when the existence of other properties of the decedent is still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode. The Court did not overturn this ruling but found it inapplicable under the facts, since the estate had no debts and the inventory could be accomplished during partition.
• Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1954) — Cited for the principle that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available, the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. Followed as controlling.
• Utulo vs. Pasion vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302 (1938) — Cited for the rule on the order of appointment of administrators under Section 6, Rule 78, and for the principle that heirs are not required to submit the estate for judicial administration when there are no pending obligations. Followed.
• Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil. 317 (1924) — Cited among the line of cases establishing that heirs succeed immediately to the estate and need not undergo administration where no debts exist. Followed.

• Section 1, Rule 74, Rules of Court — Governs extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs and provides that where heirs disagree and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to. Applied as the legal basis for converting the petition for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition.
• Section 2, Rule 74, Rules of Court — Provides for summary settlement of estates of small value (not exceeding ten thousand pesos) without appointment of an executor or administrator. Cited as an exception to the general rule requiring administration.
• Section 6, Rule 78, Rules of Court — Establishes the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator. Cited in describing the general rule that an estate shall be judicially administered when the decedent died intestate or the named executor is incompetent or refuses the trust.
• Article 777, Civil Code — Provides that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. Cited as the civil law basis for the principle of immediate succession underlying the preference for partition over administration.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, JJ., concurred.