Austria vs. Masaquel

A litigant who respectfully requests, through counsel, that a judge voluntarily inhibit himself for a just or valid reason, and who truthfully answers in open court that he doubts the judge’s impartiality when asked by the judge, does not commit direct contempt of court absent a contumacious attitude, obstruction of the proceedings, or an affront to the dignity of the court; the contempt power is preservative, not vindictive.

Domingo V. Austria was one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13258 before Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, presided over by respondent Judge Antonio C. Masaquel, in an action against Pedro Bravo for recovery of three parcels of land. Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, who later appeared as Bravo’s counsel, had been the judge’s former assistant or associate when the judge was still in law practice. Under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, specific grounds existed for compulsory disqualification of judges, while the second paragraph allowed a judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to disqualify himself for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated.

Domingo V. Austria was one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13258 before Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, an action against Pedro Bravo for recovery of three parcels of land—one in Bayambang and two in San Carlos, Pangasinan. The other plaintiffs were his mother and brothers. After trial, on April 19, 1963, respondent Judge Antonio C. Masaquel rendered judgment declaring the plaintiffs owners of the three parcels and ordering Bravo to vacate the lands and pay damages only with respect to the Bayambang parcel. The plaintiffs moved for immediate execution; the motion was granted on May 31, 1963, and after they posted a P2,000.00 surety bond, the sheriff placed them in possession of the San Carlos lands.

On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or associate of respondent Judge when the latter was still in law practice before his appointment to the bench, entered his appearance as new counsel for Bravo, vice Atty. Antonio Resngit. On June 14, 1963, Bravo, through Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay execution. On June 20, 1963, respondent Judge granted the stay over the plaintiffs’ objection and ordered the sheriff to restore possession of the San Carlos lands to Bravo. Petitioner also sought appointment of a receiver over the Bayambang parcel; the prayer was granted on July 8, 1963, but the receivership order was set aside upon Bravo’s filing of a bond for non-appointment of a receiver. On August 24, 1963, while Bravo’s amended record on appeal was pending approval, Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment. Over the plaintiffs’ vigorous objection, respondent Judge granted the motion on November 7, 1963, and the retrial was set for February 10, 1964.

Before the court’s morning session on February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co-plaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in his chambers and verbally conveyed petitioner’s request that the judge inhibit himself from further hearing the case because Bravo’s new counsel, Atty. Sicat, was the judge’s former associate. The judge rejected the request, stating that this reason was not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge under the Rules of Court. When the case was called in open court, the judge asked petitioner whether he had authorized Atty. Macaraeg to approach him verbally to request disqualification because the opposing party’s lawyer was his former assistant; petitioner answered yes. The judge then asked whether that was the reason and whether petitioner doubted the judge’s integrity to decide the case fairly and impartially because the opposing counsel was his former assistant. Petitioner answered, “Yes, sir.” The judge immediately declared petitioner guilty of contempt of court and ordered him to pay a fine of P50.00.

Atty. Macaraeg then informed the court that, after conferring with the judge in chambers, he had learned of another ground for the plaintiffs’ request: a rampant rumor coming from Bravo himself that he was boasting in San Carlos that because he had a new lawyer, he would surely win the case. The judge asked why they did not wait until the case was decided; Macaraeg replied that perhaps that was why the plaintiffs had asked him to approach the judge. When the judge asked whether Macaraeg doubted his integrity because of the rumor, Macaraeg said he personally entertained no doubt. The judge stated that petitioner had openly expressed doubts about the court’s integrity based on rumors, which was a ground for contempt if only to maintain the people’s faith in the courts. Macaraeg asked for reconsideration, noting that the plaintiffs were laymen, but the judge denied the motion. The judge then dictated an order finding petitioner’s actuation offensive, insulting, and a reflection on the judge’s integrity and honesty, showing lack of respect to the court; the order stated that petitioner was not justified in doubting the judge’s fairness and integrity simply because of the judge’s former association with defense counsel, and that rumors did not justify insinuating bias and partiality. Petitioner paid the P50.00 fine under protest. Because appeal was not available from a summary punishment for direct contempt, he filed the instant petition for certiorari.

The factual findings material to the Supreme Court were that petitioner had requested inhibition through counsel because of the judge’s former association with Atty. Sicat; that the judge rejected the request as not an enumerated disqualification ground; that petitioner answered “Yes, sir” when asked in open court whether he doubted the judge’s integrity; and that the judge summarily declared him in direct contempt and fined him P50.00. The record also showed that after Atty. Sicat’s entry, the judge had granted a stay of execution restoring possession to Bravo and had granted a new trial over plaintiffs’ objection, and that Bravo was reportedly boasting he would win because of his new lawyer.

• No Contempt / Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that under the facts and circumstances of the February 10, 1964 hearing, he had not committed an act of contempt against the court, and that respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in declaring him in direct contempt and imposing the P50.00 fine.

• No Enumerated Ground for Disqualification: Respondent Judge maintained that the fact that Atty. Sicat was his former associate is not one of the grounds for disqualification under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, and he rejected the request on that basis.
• Contempt as Offensive and Insulting: Respondent considered petitioner’s actuation—requesting inhibition and answering that he doubted the judge’s integrity—as offensive, insulting, a reflection on the judge’s integrity and honesty, and a showing of lack of respect to the court.
• Rumors Insufficient: Respondent believed that rumors circulated by defendant that he would win because of his new lawyer did not justify petitioner’s insinuation of bias and partiality or his open expression of loss of faith and confidence in the judge’s integrity, fairness, and capability.
• Maintaining Faith in the Courts: Respondent declared contempt in order to maintain the people’s faith and respect in the courts.

• Direct Contempt: Whether petitioner’s conduct—requesting the judge’s voluntary inhibition through counsel and answering “Yes, sir” when asked if he doubted the judge’s integrity—constituted direct contempt of court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in summarily declaring petitioner in direct contempt and imposing a P50.00 fine.
• Voluntary Inhibition: Whether the judge’s former association with opposing counsel may constitute a just or valid reason for voluntary inhibition under Section 1, Rule 137, even if not an enumerated ground for compulsory disqualification.

• Direct Contempt: No. Petitioner did not commit direct contempt; his request for inhibition was made honestly and respectfully, and his truthful answer to the judge’s question did not obstruct the proceedings or affront the dignity of the court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. Respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion in declaring petitioner in direct contempt and imposing the P50.00 fine; the order was annulled and the fine ordered refunded.
• Voluntary Inhibition: Yes. Although the judge’s former association with opposing counsel is not an enumerated ground for compulsory disqualification, it may constitute a just or valid reason for voluntary inhibition under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

• Direct Contempt: Direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the new Rules of Court requires misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings, or an act of disrespect toward the court or judge. The Court found neither. Petitioner’s request for inhibition, made through counsel in chambers, was impelled by a justifiable apprehension upon seeing that the adverse party’s new counsel was the judge’s former associate; it was not made in a disrespectful, insulting, or offensive manner. Although it was improper for a litigant or counsel to see a judge in chambers about a pending case, this did not amount to contempt because the request was made honestly and respectfully and was based on a ground the judge might consider just or valid. Petitioner did not insist after the judge refused; the matter became public only because the judge himself raised it in open court. When petitioner answered “Yes, sir” to the judge’s question whether he doubted the judge’s integrity, he merely expressed his sincere feeling and the misgiving of an ordinary layman. The judge elicited the answer and expected truth; petitioner would not have expressed the misgiving had the judge not asked. There was no contumacious attitude, flouting or arrogant belligerence, or defiance of the court. The answer did not tend to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings or constitute an affront to the dignity of the court. Thus, no direct contempt.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The power to punish for contempt is drastic and extraordinary and should be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive, principle, only when necessary in the interest of justice. It is intended as a safeguard for the functions of the court, not for judges as persons. The Court observed that in numerous cases judges had been asked to inhibit themselves, and movants were scarcely punished for contempt even when the grounds were not among those in the rules; contempt was imposed only when there was a direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent, and disrespectful manner. Here, petitioner’s conduct showed no deliberate design to disrespect the judge or cast aspersion on his integrity; on the contrary, he sought to avoid any cause to doubt the judge’s integrity. The judge went farther than necessary and felt offended by the truthful answer. The contempt order was therefore in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion.
• Voluntary Inhibition: The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 lists grounds for disqualification, and the circumstance that opposing counsel was the judge’s former associate is not among them; the judge could not be compelled to disqualify himself. However, the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 allows a judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to disqualify himself for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated. The Court cited Gutierrez vs. Santos: due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal; every litigant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge; second only to rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse suspicion as to its fairness and the judge’s integrity; no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. The judge’s former association with Atty. Sicat, combined with the subsequent rulings favorable to Bravo after Sicat’s entry and the rumor that Bravo was boasting he would win because of his new lawyer, made petitioner’s apprehension not groundless or entirely devoid of reason. Hence, the request for voluntary inhibition was not contempt.

• Direct contempt requires contumacious attitude or obstruction/affront — Direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court requires misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings, or an act of disrespect toward the court or judge. It presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. In this case, petitioner’s respectful request for inhibition and truthful answer to the judge’s question did not meet these requisites.
• Contempt power is preservative, not vindictive — The power to punish for contempt is drastic and extraordinary and should be exercised only when necessary in the interest of justice, to safeguard the functions of the court rather than the person of the judge. The Court applied this by annulling the contempt order, which had been imposed after the judge felt personally offended by petitioner’s truthful answer.
• Voluntary inhibition for just or valid reasons — Under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, a judge may, in the exercise of sound discretion, disqualify himself for just or valid reasons other than those enumerated in the first paragraph. The Court applied this by recognizing that a judge’s former association with opposing counsel, while not a compulsory ground for disqualification, may be a just or valid reason for voluntary inhibition.
• Due process requires an impartial and disinterested tribunal — Every litigant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. Second only to rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse suspicion as to its fairness and the judge’s integrity. The Court used this principle to explain why petitioner’s apprehension was not groundless and why his request for inhibition was not contempt.
• Judges should not be thin-skinned — A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him that may not be flattering. A judge cannot prevent any person from entertaining an opinion about him, and the contempt power should not be used to vindicate personal offense. The Court applied this in holding that petitioner’s truthful answer did not warrant summary punishment.

• "Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court . . . ." — This formulation defines the minimum mental and behavioral element of direct contempt and was used to conclude that petitioner’s respectful request and truthful answer lacked the contumacious attitude required for summary punishment.
• "The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail." — This is the Court’s canonical statement limiting the contempt power, invoked to annul an order that had been issued after the judge felt personally offended.
• "When a party litigant desires or suggests the voluntary disqualification of a judge, it is understood, without saying it in so many words, that said litigant — having knowledge of the past or present relationship of the judge with the other party or counsel — feels that no matter how upright the judge is there is peril of his being unconsciously swayed by his former connection and he may unwittingly render a biased or unfair decision." — This passage explains why a request for voluntary inhibition, honestly and respectfully made, does not necessarily imply contempt or bad faith.
• "A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him." — This admonition supports the holding that petitioner’s truthful answer to the judge’s own question could not be punished as contempt.

• Gutierrez vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-15824, May 30, 1961 — Quoted for the due process requirement of an impartial and disinterested tribunal, the litigant’s entitlement to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and the duty to render justice without arousing suspicion; the Court also noted this case in connection with the amendment adding the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
• Castillo vs. Javelona, G.R. No. L-16742, September 29, 1962 — Quoted for the principle that courts should administer justice free from suspicion or bias and prejudice, lest litigants lose confidence in the judiciary.
• Matutina vs. Buslon, G.R. No. L-14637, August 24, 1960 — Cited for the definition of contempt as presupposing a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence, and a defiance of the court.
• Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 798 — Cited for the doctrine that the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle, and only occasionally to retain respect for the administration of justice.
• Victorino, et al. vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. L-17735, July 30, 1962 — Cited for the rule that the power to punish for contempt is drastic and extraordinary and should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
• Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 87 — Cited in support of the liberal attitude of courts toward motions for inhibition and the limited circumstances in which movants are held in contempt.
• U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 741 — Cited in connection with the principle that a judge should not be thin-skinned or sensitive to honest opinions about him.

• Section 1, Rule 71, Rules of Court — Defines direct contempt as misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings, or an act of disrespect toward the court or judge. The Court applied it to find petitioner’s conduct did not constitute direct contempt. The text also notes that the new Rules replaced the old phrase “to interrupt the administration of justice” in Section 1, Rule 64 of the old Rules with “to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same.”
• Section 1, Rule 137, first paragraph, Rules of Court — Lists the grounds for disqualification of judges. The Court agreed with respondent Judge that the fact that opposing counsel was the judge’s former associate is not among the enumerated grounds, so the judge could not be compelled to disqualify himself.
• Section 1, Rule 137, second paragraph, Rules of Court — Allows a judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned in the first paragraph. The Court applied it by holding that the judge’s former association with opposing counsel may constitute a just or valid reason for voluntary inhibition.

Concepcion, C.J., and Justices Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando concurred.