Austria vs. Abaya

A clerk of court may not sign or simulate the signature of a judge on a judicial order, as the exercise of judicial power is strictly personal to the judge and can never be the subject of agency or delegation; a lawyer who commits misconduct as a government official of such character as to affect her qualification as a lawyer may be disciplined as a member of the Bar.

Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya was the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princess City, and was temporarily assigned to RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess City, from November 1984 to April 1986. Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria served as Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 52 during Judge Abaya's temporary assignment there. Annabelle Cardenas was appointed Stenographic Reporter of Branch 51 in August 1983 upon Judge Abaya's recommendation. Edgardo Servando was appointed stenographer of Branch 51 on September 3, 1984, also upon Judge Abaya's recommendation. The administrative complaints arose from cross-charges filed within days of each other in July 1986: Atty. Austria, Fuertes, and Servando charged Judge Abaya with estafa through falsification, gross dishonesty and corruption, and illegal exaction, while Judge Abaya charged Atty. Austria with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and disbarment for allegedly forging his signature on a probation order.

Annabelle Cardenas was appointed Stenographic Reporter of RTC, Branch 51, Puerto Princess City, in August 1983 upon the recommendation of Judge Emmanuel M. Abaya, the Presiding Judge of that branch. According to the complainants, Cardenas never reported for work from August 1983 to May 1984, being then employed at Princess Tours Rafols Hotel as a tourist guide. Notwithstanding her absence, Judge Abaya verified as true and correct her daily time records purportedly showing that she rendered service and incurred no absences or tardiness from August 9 to September 30, 1983, and rendered service from October 1, 1983 to May 31, 1984, with certain leaves of absence granted. Salaries corresponding to the periods allegedly worked were paid through Treasury Warrants, some of which the complainants alleged were encashed by Judge Abaya through forging Cardenas' signature. Both Judge Abaya and Cardenas vehemently denied the charges, asserting that she worked as stenographic reporter during the entire period. However, school records from Holy Trinity College showed that Cardenas was attending classes from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M. during the first semester of school year 1983-1984, enrolling in subjects including Business Organization and Management, Sining ng Pakikipagtalastas, and Accounting for Single Proprietorship, in which she received passing grades. Daily Time Records of Princess Tours further showed that she acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly rendering service as stenographic reporter. During the ten-month period in question, the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Cardenas' name to signify attendance at a court session, and she could not produce any order, transcript, or official stenographic notes taken by her in any case — only so-called practice notes. Judge Abaya stated that Cardenas collected her own salary without his intervention, but evidence showed he collected her salaries on several occasions, and she had even executed a special power of attorney authorizing him not only to collect the Treasury Warrants but to endorse and negotiate them as well. The evidence was insufficient to overturn the explanation that Judge Abaya collected the salaries in Manila to deliver them to Cardenas' mother in Candon, Ilocos Sur, or to support the theory that he appropriated the money for himself.

From November 1984 to April 1986, Judge Abaya was temporarily assigned to Branch 52, RTC, Palawan, where Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria served as Branch Clerk of Court. On August 13, 1985, Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, a school teacher and mother of the victim in Criminal Case No. 5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot" for murder, went to Branch 52 in response to a telephone call from court stenographer Nelly Vicente that Judge Abaya wanted to see her personally. Judge Abaya told her that her case was "50-50" because there was no eyewitness, and assured her he could do something about it. When Mrs. Fuertes asked what he wanted, the Judge told her he needed Five Thousand Pesos and would deny bail to the accused. Mrs. Fuertes consulted her brothers-in-law and the then prosecuting fiscal, now Judge Angel R. Miclat, who all advised against acceding to the demand. Nonetheless, on August 15, 1985, she delivered P1,200.00 to Judge Abaya in his chambers, telling him that was all she could afford. Judge Abaya looked dissatisfied but said "Never mind" and that he would contact her at the next trial for the final judgment. Stenographic reporter Roselyn Teologo corroborated portions of Mrs. Fuertes' testimony, and Judge Miclat testified that Mrs. Fuertes had reported the solicitation to him as acting City Fiscal. Entries in Mrs. Fuertes' diary corroborated her account. Judge Abaya denied the solicitation and receipt of money, alleging that the bail application was denied because the evidence of guilt was strong, and surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Vicente had been pressured by Atty. Austria into testifying against him out of vindictiveness.

Edgardo Servando, appointed stenographer of Branch 51 on September 3, 1984 upon Judge Abaya's recommendation, declared that the recommendation was made in consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya P1,000.00 from his initial salary and thereafter P400.00 monthly. In December 1984, when the Judge asked him for P1,000.00 from his fringe benefits, medical allowance, and year-end bonus, Servando was unable to comply as the benefits were paid in checks. A week later, he received a notice of termination effective December 31, 1984, upon Judge Abaya's recommendation. Nilo Jamora, another former stenographer of Branch 51, testified that Judge Abaya had been exacting P350.00 from him every payday since his employment, which ceased only in March 1986 when charges were filed, and that when Jamora refused to retract his charges, the Judge demoted him to process server. Judge Abaya denied the charge, attributing the personnel actions to Servando's and Jamora's inefficiency. The investigating officer found the evidence insufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration, observing it would simply be the word of employees against a judge.

Separately, in Criminal Case No. 4995 of RTC, Branch 52, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Leonardo Cruz" for attempted homicide, Judge Abaya had issued an order on November 4, 1985 granting the accused's motion for reconsideration of the order denying probation, setting promulgation of the probation order on January 16, 1986. Judge Abaya requested Atty. Austria to prepare the probation order with the day and month left blank for his signature. On January 16, 1986, the Judge was absent, so promulgation was reset to April 16, 1986. On that date, the provincial warden failed to bring the accused to court, and promulgation was again reset to June 3, 1986, with Judge Abaya allegedly instructing Atty. Austria before leaving for Manila to promulgate the order even in his absence should the probationer arrive. On April 21, 1986, Leonardo Cruz came and begged that the probation order be promulgated the following day, as he had to leave for Coron and had no money to sustain him until the Judge's return. When the promulgation was set for April 22, 1986, Atty. Austria discovered that Judge Abaya had neglected to sign the probation order. In view of Cruz's predicament and the authority she claimed had been granted to her, Atty. Austria signed Judge Abaya's name on the probation order and promulgated it. Judge Abaya subsequently filed charges against her for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and disbarment on the basis of this act.

• Retaliation: Judge Abaya asserted that the charges in A.M. No. R-705-RTJ were concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint he had earlier filed against Atty. Austria for forging his signature on a probation order.
• No Solicitation or Receipt of Bribe: Judge Abaya denied soliciting or receiving money from Mrs. Fuertes, maintaining that the bail application in Criminal Case No. 5304 was denied because the evidence of guilt was strong, not because of any outside interference.
• Vindictive Witnesses: Judge Abaya surmised that Mrs. Fuertes and Nelly Vicente had been pressured by Atty. Austria into testifying against him out of sheer vindictiveness, and that Mrs. Fuertes might have been blaming him for the delay in the resolution of the criminal case against her son's alleged killers.
• Personnel Actions Based on Efficiency: Judge Abaya insisted that the termination of Servando and demotion of Jamora were due to their inefficiency, not retaliation for refusing to pay exactions.
• Forgery by Atty. Austria: Judge Abaya charged that Atty. Austria forged his signature on the probation order in Criminal Case No. 4995, constituting dishonesty and grave misconduct warranting her suspension as attorney and disbarment.
• Ghost Employee Allegations: The complainants in R-705-RTJ — Atty. Austria, Fuertes, and Servando — alleged that Cardenas was a ghost employee who never reported for work, that Judge Abaya falsified her daily time records, and that he encashed her salary warrants through forgery of her signature.

• Cardenas Rendered Service: Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas countered that she worked as stenographic reporter from August 1983 to May 31, 1984. Cardenas claimed her teacher permitted her to attend typing and stenography classes after office hours, and explained that her name appeared on the Princess Tours daily time record as team leader though she did not actually conduct the tours.
• No Intervention in Salary Collection: Judge Abaya stated that it was Cardenas who collected her own salary without his intervention, though evidence showed he had collected her salaries on several occasions pursuant to a special power of attorney she executed in his favor.
• Theory of Agency: Atty. Austria justified signing Judge Abaya's name on the probation order under the theory of agency pursuant to Article 1881 of the Civil Code, arguing that having been granted full authority to promulgate the probation order, she necessarily had the authority to sign the Judge's name if the need arose.
• Ratification and Estoppel: Atty. Austria maintained that because Judge Abaya never complained about the alleged forgery, he was deemed to have ratified it and was estopped from questioning her authority.
• Analogy to Writ of Execution: Atty. Austria compared the probation order to a writ of execution, which is usually issued by the Clerk of Court, to support her claim of authority to sign.
• Authority from Judge: Atty. Austria explained that she prepared orders and decisions in Branch 52 with the knowledge and consent of Judge Abaya, who had asked her to do so to ease his load of presiding over two branches, and that she was directed to promulgate the probation order in favor of Leonardo Cruz.

• Ghost Employee Scheme (Estafa through Falsification): Whether Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas committed estafa through falsification of public or official documents by maintaining Cardenas as a ghost employee and falsifying her daily time records.
• Gross Dishonesty and Corruption (Bribery): Whether Judge Abaya committed gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, and receiving bribe money from Mrs. Leonila Fuertes in exchange for denying the bail application of the accused in Criminal Case No. 5304.
• Illegal Exaction: Whether Judge Abaya committed illegal exaction of portions of the salaries of his subordinate employees as a condition for their continued employment.
• Forgery of Judicial Signature: Whether Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria committed dishonesty and grave misconduct, warranting disciplinary action both as a government official and as a member of the Bar, by signing or simulating Judge Abaya's signature on a probation order.

• Ghost Employee Scheme (Estafa through Falsification): Yes. The charges were supported by substantial evidence, including school records showing Cardenas attended classes during working hours and Princess Tours daily time records showing she acted as tourist guide on 43 working days while supposedly serving as stenographic reporter.
• Gross Dishonesty and Corruption (Bribery): Yes. Full faith and credence was given to Mrs. Fuertes' testimony, which was rich in detail and corroborated by stenographic reporter Teologo and Judge Miclat; no improper motive was found for Mrs. Fuertes to impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it were true.
• Illegal Exaction: No. The evidence was insufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration, as it would simply be the word of employees against a judge; the benefit of the doubt was given to respondent Judge Abaya.
• Forgery of Judicial Signature: Yes. The act of signing or simulating the judge's signature on a judicial order is patently illegal and not among the duties a clerk of court may perform under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court; the misconduct affected Atty. Austria's qualification as a member of the Bar.

• Ghost Employee Scheme (Estafa through Falsification): The charges against Judge Abaya and Cardenas were supported by substantial evidence. School records from Holy Trinity College showed that Cardenas was attending school from 2:00 P.M. to 8:15 P.M. during the first semester of school year 1983-1984, enrolling in multiple subjects beyond typing and stenography in which she received passing grades, making it impossible for her to have rendered afternoon service as stenographic reporter. Daily Time Records of Princess Tours showed she acted as tourist guide on 43 working days when she was supposedly working at the court. Her explanation that her name was placed on the daily time record as team leader though she did not actually conduct tours was deemed too shallow to merit belief. During the ten-month period, the court calendar for Branch 51 never once carried her name, and she could not produce any order, transcript, or official stenographic notes — only practice notes. While Judge Abaya claimed Cardenas collected her own salary, evidence showed he collected her salaries on several occasions pursuant to a special power of attorney she executed in his favor. The evidence was insufficient to prove that Judge Abaya appropriated the salary money for himself, as the explanation that he collected the salaries to deliver them to Cardenas' mother in Candon, Ilocos Sur, could not be overthrown. Nonetheless, the falsification of daily time records and maintenance of a ghost employee constituted grave misconduct.

• Gross Dishonesty and Corruption (Bribery): Full faith and credence was given to Mrs. Fuertes' testimony. The investigating officer found no improper motive for Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, to impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it were true. Mrs. Fuertes was not a disgruntled litigant; Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of her son, she should under normal circumstances have been grateful to the Judge. Her testimony was too rich in details brought out on cross-examination to be dismissed as fabrication. The testimony found support in collateral circumstances: stenographic reporter Roselyn Teologo corroborated Mrs. Fuertes' presence in the courtroom in conference with Judge Abaya at 5:00 P.M. on August 13, 1985, and testified that officer-in-charge Carmen Baloco, who eavesdropped, remarked "Grabe ito, nanghihingi ng pera." Judge Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal handling Criminal Case No. 5304, testified that Mrs. Fuertes reported the solicitation to him. Diary entries by Mrs. Fuertes further corroborated her account. Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes perjured herself to accommodate Atty. Austria's vindictiveness was rejected as contrary to the ordinary prompting of men.

• Illegal Exaction: The investigating officer observed that while both Servando and Jamora testified in a natural and straightforward manner, the evidence would be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration, as it would simply be the word of employees against a judge. The Court agreed, noting that the charge, if true, is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than bare allegation to sustain. The benefit of the doubt was given to respondent Judge Abaya on this charge.

• Forgery of Judicial Signature: Atty. Austria's explanation that she was directed to promulgate the probation order and discovered that the Judge had overlooked signing it, even if true, did not constitute a valid justification for simulating Judge Abaya's signature. As a lawyer and branch clerk of court, she ought to have known that under no circumstances is signing the name of the judge permissible. She could have released the order with a statement that it was upon orders of the judge, but she could not make it appear that the Judge signed when he did not. Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court defines the duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge — receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and issuing orders and notices that follow as a matter of course — but signing orders in the name of and simulating the signature of the judge is not among them. Atty. Austria's theory of agency under Article 1881 of the Civil Code was wholly devoid of merit because the judicial power vested in a judge is strictly personal to the judge and can never be the subject of agency; that would be contrary to law and subversive of public order and public policy. Nor could the void act be validly ratified, as Judge Abaya himself was bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of the order is strictly judicial and exclusively vested in the judge, beyond his authority to delegate. While a lawyer holding government office may not generally be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of official duties, if that misconduct is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, discipline is warranted. Atty. Austria's misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court affected her qualification as a member of the Bar, for precisely as a lawyer she ought to have known the illegality of the act.

• Personal nature of judicial power — The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the judge, by reason of his highest qualification, and can never be the subject of agency. A judge is bereft of any power to authorize the clerk of court to sign his name in his official capacity in a matter pending adjudication before him. The issuance of a judicial order is strictly judicial and exclusively vested in the judge, beyond his authority to delegate. The Court applied this doctrine to reject Atty. Austria's theory of agency defense, holding that her simulation of Judge Abaya's signature was patently illegal and void, incapable of ratification.

• Discipline of lawyers for official misconduct — Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of duties as a government official. However, if that misconduct as a government official is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the Bar on such ground. The Court applied this doctrine to suspend Atty. Austria from the practice of law for one year, finding that her misconduct as Branch Clerk of Court in forging a judge's signature affected her qualification as a member of the Bar.

• Duties of the Clerk of Court under Section 5, Rule 136 — In the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform duties such as receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and issuing all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under the Rules of Court, and when directed by the judge, may receive accounts of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and transmit the same with findings to the judge. Signing orders in the name of, and simulating the signature of, the judge is not among these permitted duties. The Court relied on this provision to establish that Atty. Austria exceeded her lawful authority as clerk of court.

• "The judicial power vested in a judge and its exercise is strictly personal to the Judge because of, and by reason of his highest qualification, and can never be the subject of agency. That would not only be contrary to law, but also subversive of public order and public policy. Nor could her void act in signing the name of the judge be validly ratified by the latter." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for the forgery charge against Atty. Austria, establishing the principle that judicial power cannot be delegated and that a void act of simulating a judge's signature cannot be ratified.

• "The office of a judge exists for one solemn end — to promote justice by administering it fairly and impartially. In regarding justice as a commodity to be sold at a price, Judge Abaya betrayed the very essence of magistracy." — This passage defines the Court's condemnation of Judge Abaya's bribery solicitation, articulating the standard of judicial integrity that judges must uphold.

• "The judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice. From him, the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law." — This passage, cited with approval from Dela Paz vs. Inutan, articulates the foundational principle of judicial ethics that underpinned the Court's imposition of the severe penalty of forfeiture of retirement benefits against Judge Abaya.

• Dela Paz vs. Inutan, 64 SCRA 540 — Cited for the proposition that the judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice, and from him the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. Applied to underscore the gravity of Judge Abaya's misconduct and the demoralizing effect of his transgressions on public confidence in the judiciary.

• In re Turrel, 2 Phil. 266 — Cited for the general rule that a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of duties as a government official. Served as the baseline principle against which Atty. Austria's case was evaluated.

• In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 — Cited alongside In re Turrel for the same general rule regarding discipline of lawyers for official misconduct.

• In re Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, August 29, 1975 — Cited for the exception that if misconduct as a government official is of such character as to affect one's qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, discipline as a member of the Bar is warranted. Applied to justify Atty. Austria's one-year suspension from the practice of law.

• Section 5, Rule 136, Rules of Court — Defines the duties of the clerk of court in the absence of or by direction of the judge, including receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and issuing orders and notices that follow as a matter of course. The Court relied on this provision to establish that signing or simulating the judge's signature on a judicial order is not among the clerk's authorized duties, rendering Atty. Austria's act patently illegal.

• Article 1881, Civil Code — Provides that the agent must act within the scope of his authority and may do such acts as may be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of the agency. Atty. Austria invoked this provision to justify signing Judge Abaya's name on the probation order; the Court rejected the application, holding that judicial power is strictly personal to the judge and can never be the subject of agency.

• Canon 22, Canons of Judicial Ethics — Cited alongside Dela Paz vs. Inutan and Castillo vs. Barsana in support of the principle that a judge is the visible representation of the law and must uphold the highest ideals of justice and public service.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.