Austria-Carreon vs. Carreon

A judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law upon lapse of the reglementary period, and a party who fails to inform the court of a change of address or to secure new counsel after counsel’s withdrawal with conformity cannot later claim denial of due process for not receiving the decision; a belated motion for reconsideration is properly denied. On the merits, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code requires gravity—a genuinely serious psychic cause—and is not established by mere immaturity, infidelity, lack of communication, or failure to provide financial support, which are mild characterological peculiarities or mere neglect.

Petitioner Patricia Q. Austria-Carreon and respondent Luis Emmanuel G. Carreon were married on October 22, 1994, and had one son, Jeremy. Their marriage is governed by the Family Code, whose Article 36 allows nullification where a party was psychologically incapacitated at the time of celebration to comply with essential marital obligations. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, is a respondent in nullity proceedings to safeguard the State’s interest in the preservation of marriage.

Petitioner Patricia Q. Austria-Carreon and respondent Luis Emmanuel G. Carreon were introduced to each other in 1992 by a common friend. At that time, petitioner worked as a cargo supervisor with an airline company, while respondent worked as a cargo agent assigned in her flight operations. They became sweethearts, though they hardly went out on dates because respondent’s mother allowed him to go out only once a month and openly showed dislike for petitioner. After two years of being in a relationship, they planned to get married, but petitioner got pregnant before preparations could be made. Petitioner did not oblige respondent to marry her, surmising that he might not be ready for married life; respondent, however, insisted on marriage to release himself from his parents’ strict parental authority. On October 22, 1994, they married at St. Therese of the Child Jesus Church in Villamor Air Base, Pasay City. Petitioner solely shouldered most of the expenses because respondent’s family did not contribute. They initially stayed with petitioner’s mother in Makati City for several months, then transferred to Merville Park, Parañaque City, in a house lent by petitioner’s mother. They did not acquire any conjugal property in their name. On March 26, 1995, petitioner gave birth to their son, Jeremy Austria Carreon.

During their cohabitation, respondent failed to voluntarily give petitioner financial support, and she always had to remind him of his financial obligations. Petitioner paid for everything in the household, including respondent’s personal needs. Respondent admitted that he only wanted to get married a year or two after petitioner got pregnant. Petitioner felt that respondent was drifting away from her; at home, he would rather be alone watching television than talk to her, and whenever she asked what was bothering him, he would answer that nothing was wrong. Respondent’s behavior worsened, and on several occasions petitioner caught him having extramarital affairs. As she was going through a personal crisis of her own, having been disowned by her siblings, petitioner proposed separation. In 2000, they separated, and petitioner and their son transferred to a rented townhouse in Carmona, Cavite.

In 2001, petitioner decided to reconcile with respondent. Their relationship, however, lacked personal intimacy, and they realized that they were only living with each other for the sake of their son. Petitioner always recalled respondent’s incidents of infidelity, which continued to bother her despite having forgiven him. In 2007, she accidentally read an SMS text message on respondent’s phone coming from his girlfriend and saw pictures of the woman on his phone. Petitioner immediately confronted respondent and told him to leave their house. Respondent then left their conjugal dwelling, though he occasionally visited their son.

On February 29, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that she and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital obligations. For failure of respondent to file any responsive pleading, the RTC designated Prosecutor Hilario B. Dumaual, Jr. to determine whether collusion existed between the parties; finding none, the RTC set the trial on the merits. Petitioner invoked the Psychological Evaluation Report issued by Dr. Julian R. Montano, who found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Montano evaluated petitioner as suffering from “Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified” demonstrative of Dependent and Depressive Personality Disorders, and respondent as suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Petitioner was described as having difficulty expressing disagreements with others because of fear of disapproval, going to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and support, feeling uncomfortable or helpless when alone, and being pessimistic, negativistic, and prone to guilt and remorse; her disorder was opined to be serious, grave, and incurable because she lacked insight and did not have genuine commitment to seek treatment. Respondent was described as having a grandiose sense of self-importance, exaggerated achievements and talents, preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, or ideal love, a belief that he was special and required excessive admiration, and interpersonal exploitativeness; his disorder was opined to be serious, grave, incurable, and traceable to childhood, with a disciplinarian and overly structured mother and a physically and emotionally absent father. Dr. Montano stated that when confronted with external sources of control dictated by society, respondent could not adjust in acceptable ways and instead reacted with emotional immaturity, poor judgment, and poor sense of responsibility, and that his relationships with significant others were characteristically lacking in genuineness and one-sided. Dr. Montano opined that the parties’ personality disorders made them incapable of performing their respective essential marital obligations, that reconciliation would be impossible and not totally healthy, and recommended that the marriage be nullified.

The RTC credited Dr. Montano’s findings that the psychological incapacities of the parties could be traced to how they were brought up by their respective families and were grave and incurable. The CA, on the other hand, found that petitioner’s testimony established only respondent’s immaturity and irresponsibility—lack of communication skills, failure to provide financial support to their family, and infidelity—and that these were not of a psychological nature warranting nullification.

• Non-Receipt of CA Decision / Due Process: Petitioner claimed that she never received a copy of the CA Decision because she had moved out of her address on record prior to receiving any notices, and her former counsel had withdrawn from the case prior to elevation of the records to the CA; she allegedly learned of the adverse Decision only in December 2015 when she asked her counsel to follow up the case.
• Timeliness of Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner argued that the 15-day period to move for reconsideration began to run only on December 28, 2015, when her new counsel received the CA Decision, and that her Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed on January 12, 2016.
• Second Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioner maintained that the CA committed reversible error in treating her Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration as a second motion for reconsideration and denying it pursuant to Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36: Petitioner anchored her petition on Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that she and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with their essential marital obligations, and invoked Dr. Montano’s Psychological Evaluation Report finding both parties psychologically incapacitated and recommending nullity.
• Dismissal of Nullity Petition: Petitioner argued that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing her Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

• Procedural Treatment of Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the CA committed reversible error in treating petitioner’s Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration as a second motion for reconsideration, and denying the same.
• Dismissal of Petition for Declaration of Nullity: Whether the CA committed reversible error in dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

• Procedural Treatment of Motion for Reconsideration: No, in result. The CA erroneously treated the motion as a second motion for reconsideration because the prior motion was filed by respondent, not petitioner; nevertheless, denial was proper because petitioner’s motion was belatedly filed and the CA Decision had already become final and executory.
• Dismissal of Petition for Declaration of Nullity: No. Petitioner failed to establish psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; the evidence showed only mild characterological peculiarities and mere neglect, not a genuinely serious psychic cause. The CA’s dismissal was affirmed.

• Procedural Treatment of Motion for Reconsideration: The CA treated petitioner’s Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration as a second motion for reconsideration under Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. The Court found, however, that the Motion for Reconsideration referred to by the OSG in its Comment was filed by respondent, not by petitioner. Respondent received a copy of the CA Decision dated August 27, 2014 on September 16, 2014, and respondent’s counsel filed a Motion for Extension of Period to File Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for Reconsideration. In its Resolution dated March 13, 2015, the CA denied the Motion for Extension and expunged respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that they were belatedly filed. Thus, the CA erroneously noted that it was petitioner who filed a motion for reconsideration in 2014. Nevertheless, the CA did not err in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The records showed that only petitioner could be faulted for her failure to receive a copy of the CA Decision. In the Resolution dated March 13, 2015, the CA found that a copy of the Decision dated August 27, 2014 sent to petitioner was returned to it on September 23, 2014 with postal notation “RTS-moved out,” and that service was deemed complete pursuant to Sections 7 and 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Per verification in its Court Management Information System, the CA noted that no motion for reconsideration had been filed by petitioner, and held that its Decision dated August 27, 2014 had already become final and executory. As early as September 13, 2012, petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Dexter A. Bihis, filed a Notice of Withdrawal with petitioner’s conformity. On January 18, 2013, the CA noted Atty. Bihis’ Notice of Withdrawal and directed that all notices be sent to petitioner. Petitioner admitted that her counsel withdrew with her consent and that she transferred residences and was not able to keep track of notices. From the time of Atty. Bihis’ withdrawal until January 12, 2016, when petitioner’s new counsel filed a Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner did not secure the services of a new counsel. She also transferred to another residence without informing the CA of her new address, which led to her failure to track the notices, and she no longer filed the required appellee’s brief before the CA. The general rule is that where a party is represented by an attorney in an action or proceeding in a court of record, all required notices must be given to the attorney on record; service upon any person other than the counsel on record is not legally effective and binding upon the party and may not start the running of the reglementary period. Here, however, there was no counsel of record at the time the CA rendered the assailed Decision because petitioner’s former counsel withdrew his appearance with her conformity. The CA therefore sent all notices to petitioner’s address on record, but the notices were returned unserved because petitioner had moved out. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process in failing to receive the CA Decision because of her own fault. She slept on her rights first by not securing the service of a new counsel after the withdrawal of representation by her former counsel with her conformity, and second by not informing the CA of her new address. To countenance petitioner’s act would put a premium on negligence and encourage the non-termination of cases simply by not informing the courts of a new forwarding address. It is not incumbent upon the court to determine the addresses of party-litigants; the parties have the duty to inform the court of their change of address. Notices of court processes are ordinarily taken care of by clerks guided by addresses of record, but the court and its personnel are not required to continuously check the records and various addresses from which a counsel may have filed pleadings and to send them to such addresses instead of his or her address of record; to do so would create confusion and intolerably burden the courts. Because of petitioner’s failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration, the assailed CA Decision dated August 27, 2014 had already become final and executory on April 12, 2015. Thus, the CA correctly denied petitioner’s Formal Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration, not because it was a second motion for reconsideration, but because it was belatedly filed. It is a settled rule that judgments become final and executory by operation of law, and not by judicial declaration. The finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or if no motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial is filed.
• Dismissal of Petition for Declaration of Nullity: Even if the Court were to disregard the procedural infirmity, the petition would nevertheless fail on the merits. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Psychological incapacity contemplates “downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.” In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the requisites for psychological incapacity: gravity—it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; juridical antecedence—it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and incurability—it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. These parameters were reduced into definitive guidelines in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina. However, in Tan-Andal vs. Andal, promulgated on May 11, 2021, the Court held that the Molina guidelines proved to be restrictive, rigid, and intrusive on rights to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity, and modified them. The second and fourth Molina guidelines—that the root cause of psychological incapacity be medically or clinically identified, and must also be medically or clinically incurable—were abandoned. With the modification, psychological incapacity no longer requires that it be a mental incapacity or a personality disorder that must be proven by expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family. The spouse’s personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more importantly, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert; ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before marriage may testify on behaviors they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations. Under the parameter of juridical antecedence, psychological incapacity may now be proven by an ordinary witness who can portray the concerned spouse’s past experiences or environment growing up, which may have triggered his or her particular behavior. This modification clarifies that psychological incapacity under Article 36 is a legal concept, not a medical one. As underscored in Tan-Andal, psychological incapacity must be so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage; an undeniable pattern of persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse must be established to demonstrate a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other. On the other hand, gravity does not require that the psychological incapacity be of a serious or dangerous illness, but it must be shown to have been caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. Tan-Andal is categorical that mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts would still not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36. Mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will, relating to the performance of essential marital obligations cannot amount to psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify a marriage. In this case, while the CA’s application of the previous parameter—that psychological incapacity be of a serious, incurable, and medical nature, and one rooted in medical causes—is no longer warranted, petitioner failed to satisfy the parameter of gravity. As aptly found by the CA, petitioner’s testimony only sought to establish respondent’s immaturity and irresponsibility, i.e., lack of communication skills and failure to provide financial support to their family, and that he exhibited signs of infidelity. In her testimony, petitioner declared that respondent was drifting away from her; their relationship lacked intimacy; they realized that they only stayed together for the sake of their child; and petitioner would always be haunted by respondent’s purported acts of infidelity despite having forgiven him. These are characteristics of what Tan-Andal underscored as mild characterological peculiarities not amounting to psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36. They are manifestations of mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential marital obligations, short of genuinely serious psychic causes, as would render respondent completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. In the same vein, the psychological evaluation’s portrayal of petitioner as suffering from “Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified” demonstrative of Dependent and Depressive Personality Disorder making her “incapable of expressing unconditional love, mutual support, and genuine concern for the welfare of her spouse and his son” is not indicative of a serious psychic cause, as would make her totally incognitive of her marital obligations to respondent. The assessment itself described Patricia as super-dependable, with a strong need to be of service to others, relating well with people who need her, such as the sick or those in need, and deriving much satisfaction from taking care of the needs of another; she was predisposed to marry someone with strong dependency needs and conducted rescue missions to save her dependent husband, thereby camouflaging his serious irresponsible behavior as trial matters and perpetuating his dependent and irresponsible behavior. Evidently, petitioner’s character and behavior show that she was fully aware of her marital obligations as a wife, as well as her responsibilities as a mother to their child, as shown by her attitude desiring to exert efforts to observe such obligations and responsibilities amidst difficulty. The Court could only commiserate with petitioner’s predicament on her failed marriage and the fact that the couple were already living separate lives, albeit still tied by their marital bond. However, Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. Neither may the modified characterization of psychological incapacity as clarified in Tan-Andal be misconstrued as permitting the effects of a divorce law. While the expert opinion may be considered given that it was offered in evidence, it is still the totality of evidence that must convince the Court of the alleged psychological incapacity of a party. Here, the utter insufficiency of petitioner’s evidence constrained the Court to affirm the CA Decision and uphold the parties’ marriage.

• Psychological Incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code — Psychological incapacity contemplates a downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. Under Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the requisites are gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Molina guidelines further required, among others, that the root cause be medically or clinically identified and that the incapacity be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. In Tan-Andal vs. Andal, the Court abandoned the second and fourth Molina guidelines, holding that psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion; proof of personality structure through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermine the family is required, and ordinary witnesses may testify on consistently observed behaviors. Psychological incapacity is a legal concept, not a medical one. Applied here, petitioner failed to establish the required gravity; respondent’s immaturity, infidelity, lack of communication, and failure to provide financial support were mild characterological peculiarities or mere neglect, not a genuinely serious psychic cause.
• Gravity in Psychological Incapacity — Gravity does not require that the psychological incapacity be a serious or dangerous illness, but it must be caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts, and mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty—much less ill will—in performing essential marital obligations do not amount to psychological incapacity. Applied here, petitioner’s evidence showed only respondent’s immaturity, irresponsibility, lack of communication skills, failure to provide financial support, and infidelity, which did not render him completely unable to discharge essential marital obligations.
• Finality of Judgment by Operation of Law — Judgments become final and executory by operation of law, not by judicial declaration. Finality becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected, or if no motion for reconsideration or motion for new trial is filed. Applied here, the CA Decision dated August 27, 2014 became final and executory on April 12, 2015 because petitioner failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, so her later motion was correctly denied as belated.
• Service of Notices and Duty to Inform Court of Change of Address — The general rule is that all required notices must be given to the attorney on record, and service upon any other person is not legally effective and binding upon the party. However, when counsel withdraws with the party’s conformity and no new counsel is secured, the court may send notices to the party’s address of record. Parties have the duty to inform the court of a change of address; the court and its personnel are not required to continuously check records and various addresses. A party cannot invoke denial of due process for failure to receive a decision when the failure is due to the party’s own fault. Applied here, the copy sent to petitioner was returned “RTS-moved out,” service was deemed complete under Sections 7 and 8, Rule 13, and petitioner’s failure to update her address and secure new counsel defeated her due process claim.
• Second Motion for Reconsideration — Section 2, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. Applied here, the CA erroneously treated petitioner’s motion as a second motion for reconsideration because the prior motion was filed by respondent, not petitioner; nevertheless, denial was proper because petitioner’s motion was belatedly filed.
• Article 36 Is Not a Divorce Law — Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves, and the modified characterization of psychological incapacity in Tan-Andal vs. Andal cannot be misconstrued as permitting the effects of a divorce law. Applied here, the failed marriage and separate lives of the parties did not justify nullification absent sufficient evidence of psychological incapacity; the totality of evidence must convince the Court.

• “It is a settled rule that judgments become final and executory by operation of law, and not by judicial declaration.” — This passage states the ratio for the procedural holding that the CA Decision had already become final and executory, making petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration belated.
• “Indeed, petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process in failing to receive the CA Decision because of her own fault.” — This passage defines the due process consequence of petitioner’s failure to secure new counsel and to inform the CA of her change of address, and is central to the ruling that service upon her address of record was effective.
• “Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person’s personality, called “personality structure,” which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family.” — This passage articulates the modified Tan-Andal formulation of psychological incapacity, abandoning the requirement of expert proof of a mental incapacity or personality disorder.
• “The foregoing are characteristics of what Tan-Andal underscored as “mild characterological peculiarities” not amounting to psychological incapacity within the contemplation of Article 36. They are manifestations of mere refusal, neglect or difficulty to perform the essential marital obligations, short of genuinely serious psychic causes, as would render respondent completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations.” — This passage applies the modified doctrine to the facts, explaining why respondent’s immaturity, infidelity, and lack of financial support did not meet the gravity requirement.

• Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21 (1995) — Laid down the requisites of psychological incapacity: gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The Court used these requisites as the starting framework before discussing the Molina and Tan-Andal modifications.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 335 Phil. 664 (1997) — Established the Molina guidelines for psychological incapacity, including the requirement that the root cause be medically or clinically identified and that the incapacity be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. The Court noted that the second and fourth guidelines were abandoned in Tan-Andal.
• Tan-Andal vs. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 — Controlling precedent that modified the Molina guidelines, abandoned the second and fourth guidelines, held that psychological incapacity is a legal concept and not a medical one, and allowed proof through ordinary witnesses and evidence of personality structure. The Court applied this modified doctrine in denying the petition on the merits.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Iyoy, 507 Phil. 485 (2005) — Cited for the definition of psychological incapacity as a downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations.
• Castillo vs. Republic of the Philippines, 805 Phil. 209 (2017) — Cited in relation to the requisites of psychological incapacity under Santos vs. Court of Appeals.
• Marcos vs. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000) — Cited for the principle that Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes manifest themselves.
• Cervantes vs. City Service Corp., 784 Phil. 694 (2016) — Cited for the general rule that where a party is represented by an attorney of record, all required notices must be given to the attorney, and service upon another person is not legally effective and binding upon the party.
• Alicer vs. Compas, 664 Phil. 722 (2011) — Cited for the rule that parties have the duty to inform the court of their change of address, and that the court and its personnel are not required to continuously check records and various addresses.
• Philippine Savings Bank vs. Papa, 823 Phil. 725 (2018) — Cited for the rule that judgments become final and executory by operation of law, and not by judicial declaration.
• Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Romero, 781 Phil. 737 (2016) — Cited for the principle that mere refusal, neglect, or difficulty in performing essential marital obligations cannot amount to psychological incapacity.

• Article 36, Family Code — Provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. Applied here, petitioner failed to prove the required gravity of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, so the marriage was not nullified.
• Articles 68 to 71, Family Code — Define the essential marital obligations between husband and wife, which are among the obligations embraced by the psychological incapacity requirement. The Court referenced these obligations in discussing the Molina guidelines and the essential marital duties that must be shown to have been impossible for the spouse to comply with.
• Articles 220, 221, and 225, Family Code — Define the essential obligations of parents and children, also embraced by the Molina guidelines as part of the essential marital obligations relevant to Article 36. The Court included these in the framework for determining whether psychological incapacity rendered a party unable to comply with marital and parental duties.
• Section 2, Rule 52, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. The CA invoked this provision in denying petitioner’s motion, but the Supreme Court held that the CA erroneously treated petitioner’s motion as a second motion for reconsideration because the prior motion was filed by respondent; denial was nevertheless proper because petitioner’s motion was belatedly filed.
• Sections 7 and 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Govern service of pleadings and notices. The CA deemed service complete when the copy of the Decision sent to petitioner was returned with the postal notation “RTS-moved out,” and the Supreme Court upheld this ruling because petitioner failed to inform the CA of her new address.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), and Hernando, J., concurred. Gaerlan and Dimaampao, JJ., were on official leave.