Atup vs. People of the Philippines

A final and executory judgment may no longer be altered, amended, or modified, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law, except for clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, or supervening events; however, a penalty imposed in excess of what the law authorizes may be corrected even after finality, as the excess is void for want of jurisdiction.

Petitioner John Paul S. Atup and several co-accused — Sodum Decasa, Ronde Estorba, Jairius Atup, Luwell Gamalo, and Ruben Mangmang — were charged with multiple criminal offenses arising from a single incident on October 7, 1997 at a dam in Bohol. The charges comprised two counts of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by RA 8353), Frustrated Murder under Article 248, and Robbery with Homicide under Articles 293 and 294. Petitioner subsequently asserted that he was 16 years old at the time of the crimes, invoking the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and the provisions of RA 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) and PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) to seek confinement in an agricultural camp or training facility rather than a regular penal institution.

On the evening of October 7, 1997, AAA was with her suitor BBB at a dam in Bohol, accompanied by CCC and her boyfriend DDD, who sat on a separate bench nearby. While the group was leisurely spending time together, six persons — later identified as petitioner John Paul S. Atup, Sodum Decasa, Ronde Estorba, Jairius Atup, Luwell Gamalo, and Ruben Mangmang — approached them. The group demanded money and told AAA and BBB not to resist. Mangmang left the scene. Estorba poked a knife at AAA's side; out of fear, AAA gave Estorba P3.00 while BBB gave Decasa P500.00. Dissatisfied, Decasa forcibly grabbed BBB's wallet. Thereafter, petitioner and his co-accused brought AAA and BBB to a lower portion of the dam.

BBB, about six meters away from AAA, saw Gamalo undress AAA. From her end, AAA saw Decasa stab BBB three times, push him into a canal, and hit him with a big stone; Estorba also hit BBB with a piece of wood. BBB was left to die in the canal. Petitioner, Decasa, Gamalo, and Estorba then approached AAA, who was being held by Jairius. The five accused helped one another in removing AAA's clothing. Despite her resistance and pleas for mercy, the accused laughed at her. Decasa went on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina while the others fondled her breasts. After Decasa, Jairius took over and likewise raped AAA while the others held her body. After the rape, Decasa stabbed AAA several times, telling her "you will tell others so you should die." With 31 stab wounds, AAA lost consciousness.

AAA regained consciousness to find the accused gone. She put on her pants and staggered to a nearby house, whose owners helped her contact her father. Her father arrived after about thirty minutes and brought her to a hospital, where she was confined for one week. After regaining her strength, AAA underwent medico-legal examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory. For their part, petitioner, Jairius, and Estorba testified that they had attended two birthday parties that day, consuming tuba, beer, and Tanduay Rhum. They claimed they fell asleep at a hut near the dam, and that Jairius was awakened by Mangmang, who told him Decasa had killed somebody. Petitioner and Estorba claimed they ran away to hide from Decasa. Decasa remained at large throughout the proceedings.

The RTC found petitioner and co-accused Estorba, Jairius, and Gamalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of Rape, sentencing each to reclusion perpetua per count. Petitioner alone was convicted of Frustrated Murder and sentenced to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal maximum. Petitioner was acquitted of Robbery with Homicide. Petitioner and Jairius filed a Notice of Appeal on February 4, 2013. On December 22, 2014, the CA sent notices to file appellant's brief. Petitioner and Jairius filed a Motion for Extension but never submitted the brief. The CA dismissed the appeal on May 27, 2015, and the dismissal became final on July 2, 2015. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 5, 2016 — 287 days after receipt of the dismissal — which the CA denied for being filed out of time. Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, simultaneously filing a petition for habeas corpus claiming he was a minor at the time of the crimes and should be confined in an agricultural camp under RA 9344 rather than in the New Bilibid Prison.

• Reinstatement of Appeal: Petitioner prayed for the reinstatement of his appeal before the CA, which had been dismissed for failure to file an appellant's brief.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Petitioner asserted that he was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crimes on October 7, 1997, and thus entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. He presented a photocopy of his Birth Certificate dated October 4, 1995, issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sierra Bullones, Bohol.
• Habeas Corpus and Confinement in Agricultural Camp: Petitioner contended that as a child offender, he should be confined in an agricultural camp or other training facility under Section 51 of RA 9344, not in the New Bilibid Prison. He argued that commitment of a youthful offender to the DSWD, a local rehabilitation center, or a detention home from the time of arrest is mandatory under Article 191 of PD 603, and that Section 51 of RA 9344 is not merely discretionary but mandatory on the part of the RTC.

• Dismissal of Appeal: The OSG argued that the CA correctly dismissed the appeal for abandonment pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as petitioner failed to file his appellant's brief despite receiving notice and filing a motion for extension.
• Lawful Confinement: The OSG contended that petitioner's confinement in a regular penal institution during trial and after conviction was in accordance with law, citing Article 191 of PD 603, which vests discretion in the RTC regarding detention of youthful offenders during trial.
• Discretionary Nature of Section 51, RA 9344: The OSG maintained that the use of the word "may" in Section 51 of RA 9344 connotes discretion on the part of the trial court whether to confine a convicted child in conflict with the law in a regular penal facility or in a training facility or agricultural camp.

• Modifiability of Judgment: Whether the judgment of conviction issued by the RTC may still be modified.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Whether petitioner is entitled to the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority.
• Habeas Corpus: Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

• Modifiability of Judgment: No, except as to the penalty for Frustrated Murder. The judgment had become final and immutable after the CA dismissed the appeal for abandonment, and none of the recognized exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgment applied. However, the penalty for Frustrated Murder was modified because the RTC imposed a sentence in excess of what the law authorized, rendering the excess void.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: No. Petitioner failed to prove his minority with competent evidence, presenting only a photocopy of his birth certificate not authenticated by the PSA. After the judgment became final and immutable, the Court could not admit belated documentary evidence of age without defeating the doctrine of immutability of judgment.
• Habeas Corpus: No. The writ of habeas corpus is unavailing when confinement is by virtue of a valid judicial process and a final judgment of conviction. Petitioner's incarceration in the NBP was pursuant to a Commitment Order issued by the RTC after a valid conviction, and none of the exceptional circumstances warranting post-conviction habeas corpus relief were present.

• Modifiability of Judgment: The CA did not err in dismissing petitioner's appeal under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes dismissal when the appellant fails to file his brief within the prescribed period, unless represented by counsel de oficio. Petitioner was not so represented; he filed a motion for extension but never submitted the brief, and his Motion for Reconsideration — filed 287 days after receipt of the dismissal — offered no explanation for the noncompliance and did not append the required brief. The right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege that must be pursued strictly in accordance with the Rules. Because the dismissal became final on July 2, 2015, the RTC Joint Decision also became final and executory. Under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended, or modified, even to correct perceived errors of fact or law. The recognized exceptions — clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and supervening events — were none present. Petitioner adduced no evidence that the conviction was void or that supervening events rendered execution unjust. However, the Court found that the penalty for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 0102 was outside the range prescribed by law. Article 248 of the RPC prescribes reclusion perpetua to death for Murder; Article 50 provides that the penalty next lower in degree applies to a frustrated felony, yielding reclusion temporal for Frustrated Murder. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, with no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the proper penalty is twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. A sentence imposing a penalty in excess of what the court is authorized by law to impose is void as to the excess, and the Court may correct such even after finality.

• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Petitioner's assertion of minority was supported only by a photocopy of his Birth Certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar, not authenticated by the National Statistics Office (now PSA). The best evidence to prove age is the original copy of the birth certificate duly authenticated by the PSA. A mere claim of minority is insufficient, particularly because the prosecution had no opportunity to refute the allegation after conviction, and the Court had no opportunity to determine age based on evidence other than the defective photocopy. The Court must be cautious in admitting documentary evidence submitted after trial or after judgment has become immutable, lest the doctrine of immutability be easily defeated. Because petitioner failed to prove that the case falls within any exception to immutability of judgment, the question of minority could not be entertained.

• Habeas Corpus: The writ of habeas corpus extends only to cases of illegal confinement or detention. Under Section 4 of Rule 102, the writ shall not be allowed if the person is in custody under process issued by a court with jurisdiction, or by virtue of a valid judgment or order. Petitioner's incarceration in the NBP was by virtue of a Commitment Order dated January 3, 2014 issued by RTC Branch 48, Tagbilaran City, after a Joint Decision convicting him of two counts of Rape and one count of Frustrated Murder. His pre-trial confinement was also pursuant to valid court orders: an arrest order, a transfer order based on strong evidence of guilt for capital offenses, and a reconfinement order after he escaped from detention on September 15, 2006 and was rearrested on December 15, 2012. The exceptional circumstances allowing habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy — deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in restraint, lack of jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty voiding the sentence as to the excess — were absent. Petitioner's mere allegation of a violation of his constitutional right was insufficient; the violation must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.

• Immutability of Judgment — A final and executory judgment becomes immutable and unalterable, precluding modification even if meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, whether by the rendering court or the highest court. The only exceptions are: (1) correction of clerical errors, (2) nunc pro tunc entries causing no prejudice, (3) void judgments, and (4) supervening events rendering execution unjust and inequitable. The Court applied this doctrine to bar modification of the RTC conviction, as none of the exceptions were present, while separately allowing correction of the excessive penalty as void for excess of jurisdiction.

• Right to Appeal as Statutory Privilege — The right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege that must be exercised in strict accordance with the Rules of Court. Failure to comply with procedural requirements, such as timely filing an appellant's brief, results in the loss of the right to appeal. The Court relied on this principle to affirm the CA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal for abandonment.

• Habeas Corpus — Availability and Limitations — The writ of habeas corpus extends only to cases of illegal confinement or detention. It is unavailing when confinement is by virtue of a valid judicial process, a court order, or a final judgment of conviction rendered by a court with jurisdiction. As a post-conviction remedy, it may be availed of only when: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in restraint; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty is excessive, voiding the sentence as to the excess. None of these circumstances were found present.

• Correction of Excessive Penalties Despite Finality — A sentence that imposes a penalty in excess of what the court is authorized by law to impose is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. The Court may correct such penalties even after the decision has become final, because the excess is legally nonexistent. The Court applied this by modifying the Frustrated Murder penalty from 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal maximum, to 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• "Time and again, the Court has stressed that the right to appeal is not a natural but a statutory privilege and must be pursued in accordance with the law. It follows that the party who intends to pursue it must observe the requirements of the Rules; otherwise, his or her right to appeal is lost." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for affirming the CA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal, underscoring that procedural rules on appeals are not mere technicalities but essential conditions for the exercise of the right.

• "A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land." — This is the canonical formulation of the immutability doctrine as quoted from Britchford vs. Alapan, frequently cited in Philippine jurisprudence to bar post-finality modifications.

• "A sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess." — This passage establishes the exception allowing correction of an excessive penalty even after finality, distinguishing it from the general bar on modification of final judgments.

• "The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing." — This defines the essential prerequisite for habeas corpus relief, explaining why the writ was denied where confinement rested on a valid commitment order and final judgment.

• Britchford vs. Alapan, 823 Phil. 272 (2018) — Followed for the doctrine of immutability of judgment and its exceptions. The Court quoted this case extensively to establish that final judgments may no longer be modified except for clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, and void judgments.

• Go vs. Echavez, 765 Phil. 410 (2015) — Followed for the four exceptions to immutability of judgment: clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries, void judgments, and supervening events. The Court relied on this case's detailed discussion of each exception.

• Ampatuan vs. Judge Macaraig, 636 Phil. 269 (2010) — Followed for the principle that habeas corpus presupposes illegal confinement and is unavailing when custody is by virtue of judicial process or a valid judgment.

• In re: Abellana vs. Paredes, G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019 — Followed for the rule that habeas corpus may serve as a post-conviction remedy only in exceptional circumstances: deprivation of a constitutional right, lack of jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty voiding the sentence as to the excess.

• Bigler vs. People, 782 Phil. 158 (2016) — Followed for the principle that a penalty imposed in excess of what the law authorizes is void as to the excess, permitting correction even after finality.

• Polintan vs. People, 604 Phil. 42 (2009) — Cited for the proposition that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be pursued in accordance with the Rules.

• Section 8, Rule 124, Rules of Court — Authorizes the CA to dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the prescribed period, except where the appellant is represented by counsel de oficio. Applied to affirm the CA's dismissal of petitioner's appeal for abandonment.

• Section 1(e), Rule 50, Rules of Court — Provides grounds for dismissal of appeal by the CA, referenced in relation to Section 8, Rule 124.

• Section 1, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Defines the scope of habeas corpus as extending to all cases of illegal confinement or detention. Applied to deny the writ, as petitioner's confinement was lawful.

• Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court — Provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed if the person is in custody under process issued by a court with jurisdiction, or by virtue of a valid judgment or order. Applied to bar the writ since petitioner's confinement rested on a valid commitment order and final conviction.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code (as amended by RA 8353) — Defines and penalizes the crime of Rape. Petitioner was convicted of two counts under this provision.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by RA 7659) — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Murder. Applied to determine the proper penalty for Frustrated Murder.

• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Applied to derive reclusion temporal as the penalty for Frustrated Murder.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines frustrated felonies, referenced in the Information for Frustrated Murder.

• Section 1, Republic Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) — Governs the imposition of indeterminate sentences. Applied to fix the modified penalty at 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Section 51, Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) — Provides that a child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, serve sentence in an agricultural camp or training facility in lieu of a regular penal institution. The Court upheld the OSG's position that the word "may" connotes judicial discretion.

• Sections 40, Republic Act No. 9344 — Governs the return of a child in conflict with the law to court and the court's discretion regarding execution, discharge, or extension of suspended sentence. Cited by the OSG to support the discretionary nature of the RTC's detention decisions.

• Article 191, Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) — Outlines the RTC's discretion in detaining youthful offenders during trial. Cited by both parties regarding the propriety of petitioner's confinement.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J. (Chairperson), Hernando, Gaerlan, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred.