Atty. Romeo G. Roxas vs. Republic Real Estate Corporation

A final and executory judgment is immutable and unalterable, and neither the trial court nor the sheriff may, through a writ of execution or notice purporting to implement it, directly or indirectly alter its terms. The sheriff's execution of judgment is a purely ministerial phase of adjudication, and the sheriff must strictly conform to the letter of the dispositive portion of the judgment.

Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into a reclamation agreement with Pasay City in 1959, authorized by Pasay City Council Ordinances No. 121 and No. 158, to reclaim 300 hectares of foreshore lands along Manila Bay. The Republic sued to nullify the agreement, and in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared the agreement and ordinances null and void as ultra vires and contrary to Republic Act No. 1899, but awarded RREC and Pasay City P10,926,071.29 plus 6% interest per annum from May 1, 1962, based on quantum meruit. The present consolidated petitions arise from RREC's repeated attempts to relitigate and inflate that final award, and from the counsel dispute between Atty. Roxas and RREC.

On April 24, 1959, Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) entered into an agreement with Pasay City for the reclamation of foreshore lands along Manila Bay, on the strength of Pasay City Council Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, which authorized RREC to reclaim 300 hectares of foreshore lands in the city. On December 19, 1961, the Republic of the Philippines sued for recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary injunction, questioning the agreement on three grounds: the reclaimed area was a national park outside the commerce of man; the ordinances went beyond Republic Act No. 1899, which allows municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim only "foreshore lands," not "submerged lands"; and the agreement was executed without approval from the national government and without public bidding.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the Republic's arguments, declaring both the agreement and the ordinances null and void for being ultra vires and contrary to Republic Act No. 1899. The Court ruled that RREC had no authority to resume its reclamation work and that it failed to reclaim any area within the reclamation project. Nevertheless, recognizing that RREC undertook partial work by using the dredge fill of 1,558,395 cubic meters and mobilizing its equipment, the Court awarded RREC compensation based on quantum meruit, pegging the reasonable value of its services at P10,926,071.29 plus interest at 6% per annum from 1962 until fully paid, to prevent the Republic's unjust enrichment. The Decision became final and executory on July 27, 1999.

Despite the finality, RREC and Pasay City filed numerous motions and petitions seeking to adjust the award. The Supreme Court denied or expunged these pleadings, warning against further filings under pain of contempt. On April 17, 2001, RREC and Pasay City filed a Motion for Execution (After Adjustment of Quantum Meruit Compensation) before the Regional Trial Court, praying in the alternative for: (1) delivery and transfer of titles to over 109 hectares of land at the Manila Bay reclamation site; (2) payment of P54.5 million; (3) delivery and transfer of titles to over 35 hectares of land; (4) payment of P5 billion; or (5) payment of P596,053,484.00. The RTC denied the motion on November 22, 2002, finding that it merely repeated arguments already disposed of by the Supreme Court, and the denial was affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 25, 2003.

On November 21, 2006, RREC again moved for a writ of execution before the RTC, and on May 8, 2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Writ of Execution. On May 11, 2007, Sheriff IV Reyner S. De Jesus issued a Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay against the Republic for P49,173,064,201.17 instead of the P10.9 million ordered by the Supreme Court, based on a formula that set the Philippine peso at P51.58 for every one peso in 1962, with compounding interests. Sheriff De Jesus did not attach his source for the alleged real value. The Republic's Very Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and the Notice was denied on July 3, 2007, and its Motion for Reconsideration was denied on February 28, 2008.

The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which granted the petition on February 27, 2009, declaring the Writ of Execution and Sheriff's Notice null and void as "palpably at variance" with the Supreme Court's November 25, 1998 Decision. Meanwhile, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas of RGR & Associates, counsel for RREC since August 6, 1990, filed a Complaint against the three Court of Appeals Justices for alleged misconduct and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in relation to Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, praying for their disbarment, as well as a Motion for Inhibition — both filed without RREC's authority. On June 29, 2009, RREC terminated the services of RGR & Associates due to loss of confidence and breach of trust, and through a board resolution, engaged the services of Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Offices on October 29, 2009. The Court of Appeals, in its July 16, 2013 Resolution, declared Siguion Reyna as RREC's rightful counsel of record.

Atty. Roxas filed a Pro Hac Vice Petition (G.R. No. 208205) on August 1, 2013, in his personal capacity and without RREC's authority, assailing the Court of Appeals' Resolution and arguing that RGR & Associates' engagement with RREC, being on a contingent or "no cure, no pay" basis, was coupled with interest and therefore irrevocable. RREC, through Siguion Reyna, filed its own Petition for Review (G.R. No. 208212) on September 5, 2013, rehashing claims on the present-day value of the peso with compounding interests and seeking to exclude Pasay City from receiving any amount. On March 2, 2015, RREC President Catalina B. Blanco filed a Petition on Final Execution and Settlement, stating the same arguments and praying for P16,572,743,241.90, and praying that Pasay City be given the long-term use of the idle portions of the Cultural Center Complex instead of sharing part of RREC's monetary award.

• Rightful Counsel: Atty. Roxas argued that RGR & Associates is RREC's rightful counsel and that the termination of its legal services was made in bad faith.
• Irrevocable Engagement: Atty. Roxas argued that RGR & Associates' engagement with RREC, being on a contingent or "no cure, no pay" basis, was coupled with interest and therefore irrevocable.
• Attorney's Fees: Atty. Roxas prayed for attorney's fees beyond quantum meruit, specifically "the full amount upon the terms and conditions of his contingency contract with RREC."
• Current Value of the Peso: Atty. Roxas argued that the monetary award to RREC should reflect the current value of the peso, which he alleged was equivalent to P82.5 billion.
• Reclamation of 55 Hectares: Atty. Roxas alleged that RREC actually reclaimed 55 hectares of Manila Bay and that the national government illegally confiscated these reclaimed lands, invoking the Court of Appeals' ruling that was set aside in Republic vs. Court of Appeals.
• Reclamation of 55 Hectares: RREC insisted that it reclaimed 55 hectares and that the amount it prayed for far exceeded what was adjudged in Republic vs. Court of Appeals.
• Present-Day Value: RREC argued that the amount of P49.17 billion was justified as the judgment award based on the present-day value of the peso with compounding interests, recycling arguments already repeatedly rejected by the Court.
• Exclusion of Pasay City: RREC sought to exclude Pasay City from receiving any amount, arguing that the phrase "share and share alike" should be interpreted to mean that each should receive their share depending on each's share in the reclamation project, and since Pasay City contributed nothing, RREC alone should receive the full amount.
• Same Arguments in Third Petition: RREC President Catalina B. Blanco stated the same arguments as in RREC's Petition for Review, praying for P16,572,743,241.90 to compensate for RREC's alleged reclamation of 55 hectares of land.
• Alternative Relief for Pasay City: Blanco prayed that Pasay City be given the long-term use of the idle portions of the Cultural Center Complex instead of sharing part of RREC's monetary award.

• Dismissal of Pro Hac Vice Petition: RREC argued that Atty. Roxas' refusal to be discharged as counsel was highly irregular and unethical, especially in light of his filing his own Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution, and that the Pro Hac Vice Petition should be denied or expunged for lack of RREC's consent.
• Contravention of Final Judgment: The Republic opposed the Motion for Execution (After Adjustment of Quantum Meruit), arguing that RREC and Pasay City's Motion contravened the Supreme Court's Decision in Republic vs. Court of Appeals.
• Lack of Basis for Computation: The Republic argued that Sheriff De Jesus executed a judgment based on a computation that only he was privy to, as his Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay failed to provide any attachment or explanation as to the source of his calculations.

• Jurisdiction: Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
• Validity of the Writ of Execution: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus' Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay as null and void.
• Pasay City's Share: Whether Pasay City has a share in the monetary award granted by this Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals.
• Rightful Counsel: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing Atty. Romeo G. Roxas as rightful counsel of RREC.

• Jurisdiction: No. The case is premature; the money claim against the Republic should have first been brought before the Commission on Audit, which has primary jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all debts and claims due from or owing the Government, subject only to appeal via a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
• Validity of the Writ of Execution: No. The Court of Appeals correctly declared the Writ of Execution and Sheriff De Jesus' Notice null and void, as they went beyond the dispositive portion of the final and executory judgment in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, which decreed only P10,926,071.29 plus 6% interest per annum from May 1, 1962.
• Pasay City's Share: Yes. Pasay City has a share in the monetary award; the phrase "share and share alike" plainly means that one party's share is the same as the other party's share, and there is no need to go beyond the ordinary or literal meaning when the words are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity.
• Rightful Counsel: No. The Court of Appeals did not err; Atty. Roxas' Pro Hac Vice Petition was denied for his lack of legal standing to file the case on behalf of RREC and for being the wrong remedy, without prejudice to his filing of a separate collection suit.

• Jurisdiction: The money claim against the Republic should have been first brought before the Commission on Audit. Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 orders all judges of lower courts to observe utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies, and Commission on Audit Circular No. 2001-002 requires observance of the same. Chapter 4, Section 11 of Executive Order No. 292 gives the Commission on Audit the power and mandate to settle all government accounts. Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, requires that all money claims against government must first be filed before the Commission on Audit, which must act upon them within 60 days; only when the Commission on Audit rejects the claim can the claimant elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari. RREC's procedural shortcut was rejected, as any allowance or disallowance of its money claims is for the Commission on Audit to decide.

• Validity of the Writ of Execution: Republic vs. Court of Appeals has long been final and executory, and the Court had judiciously examined and exhaustively discussed the issues raised in RREC's Petition — the same arguments now being raised. RREC's relentless pursuit of the case vexed the Court, which had repeatedly expunged its motions and cautioned it against contempt. The Court restated that RREC did not reclaim any land, much less present any evidence to prove its allegations, as no contracts, plans, designs, specifications, statements of work, vouchers, or witness testimony were ever presented to describe the extent of RREC's accomplishment. RREC's compensation was based on quantum meruit, awarded merely based on equity to prevent unjust enrichment, and equity is not a one-way street — providing justice to RREC cannot justify perpetrating injustice against the Republic. Pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata, the ruling in Republic vs. Court of Appeals is the settled law of this case, and the Court cannot allow RREC to waste more of its time and resources and disturb what is already settled.

• Validity of the Writ of Execution (Immutability of Judgment): A judgment, once final, is immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The final and executory decision cannot be amended by the trial court, much less by its sheriff, whose execution of judgment is a purely ministerial phase of adjudication. In implementing the writ, the sheriff must strictly conform to the letter of the judge's order, and the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained in the dispositive portion. Sheriff De Jesus' Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay went beyond the dispositive portion in Republic vs. Court of Appeals, modifying the decreed amount of P10.9 million at 6% interest per annum to P49.17 billion at the rate of 6% from 1962 to 1973 and 12% from 1974 to present, compounded. The computation was based on a testimony given in 2001 in a clarificatory hearing, which both the lower court and the Supreme Court had rejected. The sheriff cannot act as a party's agent; he or she can only act as an officer of the court which he or she represents. Accordingly, the Court resolved to refer Sheriff De Jesus' acts to the Office of the Court Administrator for proper investigation, report, and recommendation.

• Pasay City's Share: Republic Act No. 1899 delegated to local government units the state's sovereign right to reclaim foreshore lands, and Section 1 in relation to Section 9 mandates that the reclamation must be carried out by the municipality or chartered city concerned (that is, Pasay City) and not by a private entity (that is, RREC). RREC was able to undertake reclamation work on behalf of the city only through a special power of attorney. Thus, Pasay City cannot be deprived of its share in the compensation. A plain interpretation of the phrase "share and share alike" means that one party's share is the same as the other party's share — RREC would receive a share equal to that of Pasay City. If the Court intended the interpretation made by RREC, it should have instead used the phrase "in proportion to their contribution," or an analogous wording. There is no need to go beyond the ordinary or literal meaning when the words themselves are "clear, plain, and free from ambiguity," in line with the plain-meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction.

• Rightful Counsel: Atty. Roxas' Pro Hac Vice Petition was denied for two reasons: first, it was a wrong remedy; and second, he had no legal standing to appeal on RREC's behalf. The letter-agreement between RREC and RGR & Associates, which would entitle Atty. Roxas' firm to at least 3.5 hectares of land or a minimum of P175 million from the judgment award, was champertous and void for being against public policy, as it was a bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit whereby the third person undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds. Such agreements violate the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client. Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from lending money to a client except when, in the interest of justice, he or she has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he or she is handling for the client, and absent a reimbursement agreement, the champertous contract is void. A client may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause, and there is no such thing as an irrevocable attorney-client relationship. Atty. Roxas' act of suing the Court of Appeals Justices without RREC's prior notice and board approval betrayed his client's trust and confidence. Moreover, under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, Atty. Roxas was not a party litigant, not a party-in-interest, and not a party representative, as he was no longer RREC's lawyer. Rule 45, Section 1 provides that appeals by certiorari may be had only by the party to the case, and Atty. Roxas was neither a party nor a counsel for any of the parties. The Court resolved to direct Atty. Roxas to show cause why he should not be imposed a disciplinary sanction for his pernicious attempt not just to re-litigate the case, but also to continue arguing for RREC despite his discharge as counsel.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — A judgment, once final, is immutable and unalterable; it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that neither the Regional Trial Court nor its sheriff could alter the November 25, 1998 Decision through a writ of execution or a notice purporting to implement the writ.

• Res Judicata — A final judgment is the settled law of the case; relitigation of the same claims is barred to conserve scarce judicial resources, promote efficiency, provide repose for both party litigants and the public, and prevent inconsistent results. The Court applied this doctrine to reject RREC's repeated attempts to relitigate the same claims and arguments that had already been exhaustively addressed in Republic vs. Court of Appeals.

• Quantum Meruit — Compensation based on equity to prevent unjust enrichment; it is not a loan, a forbearance of money, or an obligation arising out of a valid contract, but is awarded merely based on equity. The Court applied this doctrine to emphasize that RREC's compensation was based on quantum meruit, and that equity is not a one-way street — providing justice to RREC cannot justify perpetrating injustice against the Republic.

• Champertous Contract — A contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit whereby the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment; such agreements are against public policy, especially where the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at its own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The Court applied this doctrine to void the letter-agreement between RREC and RGR & Associates, which entitled Atty. Roxas' firm to at least 3.5 hectares of land or a minimum of P175 million from the judgment award.

• Plain Meaning Rule (Verba Legis) — When the words of a statute or judgment are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, there is no need to go beyond the ordinary or literal meaning. The Court applied this rule to interpret the phrase "share and share alike" in the dispositive portion of the November 25, 1998 Decision as meaning equal shares between RREC and Pasay City.

• Ministerial Duty of the Sheriff — The sheriff's execution of judgment is a purely ministerial phase of adjudication; the sheriff must strictly conform to the letter of the judge's order, and the only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained in the dispositive portion. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Sheriff De Jesus' Notice of Execution and Notice to Pay, which modified the decreed amount to P49.17 billion, was null and void.

• "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy." — This states the controlling rule on execution of money judgments against the government, which the Court applied to hold that the case was premature and that the money claim should have first been brought before the Commission on Audit.

• "A judgment, once final, is immutable and unalterable." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine of immutability of final judgments, which the Court applied to reject RREC's attempts to amend the November 25, 1998 Decision through the trial court and sheriff.

• "The only portion of the decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained in the dispositive portion." — This states the rule on what may be executed, which the Court applied to hold that Sheriff De Jesus' Notice went beyond the dispositive portion of the final judgment.

• "A champertous contract is defined as a contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment." — This defines the champertous contract doctrine, which the Court applied to void the letter-agreement between RREC and RGR & Associates and to deny Atty. Roxas' claim for attorney's fees.

• Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530 (1998) — Controlling precedent; the original decision that became final and executory, declaring the reclamation agreement null and void but awarding quantum meruit compensation of P10,926,071.29 plus 6% interest per annum from May 1, 1962.
• Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. CLT Realty Development Corporation, 512 Phil. 679 (2005) — Followed; on the immutability of final judgments, holding that a final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect.
• Salud vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100156, June 27, 1994, 233 SCRA 384 — Followed; on res judicata, explaining the purposes of conserving judicial resources, promoting efficiency, and providing repose.
• Nocom vs. Camerino, 598 Phil. 214 (2009) — Followed; on champertous contracts, defining them and holding that they are against public policy and violate the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client.
• Carabao, Inc. vs. Agricultural Productivity Commission, 146 Phil. 236 (1970) — Followed; on the requirement that money claims against the Government must be prosecuted under Commonwealth Act No. 327, with conditions strictly observed.
• Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. vs. Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No. 181792, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 66 — Followed; on the Commission on Audit's primary jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all debts and claims due from or owing the Government.
• Lim Jr. vs. Villarosa, 524 Phil. 37 (2006) — Followed; on a client's right to discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause, without the consent of the lawyer or approval of the court.
• Busiños vs. Ricafort, 347 Phil. 687 (1997) — Followed; on the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith.
• Bautista vs. Gonzales, 261 Phil. 266 (1990) — Followed; on the rule that although a lawyer may, in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement.
• Jereos vs. Reblando, 163 Phil. 121 (1976) — Followed; on the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, which must be characterized with propriety and decorum.
• Teodosio vs. Somosa, 612 Phil. 858 (2009) — Followed; on the ministerial duty of sheriffs to execute writs in accordance with their mandate, without discretion to vary the judgment.
• Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. Gonzales, 180 Phil. 604 (1979) — Followed; on the rule that a final judgment cannot be amended by the trial court or sheriff absent an order of remand.

• Section 1 and Section 9, Republic Act No. 1899 — Authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim foreshore lands and to execute reclamation work by administration; applied to hold that the reclamation must be carried out by Pasay City and not by a private entity, and that Pasay City cannot be deprived of its share in the compensation.
• Sections 49-50, Presidential Decree No. 1445 — Requires that all money claims against the Government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit, which must act upon them within 60 days; applied to hold that RREC's procedural shortcut of seeking execution before the RTC was premature.
• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 327 — Fixes the time within which the Auditor General shall render decisions on claims; applied together with Presidential Decree No. 1445 to require that money claims against the Government be first filed with the Commission on Audit.
• Section 11, Chapter 4, Book V, Executive Order No. 292 — Gives the Commission on Audit the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the Government; applied to hold that the finding that government is liable in a suit to which it consented does not translate to enforcement of the judgment by execution.
• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that appeals by certiorari may be had only by a party to the case; applied to deny Atty. Roxas' Pro Hac Vice Petition for lack of legal standing.
• Section 1, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Governs execution upon judgments or final orders; applied to order RREC and Pasay City to abide by the provision on execution of judgments.
• Sections 1-3, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Defines parties to civil actions and real parties in interest; applied to hold that Atty. Roxas was not a party litigant, not a party-in-interest, and not a party representative.
• Canon 17 and Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility — Requires a lawyer to owe fidelity to the cause of his client and prohibits a lawyer from lending money to a client except when, in the interest of justice, he or she has to advance necessary expenses; applied to hold that Atty. Roxas' champertous agreement was void and that his act of suing the Court of Appeals Justices betrayed his client's trust.
• Canon VI, Section 6, Code of Conduct for Court Personnel — Requires court personnel to expeditiously enforce rules and implement orders of the court within the limits of their authority; applied to hold that the sheriff cannot go beyond the letter of the court's order.
• Administrative Circular No. 10-2000 — Orders all judges of lower courts to observe utmost caution, prudence, and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against government agencies; applied to hold that the Writ of Execution and Sheriff's Notice violated the circular.
• Commission on Audit Circular No. 2001-002 — Requires department heads, bureau chiefs, and all others concerned to observe Administrative Circular No. 10-2000; applied to hold that the Writ of Execution and Sheriff's Notice violated the circular.

Carpio (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred.