Atillo vs. Bombay

Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires a petition for review to be accompanied by the judgments or final orders of both lower courts and by the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the petition’s allegations; failure to comply is a sufficient ground for dismissal under Section 3, Rule 42. The petitioner initially exercises discretion in selecting supporting documents, but that discretion is not unbridled, and the Court of Appeals ultimately determines whether the documents are sufficient to make out a prima facie case.

Nelia Atillo occupied a unit in the Alto Commercial Building in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal under a Lease Agreement with Buenaventura Bombay, who claimed ownership of the building. The lease dispute later intersected with a claim by the heirs of Tomas Escaraman, to whom ownership was allegedly transferred by Nide Marie Bombay under a ten-year lease agreement or Kasunduan. The procedural question before the Supreme Court concerns the requirements for a petition for review from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Nelia Atillo entered into a Lease Agreement with Buenaventura Bombay, the alleged owner of the Alto Commercial Building in Mayamot, Antipolo, Rizal. The Lease Agreement provided that the period of lease was one year, starting May 1, 1988, and renewable upon the mutual consent of the parties. Atillo failed to pay rentals starting January 1995, a ground for terminating the Lease Agreement. Despite Bombay’s written demand dated August 15, 1994 to pay the monthly rental and vacate the premises, Atillo did not do so. Bombay then filed an ejectment case against Atillo with the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch I.

In her Answer, Atillo alleged that the Alto Commercial Building was actually owned by the heirs of Tomas Escaraman, to whom ownership was transferred by Nide Marie Bombay under a ten-year lease agreement or Kasunduan. She contended that when Bombay demanded that she vacate the leased unit, Bombay allegedly no longer had any rights over the same and was already guilty of illegal detainer. Atillo pointed out that the heirs of Tomas Escaraman had in fact brought an unlawful detainer suit against Bombay, docketed as Civil Case No. 2563 before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. Upon discovery of these developments, Atillo entered into a Contract of Lease with the heirs of Tomas Escaraman for the same unit already covered by her Lease Agreement with Bombay. With the new contract, Atillo paid rentals for the leased unit to the heirs of Tomas Escaraman, and this was the basis of her refusal to comply with Bombay’s demand to vacate.

On November 24, 1995, the MTC dismissed the ejectment case on the ground that Bombay was not the proper party in interest based on the Kasunduan and had no right to eject Atillo. Bombay appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72. On February 24, 1997, the RTC rendered an Order reversing the MTC Decision and ruling in favor of Bombay. The Order awarded back rentals to Bombay and ordered Atillo to vacate the leased premises. Aggrieved, Atillo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

In her petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Atillo disputed the award of back rentals. She claimed that at the time she possessed the premises her rental was only P1,500.00 per month under the lease agreement with Bombay; that the P4,000.00 claimed by Bombay was based on mere speculation and unsupported by evidence; and that she still had a credit of P3,000.00 representing the balance of her deposit, which Bombay had acknowledged and documented in his communications. Atillo attached to her petition only the MTC Decision, the assailed RTC Order, and the RTC Writ of Execution. The two other documents she submitted, the Notice to Vacate and Writ of Execution, pertained to the case of Salome Escaraman vs. Nadie Bombay, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-3745. She did not annex the Kasunduan or Agreement, the Lease Contract between her and Bombay, the letters evidencing the alleged credit, and the other documentary evidence vital and indispensable to the disposition of her petition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and later denied reconsideration; Atillo insisted that the attachment requirement was not mandatory.

• Directory Nature of Rule 42, Section 2(d): Petitioner argued that the portion of Section 2(d), Rule 42 requiring attachment of pleadings and other material portions of the record is directory, not mandatory, and vests the party or counsel with discretion to determine which pleadings, if any, to attach.
• Non-Enumeration of Pleadings: Petitioner maintained that because the pleadings to be attached are not enumerated in the rule, failure to include a pleading that the Court of Appeals may require should not result in dismissal.
• Liberal Construction and Cure: Petitioner urged liberal construction, arguing that the mandatory requirement pertains only to judgments or final orders of both lower courts, while the attachment of pleadings and material record portions is discretionary; any deficiency could be cured by the Court of Appeals directing the trial court clerk to elevate the original records.
• No Basis for Back Rentals: Petitioner argued that the decision awarding back rentals had no basis and should not be countenanced; she claimed the rental was only P1,500.00 per month under the lease agreement, that the P4,000.00 claimed was speculative and unsupported by evidence, and that she had a P3,000.00 credit/deposit that should have been credited.
• Whimsical Dismissal and Disparate Treatment: Petitioner claimed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal was whimsical and capricious, citing the allegedly favorable treatment of Sofia Caccan vs. Buenaventura Bombay, CA-GR SP No. SP-46193, which involved the same respondent, causes of action, issues, and arguments and also lacked attached pleadings, yet was not dismissed and was ordered to be commented on by the Fifth Division.

• No Liberal Application: Private respondent countered that there is no reason to justify a liberal application of the rules.
• Failure to Attach Required Documents: Respondent pointed out that petitioner did not attach to her Court of Appeals petition the pleadings and other material portions of the record, such as the complaint, answer, and position papers filed with the lower court.
• Necessity of Attachments: Respondent argued that these attachments are necessary to enable the Court of Appeals to determine whether the petition is patently without merit or the issues raised are too insubstantial to require consideration.

• Mandatory Attachment Requirement: Whether the requirement in Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to attach the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition is mandatory, such that non-compliance warrants outright dismissal.
• Substantial Compliance and Discretion: Whether petitioner substantially complied with the attachment requirement or whether the Court of Appeals should have liberally construed the rule and allowed cure by elevating the original records.
• Whimsical Dismissal and Disparate Treatment: Whether the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of the petition was whimsical or capricious, particularly in light of the alleged different treatment of Sofia Caccan vs. Buenaventura Bombay.

• Mandatory Attachment Requirement: Yes. The requirement is mandatory; Section 3, Rule 42 makes failure to comply with the documents that should accompany the petition a sufficient ground for dismissal. The petitioner’s initial discretion in selecting supporting documents is subject to the Court of Appeals’ ultimate determination of sufficiency.
• Substantial Compliance and Discretion: No. Petitioner did not substantially comply; the documents attached did not set out the factual milieu of her claims, and she omitted the Kasunduan, Lease Contract, letters evidencing credit, and other vital evidence. Her refusal to submit additional documents foreclosed leniency.
• Whimsical Dismissal and Disparate Treatment: No. The dismissal was not whimsical; the Court of Appeals examined the attached documents, and requiring additional documents would have been futile because petitioner obstinately maintained that the rule was not mandatory.

• Mandatory Attachment Requirement: Section 2(d), Rule 42 requires the petition to be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies, and the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations. Section 3 provides that failure to comply with any of the requisites regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. The phrase “as would support the allegations of the petition” contemplates discretion in selecting relevant documents, but the Court of Appeals ultimately determines if the supporting documents are sufficient to make out a prima facie case. The Court of Appeals examined the attached documents to determine whether it could judiciously decide the merits. The issue was therefore whether the documents accompanying the petition sufficiently supported the allegations.
• Substantial Compliance and Discretion: In Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz, the Court of Appeals dismissed for failure to attach certified true copies of material portions, but the Supreme Court found substantial compliance because the attached MTC Decision reproduced verbatim the Contract to Sell, a central document, and the petitioner later annexed the missing documents in her motion for reconsideration. In Cadayona vs. CA, not all supporting papers accompanying the petition need be certified. Here, petitioner attached only the MTC Decision, the assailed RTC Order, and the RTC Writ of Execution; the Notice to Vacate and Writ of Execution pertained to Salome Escaraman vs. Nadie Bombay, Civil Case No. 95-3745. None set out the factual milieu. She did not annex the Kasunduan, the Lease Contract between her and private respondent, the letters evidencing the alleged credit, and other documentary evidence vital and indispensable to the disposition. Without these, the allegations were bare. The Court of Appeals had no factual basis to completely dispose of the case. Although the Court of Appeals had power under Section 3(d), Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals to require additional documents, exercising it would have been futile because petitioner obstinately refused to submit them and insisted the rule was not mandatory. She also could have attached supplemental documents in her motion for reconsideration but did not. Thus no substantial compliance and no room for leniency.
• Whimsical Dismissal and Disparate Treatment: The Court rejected the claim that the dismissal was whimsical. The Court of Appeals took pains to examine the documents attached to discern whether it could judiciously determine the merits. The insufficiency of the supporting documents, combined with petitioner’s unjustified refusal to attempt substantial compliance, justified dismissal. The Court of Appeals has the duty to check the exercise of discretion to ensure submission is not perfunctory, enabling early determination of prima facie merit. Petitioner’s unreasonable stance left no room for leniency. The alleged disparity with Caccan vs. Bombay did not persuade; the dismissal was not whimsical or capricious.

• Mandatory Attachment Requirement under Rule 42 — Section 2(d), Rule 42 requires a petition for review to be accompanied by the judgments or final orders of both lower courts and the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations. Section 3 makes non-compliance a sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court applied this to affirm dismissal where petitioner omitted essential documents.
• Discretion in Selecting Supporting Documents — Petitioner initially exercises discretion in selecting relevant supporting documents, but this discretion is not unbridled. The Court of Appeals has the duty to check the exercise of discretion and ultimately determine whether the documents are sufficient to make out a prima facie case. The Court applied this to find that the Court of Appeals properly examined the attachments and dismissed.
• Substantial Compliance — Dismissal may be avoided where petitioner substantially complies, as in Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz where the attached decision reproduced the central contract verbatim and missing documents were later supplied. Here, no substantial compliance because the attached documents did not set out the factual milieu and vital documents were omitted; petitioner refused to supply them.
• Futility of Requiring Additional Documents — Although the Court of Appeals may require additional documents under its Revised Internal Rules, such a directive is futile where petitioner obstinately refuses to comply and insists the rule is not mandatory. The Court applied this to reject the claim of whimsical dismissal.

• “The phrase ‘of the pleadings and other material portions of the record’ in Section 2 (d), Rule 42 is followed by the phrase ‘as would support the allegations of the petition’ clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the petition. However, while it is true that it is petitioner who initially exercises the discretion in selecting the relevant supporting documents that will be appended to the petition, it is the CA that will ultimately determine if the supporting documents are sufficient to even make out a prima facie case.” — This passage states the ratio on the petitioner’s initial discretion and the Court of Appeals’ ultimate authority to assess sufficiency.
• “In the case at bar, petitioner did not even come close to substantially complying with the requirements of Section 2 (d) of Rule 42. In fact, the CA had no factual basis upon which it could actually and completely dispose of the case.” — This passage applies the substantial-compliance standard and explains why dismissal was warranted on the facts.
• “Petitioner’s discretion in choosing the documents to be attached to the petition is however not unbridled. The CA has the duty to check the exercise of this discretion, to see to it that the submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory.” — This passage defines the limits of petitioner’s discretion and the Court of Appeals’ supervisory duty.
• “In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents combined with the unjustified refusal of petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of her petition.” — This passage is the concluding ratio tying the insufficiency of attachments and petitioner’s refusal to the affirmance of dismissal.

• Cusi-Hernandez vs. Diaz, GR No. 140436, July 18, 2000 — The Court cited this as the recent case where the Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for failure to attach certified true copies of material record portions, but the Supreme Court found substantial compliance because the attached MTC Decision reproduced the Contract to Sell verbatim and the petitioner later annexed the missing documents in her motion for reconsideration. The Court distinguished Atillo because she did not substantially comply and refused to submit the missing documents.
• Cadayona vs. CA, GR No. 128772, February 3, 2000 — Cited for the rule that not all supporting papers accompanying the petition need be certified. The Court used it in discussing the certification requirement under Section 2, Rule 42.

• Section 2(d), Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires the petition for review to be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies, and the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations. Applied: petitioner failed to attach required pleadings and material portions, so dismissal was proper.
• Section 3, Rule 42, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that failure of petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requisites regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for dismissal. Applied: the Court of Appeals’ dismissal was affirmed.
• Section 3(d), Rule 3, Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals — Empowers the Court of Appeals to require the parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Applied: the Court noted that exercising this power would have been futile because petitioner obstinately refused to submit additional documents.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.