Asutilla vs. Philippine National Bank

Injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except in specified cases such as to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; absent clear and convincing evidence bringing the case within an exception, a trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining prosecution.

On March 1, 1971, a Toyota jeep belonging to the Philippine National Bank, Tagbilaran and Tubigon Branches, and a Volkswagen Kombi, registered in the name of the Nazareno and/or Bohol Poly Clinic and apparently owned by Dr. Domiciano Nazareno and Dr. and Mrs. Manuel Relampagos, collided in Tubigon, Bohol. At the time of the accident, the regular driver of the PNB jeep was Rene Arcaya, but it was actually being driven by Emmanuel Ceballos, both employees of PNB. The Kombi was then driven by petitioner Wilfredo Asutilla.

On April 20, 1971, Virgilio Dizon, then the Acting Chief of Police of Tubigon, filed a Complaint with the former Municipal Court of Tubigon against Asutilla for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1396. On April 27, 1971, Chief of Police Bagolor filed a Complaint against Arcaya and Ceballos for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property and Physical Injuries with the same Municipal Court, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1397.

On May 15, 1971, Asutilla filed a Petition for prohibition and mandamus with the trial Court to restrain the Municipal Court of Tubigon from proceeding with its prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396. Made respondents were the PNB, Dizon, Bagolor, and the Municipal Judge of Tubigon. The Petition described how the collision between the jeep and the Kombi happened, ascribing the fault to the jeep; alleged that because there were overtures of amicable settlement, the Kombi owners desisted from filing criminal charges against Ceballos and Arcaya; and that “jumping the gun” on the Kombi owners, PNB caused the filing of Criminal Case No. 1396. The Petition further alleged that the criminal case was “utterly baseless” and “purely motivated by malice,” and that the filing thereof was intended solely “to use the strong arm of the law in order to oppress, harass and coerce the petitioner and his employer to submit and agree to an amicable settlement of the cases.”

On the same date, May 15, 1971, the trial Court issued a Restraining Order, and a hearing was set on May 29, 1971 to determine whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction should issue. Answers were filed by respondents traversing the allegations of the Petition and contending that petitioner’s remedy was to appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, if convicted, and not the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus; and that the latter petition was “merely a prelude by the petitioner to file possible countercharges if and when respondents might make some unguarded statements in the answer.” On July 27, 1971, the trial Court issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396. Reconsideration sought by respondents was denied.

Hearing on the merits was set on September 24, 1971. However, on September 3, 1971, Asutilla filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The case was not called on September 24, 1971, respondents having previously asked for postponement. The record does not contain Minutes for that date. On September 25, 1971, the trial Court rendered a Decision upholding the Petition, directing the Municipal Court immediately to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1396, and declaring permanent the Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The Decision, in effect, granted Asutilla’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

• Injunction Against Criminal Prosecution: Petitioner sought prohibition and mandamus to restrain the Municipal Court from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 1396, alleging that the criminal case was “utterly baseless” and “purely motivated by malice.”
• Oppression and Coercion: Petitioner alleged that the filing of Criminal Case No. 1396 was intended solely “to use the strong arm of the law in order to oppress, harass and coerce the petitioner and his employer to submit and agree to an amicable settlement of the cases.”
• Fault of PNB Driver: Petitioner alleged that the collision happened as described in the Petition, ascribing the fault to the jeep.
• Desistance by Kombi Owners: Petitioner alleged that because there were overtures of amicable settlement, the Kombi owners desisted from filing criminal charges against Ceballos and Arcaya, and that PNB “jumped the gun” by causing the filing of Criminal Case No. 1396.

• Adequate Remedy of Appeal: Respondents contended that petitioner’s remedy was to appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, if convicted, and not the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus.
• Petition as Prelude to Countercharges: Respondents contended that the Petition was “merely a prelude by the petitioner to file possible countercharges if and when respondents might make some unguarded statements in the answer.”
• Judgment on Pleadings Improper: On appeal, respondents assigned as errors that the lower court erred in holding that their Answers failed to tender an issue or otherwise admit the material allegations of the petition, and in rendering judgment on the pleadings without a hearing.

• Injunction Against Criminal Prosecution: Whether injunction will lie to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396.
• Judgment on Pleadings: Whether the trial court properly rendered judgment on the pleadings.

• Injunction Against Criminal Prosecution: No. Injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution except in specified cases, such as to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; the records lacked clear and convincing evidence of any exception.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Yes. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in permanently enjoining the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396, as the injunction blocked the smooth and efficient functioning of the machinery of justice.
• Judgment on Pleadings: Not reached. The Court resolved the case on the more vital consideration of the injunction against criminal prosecution and expressly declined to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings.

• Injunction Against Criminal Prosecution: The Court stated that it is a long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society, except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. The Order of the trial Court of July 27, 1971 and its Decision of September 25, 1971 enjoined the further prosecution of criminal proceedings without clear and convincing evidence showing that the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1396 was false, malicious and unfounded and was filed merely to oppress petitioner, or that it was filed by the Acting Chief of Police out of political and personal considerations, or that petitioner had been deprived of his constitutional rights. Nothing in the records showed that the Acting Chief of Police had usurped any authority not belonging to him when he filed the Complaint. The filing of the criminal case was by no means intended to coerce the Kombi owners into submitting to an amicable settlement; the records indicated that the amicable settlement may have failed because of the huge sum of around P200,000.00 which the Kombi owners were trying to recover from the PNB. The unjustness of petitioner’s stance was emphasized by the fact that Criminal Case No. 1397, arising from the same incident with the Kombi owners as the offended parties and Ceballos and Arcaya as the accused, was proceeding on its normal course. It would be more in the interest of justice if the two cases were to take their course and the party responsible for the accident judicially determined. If petitioner was merely being oppressed or subjected to harassment, or if the complaint against him was filed with malice aforethought, or if the circumstances of the accident showed that he did not commit the act charged, then the chances of his acquittal would have been great; if convicted, he had the adequate remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law. But it should be up to a judicial body to determine the party criminally responsible for the vehicular accident after evaluating the evidence presented during trial on the merits.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Even without ruling on the question of propriety of the judgment on the pleadings, the trial Court had committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining permanently the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396. In doing so, it had blocked the smooth and efficient functioning of the machinery of justice. The judgment appealed from was therefore reversed and set aside, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dissolved, and Criminal Case No. 1396 ordered reinstated and heard on the merits together with Criminal Case No. 1397 if still pending.
• Judgment on Pleadings: The Court expressly declined to rule on the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings, stating that the case should be resolved on a more vital consideration. It nevertheless observed that even without ruling on that question, the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining permanently the prosecution.

• Injunction Will Not Lie to Enjoin a Criminal Prosecution — Under this doctrine, injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society. The Court recognized specified exceptions, among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. In this case, the records did not bring the prosecution within any exception; the trial court therefore erred in permanently enjoining Criminal Case No. 1396.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence Requirement for Enjoining Criminal Prosecution — To justify enjoining a criminal prosecution, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the complaint was false, malicious, and unfounded and filed merely to oppress the accused; or that it was filed by the prosecuting officer out of political and personal considerations; or that the accused had been deprived of constitutional rights. The Court found none of these circumstances present.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Enjoining Criminal Prosecution — A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion when it permanently enjoins a criminal prosecution without clear and convincing evidence of an exception, thereby blocking the smooth and efficient functioning of the machinery of justice. The Court applied this to reverse the trial court’s order and dissolve the writ.
• Adequate Remedy of Appeal in Criminal Cases — If an accused is convicted, the adequate remedy is appeal in the ordinary course of law; the determination of criminal responsibility should be left to a judicial body after trial on the merits. The Court noted that if Asutilla’s defenses were meritorious, his chances of acquittal would have been great, and if convicted, he could appeal.

• "It is a long-standing doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society except in specified cases among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on injunctions against criminal prosecution and identifies the exceptions the Court applied.
• "The Order of the trial Court of July 27, 1971 and its Decision of September 25, 1971 enjoined the further prosecution of criminal proceedings without clear and convincing evidence showing that the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1396 was false, malicious and unfounded and was filed merely to oppress petitioner, or, that it was filed by the Acting Chief of Police out of political and personal considerations, or that petitioner had been deprived of his constitutional rights." — This passage specifies the evidentiary threshold the trial court failed to satisfy before enjoining the criminal case.
• "In fine, even without ruling on the question of propriety of the judgment on the pleadings, it is clear that the trial Court had committed grave abuse of discretion in enjoining permanently the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 1396." — This passage is the ratio decidendi: the Court resolved the case on the injunction issue and found grave abuse of discretion despite not reaching the judgment on the pleadings.
• "ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the lower Court hereby dissolved; and Criminal Case No. 1396 hereby ordered reinstated and heard on the merits together with Criminal Case No. 1397 if still pending. No costs." — This passage is the dispositive portion of the resolution.

Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Patajo, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, (Chairman), J., took no part.