Asuncion vs. Court of Appeals

A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is a doctrinally accepted exception to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The search is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

The petitioner, Jose Maria M. Asuncion, also known as Binggoy and/or Vic Vargas, was a movie actor charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, the "Dangerous Drugs Act." The case arose from a police operation conducted on December 6, 1993, in Barangay Tañong, Malabon, pursuant to the Malabon Municipal Mayor's order to intensify the campaign against illegal drugs. The constitutional backdrop is Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which protects the right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures and requires a warrant issued upon probable cause determined personally by a judge.

On December 6, 1993, in compliance with the order of the Malabon Municipal Mayor to intensify the campaign against illegal drugs particularly at Barangay Tañong, the Chief of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol in the area with specific instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and to watch out for a certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. SPO1 Advincula, PO3 Parcon, PO3 Pilapil, and a police aide were dispatched at around 11:45 in the evening. The team proceeded to Barangay Tañong where they were joined by their confidential informant, who informed them that a gray Nissan car was always parked therein for the purpose of selling shabu. While patrolling along Leoño Street, the confidential informant pointed the gray Nissan car to the policemen and told them that the occupant thereof had shabu in his possession. The policemen immediately flagged down the said car along First Street and approached the driver, who turned out to be the accused Jose Maria Asuncion y Marfori, a movie actor using the screen name Vic Vargas and also known as Binggoy.

Advincula asked the accused if they could inspect the vehicle. As the accused acceded, Advincula conducted a search on the vehicle and found a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit D-1) beneath the driver's seat. The accused told the policemen that he just borrowed the car and was not the owner thereof. The accused was thereafter taken to the police headquarters for the purpose of taking his identification. However, when he was frisked by Advincula at the headquarters, the latter groped something protruding from his underwear, which when voluntarily taken out by the accused turned out to be a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exhibit D). A press conference was conducted the following day presided by Northern Police District Director Pureza, during which the accused admitted that the methamphetamine hydrochloride were for his personal use in his shooting. Advincula further testified that prior to this incident, they already had an encounter with the accused but the latter was able to evade them, and that they did not secure a search warrant for the reason that the accused uses different vehicles and they could not get his exact identity and residence. The suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride confiscated from the accused (Exhibits D and D-1) were transmitted to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division (Exhibit A), and upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibits B and C).

On the other hand, the accused denied the charges against him. He testified that on December 6, 1993, between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he was abducted at gun point in front of the house where his son lives by men who turned out to be members of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; that he was told to board at the back seat by the policemen who took over the wheels; that he acceded to be brought at the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon for drug test but only his blood pressure was checked in the said hospital; that he was thereafter brought at the Office of the Malabon Police Anti-Narcotics Unit; and that he was not aware of what happened at 11:45 in the evening as he was then sleeping at the said office. The defense anchored its case on a single document — a medical certificate signed by a Dr. Aster Sagun, Jr. of the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon — which the defense claimed proved that petitioner was forcibly abducted by the police, brought to the said hospital at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, and afterwards brought to the police station where he slept until the alleged time of his "arrest."

• Time of Commission: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that the time of commission is not material in proving the offense charged.
• Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest and Search: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the finding of the trial court that the probable cause required to effect a warrantless arrest and search existed under the circumstances as narrated by the prosecution's witnesses.
• Defense Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the defense evidence were mere denials which cannot override the positive assertions of the prosecution's witnesses.
• Illegality of Warrantless Search: In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued on "grave constitutional considerations" that the warrantless search was illegal, and that the "shabu" recovered, being illegally obtained, was inadmissible as evidence.
• Re-examination of Constitutional Issues: Petitioner also argued that the raising of constitutional issues necessitated a re-examination of the issues presented.
• Application of Aminnudin: Petitioner vigorously argued for the application of the rule enunciated in People vs. Idel Aminnudin y Ahni, wherein it was held that warrantless arrests could not be justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante delicto or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed, and that evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not by law enforcement agents.

• Urgency of the Search: The Solicitor General argued that with the knowledge and experience of the narcotic operatives, they had reasonable ground to believe that the gray Nissan car referred to by their confidential informant was one of the vehicles being used by their subject, so that when the same was pointed to them by their confidential informant, with the information that the occupant thereof was carrying shabu, the operatives had to act quickly; otherwise, they would again lose their subject whom they reasonably believed to be committing a crime at that instance, and there would be no more time for them to secure a search warrant.

• Warrantless Search of a Moving Vehicle: Whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's vehicle was valid under the moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.
• Admissibility of the Seized Drugs: Whether the prohibited drugs seized during the warrantless search were admissible in evidence.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the petitioner's defense of denial and frame-up.
• Propriety of the Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was proper given the quantity of the drug involved.

• Warrantless Search of a Moving Vehicle: Yes. The search was valid as an exception to the warrant requirement. The petitioner's vehicle was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon identification, and the situation demanded immediate action since the vehicle could be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before a warrant could be secured.
• Admissibility of the Seized Drugs: Yes. The shabu discovered was admissible in evidence because it was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search, and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to the search.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The Court found no cogent reason to deviate from the time-honored precept that findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court.
• Propriety of the Penalty: Yes. Considering that less than one (1) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" was found in the possession of petitioner, the Court agreed with the penalty imposed by the appellate court as this was in line with previous decisions on the matter.

• Warrantless Search of a Moving Vehicle: The Court recognized the well-entrenched rule that no arrest, search, and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority, as ordained by the fundamental law of the land. However, the rule is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate. The Court cited People vs. Lo Ho Wing for the rationale that the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality, considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things, and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle. The prevalent circumstances of the case bore out that the search was made as regards a moving vehicle — petitioner's vehicle was "flagged down" by the apprehending officers upon identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the petitioner's automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate action.
• Admissibility of the Seized Drugs: The Court noted that the apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence.
• Distinguishing Aminnudin: The Court distinguished the case from People vs. Idel Aminnudin y Ahni. In Aminnudin, the accused was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime, nor was it shown that he was about to do so or had just done so; he was merely descending the gangplank of a vessel, and the police had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant. In the present case, the factual circumstances were different. First, even though the police authorities already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal trade, they were uncertain as to the time he would show up in the vicinity. Secondly, they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle petitioner would be in, taking into account reports that petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area. Finally, there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter with the petitioner, who was then able to evade arrest. When the police officers suddenly sighted petitioner's gray Nissan Sentra, they obviously no longer had the time to apply for a search warrant; the dictates of urgency necessitated the flagging down of the vehicle.
• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court held that the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the positive testimonies of the apprehending police officers, SPO1 Antonio Advincula, PO3 Enriqueto Parcon, and PO3 Rolando Pilapil, more than met the quantum of proof needed to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate court was correct in giving scant consideration to the petitioner's defense, which consisted of mere denials of the incidents narrated by the prosecution witnesses. In drug-related cases, for the defense of frame-up to prosper, the evidence must be clear and convincing. The medical certificate relied upon by the defense could not possibly prove anything more than the fact that petitioner had his blood pressure checked at the hospital at a certain time; to claim that it proved something more would be to venture into speculation and guesswork.

• Moving Vehicle Exception to the Warrant Requirement — A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the search of the petitioner's vehicle, which was flagged down by police officers upon identification by a confidential informant, where the officers had no time to secure a warrant because the vehicle could be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction.
• Consent as an Exception to the Warrant Requirement — A search conducted with the voluntary consent of the person searched is valid, and evidence obtained therefrom is admissible. The Court noted that the apprehending officers sought the permission of the petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed, further supporting the admissibility of the seized drugs.
• Credibility of Witnesses — Findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. The Court applied this precept in affirming the conviction, finding no cogent reason to deviate from the lower courts' assessment of the prosecution witnesses' positive testimonies over the petitioner's mere denials.
• Frame-up Defense in Drug Cases — For the defense of frame-up to prosper in drug-related cases, the evidence must be clear and convincing. The Court held that the petitioner's defense, anchored only on a medical certificate, failed to meet this standard.

• "Well-entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the land ordains it. However, the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause." — This passage establishes the doctrinal framework for the case, recognizing the moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement as the controlling principle.
• "The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence." — This passage articulates the dual basis for the admissibility of the seized drugs: the valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle and the petitioner's consent.
• "Time and again, it has been held that the findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified before the court. In this case, this Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this time-honored precept." — This passage states the standard of appellate review for credibility findings and the Court's deference to the trial court's assessment.

• People vs. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991 (193 SCRA 122) — Cited as the authority elucidating the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the coverage of the requirement of search warrants, on the basis of practicality and the impossibility of describing the place, things, and persons to be searched when a moving vehicle is involved.
• People vs. Idel Aminnudin y Ahni, 163 SCRA 401, G.R. No. L-74869, July 6, 1998 — Distinguished from the present case; the Court explained that in Aminnudin, the accused was not caught in flagrante delicto and the police had time to secure a warrant, whereas in the present case, the urgency of the situation justified the warrantless search.
• People vs. Antolin Cuizon, G.R. No. 10928, April 18, 1996 (256 SCRA 325) — Cited in support of the admissibility of evidence obtained through a valid warrantless search with the consent of the accused.
• Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996 (257 SCRA 430) — Cited as authority for the moving vehicle exception to the warrant requirement.
• People vs. Lua, 256 SCRA 539 — Cited for the principle that findings of the lower court respecting the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect.
• People vs. Piasidad, 262 SCRA 752; De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 690; People vs. Manalo, 245 SCRA 492; Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 494 — Cited in support of the penalty imposed by the appellate court for possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision protecting the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and requiring that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. The Court recognized this as the fundamental law ordaining the warrant requirement, but applied the moving vehicle exception to uphold the warrantless search.
• Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 — The provision of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizing the possession of regulated drugs. The petitioner was charged with and convicted of violating this provision for possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu."
• Rule 113, Rules of Court — The procedural rule governing warrantless arrests, cited in the discussion of People vs. Aminnudin regarding the circumstances under which a warrantless arrest may be justified, such as when the accused is caught in flagrante delicto or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concurred.