Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines vs. NLRC

An ordinary striking worker who merely participated in an illegal strike may not be declared to have lost employment status absent substantial evidence identifying him as having knowingly committed illegal acts during the strike, and where reinstatement is no longer feasible after prolonged delay, separation pay with full backwages without deduction is the proper substitute relief.

CENAPRO Chemical Corporation employed Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana as casual employees. All rank-and-file employees were represented by CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA), which had a duly registered collective bargaining agreement with the company that excluded casual employees from union membership. After their demand for regularization was denied, the casual employees with one to six years of service organized themselves and affiliated with the Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines (AIUP).

Petitioners Densing, Mirafuentes, Patentes, and Tejana were casual employees of CENAPRO Chemical Corporation who had rendered one to six years of service. When the company denied their demand for regularization, they formed an organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines. AIUP thereafter filed a petition for certification election, which the company and the incumbent union CCEA opposed on the ground of the contract bar rule given the existing collective bargaining agreement between the company and CCEA.

On May 4 and July 3, 1990, the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and required documentation with the Department of Labor and Employment, citing unfair labor practice in the form of coercion of employees and systematic union busting. On July 23, 1992, the union staged a strike during which the strikers padlocked the company gate, formed barricades and blocked areas fronting the gate, prevented passage of the company truck, and prevented and coerced non-striking employees from reporting for work. Because of these activities, the company obtained a Temporary Restraining Order from the NLRC enjoining further violence, coercion, intimidation, and blockage of ingress and egress, which was later made permanent.

On July 25, 1990, the company filed a complaint for illegal strike, while on July 24, 1990, petitioners had filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout. According to the petitioners, they were harassed, insulted, scolded for little mistakes, issued memoranda for tardiness, and required to work another eight hours after their tour of duty. In a consolidated Decision dated September 10, 1993, the Labor Arbiter found the strike illegal, found the unfair labor practice and illegal lockout charges baseless, declared five officers — Oscar Enicio, Jaime dela Piedra, Lino Isidro, Ariel Jorda, and Jose Catnubay — to have lost employment status, excluded fifteen members who had executed quitclaims, and ordered reinstatement of six workers including the four petitioners herein. The October 8, 1993 Order narrowed the reinstatement to Densing, Mirafuentes, Patentes, and Tejana, whose payroll reinstatement from October 15, 1993 was sustained by the NLRC on August 15, 1994 before being modified on reconsideration on February 21, 1995.

• Grave Abuse in Entertaining Second Appeal: Petitioner argued that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the April 6, 1994 appeal, which was based on similar grounds as the October 5, 1993 appeal, and in issuing a contradictory ruling on February 21, 1995 reversing its August 15, 1994 affirmance.
• Union Busting and Unfair Labor Practice: Petitioner maintained that the strike was grounded on coercion of employees and systematic union busting constituting unfair labor practice.
• Weight of Labor Arbiter Findings: Petitioner argued that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter as trial officer, who observed the demeanor of witnesses, deserved much weight and should not have been disturbed absent substantial proof based on speculation.
• Reinstatement and Backwages: Petitioner maintained that Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana were deprived of the right to reinstatement and backwages, and that Joel Densing was deprived of the right to reinstatement or separation pay with backwages.

• Loss of Status for All Participants: Respondent argued that all union members who participated in the illegal strike should be declared to have lost employment status.
• Strained Relations and Separation Pay: Respondent countered that reinstatement was unwise and inappropriate because the circumstances had strained the parties' relationship, and sought payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement.
• Proof of Illegal Acts: Respondent maintained that sufficient testimonial, documentary, and real evidence, including photographs taken by Mr. Ponce, were presented at arbitration showing the strikers' participation in illegal acts such as blocking the gate and preventing the truck from proceeding.

• Second Appeal: Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in entertaining the second appeal based on similar grounds and modifying its earlier affirmance.
• Legality of Strike and Officers' Dismissal: Whether the strike was illegal for commission of prohibited acts and violation of the restraining order, justifying the officers' loss of employment status, and whether unfair labor practice, union busting, and illegal lockout were committed.
• Loss of Status of Ordinary Strikers: Whether Joel Densing, and by extension Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, knowingly participated in illegal acts during the strike so as to lose employment status.
• Reinstatement, Separation Pay, and Backwages: Whether the three petitioners were entitled to reinstatement with backwages rather than separation pay without backwages, and whether Densing was entitled to reinstatement or separation pay with backwages.

• Second Appeal: No. The two appeals were separate and distinct remedies, the first from the September 10, 1993 decision on the merits and the second in effect an opposition to the March 23, 1994 writ of execution for immediate reinstatement.
• Legality of Strike and Officers' Dismissal: Yes. The strike was illegal for obstruction, coercion, and violation of the TRO, with no unfair labor practice, union busting, or lockout, so dismissal of the participating union officers was justified under Article 264(a).
• Loss of Status of Ordinary Strikers: No. Mere participation in an illegal strike does not justify termination of ordinary workers without proof identifying them as having committed illegal acts, and the uncorroborated reference to strikers did not meet substantial evidence.
• Reinstatement, Separation Pay, and Backwages: Yes. Reinstatement with full backwages from October 15, 1993 was warranted under Article 223, converted to separation pay of one month per year of service only because more than eight years had passed.

• Second Appeal: The first appeal filed October 5, 1993 assailed the Labor Arbiter's September 10, 1993 decision and sought loss of employment status for all participating members, while the April 6, 1994 appeal assailed the March 23, 1994 second writ ordering actual or payroll reinstatement of the four petitioners. Because the subjects and reliefs differed, entertaining and separately acting upon both did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
• Legality of Strike and Officers' Dismissal: The unfair labor practice claim failed because scolding for mistakes, memoranda for tardiness, and ordinary administrative supervision were not harassment, and the claim of sixteen-hour work was uncorroborated as to dates, instances, and actual performance. The action was characterized as a union-recognition strike to compel recognition despite an existing CBA with CCEA, barred outside the sixty-day freedom period under the contract bar rule, so no union busting occurred. Illegality was established because strikers formed human barricades, blocked the road and truck passage, padlocked the gate, prevented co-workers from entering, and violated the TRO enjoining obstruction; even a strike lawful in objective becomes invalid when illegal means under Article 264(e) are used. Consequently, officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike or illegal acts were validly dismissed under Article 264(a), their responsibility being greater as duty-bound guides of members. No lockout occurred, defined as temporary refusal to furnish work due to a labor dispute, since petitioners voluntarily stopped working and admitted non-strikers who wished to return were allowed to do so.
• Loss of Status of Ordinary Strikers: Under Article 264(a), an ordinary worker may be declared to have lost employment status only upon proof that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike, with the striker duly identified; proof beyond reasonable doubt is unnecessary but substantial evidence sufficient to support dismissal is required. The sole basis against Densing was Mr. Ponce's testimony that several strikers blocked the gate, with the record noting reference to five persons present including Densing, without exhibiting the alleged photographs for identification of petitioners as was done for other persons. Similarly, identification of Mirafuentes, Patentes, and Tejana rested only on testimony that persons lying on the road in a picture were strikers or AIU complainants. Such generic, uncorroborated references did not hurdle the substantial evidence test, which explains why the Labor Arbiter and the August 15, 1994 NLRC decision had upheld reinstatement, and factual findings of the Labor Arbiter as trial officer were entitled to full consideration absent speculation.
• Reinstatement, Separation Pay, and Backwages: Under Article 223, the Labor Arbiter's reinstatement order is immediately executory pending appeal by admission back to work or payroll reinstatement, with posting of bond not staying execution. The February 21, 1995 deletion of backwages stated no plausible basis, and being not entirely faultless did not defeat entitlement where no just ground for dismissal of the four was shown; the employer's unmeritorious appeal and delay left payroll reinstatement as the only option. Full backwages without deduction from October 15, 1993 until full payment of separation pay were therefore ordered, with separation pay of one month per year of service authorized in lieu of actual reinstatement as more practical after more than eight years.

• Illegal strike due to illegal means — Even if a strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, it may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal, particularly violence, coercion, intimidation, obstruction of ingress or egress, or obstruction of public thoroughfares under Article 264(e). Applied here to declare the union-recognition strike illegal because strikers barricaded roads, blocked the company truck, padlocked the gate, coerced non-strikers, and violated the TRO.
• Union-recognition strike and contract bar rule — A union-recognition strike seeks to compel recognition as bargaining representative despite doubtful majority and lack of certification, and cannot succeed where a duly registered CBA exists because a certification election petition may be entertained only within sixty days prior to expiry. Applied to reject union busting where AIUP sought certification despite the existing CBA with CCEA.
• Liability of union officers in illegal strike — Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike or in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost employment status, officers bearing greater responsibility to guide members to respect the law. Applied to sustain dismissal of the five officers who participated in the illegal strike in Association of Independent Unions in the Philippines (AIUP) et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission et al.
• Liability of ordinary strikers; identification and substantial evidence — An ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike; there must be proof, by substantial evidence, that he knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts and he must be duly identified. Applied to reverse Densing's loss of status and sustain the three other petitioners, since generic references to strikers and unexhibited photographs were not substantial evidence.
• Lockout — Lockout means temporary refusal of the employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Applied to find no illegal lockout where workers voluntarily withdrew services to compel union recognition and non-strikers were allowed to return.
• Immediately executory reinstatement; separation pay and full backwages — The Labor Arbiter's reinstatement order is immediately executory pending appeal by actual or payroll reinstatement, and where reinstatement becomes impractical after long lapse of time, separation pay of one month per year of service with full backwages without deduction is proper. Applied to grant full backwages from October 15, 1993 until payment of separation pay after more than eight years.

• "Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial". Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion." — States the substantial-evidence test for administrative adjudication, used to reject uncorroborated identification of Densing and the other petitioners.
• ". . . any worker . . who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. . ." — States the statutory predicate for dismissing ordinary strikers, construed to require proof of illegal acts plus individual identification, not mere participation.
• ". . . In any event, the decision of the labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee shall be immediately executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of bond shall not stay the execution of the reinstatement provided therein. . . ." — States the executory character of reinstatement, used to sustain payroll salaries and backwages despite the employer's appeals.

• Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 — Followed as the landmark formulation of substantial evidence required to support administrative findings, applied to test the evidence against Densing and the other petitioners.
• Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627 — Followed for the rule that an ordinary striking employee cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike without proof of commission of illegal acts.
• Bustamante vs. NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 — Followed to order payment of full backwages without deductions from October 15, 1993 until full payment of separation pay.
• United Seamen's Union of the Philippines vs. Davao Shipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226 — Cited as example where a strike was illegal because strikers formed a human cordon blocking ways to vessels, analogous to the barricades here.
• Continental Cement Labor Union vs. Continental Cement Corporation, 189 SCRA 134 — Cited for the greater responsibility of union officers to respect the law, supporting dismissal of officers urging violation.
• Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. vs. NLRC, 226 SCRA 499 — Cited for the principle that the strike is the most effective weapon to improve terms and conditions of employment, but must be pursued within legal bounds.
• People vs. Gelaver, 223 SCRA 310 — Cited for deference to the trial officer's factual findings absent speculation, supporting reliance on the Labor Arbiter's assessment.

• Article 264(a), Labor Code — Provides that a union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike or in illegal acts, and any worker who knowingly participates in illegal acts during a strike, may lose employment status; applied to sustain officers' dismissal but reverse that of ordinary petitioners for lack of identified illegal acts.
• Article 264(e), Labor Code — Prohibits picketers from committing violence, coercion, intimidation, obstructing ingress or egress, or obstructing public thoroughfares; applied to declare the strike illegal due to barricades, padlocking, and coercion.
• Article 223, Labor Code — Makes a Labor Arbiter's reinstatement order immediately executory pending appeal through actual or payroll reinstatement; applied to uphold salaries from October 15, 1993 and full backwages.
• Article 212(p), Labor Code — Defines lockout as temporary refusal to furnish work resulting from a labor dispute; applied to find no illegal lockout.
• Article 231, Labor Code and Sec. 3, par. 2, Rule XI, Book V, Implementing Rules — Imposes the contract bar rule allowing a certification election petition only within sixty days before CBA expiry; applied to reject the AIUP petition and union-busting claim.

Romero, J., Vitug, J., Panganiban, J. and Gonzaga-Reyes, J., concur.