Asignado vs. Office of the Ombudsman

The Ombudsman's dismissal of criminal charges for lack of probable cause may be reviewed by the Supreme Court via Rule 65 certiorari upon allegation of grave abuse of discretion, but where the elements of the charged offenses are not reasonably likely present — particularly absent any proof of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, undue injury, pecuniary benefit, or violence — the Court will not disturb the Ombudsman's finding. The administrative aspect of a consolidated Ombudsman ruling that exonerates a respondent is final and unappealable, and the proper remedy to challenge it is a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court.

Petitioners were officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the Bureau of Fire Protection Mutual Aid & Beneficiary Association, Inc. (BFPMBAI), a mutual aid association for BFP personnel, while private respondent Romero was a Fire Chief Superintendent who served as BFP Officer-in-Charge. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated March 6, 2006 between BFP and BFPMBAI authorized BFP to periodically deduct BFPMBAI contributions from the payroll salaries of BFP personnel and remit the same to BFPMBAI. The MOA was signed by Asignado as BFP Chief and Romero as BFPMBAI President. The dispute arose from a contested BFPMBAI board election held on June 30, 2012, which produced two rival sets of trustees and triggered the withholding of remittances that petitioners alleged constituted graft and coercion.

Petitioners were officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the Bureau of Fire Protection Mutual Aid & Beneficiary Association, Inc. (BFPMBAI), with the exception of Asignado, who was BFPMBAI's founder and chairman emeritus. On March 6, 2006, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between BFPMBAI and the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), whereby BFP undertook to periodically deduct from the payroll salaries of all BFP personnel who were BFPMBAI members and remit said deductions to BFPMBAI. The MOA was signed by Asignado as BFP Chief and by Romero as BFPMBAI President. The deduction and remittance scheme proceeded without incident until February 2013.

The controversy originated in the 6th BFPMBAI General Membership Meeting and election held on June 30, 2012, at which nine members of the BFPMBAI Board of Trustees were to be elected. According to the undated Report of the BFPMBAI Committee on Elections (COMELEC), only 167 of 3,007 members were present, but the presiding officer — Fire Chief Superintendent Danilo R. Cabrera, described as a supposed ally of Romero — cast the votes of 2,840 absent members in favor of Romero and candidates allied with him. The BFPMBAI COMELEC did not proclaim any winners and instead issued a "status quo ante order" in light of anticipated queries before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Petitioners and their fellow complainants nonetheless assumed and administered the affairs of BFPMBAI, viewing the additional votes and new tally as without basis. Romero, for his part, had earlier received a Letter-Reply from the SEC dated October 19, 2012, which declined to render a legal opinion on the election controversy but noted that a majority of bona fide BFPMBAI members were not present during the election.

Romero was designated BFP Officer-in-Charge on January 11, 2013. Upon assumption of duties, he learned that petitioners had taken over BFPMBAI's management despite the COMELEC's status quo ante order. On February 5, 2013, Collado, then BFPMBAI President, wrote Romero invoking the MOA and demanding the immediate release of the January 2013 remittances. On February 8, 2013, Romero issued a Memorandum to the BFP Cash Management Division Chief directing the temporary stoppage of deductions from the Continuous Form Checks for salaries and allowances of BFP personnel, effective February 2013, pending legal resolution as to the legitimate set of BFPMBAI officers. The Memorandum also ordered the immediate refund of amounts already deducted for January 2013. Collado sent a follow-up letter on February 20, 2013 to the BFP Cash Management Division Chief inquiring into the refusal to remit, but received no reply. Petitioners alleged that in meetings with Romero, he declared he would release the remittances only on the condition that he be seated as chairman and the voted-out trustees assume board positions.

On March 8, 2013, petitioners and their fellow complainants, acting as BFPMBAI's Board of Trustees, issued Resolution No. 13-04, which accepted the resignation of F/CSupt. Ruben F. Bearis as Vice Chairman and elected Romero as his replacement. Petitioners claimed this resolution was issued under Romero's "continuing intimidation, compulsion, and insistence." Romero denied any knowledge of or involvement in the resolution, characterizing it as self-serving. On March 14, 2013, Romero met with representatives from Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. to work out the uninterrupted processing of BFPMBAI members' insurance claims during the controversy. On March 21, 2013, Romero filed a Complaint-in-Interpleader before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-13-72923, against the two competing groups claiming to be the legitimate BFPMBAI Board of Trustees, praying for the deposit of the outstanding remittances with the court and release to whichever group was entitled. On July 15, 2013, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining petitioners from conducting business as BFPMBAI's Board of Trustees during the pendency of the case. As of March 27, 2013, the accumulated unremitted deductions amounted to ₱18,595,384.23, which reverted to the Bureau of the Treasury.

Petitioners filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman charging Romero with violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019 and Article 286 of the RPC, as well as administrative offenses of grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, oppression, and grave abuse of authority. The Ombudsman, in its Joint Resolution dated June 20, 2014, dismissed all charges, finding that a legal controversy existed as to who should be recognized as the legitimate Board of Trustees, that Romero was justified in withholding the remittances and filing the interpleader case, and that there was no showing of ill will since the withheld funds reverted to the Bureau of the Treasury. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman's Joint Order dated December 21, 2015.

• Legitimacy of the Board: Petitioners asserted that Romero never questioned their election as the rightful Board of Trustees through an intra-corporate controversy before the appropriate RTC within 15 days of the June 30, 2012 election, as required by the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, and thus their election could no longer be questioned — giving Romero no legal ground to stop the remittances.
• Separate Legal Personality: Petitioners maintained that any doubt as to their legitimacy as the Board was irrelevant given BFPMBAI's separate and distinct legal personality from its Board of Trustees, meaning the remittances would go to BFPMBAI as an institution, not merely into the hands of its Board.
• Invalidity of the Interpleader: Petitioners argued that Romero's Complaint-in-Interpleader could not substitute for the intra-corporate controversy he should have filed, and was thus improperly filed.
• Admission Against Interest: Petitioners pointed to Romero's loan application from BFPMBAI dated August 3, 2012, approved by Collado on behalf of the Board, as an admission and recognition of petitioners' authority as the legitimate Board of Trustees.
• Nature of the Remittances: Petitioners contended that the remittances were already private property of BFPMBAI members once deposited into their ATM accounts, and thus Romero had no legal ground to stop payment under the MOA.
• Alleged Bias of Deputy Ombudsman: Petitioners alleged that former Deputy Ombudsman for the Military & Other Law Enforcement Offices Cyril E. Ramos had been a financial consultant of Romero during the controversy, suggesting influence and partiality in the dismissal of charges.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Private respondent countered that the Ombudsman committed neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion in dismissing all charges, as the BFPMBAI COMELEC never proclaimed any winners and issued a status quo ante order, creating a genuine legal controversy.
• Justified Stoppage: Romero argued that the unresolved electoral controversy and the resulting separate sets of BFPMBAI officers compelled him to act prudently by ordering the stoppage of remittances and filing the interpleader case, recognizing the jurisdiction of the courts to settle the dispute.
• Absence of Ill Will: Romero maintained there was no showing of any ill will on his part, as the withheld funds reverted to the Bureau of the Treasury and were not misappropriated or pilfered, and he took steps to ensure BFPMBAI members' insurance claims were processed during the controversy.
• No Coercion: Romero denied compelling, intimidating, or threatening petitioners, and disclaimed any knowledge of or involvement in Resolution No. 13-04, characterizing it as self-serving and issued without his participation.

• Jurisdiction over Administrative Aspect: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the Ombudsman's dismissal of the administrative charges against private respondent.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to charge private respondent with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to charge private respondent with violation of Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Article 286 of the RPC: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to charge private respondent with Grave Coercion under Article 286 of the RPC.

• Jurisdiction over Administrative Aspect: No. The administrative dismissal had already attained finality because the proper remedy to assail the Ombudsman's exoneration of a respondent in an administrative case is a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals, not a direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: No. The third element (manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence) and the fourth element (undue injury or unwarranted benefits) were both lacking, as Romero's actions were motivated by a desire to protect the interests of BFP and BFPMBAI, and the withheld funds reverted to the Bureau of the Treasury without any showing of personal benefit.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019: No. The fourth element — that the failure to act was for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary or material benefit — was not established, petitioners having submitted only bare allegations unsubstantiated by any evidence.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Article 286 of the RPC: No. There was no evidence of violence, threats, or intimidation on the part of Romero, save for bare and unsubstantiated allegations, and Resolution No. 13-04 contained no extrinsic reference to any concrete action by Romero.

• Jurisdiction over Administrative Aspect: The Court clarified, citing Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Yatco vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, that the proper remedy to assail the complete exoneration of a respondent in an administrative case decided by the Ombudsman is an original petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court. When the Ombudsman renders a consolidated ruling disposing of both criminal and administrative aspects, the aggrieved party must take the appropriate procedural remedies to separately assail each component. A Rule 65 certiorari petition before the Supreme Court is proper only for the criminal aspect. Because petitioners filed directly with the Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals for the administrative aspect, that dismissal attained finality and the Court lacked jurisdiction to review it.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: The elements of Section 3(e) are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of official, administrative, or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the officer caused undue injury to any party or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The Court found both the third and fourth elements severely lacking. While Romero may have lacked proper authority to order the stoppage — given that remittances to associations like BFPMBAI are authorized deductions chargeable to personnel services appropriations under the Administrative Code of 1987 — his actions belied any actual intent to protect the interests of BFP and BFPMBAI. He was motivated by his assessment that the remittances would likely be mishandled due to the conflicting sets of trustees, and he took steps to ensure BFPMBAI members' insurance claims were processed. Citing Suba vs. Sandiganbayan, bad faith under Section 3(e) does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but requires a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose, a deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage. Absent concrete proof of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence, no criminal intent could be imputed. As to undue injury, the Court cited Tiro vs. Hontanosas for the rule that a salary check does not belong to the government employee before physical delivery, and since the unremitted amounts never reached BFPMBAI members' accounts, they were not yet their personal property and they suffered no injury. As to unwarranted benefits, all unremitted remittances reverted to the Bureau of the Treasury, and petitioners did not allege any misappropriation.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019: The elements of Section 3(f) are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the officer neglected or refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request; (3) reasonable time has elapsed without the officer acting; and (4) such failure to act was for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage. The fourth element was lacking. Petitioners' allegations that Romero held the remittances "hostage" in return for the ousting of petitioners' board, recognition of Romero as chairperson, or issuance of Resolution No. 13-04 were bare allegations unsubstantiated by any evidence. No transcript or record of conversations was presented, and no pecuniary or material benefit was shown. Mere inferences and conjectures regarding the rivalry between the two electoral camps were insufficient for probable cause.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Article 286 of the RPC: The elements of Grave Coercion are: (1) a person is prevented from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will; (2) the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or intimidation; and (3) the person restraining another has no right to do so. There was no evidence of violence, threats, or intimidation on the part of Romero beyond bare and unsubstantiated allegations. Resolution No. 13-04 contained no extrinsic reference to any concrete action by Romero demanding its issuance. A criminal charge for grave coercion based on mere imputation bred no probable cause for indictment.

• Policy of Non-Interference with the Ombudsman's Probable Cause Findings — As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, respecting the initiative and independence inherent in the Office. The Ombudsman's findings as to probable cause are generally not reviewable. The exception is where there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in which case the Court may review under its expanded power of judicial review. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction — the exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. In this case, petitioners failed to discharge their burden of showing such grave abuse.

• Separate Remedies for Consolidated Ombudsman Rulings — When the Ombudsman consolidates criminal and administrative charges and renders a joint resolution, the aggrieved party must take the appropriate procedural remedies to separately assail the administrative and criminal components. A Rule 65 certiorari petition before the Supreme Court is the proper remedy for the criminal aspect (finding or absence of probable cause). For the administrative aspect, if the ruling is final and unappealable (as when the respondent is exonerated, publicly censured, reprimanded, or suspended for not more than one month's salary), the proper remedy is a Rule 65 certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals. If the administrative ruling is appealable (penalty exceeding one month's salary suspension), the proper remedy is a Rule 43 appeal before the Court of Appeals. Failure to resort to the proper remedy renders the corresponding aspect final and unreviewable.

• Bad Faith Under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 — Bad faith referred to under Section 3(e) does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but requires a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It connotes a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will, or ulterior purpose. It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent of ill will and partakes of the nature of fraud. Bad faith per se is not enough; it must be evident and must partake of the nature of fraud — a manifestly deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage.

• Ownership of Salary Checks Before Delivery — The salary check of a government officer or employee does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to him; until that time, the check belongs to the government. Before actual delivery, the payee has no power over it and cannot assign it without the consent of the Government. Thus, unremitted payroll deductions that never reached BFPMBAI members' accounts were not yet their personal property, and they suffered no injury from the non-remittance.

• "Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner — which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law — in order to exceptionally warrant judicial intervention." — This passage articulates the standard for judicial intervention in Ombudsman findings, defining the threshold of grave abuse of discretion that must be met before the Court will depart from its policy of non-interference.

• "Jurisprudence instructs that bad faith referred to under Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive, or ill will." — This is the canonical formulation of the bad faith element under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, frequently cited in anti-grraft jurisprudence to distinguish actionable bad faith from mere errors in judgment.

• "[M]ere disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings is not enough reason to constitute grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner must show that the preliminary investigation was conducted in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law." — This passage defines the limits of certiorari review over Ombudsman determinations of probable cause, emphasizing that mere disagreement with findings is insufficient.

• "However, after the Ombudsman renders its consolidated ruling, the aggrieved party is then required to take the appropriate procedural remedies to separately assail the administrative and criminal components of the same." — This passage, quoted from Yatco vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, establishes the rule that consolidated Ombudsman rulings require separate procedural remedies for their administrative and criminal aspects.

• Joson vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 784 Phil. 172 (2016) — Controlling precedent on the proper remedy for assailing the Ombudsman's dismissal of administrative charges; held that the correct procedure is to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, not the Supreme Court.
• Yatco vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 244775, July 6, 2020 — Followed; clarified the distinct procedural remedies for criminal and administrative aspects of consolidated Ombudsman rulings, and the proper forum for each.
• Gatchalian vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 838 Phil. 140 (2018) — Cited in the jurisprudential lineage on the Court's jurisdiction over original petitions for certiorari assailing the Ombudsman's rulings in criminal cases involving findings of probable cause.
• Casing vs. Ombudsman, 687 Phil. 468 (2012) — Cited for the doctrine on the Court's limited power to review the Ombudsman's exercise of prosecutorial powers, and the definition of grave abuse of discretion warranting judicial intervention.
• Tupaz vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, G.R. Nos. 212491-92, March 6, 2019 — Followed; restated the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
• Suba vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 235418, March 3, 2021 — Followed; articulated the standard for bad faith under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, requiring deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage spurred by corrupt motive.
• Tiro vs. Hontanosas, 211 Phil. 47 (1983) — Applied; ruled that a salary check does not belong to the government employee before physical delivery, establishing that unremitted deductions not yet deposited to members' accounts were not their personal property.
• Lacap vs. Sandiganbayan, 811 Phil. 441 (2017) — Followed; restated the elements of Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019.
• Sy vs. Secretary of Justice, 540 Phil. 111 (2006) — Followed; outlined the elements of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of the RPC.
• Arroyo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 210488, January 27, 2020 — Applied; held that mere disagreement with the Ombudsman's findings does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Penalizes public officers who cause undue injury to any party or give unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of official functions. The Court found the third and fourth elements lacking — no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence was shown, and no undue injury or unwarranted benefit was established.
• Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 3019 — Penalizes public officers who neglect or refuse to act without sufficient justification after due demand or request, for the purpose of obtaining pecuniary or material benefit or advantage. The Court found the fourth element lacking — no evidence of any pecuniary or material benefit to Romero.
• Article 286, Revised Penal Code (Grave Coercions) — Penalizes any person who, without authority of law, by means of violence, threats, or intimidation, prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compels him to do something against his will. The Court found no evidence of violence, threats, or intimidation.
• Book VI, Chapter 5, Section 38, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) — Authorizes the President to suspend or stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, except personnel services appropriations for permanent officials and employees. The Court noted that Romero seemingly lacked proper authority to order the stoppage, as remittances to associations like BFPMBAI are authorized deductions chargeable to personnel services appropriations — but this legal error did not amount to criminal intent.
• Book VI, Chapter 4, Section 28, Administrative Code of 1987 — Provides that unexpended balances of appropriations revert to the unappropriated surplus of the General Fund at the end of the fiscal year and are not thereafter available for expenditure except by subsequent legislative enactment. The Court noted that Romero had no right of disposal over the reverted funds, but this did not establish criminal liability.
• Articles 1256 and 1258, Civil Code of the Philippines — Govern consignation of payment when a creditor refuses to accept payment or when two or more persons claim the same right to collect. The Court noted that Romero's interpleader filing would have necessitated consignation of the remittance amounts, which was seemingly impossible after reversion to the Bureau of the Treasury.
• Rule 65, Section 5, 1997 Rules of Court — Provides that when a petition relates to acts of a quasi-judicial agency, the public respondent need not appear or participate unless specifically directed by the court. The Court granted the Ombudsman's request to be excused as a nominal party.
• Section 27, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides that Ombudsman decisions imposing public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month's salary are final and unappealable. By implication, rulings exonerating a respondent from administrative liability are also final and unappealable, reviewable only via Rule 65 certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

• Inting, J. — Concurred.
• Dimaampao, J. — Concurred.
• Singh, J. — Concurred.
• Caguioa, J. (Chairperson) — Filed a separate concurring opinion elaborating on: (1) the distinction between Rule 43 and Rule 65 remedies for administrative cases before the Ombudsman, emphasizing that the aggrieved party does not have the option of freely resorting to either remedy and that non-conformity with the appropriate remedy precludes further review; (2) the Court's authority to make a definitive determination of lack of probable cause rather than remanding to the Ombudsman, citing Tupaz vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for the proposition that where grave abuse of discretion is found, the Court may set aside the Ombudsman's findings and direct the filing of information; and (3) the sufficiency of the Ombudsman's finding that Romero acted without ill will or malice, noting that the reversion of funds to the Bureau of Treasury belied any imputation of bad faith and that the inconvenience of requiring subsequent legislative enactment for expenditure did not rise to the level of a criminal element.