Aruelo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not prohibit the filing of motions to dismiss or motions for bill of particulars in election protests before the Regional Trial Court; such proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court, and the Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. An answer filed within five days from receipt of the order denying a motion for a bill of particulars is timely under Section 1(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates for the office of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan in the May 11, 1992 elections. The dispute concerned the procedural rules governing an election protest filed before the Regional Trial Court, particularly the interplay between the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the Revised Rules of Court. The COMELEC Rules, except Part VI, apply to proceedings before the Commission, while Part VI applies to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.

Gregorio M. Aruelo, Jr. and Danilo F. Gatchalian were rival candidates for the office of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan in the May 11, 1992 elections. Gatchalian was proclaimed the duly elected Vice-Mayor on May 13, 1992, having won over Aruelo by a margin of four votes. On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the COMELEC a petition docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of fraudulent alteration and tampering of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns. On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition docketed as Civil Case No. 343-M-92 protesting the same election, and he informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC. On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC denied Aruelo's petition for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166, which requires the submission of the evidence and documents in support of the petition to annul Gatchalian's proclamation.

Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial court on June 10, 1992, giving him five days within which to answer the petition. Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian filed on June 15, 1992 a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the petition was filed out of time, that there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC, and that Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss on July 10, 1992, ordered Gatchalian to file his answer within five days from notice, and directed Aruelo to pay the deficiency in his filing fee, which Aruelo complied with. Gatchalian filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the trial court denied it on August 3, 1992. On July 23, 1992, Gatchalian filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, which Aruelo opposed. The trial court denied the motion in an order dated August 5, 1992, a copy of which Gatchalian received on August 6, 1992.

On August 6, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and his Motion for Reconsideration. On August 11, 1992, Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim, alleging that Aruelo was the one who committed the election fraud and that were it not for the said fraud, Gatchalian's margin over Aruelo would have been greater. Gatchalian prayed for the dismissal of the petition, the confirmation of his election, and the award of damages. On the day the answer was filed, the trial court issued an order admitting it and, without Gatchalian's specific prayer, directed the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated in Gatchalian's Counter-Protest and the delivery of the contested ballot boxes to the Branch Clerk of Court. Aruelo filed a Motion to Reconsider As Well As To Set Aside the Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim as filed out of time. The trial court denied Aruelo's motion on September 2, 1992 and scheduled the constitution of the revision committee.

On September 21, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28977, again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the Order dated August 5, 1992, which denied his Motion for Bill of Particulars. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition on September 28, 1992 for lack of merit. On September 28, 1992, Aruelo prayed before the Court of Appeals for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the trial court from implementing the Order of August 11, 1992 regarding the revision of ballots. The Court of Appeals belatedly issued a temporary restraining order on November 9, 1992, after the actual revision of the contested ballots ended on October 28, 1992. On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, denying Gatchalian's petition but declaring that his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed; it also lifted the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below. Hence, Aruelo filed the present petition.

• Applicability of COMELEC Rules: Aruelo claimed that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the petition under Part VI, Rule 35, Section 7.
• Prohibition on Motions: Aruelo maintained that the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of those pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period or give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
• Lapsed Period: Aruelo argued that the five-day period had already lapsed when Gatchalian filed his Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim.
• Certiorari and Prohibition: Aruelo sought to set aside the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 24, 1992, which ruled that Gatchalian's answer and counter-protest was filed timely and ordered the Regional Trial Court to continue with the proceedings.

• Timeliness of Protest: In his Motion to Dismiss before the trial court, Gatchalian claimed that Aruelo's petition was filed out of time.
• Pending COMELEC Case: Gatchalian claimed that there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC.
• Filing Fees and Deposit: Gatchalian claimed that Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: In his petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, Gatchalian alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration, and in denying his Motion for Bill of Particulars.

• Applicability of COMELEC Rules to RTC Election Protests: Whether Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which prohibits motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars, applies to an election protest filed before the Regional Trial Court.
• Timeliness of Answer: Whether Gatchalian's Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed after the denial of his Motion for Bill of Particulars.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the answer was timely and ordering the trial court to continue with the proceedings.

• Applicability of COMELEC Rules to RTC Election Protests: No. The COMELEC Rules, except Part VI, apply to proceedings before the COMELEC; Part VI applies to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts, but it does not prohibit motions to dismiss or bills of particulars in regular courts. The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
• Timeliness of Answer: Yes. Under Section 1(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days from receipt of the order denying a motion for a bill of particulars to file an answer; Gatchalian received the order on August 6, 1992 and filed his answer on August 11, 1992.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the answer was timely and properly ordered the trial court to proceed with dispatch.

• Applicability of COMELEC Rules to RTC Election Protests: The election protest was filed with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. Under Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the rules except Part VI apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission, while Part VI applies to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction. Nowhere in Part VI is it provided that motions to dismiss and bills of particulars are not allowed in election protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular courts. Constitutionally, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts because the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
• Timeliness of Answer: Gatchalian received a copy of the Regional Trial Court order denying his Motion for Bill of Particulars on August 6, 1992. Under Section 1(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Gatchalian therefore had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion was found on the part of the Court of Appeals. The case is different from a pre-proclamation controversy, which the law expressly mandates to be resolved in a summary proceeding under B.P. Blg. 881, Article XX, Section 246 and COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Section 2, as held in Dipatuan vs. Commission on Elections. Pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators' desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidate be done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. Questions involving the appreciation of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest, as held in Abella vs. Larrazabal and Alonto vs. Commission on Elections. An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office; over and above the desire of the candidates to win is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For this reason, laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end that the popular will, expressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated, as held in Unda vs. Commission on Elections, De Leon vs. Guadiz, Jr., Macasundig vs. Macalangan, and Corocoro vs. Bascara.

• COMELEC Rules of Procedure do not govern pleadings in election protests before regular courts — The COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts because the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme Court. Applied to this case, Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure did not apply to Aruelo's election protest before the Regional Trial Court.
• Timeliness of answer after denial of motion for bill of particulars — Under Section 1(b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days from receipt of the order denying a motion for a bill of particulars to file an answer. Applied to this case, Gatchalian's answer filed on August 11, 1992, five days after his receipt on August 6, 1992 of the order denying his Motion for Bill of Particulars, was timely.
• Liberal construction of election protest laws — Laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to ensure that the popular will, expressed in the election of public officers, is not defeated by purely technical reasons. Applied to this case, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ruling allowing the election protest to proceed.
• Pre-proclamation controversies are summary; election protests are not — Pre-proclamation controversies are resolved in summary proceedings to ensure that the canvass of votes and proclamation of the winning candidate are done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. Questions involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of balloting require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration and are left for examination in the corresponding election protest. Applied to this case, the Court distinguished the summary nature of pre-proclamation controversies from the election protest before the Regional Trial Court.

• "Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts." — This states the core ruling on the non-applicability of the COMELEC rule prohibiting motions to dismiss and bills of particulars to election protests filed before the Regional Trial Court.
• "Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5])." — This articulates the constitutional basis for invalidating the COMELEC rule's application to regular courts and affirms the Supreme Court's exclusive rule-making power over pleadings and procedure in all courts.
• "Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars." — This is the controlling rule applied to hold that Gatchalian's Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely filed.
• "An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people." — This expresses the public-interest rationale for the liberal construction of election protest laws.

• Dipatuan vs. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 86 [1990] — Cited to support the rule that pre-proclamation controversies are resolved in summary proceedings.
• Abella vs. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 [1989] — Cited for the rule that questions involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of balloting are left for examination in the corresponding election protest.
• Alonto vs. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 878 [1968] — Cited for the same rule that questions involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of balloting are left for election protest.
• Unda vs. Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA 827 [1990] — Cited for the principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally construed so that the popular will is not defeated by purely technical reasons.
• De Leon vs. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA 591 [1981] — Cited for the same principle of liberal construction of election protest laws.
• Macasundig vs. Macalangan, 13 SCRA 577 [1965] — Cited for the same principle of liberal construction of election protest laws.
• Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 519 [1963] — Cited for the same principle of liberal construction of election protest laws.

• Section 2, Rule 1, Part I, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provides that the rules, except Part VI, apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the Commission, while Part VI applies to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction. The Court used this to show that Part VI does not prohibit motions to dismiss or bills of particulars in regular courts.
• Section 1, Rule 13, Part III, COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Petitioner invoked this as prohibiting motions to dismiss and motions for bill of particulars. The Court held it inapplicable to proceedings before the regular courts.
• Section 1(b), Rule 12, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that a party has at least five days to file an answer after receipt of the order denying a motion for a bill of particulars. Applied to hold Gatchalian's answer timely.
• Article VIII, Section 5(5), 1987 Constitution — Vests the power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts in the Supreme Court. The Court used this to reject any COMELEC rule prohibiting pleadings in regular courts.
• B.P. Blg. 881, Article XX, Section 246 — Requires pre-proclamation controversies to be resolved in summary proceedings. Cited to distinguish them from election protests.
• COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Section 2 — Also requires summary proceedings for pre-proclamation controversies. Cited to distinguish them from election protests.
• Section 20, R.A. No. 7166 — Requires the submission of evidence and documents in support of a petition to annul a proclamation. The COMELEC denied Aruelo's pre-proclamation petition for non-compliance with this section.

Cruz and Bellosillo, JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., J., concurs in the result. Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.