Artillero vs. Casimiro

A punong barangay is authorized by Section 389(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction in the performance of peace and order functions, without need for a PTCFOR under P.D. 1866 as amended, and this statutory authority constitutes "legal authority" that exempts him from criminal liability for carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence. The constitutional right to due process in criminal prosecutions belongs to the accused, not the complainant, and the filing of a motion for reconsideration cures any procedural defect arising from a complainant's non-receipt of pleadings or resolutions in a preliminary investigation.

Petitioner Ariel S. Artillero is the Chief of Police of the PNP Municipal Station in Ajuy, Iloilo. Respondent Edito Aguillon is the Barangay Captain of Barangay Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo. The dispute arises at the intersection of two legal regimes: P.D. 1866 (as amended by R.A. 8294), which penalizes carrying a licensed firearm outside one's residence without legal authority, and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which grants the punong barangay authority to carry firearms within his territorial jurisdiction in the performance of peace and order functions. The case also involves the procedural rights of a complainant in a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly the right to receive copies of the respondent's counter-affidavit and the prosecutor's resolution.

On August 6, 2008, at about 6:45 in the evening, the PNP Municipal Station in Ajuy, Iloilo received information that successive gunshots had been heard in Barangay Lanjagan. Petitioner, together with Police Inspector Idel Hermoso and SPO1 Arial Lanaque, immediately proceeded to the area to investigate. Upon arrival, they encountered Paquito Panisales, Jr., standing beside the road wearing a black sweatshirt with a "Barangay Tanod" print. When asked about the gunshots, Paquito answered in the negative. Before the officers could proceed further, they observed Paquito turn his back and display a firearm tucked in his waist, appearing to be under the influence of alcohol. They frisked him to verify the firearm and its supporting documents, and Paquito presented a Firearm License Card and a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR).

Thereafter, the officers spotted two persons walking toward them, wobbling and visibly drunk. One of them, Barangay Captain Edito Aguillon, was openly carrying a rifle, with its barrel occasionally touching the concrete road. Petitioner and Hermoso disarmed Aguillon and recovered a Caliber 5.56 M16 rifle with Serial Number 101365 and 20 live ammunitions in its magazine. According to petitioner and Hermoso, Aguillon presented a Firearm License Card but was unable to present a PTCFOR. Petitioner arrested Aguillon and his companion Aldan Padilla and brought them to the police station. Paquito was released the same night, having complied with the requirements to possess and carry a firearm. Aguillon was detained but released the next day, August 7, 2008, after posting a cash bond of ₱80,000.

On August 12, 2008, petitioner and Hermoso executed a Joint Affidavit narrating the foregoing facts, and petitioner endorsed the filing of a complaint against Aguillon for illegal possession of firearm through a letter to the Provincial Prosecutor. Aguillon executed a counter-affidavit asserting that petitioner had unlawfully arrested and detained him, claiming he had every right to carry the rifle as evidenced by the license he had surrendered to petitioner and that he was duly authorized by law to carry his firearm within his barangay. Petitioner claimed he never received a copy of Aguillon's Counter-Affidavit.

In a Resolution dated September 10, 2008, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo P. Camacho recommended dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence, finding no sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that Aguillon was probably guilty. The resolution also recommended the return of the rifle to Aguillon. Petitioner claimed he never received a copy of this resolution. Provincial Prosecutor Bernabe D. Dusaban forwarded the resolution to the Office of the Ombudsman for approval. On February 17, 2009, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando C. Casimiro approved the dismissal, ruling that the evidence proved Aguillon did not commit the crime since he had a license for his rifle. Petitioner again claimed non-receipt. On April 13, 2009, petitioner requested copies of the referral letter, resolution, and Aguillon's counter-affidavit from the Provincial Prosecutor. On June 22, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 17, 2009 Resolution, which was denied by the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2009. Petitioner then filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 on December 8, 2009.

• Due Process: Petitioner argued that he was denied his right to due process when he was not given copies of Aguillon's Counter-Affidavit, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor's September 10, 2008 Resolution, and the Office of the Ombudsman's February 17, 2009 Resolution, citing Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which requires the respondent to furnish the complainant with a copy of his counter-affidavit.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint based solely on insufficiency of evidence, contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, including Memorandum Circular No. 2000-016.
• Probable Cause: Petitioner asserted that the assailed resolutions were issued contrary to law, jurisprudence, and with grave abuse of discretion, and prayed that probable cause be found and the filing of the information against Aguillon be directed.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Aguillon submitted that the Deputy Ombudsman found no sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution for violation of P.D. 1866 as amended.
• Frivolous Petition: Aguillon argued that the petition was frivolous and manifestly prosecuted for delay.
• Failure to Specify Grave Abuse: Aguillon contended that petitioner failed to specifically allege the manner in which the alleged grave abuse was committed by the Deputy Ombudsman.
• Substantial Evidence: Aguillon maintained that the Deputy Ombudsman's findings were supported by substantial evidence.
• Due Process Belongs to the Accused: The Deputy Ombudsman argued that petitioner was not deprived of due process, as the constitutional right to due process in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed to the accused, not the complainant.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: Whether petitioner, as complainant in a preliminary investigation, was denied due process by not receiving copies of the respondent's counter-affidavit and the resolutions dismissing the complaint.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Ombudsman: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint against Aguillon for insufficiency of evidence.
• Authority of Punong Barangay to Carry Firearm: Whether Section 389(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 exempts a punong barangay from the PTCFOR requirement under P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294 when carrying a firearm within his territorial jurisdiction.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: No. Petitioner was not deprived of due process; any procedural defect from his non-receipt of the counter-affidavit and resolutions was cured when he filed a motion for reconsideration, which afforded him the opportunity to be heard.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Ombudsman: No. The Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause, as Aguillon had legal authority to carry his firearm under Section 389(b) of the LGC, and the Court adopts a policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's investigatory powers absent a clear showing of arbitrariness.
• Authority of Punong Barangay to Carry Firearm: Yes. Section 389(b) of the LGC of 1991 grants the punong barangay authority to carry necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction in the performance of peace and order functions, constituting "legal authority" under P.D. 1866 and carving out an exception to the PTCFOR requirement.

• Due Process in Preliminary Investigation: The constitutional right to due process under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution is guaranteed to the accused in a criminal prosecution, not to the complainant. A preliminary investigation is not a proper trial but merely preparatory thereto; its purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether probable cause exists to believe the accused guilty. The right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional, and the rights of parties therein depend on statutory grants rather than the phrase "due process of law." While Section 3(c), Rule 112 requires the respondent to furnish the complainant with a copy of his counter-affidavit, there is no provision in Rule 112 granting the complainant a right to file a reply; the prosecutor has discretion to require or allow reply-affidavits, and may even resolve the complaint without a counter-affidavit under Section 3(d). The prosecutor's only obligation under Section 4 was to forward the record to the proper officer within five days. Although petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of the counter-affidavit, whatever procedural defects existed were cured when he filed his motion for reconsideration, which the Office of the Ombudsman considered and acted upon. The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard; where a party has been given the chance to be heard with respect to a motion for reconsideration, there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. Nevertheless, the Court stressed that the Provincial Prosecutor had the duty to send petitioner a copy of the counter-affidavit under Section 3(c), Rule 112, and that the curing effect of the MR was a "fortunate turn of events" for the prosecution.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Ombudsman: The Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's investigatory powers. In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, the Court gives credence to the findings and determination of probable cause by prosecutors. It was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused, which he failed to do. The evidence on record showed that Aguillon had a license for his rifle and had legal authority to carry it under Section 389(b) of the LGC. The Ombudsman's dismissal was therefore supported by the facts and applicable law.

• Authority of Punong Barangay to Carry Firearm: The IRR of P.D. 1866, issued on October 28, 1983, prohibits lawful holders of firearms from carrying them outside their residences unless authorized by the Chief of Constabulary (later the PNP Chief under R.A. 6975). The PNP Chief's Guidelines issued on January 31, 2003 revoked all PTCFORs and enumerated persons authorized to carry firearms outside their residences. A barangay captain is not among those listed. However, Section 389(b) of the LGC of 1991 specifically grants the punong barangay the authority to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction in the performance of peace and order functions, subject to appropriate rules and regulations. This provision, which retained the language of Section 88(3) of B.P. 337 (the LGC of 1983), carved out an exception to P.D. 1866 by adding to the list of persons authorized to carry firearms outside their residences without a permit. The phrase "subject to appropriate rules and regulations" refers to the IRR of the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866, not those it has already amended. The Court deemed that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as peace officers that must be discharged 24 hours a day; as long as Aguillon was within his barangay, he could not be separated from his duty to maintain peace and order. Petitioner did not deny that Aguillon was within his territorial jurisdiction when found carrying the rifle. While the Court did not condone Aguillon's conduct—carrying a high-powered firearm while possibly intoxicated—it found no law penalizing a local chief executive for imbibing liquor while carrying a firearm, nor any law restricting the kind of firearms a punong barangay may carry in the performance of peace and order functions.

• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — A preliminary investigation is not a proper trial or part thereof but is merely preparatory thereto; its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty. The right to such investigation is statutory, not constitutional. Rights of parties therein depend on statutory grants, not on the phrase "due process of law." Applied: The complainant's rights in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by Rule 112 and do not include a constitutional due process right to receive copies of all pleadings or to file a reply.

• Essence of Due Process — The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. Where a party has been given the chance to be heard with respect to a motion for reconsideration, there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. Applied: Petitioner's filing of an MR cured any procedural defect from his non-receipt of the counter-affidavit and resolutions.

• Non-Interference with the Ombudsman — The Court consistently adopts a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's investigatory powers. In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, the Court gives credence to the findings and determination of probable cause by prosecutors. Applied: Petitioner failed to prove that the Ombudsman's dismissal was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Punong Barangay as Peace Officer — Like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as peace officers that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As long as the punong barangay is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty to maintain peace and order. Applied: Aguillon was within his territorial jurisdiction when found carrying the rifle, and thus the LGC exception applied.

• Statutory Exception to P.D. 1866 via the Local Government Code — Section 389(b) of the LGC of 1991 added to the list of persons authorized to carry firearms outside their residences without a PTCFOR, carving out an exception to P.D. 1866. The phrase "subject to appropriate rules and regulations" refers to the IRR of the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866, not those it has already amended. Applied: Aguillon's authority to carry his firearm was rooted in the LGC, not in the IRR or guidelines of P.D. 1866.

• "It is therefore clear that because a preliminary investigation is not a proper trial, the rights of parties therein depend on the rights granted to them by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights they believe they are entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase 'due process of law.'" — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the due process issue, establishing that a complainant's rights in a preliminary investigation are statutory, not constitutional, in nature.

• "The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. 'What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.'" — This defines the core of due process and explains why the filing of a motion for reconsideration cured the procedural defect in the case.

• "As long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangay—to maintain peace and order." — This articulates the ratio decidendi for the holding that the LGC exception applies whenever a punong barangay is within his territorial jurisdiction, regardless of the specific circumstances.

• "Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of P.D. 1866, which enumerated the persons given the authority to carry firearms outside of residence without an issued permit. The phrase 'subject to appropriate rules and regulations' found in the LGC refers to those found in the IRR of the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866 and not those that it has already amended." — This defines the relationship between the LGC and P.D. 1866's IRR, clarifying that the LGC modified the existing framework by adding a new statutory exception.

• People vs. Monton, G.R. No. L-48112, February 29, 1988 — Controlling precedent. The Court acquitted a barrio captain charged with illegal possession of firearm on the basis of Section 88(3) of B.P. 337, which authorized the punong barangay to possess and carry necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction. This precedent was relied upon to support the holding that the LGC grants legal authority to carry firearms.

• Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1051 (1953) — Followed. Explained the nature of preliminary investigation as merely preparatory to trial and the statutory, not constitutional, basis of the right thereto, establishing that rights of parties in a preliminary investigation depend on statutory grants.

• Chavez vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534 — Cited for the proposition that by virtue of R.A. 6975, the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary and the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary, assuming the latter's licensing authority.

• Vergara vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693 — Followed. Supports the Court's policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's investigatory powers.

• De Borja vs. Tan, 93 Phil. 167 (1953) — Cited for the principle that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard, and that the law prohibits the absolute absence of notice and lack of opportunity to be heard.

• Section 3(c), Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires the respondent in a preliminary investigation to furnish the complainant with a copy of his counter-affidavit. The Court acknowledged this right existed but found the defect cured by the filing of an MR.

• Section 3(d), Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Allows the investigating officer to resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or does not submit counter-affidavits. Cited to illustrate the non-mandatory nature of filing a reply in preliminary investigations.

• Section 4, Rule 112, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Obliges the investigating prosecutor to forward the record of the case to the proper officer within five days from resolution. The Court found this was the prosecutor's only obligation, not to furnish the complainant with a copy of the recommendation.

• Section 389(b), Chapter 3, Book III, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Grants the punong barangay the authority to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction in the performance of peace and order functions, subject to appropriate rules and regulations. The Court held this constitutes "legal authority" under P.D. 1866 and carves out an exception to the PTCFOR requirement.

• Last paragraph, Section 1, P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294 — Penalizes carrying a licensed firearm outside one's residence without legal authority with the penalty of arresto mayor. The Court found that Aguillon had "legal authority" through the LGC.

• Article III, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The Court held this right belongs to the accused, not the complainant.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Jose Portugal Perez, and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred with the ponencia.

• Justice Arturo D. Brion — Brion dissented, voting to grant the petition. He argued that probable cause was established by the facts showing Aguillon carried a licensed M16 rifle outside his residence without a PTCFOR, satisfying the standard of reasonable belief that a crime was committed and that Aguillon was probably guilty. He contended that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, as the dismissal was not supported by the established facts and was contrary to applicable laws, rules, and jurisprudence. On the LGC exception, Brion identified four conditions in Section 389(c) (which he noted the ponencia mislabeled as "389(b)"): (1) the right must be exercised in performance of peace and order functions; (2) within the territorial jurisdiction; (3) the firearm must be necessary; and (4) subject to appropriate rules and regulations. He found none of these conditions clearly established—the records showed Aguillon was wobbling and visibly drunk, made no claim of performing official duties, and the records did not show he was within his territorial jurisdiction. Brion rejected as "preposterous" the ponencia's claim that a barangay captain performs peace and order functions 24 hours a day, arguing that a presumption of official duty should not apply when attendant circumstances dictate otherwise. He further argued that the IRR of P.D. 1866 could not have been modified by the LGC, since the IRR was issued after B.P. 337 took effect, and that as an exception, the burden lay with Aguillon to show he fell within it—a showing absent from the records.