Arnobit vs. Arnobit

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct committed in his private capacity, including abandoning his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman by whom he has sired children. The requirement of good moral character is not merely a condition precedent to admission to the bar but a continuing qualification for all members of the legal profession; misconduct unrelated to the actual practice of law may nonetheless render a lawyer unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges of the license.

Complainant Rebecca B. Arnobit and respondent Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit were married on August 20, 1942, and twelve children were born of the union. Rebecca supported respondent through law school until he passed the bar examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. The complaint was brought under the Court's disciplinary power over members of the bar, grounded on the continuing requirement of good moral character for lawyers.

Rebecca B. Arnobit and Atty. Ponciano P. Arnobit were married on August 20, 1942, and twelve children were born of the union. Rebecca alleged that she saw respondent through law school, continuously supporting him until he passed the bar examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. In 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with one Benita Buenafe Navarro, who later bore him four more children. Rebecca's complaint alleged that respondent's infidelity impelled her to file a complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for adultery against Benita and respondent later followed.

In his Answer dated July 31, 1975, respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife and the mother of their twelve children, but denied having cohabited with Benita. He pointed to his complaining wife as the cause of their separation, observing that she was "always traveling all over the country, ostensibly for business purposes, without his knowledge and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family."

At the hearings before the Office of the Solicitor General and subsequently before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Rebecca presented oral and documentary evidence. Aside from her own testimony, she presented Venancia M. Barrientos, her sister, who identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent addressing her as "Vending," therein asking for forgiveness for the unhappiness he caused his family. Melecio Navarro, husband of Benita, testified about how respondent took his wife as a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful marriage. Rebecca also presented the affidavits of NBI agents Eladio C. Velasco and Jose C. Vicente to show the existence of a prima facie case for adultery, and the pictures and baptismal and birth certificates of Mary Ann, Ma. Luisa, Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, to prove that respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with Benita.

According to the investigating commissioner, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence, and scheduled hearings had to be postponed to afford him ample opportunity to present his side. In most cases, respondent would seek postponement, pleading illness, on the very date of the hearing. The Commission's several directives for respondent to send his affidavits and documentary exhibits by mail proved futile.

• Immorality and Abandonment: Complainant alleged that respondent left the conjugal home in 1968 and started cohabiting with Benita Buenafe Navarro, who later bore him four children, constituting grounds for disciplinary action.
• Evidence of Infidelity: Complainant presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including the testimony of Benita's own husband, NBI affidavits showing a prima facie case for adultery, and baptismal and birth certificates of four illegitimate children surnamed Arnobit.

• Denial of Cohabitation: Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife and the mother of their twelve children but denied having cohabited with Benita.
• Blame on Complainant: Respondent pointed to his complaining wife as the cause of their separation, stating that she was "always traveling all over the country, ostensibly for business purposes, without his knowledge and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family."

• Gross Immoral Conduct: Whether respondent's act of abandoning his wife and twelve children to cohabit with and sire children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.
• Abandonment: Whether respondent is liable for abandonment of his family.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether complainant established the charges by clear, convincing, and preponderant evidence despite respondent's denial.

• Gross Immoral Conduct: Yes. Respondent's act of leaving his wife and twelve children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct, and disbarment is warranted under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Abandonment: Yes. The IBP's finding of liability for abandonment was affirmed, but the Court held that respondent was liable for more than just that offense.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. Complainant established the charges by clear, convincing, and preponderant evidence; respondent's mere denial did not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness.

• Gross Immoral Conduct: The Court held that immoral conduct is that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must be grossly immoral — so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. Respondent's act of leaving his wife and twelve children to cohabit and have children with another woman undoubtedly constitutes grossly immoral conduct. The Court noted that there seemed to be little attempt on respondent's part to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman.

• Continuing Requirement of Good Moral Character: The Court emphasized that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession but must also remain intact to maintain one's good standing. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. The grounds in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

• Burden of Proof and Respondent's Failure to Rebut: While the onus rests on the complainant to prove the charges, respondent owes himself and the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing would not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness. Respondent never attended the hearings to rebut the serious charges brought against him, irresistibly suggesting that the charges are true. He opted not to take the witness stand and be cross-examined on his sworn answer, and neither did he present Benita, who could have disproved the adulterous relationship or confirmed his protestation about the paternity of her four children. Significantly, Benita's husband risked personal ridicule by testifying on the illicit liaison between his wife and respondent.

• Applicability of Precedent: The Court cited established jurisprudence that disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court found the penalty of disbarment most appropriate under the premises.

• Continuing requirement of good moral character — Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession but must also remain intact to maintain one's good standing in the profession. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's grossly immoral conduct in his private life rendered him unfit to remain a member of the bar.

• Grossly immoral conduct as ground for disbarment — Immoral conduct is that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To warrant disciplinary action, such conduct must be grossly immoral — so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. The Court applied this doctrine to respondent's abandonment of his wife and twelve children to cohabit with another woman.

• Misconduct in private capacity as ground for discipline — A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. The grounds in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

• Burden on respondent to prove moral fitness — While the onus rests on the complainant to prove the charges, respondent owes himself and the Court the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial of wrongdoing would not suffice in the face of clear evidence demonstrating unfitness.

• "As this Court often reminds members of the bar, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity." — This passage articulates the foundational doctrine that good moral character is a continuing qualification for membership in the bar, not merely a one-time admission requirement.

• "Undoubtedly, respondent's act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman constitutes grossly immoral conduct. And to add insult to injury, there seems to be little attempt on the part of respondent to be discreet about his liaison with the other woman." — This is the Court's direct application of the grossly immoral conduct standard to the facts of the case, forming the ratio decidendi for the disbarment.

• "When one's moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, it behooves the individual concerned to meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to keep his name in the Roll of Attorneys." — This passage establishes the burden on the respondent lawyer to affirmatively demonstrate moral fitness when charges are brought, and explains why respondent's failure to appear at hearings suggested the charges were true.

• Cordon vs. Balicanta, A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 299 — Cited for the proposition that vast interests are committed to a lawyer's care and that he deals with his client's property, reputation, life, and all.
• Narag vs. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451 — Cited for the definition of immoral conduct and grossly immoral conduct, and for the rule that disbarment is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife to maintain an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child.
• Barrientos vs. Daarol, A.C. No. 1512, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 30 — Cited for the proposition that lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
• Orbe vs. Adaza, A.C. No. 5252, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 567 — Cited for the rule that the grounds in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.
• Obusan vs. Obusan, A.C. No. 1392, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 485 — Cited as precedent for disbarment of a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife.
• Toledo vs. Toledo, A.C. No. 266, April 27, 1963, 7 SCRA 757 — Cited as precedent for disbarment of a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife.

• Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Applied to respondent's adulterous relationship and abandonment of his family.
• Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Applied to respondent's conduct in his private life.
• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, and grossly immoral conduct. The Court held that these grounds are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno; Associate Justices Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Dante O. Tinga, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Ruben T. Reyes, Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Arturo D. Brion.