Arnado vs. Commission on Elections and Capitan

A candidate who reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 but whose prior sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship was deemed recanted must execute a fresh personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the Certificate of Candidacy; subsequent compliance does not cure the defect, and a landslide election victory cannot override constitutional and statutory eligibility requirements.

Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America. He reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) by taking an Oath of Allegiance on July 10, 2008, and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship on April 3, 2009. Section 5(2) of RA 9225 requires those seeking elective public office to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, while Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 disqualifies persons with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position.

Rommel C. Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America. In preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008, and an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor on the same date. On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport after executing the Affidavit of Renunciation. While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded, and Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate.

On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division disqualified Arnado, holding that his continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Arnado moved for reconsideration, and Casan Macode Maquiling, another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, intervened. On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc reversed the First Division, holding that Arnado's use of his US passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. Maquiling then sought recourse to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 195649.

While G.R. No. 195649 was pending, the period for filing CoCs for the May 13, 2013 elections began. On October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC for the same position without executing a new Affidavit of Renunciation. Respondent Florante Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post. On April 16, 2013, the Supreme Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling, annulling the Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualifying Arnado from running for elective position, and declaring Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan in the May 10, 2010 elections. The Court held that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, recanted his Oath of Renunciation, and that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applied to his situation.

On May 9, 2013, shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009." The following day, May 10, 2013, Capitan filed a Petition seeking to disqualify Arnado from running for municipal mayor and/or to cancel his CoC based on the Maquiling ruling, docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC). The resolution of said petition was overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections, where Arnado garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 votes (16%). On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed the winning candidate. Capitan filed another Petition seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation, arguing that with the April 16, 2013 Maquiling Decision, Arnado was disqualified from running for any local elective office, and thus his proclamation was void.

The Comelec Second Division granted Capitan's petition, disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. It ruled that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, as his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn or recalled pursuant to Maquiling. The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for the May 13, 2013 elections, and that the May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming the April 3, 2009 Affidavit would not suffice because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc affirmed, annulled Arnado's proclamation, and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor.

Arnado thereafter filed the instant Petition with the Supreme Court, with an ancillary prayer for injunctive relief. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 14, 2014, and later a Status Quo Ante Order on February 25, 2014, directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor pending resolution of the case. Arnado also alleged the discovery of a November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance executed before his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, which he claimed showed he was qualified to run in the May 13, 2013 elections.

• Procedural Due Process and Forum-Shopping: Arnado argued that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his right to procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), claiming that Capitan was guilty of forum-shopping because he subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC No. 13-019, and that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period reckoned from the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.

• Commissioner Yusoph's Participation: Arnado claimed that the Comelec En Banc violated due process and committed grave abuse of discretion by allowing Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph to participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the Second Division.

• Disenfranchisement of Voters: Arnado argued that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him, thereby disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan who voted for him in the May 2013 elections.

• Compliance with RA 9225: Arnado averred that he had fully complied with the requirements of RA 9225 before the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012, and that further examination of the notarial register of his former counsel revealed that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30, 2009, making him a citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country.

• Procedural Infirmities: Arnado asserted that the Comelec violated its own rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate, that the case was not set for trial, and that no hearing for the reception of evidence was conducted, and that the Comelec did not follow its own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of promulgation of resolutions.

• Forum-Shopping and Late Filing: The Solicitor General observed that the parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same — in the first case, the parties are only Capitan and Arnado, while in the second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan is impleaded as respondent — and that there is dissimilitude in the reliefs sought, the former seeking disqualification and/or cancellation of CoC while the latter prayed for annulment of proclamation.

• Timeliness of Petition: The petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013, as under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation," and Arnado was proclaimed on May 14, 2013.

• Belated Evidence: The Solicitor General pointed out that the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance was highly suspect, as the original or certified true copy was not presented, and such crucial evidence was never presented before the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case, only surfacing for the first time in the petition before the Supreme Court.

• Forum-Shopping and Late Filing: Whether the Comelec En Banc and Second Division violated procedural due process and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss Capitan's petitions on the ground of forum-shopping and/or late filing.

• Commissioner Yusoph's Participation: Whether the Comelec En Banc violated due process and committed grave abuse of discretion by allowing Commissioner Elias Yusoph to review the decision he wrote for the Second Division.

• Disenfranchisement of Voters: Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan in the May 2013 elections.

• Compliance with RA 9225: Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner who had fully complied with the requirements of RA 9225 before the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.

• Forum-Shopping and Late Filing: No. Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping, as he did not demonstrate how the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. The petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013, as a petition for disqualification may be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, and Arnado was proclaimed on May 14, 2013.

• Commissioner Yusoph's Participation: No. Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not correct, as the September 6, 2013 Resolution does not state who the ponente is, and the December 9, 2013 Resolution is a per curiam resolution arrived at by the Comelec En Banc as a whole without any particular ponente.

• Disenfranchisement of Voters: No. A landslide election victory cannot override eligibility requirements, as popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate, and the application of constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

• Compliance with RA 9225: No. Arnado had not yet satisfied the twin requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections, as his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport, and subsequent compliance through the May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming the same does not suffice.

• Forum-Shopping and Late Filing: Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, requiring identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, and identity such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata. Arnado failed to substantiate his claim, as he did not submit a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019 and did not demonstrate how forum-shopping was present. The Solicitor General correctly observed that the parties and reliefs sought in the two cases were not the same. With regard to the alleged tardiness, the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the petition, and the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was one for disqualification with an alternative prayer to cancel the CoC. Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, and since Arnado was proclaimed on May 14, 2013, the petition filed on May 10, 2013 was seasonable.

• Commissioner Yusoph's Participation: Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both resolutions is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners Padaca and Guia, signed the September 6, 2013 Resolution, there is nothing therein indicating that he was the writer or ponente. The December 9, 2013 Resolution is a per curiam resolution, arrived at by the Comelec En Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente. Hence, Arnado's claim of denial of due process lacks factual moorings.

• Disenfranchisement of Voters: In Maquiling, the Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. While Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications. Citing Velasco vs. Comelec, election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. If popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39 of the Local Government Code, a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 of the same law. The case of Lopez vs. Comelec is strikingly similar, where the Court affirmed the disqualification of a candidate who won the elections but failed to comply with Section 5(2) of RA 9225, holding that garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate.

• Compliance with RA 9225: Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local position, and in Mercado vs. Manzano, the phrase "dual citizenship" was clarified to refer to "dual allegiance." RA 9225 allows natural-born citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship to reacquire it and run for public office provided they meet the qualifications and make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing their CoC. The Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite because, as held in Maquiling, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation would not suffice for having been belatedly executed. The reason for Arnado's disqualification during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines — still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections. The Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements, and it is with more reason that strict compliance should be required in this case. The circumstances surrounding Arnado's qualification during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections are the same, and since he had not cured the defect in his qualification, Maquiling is binding and applicable following the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As early as 2010, Arnado had gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose a problem to his candidacy, yet he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 without executing another Affidavit of Renunciation. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period to avert possible questions about his qualifications. The alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance cannot be given probative weight, as the original or certified true copy was not presented, it was never presented before the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case, and it only surfaced for the first time in the petition. Citing Jacot vs. Dal, the belated presentation of similar evidence is disallowed on due process considerations, as the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice. Moreover, in Maquiling, it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, and he never bothered to correct or refute this. Even assuming the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit is true and authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010, which effectively negated the alleged Affidavit resulting in his disqualification.

• Stare Decisis et Non Quieta Movere — The doctrine means to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are established. When the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that Maquiling is binding on and applicable to the present case, as the circumstances surrounding Arnado's qualification to run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections are the same.

• Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance — Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by said states, and is involuntary. Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states, and is the result of an individual's volition. Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position, and in Mercado vs. Manzano, the phrase "dual citizenship" was clarified to refer to "dual allegiance."

• Strict Compliance with Eligibility Requirements — Matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. The novelty of an issue does not excuse a candidate from strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office, nor does it allow the candidate to correct the deficiency in qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation after the filing of the CoC.

• Popular Vote Cannot Override Eligibility Requirements — Election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

• Forum-Shopping — There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, requiring: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

• "We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections." — This passage from the Maquiling Decision, quoted in the present case, states the ratio decidendi that the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to recantation of the oath of renunciation, resulting in disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

• "The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office." — This excerpt articulates the policy rationale behind the disqualification of dual citizens from elective public office, emphasizing that subsequent representation as a foreign citizen negates the earlier renunciation.

• "While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity." — This passage from Lopez v. Comelec, quoted in the present case, establishes the doctrine that a landslide election victory cannot override eligibility requirements.

• "As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule." — This passage from Jacot v. Dal, quoted in the present case, supports the Court's refusal to give probative weight to the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, which was never presented before the Comelec and only surfaced for the first time in the petition before the Supreme Court.

• Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case, which disqualified Arnado from the May 2010 elections for using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, holding that such use effectively recanted his Oath of Renunciation. The Court applied this ruling to the present case under the doctrine of stare decisis, as the circumstances surrounding Arnado's qualification were the same.

• Mercado vs. Manzano, 367 Phil. 132 (1999) — Followed. The Court cited this case to clarify that the phrase "dual citizenship" in Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance," and to distinguish dual citizenship (involuntary) from dual allegiance (voluntary).

• Velasco vs. Commission on Elections, 595 Phil. 1172 (2008) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the proposition that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements, and that the Court will not interfere with Comelec resolutions unless grave abuse of discretion is shown.

• Lopez vs. Commission on Elections, 581 Phil. 657 (2008) — Followed. The Court cited this case as strikingly similar, where a natural-born Filipino who reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship was disqualified despite winning the elections, holding that victory cannot cure the defect of candidacy.

• Jacot vs. Dal, 592 Phil. 661 (2008) — Followed. The Court cited this case to disallow the belated presentation of the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, on due process considerations, as evidence not formally offered before the Comelec cannot be admitted.

• Japzon vs. Commission on Elections, 596 Phil. 354 (2009) — Cited. The Court cited this case for the proposition that for a natural-born Filipino who reacquired or retained Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 to run for public office, he must meet the qualifications for holding such public office and make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

• Cayago vs. Hon. Lina, 489 Phil. 735 (2005) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the rule that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin.

• Muñoz vs. Comelec, 527 Phil. 733 (2006) — Followed. The Court cited this case to emphasize that consolidation of cases is permissive, not mandatory, as the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option.

• Diangka vs. Comelec, 380 Phil. 859 (2000) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the rule that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings, especially where the law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character, and that petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings.

• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) — This provision requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The Court applied this provision in holding that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012.

• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9225 — This provision requires natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic to reacquire Philippine citizenship. The Court noted that the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by this provision, but for those who intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships.

• Section 40(d), Local Government Code of 1991 — This provision disqualifies persons with dual citizenship from running for any elective local position. The Court applied this provision in affirming Arnado's disqualification, as his use of his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship effectively recanted his Oath of Renunciation, reverting him to dual citizen status.

• Section 39, Local Government Code of 1991 — This provision specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials, including citizenship, registration as voter, residency, and ability to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. The Court cited this provision in Velasco vs. Comelec to emphasize that popular vote cannot override the required qualifications.

• Section 3, Rule 25, Comelec Rules of Procedure — This provision states that a petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." The Court applied this provision in holding that Capitan's petition filed on May 10, 2013 was seasonable, as Arnado was proclaimed on May 14, 2013.

• Section 4, Rule 25, Comelec Rules of Procedure — This provision provides that petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings. The Court cited this provision in rejecting Arnado's claim that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial.

• Section 9, Rule 3, Comelec Rules of Procedure — This provision states that when an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number. The Court cited this provision to emphasize that consolidation is permissive, not mandatory.

• Section 34, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court — This provision states that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered, and the purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The Court cited this provision in disallowing the belated presentation of the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred. Sereno, C.J., wrote a separate concurring opinion. Leonen, J., wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion.

• Brion, J. (joined by Perez, J., and Mendoza, J.) — Justice Brion dissented, arguing that the Maquiling ruling is limited to Arnado's qualification for the May 2010 elections and did not perpetually disqualify him from running in any other elections. He contended that Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen on April 3, 2009, and that his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit, cured any defect in his qualification for the May 2013 elections. He further argued that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013 Affidavit was filed out of time, as Arnado was placed in an impossible situation of being disqualified in 2013 for a ruling applicable to the 2010 elections without being given the opportunity to submit his compliance. He also emphasized that all doubts should be resolved in favor of Arnado's qualification given the overwhelming mandate of the people of Kauswagan, who twice elected Arnado as their mayor.

• Leonen, J. (joined by Mendoza, J.) — Justice Leonen concurred with the ponencia's finding that Arnado's claim of procedural infirmities was unsubstantiated but dissented from the conclusion that Arnado remained an American citizen. He argued that Arnado's use of his American passport was an isolated act required by the circumstances, as he had not yet been issued his Philippine passport at the time, and that upon receiving his Philippine passport, he consistently used it for his travels. He contended that Arnado had renounced his American citizenship no less than three times and had performed all the acts required by RA 9225, and that the ponencia unduly gave weight to the Bureau of Immigration's certification over Arnado's Philippine passport. He also argued that election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people, and that Arnado's landslide victory of 84% of the votes cast should be respected.