Armed Forces of the Philippines vs. Amogod

A writ of preliminary or permanent injunction requires proof of a clear and unmistakable right to the property sought to be protected; mere actual possession by tolerance, without possession in the concept of an owner or proof of lawful entry, does not constitute such a right sufficient to support injunctive relief against the true owner.

The disputed parcels of land, located in Cagayan de Oro City and designated as Lots 45748, 45749, 45750, 45751, and 45752, lie outside the boundaries of Camp Edilberto Evangelista, a 32-hectare military reservation under Presidential Proclamation No. 265. The Armed Forces of the Philippines traces its claim to a sale allegedly executed in 1936 by Apolinar Velez, evidenced by quitclaim deeds executed by the Velezes and Pinedas in 1951 acknowledging the prior sale and donating the lands to the AFP. Since the 1970s, respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied these parcels, constructing residential houses and commercial stores. In 2007, the AFP issued notices to vacate and subsequently closed some stores, prompting respondents to file separate petitions for injunction to prevent eviction and demolition.

• Nature of the Dispute: The controversy involves parcels of land located in Cagayan de Oro City, specifically Lots 2 (Lot 45748, 69,974 sq.m.), Lot 3 (Lot 45749, 12,859 sq.m.), Lot 4 (Lot 45750, 1,417 sq.m.), Lot 5 (Lot 45751, 4,739 sq.m.), and Lot 6 (Lot 45752, 2,462 sq.m.). These lots are situated outside the 32-hectare Camp Edilberto Evangelista military reservation under Presidential Proclamation No. 265.
• AFP's Claim of Ownership: The AFP asserted ownership based on a sale allegedly executed by Apolinar Velez in 1936. This claim was supported by: (1) a Quitclaim Deed dated December 26, 1951 executed by the Heirs of Apolinar Velez acknowledging the 1936 sale; (2) a Quitclaim Deed dated December 22, 1951 executed by Hernando Pineda; (3) a Deed of Donation dated September 20, 1960 executed by the Heirs of Apolinar Velez (which the AFP argued was invalid as to the donation but valid as acknowledgment of the 1936 sale); (4) Tax Declaration No. 198089; (5) Land History Card of Lot 4319 showing Apolinar Velez as cadastral claimant; and (6) Consolidation/Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-10-001013 approved by the Land Management Services, DENR. A Supplemental Relocation Survey Report confirmed the disputed lots were outside the military reservation but inside the area covered by the quitclaim deeds and donation.
• Respondents' Occupation: Respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been actual occupants of the subject parcels for over thirty years, utilizing them for residential purposes and commercial stores. They claimed to have filed a petition with the President in 1995 for segregation and release of the lands on the ground that they were outside the AFP property.
• Events of 2007: In 2007, the AFP issued notices to vacate demanding that respondents leave the premises within two months. When respondents refused, the AFP closed some of their stores and allegedly harassed them, prompting the filing of the petitions for injunction.
• DENR Administrative Proceedings: Respondents filed a petition for exclusion and segregation with the DENR. On September 21, 2010, the Regional Executive Director (RED) of DENR-Region X issued an Order granting the petition, finding the lands alienable and disposable and concluding that respondents as actual occupants had the right to apply for segregation. On August 8, 2013, the DENR Secretary reversed the RED's Order, ruling that the AFP had a better right to the disputed lots based on the documentary evidence presented, and noting that respondents failed to establish the legality of their entry or possession in the concept of an owner.

• Superior Title and Right to Possess: The AFP maintained that it holds superior title to the disputed parcels based on the 1936 sale evidenced by the 1951 quitclaim deeds and the 1960 deed of donation, which were acknowledged by the DENR Secretary in his August 8, 2013 Decision. It argued that with the DENR Secretary's ruling reversing the RED's Order, respondents' occupation lost any legal basis.
• Nuisance Per Se: The AFP contended that respondents, being squatters in a military reservation (or lands appurtenant thereto), constitute nuisances per se subject to summary abatement without judicial order.
• Summary Eviction Under RA 7279: It argued that under Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), it could summarily evict respondents and demolish their homes as underprivileged and homeless citizens occupying areas without legal claim.
• Violation of PD 1227: The AFP asserted that respondents violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1227 by re-entering Camp Evangelista after having been removed therefrom.

• Clear and Unmistakable Right: Respondents argued that they possess a clear and unmistakable right as actual occupants of alienable and disposable lands for over thirty years, supported by the DENR RED's September 21, 2010 Order granting their petition for exclusion and segregation.
• Invalidity of AFP's Title: They contended that the deeds of donation executed by the Velezes in 1960 were invalid for lack of acceptance by the AFP, and that the quitclaim deeds were insufficient to transfer title.
• Prescriptive Rights: Respondents maintained that their possession for more than thirty years ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription, or at the very least, gave them a right to remain undisturbed.
• Timeliness of DENR Appeal: They claimed that the AFP's appeal to the DENR Secretary was filed out of time, rendering the August 8, 2013 Decision void.

• Requisites for Injunction: Whether respondents established the requisite clear and unmistakable right to the subject property and the existence of material and substantial invasion of that right necessary for the issuance of a writ of injunction.
• Superior Title: Whether the AFP demonstrated a better right to the disputed parcels of land compared to respondents' claim based on actual possession.
• Summary Abatement and Eviction: Whether the AFP could summarily abate respondents' structures as nuisance per se or summarily evict them under Section 28 of RA 7279 without prior judicial order.
• Applicability of PD 1227: Whether Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1227 (prohibiting re-entry to military bases) applies to the disputed lands located outside the military reservation.

• Requisites for Injunction: The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary or permanent injunction were not satisfied. While an action for injunction may be the principal remedy, Section 3 of Rule 58 requires that the applicant be entitled to the relief demanded, that the invasion of the right be material and substantial, and that the right be clear and unmistakable. Respondents' right was neither clear nor unmistakable.
• Superior Title: The AFP established superior title to the disputed lands. The DENR Secretary's August 8, 2013 Decision, which reviewed the documentary evidence including the 1951 quitclaim deeds acknowledging the 1936 sale, tax declarations, and the approved consolidation plan, concluded that the AFP had a better right than respondents. Administrative decisions on matters within the agency's jurisdiction are entitled to respect and may only be set aside for grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law, none of which were present. Independently, the documentary evidence showed that the lands were sold to the AFP in 1936, rendering the Velezes unable to donate the same in 1960. Tax declarations, while not conclusive, constituted credible proof of claim of title.
• Acquisitive Prescription: Respondents' possession, even if spanning over thirty years, did not ripen into ownership because it was merely by tolerance and not in the concept of an owner. Possession by mere tolerance does not start the running of the prescriptive period. Lawful owners may demand return of property at any time where possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.
• Summary Abatement: The AFP could not summarily abate respondents' structures. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as an act or condition injuring health, safety, or obstructing public passage. Nuisance per se constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety and may be summarily abated; nuisance per accidens requires judicial determination. Residential houses and stores do not constitute nuisance per se as they are not direct menaces to public health or safety.
• RA 7279 Section 28: Summary eviction and demolition under Section 28 of RA 7279 are permitted only in three instances: (1) occupation of danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, riverbanks, etc.; (2) implementation of government infrastructure projects with available funding; or (3) pursuant to a court order for eviction. None of these circumstances obtained. The disputed lands were not danger areas, no concrete infrastructure plan with available funding was shown, and no court order for eviction existed.
• PD 1227: Section 1 of PD 1227 penalizing re-entry to military bases without authority does not apply because the Supplemental Relocation Survey Report confirmed that the disputed lands are outside the Military Reservation under Presidential Proclamation No. 265.

• Requisites for Writ of Injunction — Before a writ of preliminary or permanent injunction may issue, the following must concur: (a) the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. The onus probandi rests on the movant to demonstrate the existence of a right to be protected that is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined.
• Acquisitive Prescription and Tolerance — Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted. Possession by mere tolerance of the owner, or possession with a juridical title (such as lessee, agent, or trustee), does not start the running of the prescriptive period. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or tolerance are inadequate to establish adverse possession. Lawful owners retain the right to demand return of property at any time where possession was merely tolerated.
• Nuisance Per Se vs. Nuisance Per Accidens — Nuisance per se is recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and may be abated summarily under the law of necessity. Nuisance per accidens depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, cannot be abated without due hearing in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such thing constitutes a nuisance.
• Summary Eviction Under RA 7279 — Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 permits summary eviction and demolition only in three specific situations: (1) when persons occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (2) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; and (3) when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. Absent any of these grounds, summary demolition is unlawful.
• Respect for Administrative Decisions — Decisions of administrative bodies on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. Courts are inclined to be guided by the conclusions of administrative agencies unless it is shown that the agency acted in a wanton, whimsical, or oppressive manner.

• "The law giving preferential rights to actual occupants is not designed to encourage, condone and reward illegal settlers. Moreover, it must be stressed that the law on preferential rights of actual occupants was not designed to defeat or nullify the legal title or the vested right of the lawful possessor of the land involved, because it would [be] tantamount to a taking without just compensation." — The DENR Secretary's ruling, adopted by the Court, emphasizing that preferential rights under agrarian or land reform laws do not override vested legal title.
• "Possession by mere tolerance does not start the running of the prescriptive period." — Statement of the principle that possession must be adverse and in the concept of an owner to ripen into title.
• "Nuisance per se is one recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances, because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and, for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of necessity. The second, nuisance per accidens, is that which depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law constitutes a nuisance." — Distinction between the two types of nuisance.
• "While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible proof of a claim of title over the property." — Evidentiary value of tax declarations.

• Sangguniang Panglunsod ng Baguio City v. Jadewell Parking Systems, Corporation, 734 Phil. 53 (2014) — Cited for the principle that an action for injunction is a recognized remedy with independent existence, distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction.
• European Resources and Technologies, Inc. v. Ingenieuburo Birkhahn + Nolte, 479 Phil. 114 (2004) — Cited for the requisites before an injunctive writ can be issued: existence of a right in esse and violation of such right by the act sought to be enjoined.
• Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, 728 Phil. 608 (2014) — Cited for the synthesis of requisites for preliminary injunction: material and substantial invasion of right, clear and unmistakable right, and urgent necessity.
• Heirs of Jarque v. Jarque, G.R. No. 196733, November 21, 2018 — Cited for the doctrine that possession to constitute the foundation of prescriptive right must be in concept of an owner (en concepto de dueño), and that acts of possessory character executed due to license or tolerance are inadequate.
• Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453 (2017) — Cited for the distinction between nuisance per se and nuisance per accidens.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
• Rule 58, Sections 3 and 5, Rules of Court — Section 3 enumerates the grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction (entitlement to relief, injustice during litigation, violation of rights); Section 5 provides the procedure for issuance of temporary restraining orders and the requirement of notice and hearing.
• Article 694, Civil Code of the Philippines — Defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which injures or endangers health or safety, annoys or offends the senses, shocks morality, obstructs public passage, or hinders use of property.
• Section 28, Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — Enumerates the three situations where summary eviction and demolition of underprivileged and homeless citizens may be allowed: occupation of danger areas, government infrastructure projects with funding, and pursuant to court order.
• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1227 — Penalizes re-entry into military bases without permission of the base commander.
• Presidential Proclamation No. 265 — Declares the 32-hectare Camp Edilberto Evangelista as a military reservation.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Caguioa, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ.